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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Over the last several years (and especially since China’s admission to the 
World Trade Organisation in 2001) merger and acquisition (M&A) activities in 
China have increased significantly as a result of the rapid growth in the 
Chinese economy and the measures which the Chinese government has 
taken to modernise the laws and regulations which govern its securities 
markets.  Despite this, only a few researchers have studied M&A activities in 
China in any depth.  Moreover, such research as has been conducted on 
Chinese M&A activities is mainly concerned with the laws and regulations 
affecting the area and not with their economic consequences.  Hence, the 
particular concern of this dissertation is with the economic benefits that accrue 
to the shareholders of Chinese acquiring and target firms from the M&A 
activities that have occurred in the People’s Republic of China over the last 
twenty years.  In particular, our study encompasses a theoretical, institutional 
and empirical analysis of Chinese M&A activities.   
 
M&A activities in China are governed by a number of laws and regulations of 
which the Takeover Measures, 2006, is undoubtedly the most important.  Our 
analysis in the early part of the dissertation summarises the legal framework 
under which M&A activities are conducted in China.  In particular, the 
Takeover Measures, 2006 aim to make Chinese laws in the M&A area more 
compatible with best international practice.  Furthermore, a new Anti-
Monopoly Law, which addresses the anti-trust issues associated with mergers 
and acquisitions came into force on 1 August 2008.  Amongst other things, 
this new Anti-Monopoly Law addresses issues of anti-trust and declaration 
thresholds in M&A activities in China.  Besides these issues, the early 
chapters of the dissertation summarise the Chinese laws dealing with cross-
border mergers and acquisitions, the laws relating to the issue of new shares, 
the laws relating to share swap transactions and the important provisions 
affecting the regulation of special purpose companies (SPCs).   
 
The dissertation then turns to an empirical analysis of the economic benefits 
ii 
 
which accrue to the shareholders of Chinese target and Chinese acquiring 
firms as a result of their M&A activities.  Our analysis is based on the standard 
market model methodology using both the Dimson (1979) and Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS) estimates of equity betas.  We also employ an hitherto unused 
nonparametric testing procedure based on the Corrado (1989) rank test in 
order to enhance the robustness of our empirical analysis.  Suffice it to say 
that the empirical analysis summarised in the dissertation shows that there 
are significant abnormal returns around the takeover announcement date for 
the holders of equity securities in Chinese target firms.  This is a result which 
mirrors much of the empirical research conducted on M&A activities in 
western economies.  Interestingly, however, a significant proportion of these 
abnormal returns decay away within a few weeks following the takeover 
announcement date.  In contrast, there are few, if any, economic benefits for 
the holders of equity securities in Chinese acquiring firms from their M&A 
activities.  In this respect our results for Chinese acquiring firms are very 
similar to those obtained by researchers for western acquiring firms, although 
there are some important differences.  In particular, there appear to be 
statistically significant and positive abnormal returns for shareholders of 
Chinese acquiring firms around the takeover announcement date but these 
generally decay away over the next ten to fifteen trading days thereby leaving 
the shareholders of Chinese acquiring firms with no significant benefits from 
their M&A activities.  We provide some possible explanations for this 
phenomenon by linking our empirical results with the Chinese political, 
economic and capital systems.   
 
A fundamental decision the directors of acquiring firms must make is whether 
the mode of consideration for takeovers ought to be in cash or some 
alternative medium of exchange.  Prior research in western countries shows 
that the mode of consideration used in takeovers can have a significant impact 
on the abnormal returns which accrue to the shareholders of both acquiring 
and target firms.  Our empirical analysis of this issue shows that when the 
mode of consideration is purely in cash the abnormal returns which accrue to 
the shareholders of Chinese target firms around the takeover announcement 
date are positive and significantly different from zero.  In contrast, there are no 
iii 
 
economic benefits (and indeed, probably economic losses) for the 
shareholders of Chinese target firms when the consideration for takeovers is 
other than purely in cash.  For Chinese acquiring firms there are significant 
positive abnormal returns when the consideration for takeovers is other than 
purely in cash.  However, when cash is used as the sole mode of 
consideration by Chinese acquiring firms there are very few, if any, economic 
benefits for their shareholders.    
 
The concluding sections of the dissertation note that our calculation of the 
abnormal returns that accrue to firms involved in Chinese M&A activities is 
based exclusively on the standard market model - which is empirical 
counterpart of the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM).  In recent years, 
however, Fama and French (1992, 1993, 1995, 1996) amongst other authors 
have suggested that the CAPM has serious deficiencies and that these 
deficiencies flow through to the standard market model on which the empirical 
analysis of Chinese M&A activities summarised in this dissertation is based.  
We show, however, that the Fama and French Asset Pricing Model (1992, 
1993, 1995, 1996) has numerous deficiencies of its own and that to base the 
calculation of abnormal returns upon this model has the potential to lead to a 
seriously flawed analysis of the abnormal returns which accrue to the 
shareholders of Chinese firms involved in M&A activities and on which our 
empirical analysis is based.   
 
Key Words: M&A activities, Modified Corrado test, Corrado test, Patell test, 
average abnormal returns (AARs), cumulative average abnormal returns 
(CAARs), mode of consideration,  A shareholders, B shareholders, H 
shareholders, Chinese target firms,  Chinese acquiring firms. 
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1 
CHAPTER ONE  
 INTRODUCTION 
 
 
In recent years the Chinese economy has experienced a prolonged period of 
rapid expansion with a growth rate in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) which 
far exceeds that of most western economies (Prasad, 2004).  The vibrancy of 
the Chinese economy has attracted significant investment from both domestic 
firms and virtually every advanced industrialised country in the world (Fei, 
2004).  This investment takes a variety of forms, including merger and 
acquisition (M&A) activities where firms grow by acquiring (or merging with) 
other firms in order to reap the benefits which arise from a strongly expanding 
economy.  The Chinese government has recognised the benefits which flow 
from M&A activities by modernising the laws and regulations which govern the 
country’s M&A activities, by restructuring listed firms in the country's key 
industries under the shareholding structure reform (Guquan Fenzhi Gaige) 
and opening new financing channels to allow qualified firms to fund their M&A 
activities more easily.   Over the last few years (and especially since China’s 
admission to the World Trade Organisation in 2001) M&A activities in China 
have increased significantly as a result of these measures implemented by the 
Chinese government (Fei, 2004).  Nevertheless, only a few researchers have 
studied M&A activities in China in any depth.  Moreover, such research as has 
been conducted on Chinese M&A activities is mainly concerned with the laws 
and regulations affecting the area and not with its economic consequences.  
Hence, few empirical studies are available on the economic effects of Chinese 
M&A activities (Fei, 2004).  Furthermore, conclusions based on research 
results from advanced industrialised countries like the UK and US do not 
necessarily apply to China since the laws and regulations in these countries 
are significantly different from those which prevail in China.  Given this, there 
is a gap in the research literature which this dissertation seeks to fill. 
 
The particular concern of this dissertation is with the economic benefits                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              
that accrue to the shareholders of Chinese acquiring and target firms from the 
M&A activities that have occurred in the People’s Republic of China over the 
Introduction 
 
 
2 
last twenty years.  In particular, our study encompasses a theoretical, 
institutional and empirical analysis of Chinese M&A activities.  We begin our 
analysis in chapter two by summarising the prior Chinese and western 
literature dealing with M&A activities and then draw out its implications for the 
important issues which will be addressed in later chapters of this dissertation.  
Thus, the principal brief of chapter two is to summarise the literature that 
deals with such things as the motivation for takeovers and the wealth effects 
that mergers and acquisitions can have for the shareholders of Chinese 
acquiring and target firms, the reasons why a particular mode of consideration 
(cash, shares or a combination of cash and shares) is used in a given merger 
and/or acquisition and the effects which hostile as against friendly takeovers 
can have on the long run profitability of acquiring and target firms, etc.  Most 
of the literature in these areas encompasses data and issues that arise in 
western economies.  However, there is a growing literature in China dealing 
with the unique issues that arise in a Chinese M&A context and this is also 
summarised in this chapter.  Here, however, we have to emphasise that the 
Chinese literature is mainly theoretical in nature.  Moreover, the 
methodologies employed in the few empirical papers which have been 
published on Chinese M&A activities are normally very different to the market 
model approaches for detecting abnormal returns that are applied in the 
western literature.  Given this, chapter two outlines the implications which the 
western literature has for the empirical work on Chinese M&A activities that is 
summarised in this dissertation.  This enables us to identify any gaps in the 
Chinese literature and any significant methodological issues which need to be 
addressed in the empirical work conducted for this dissertation. 
 
The focus of our analysis in chapter three is on the laws and regulations that 
govern M&A activities in the mainland of China.  We begin chapter three by 
noting that China’s recent admission to the World Trade Organisation (WTO) 
and its generally vibrant economy, has meant that M&A activities in China 
have increased considerably over the last several years (Fei, 2004).  The 
Chinese government has responded to the increased volume of M&A activities 
by establishing a legal framework which, on the one hand, is in line with best 
international practice but also, meets the unique political and socio-economic 
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considerations that have shaped the People’s Republic of China since its 
formation in 1949.  Hence, on 31 July 2006 China’s principal securities market 
regulator, the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC), promulgated 
the Takeover Measures, 2006.  The Takeover Measures, 2006 is a revised 
version of the original Takeover Measures, 2002 and is designed to fill gaps 
and loopholes which experience has shown existed in the laws and 
regulations covering Chinese M&A activities up to that point in time.  The 
Takeover Measures, 2006 also aim to make Chinese laws in the M&A area 
more compatible with best international practice.  Furthermore, in order to 
address the anti-trust issues associated with mergers and acquisitions, the 
Standing Committee of the Tenth National People’s Congress of China 
promulgated a new Anti-Monopoly Law which came to force on 1 August 
2008.  Amongst other things, this new Anti-Monopoly Law addresses issues of 
anti-trust and declaration thresholds in M&A activities in China.  Besides these 
issues, chapter three also summarises the Chinese laws dealing with cross-
border mergers and acquisitions, the laws relating to the issue of new shares, 
the laws relating to share swap transactions and the important provisions 
affecting the regulation of special purpose companies (SPCs).  In chapter 
three we also note that shares listed on stock exchanges in China fall into 
three broad categories; namely, A shares which are usually denominated in 
the Chinese Yuan and until recently, could only be purchased by Chinese 
nationals; B shares which are denominated in either the U.S dollar or the 
Hong Kong dollar and normally can only be purchased by foreign investors; 
and H shares which are listed exclusively on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange. 
 
In chapter four of the dissertation, we assess the significance of the abnormal 
returns earned by Chinese target firms involved in M&A activities over the 
period from 1 January, 1990 until 31 December, 2008.  Our analysis is based 
on the standard market model methodology using both the Dimson (1979) and 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimates of equity betas.  We employ 
nonparametric testing procedures in order to enhance the robustness of our 
analysis.  Here Corrado (1989) has introduced a nonparametric rank test for 
assessing abnormal security-price performance which, it is claimed, is 
preferable to the conventional parametric “t” tests employed in the area 
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(Patell, 1976).  The Corrado (1989) test is valid when applied to skewed 
and/or lepto(meso)kurtic distribution functions and avoids many of the 
limitations implicit in alternative nonparametric tests of abnormal security-price 
performance (e.g. the symmetry assumptions on which the Wilcoxon signed 
rank test is founded).  Yet for all its virtues the Corrado (1989) test is 
computationally cumbersome and lacks power in comparison to the Patell 
(1976) “t” test which, as we have already noted, is the traditionally used 
parametric test in the area.  Moreover, little is known about the small sample 
properties of the Corrado (1989) test.  We address these issues by modifying 
the Corrado (1989) test so as to increase its power relative to the benchmark 
Patell (1976) “t” test.  In particular, we employ a consistent estimator for the 
variance of the ranks of abnormal security returns and then use it to obtain an 
exact closed form expression for the Corrado (1989) test statistic.  This 
simplifies the computational procedures behind the Corrado (1989) test 
considerably – to the point where they can be implemented using only a hand 
held calculator.  We also demonstrate how a second order Edgeworth 
expansion can be employed to determine the small sample properties of the 
Corrado (1989) test statistic.1  Suffice it to say that the empirical analysis 
summarised in this chapter shows that there are significant abnormal returns 
around the takeover announcement date for the holders of A shares in 
Chinese target firms.  Interestingly, however, a significant proportion of these 
abnormal returns decay away within a few weeks following the takeover 
announcement.   
 
Our review of the literature in chapter two shows that most research which 
deals with Chinese M&A activities is restricted to a consideration of A shares.  
In other words, M&A activities that involve B shares and H shares have 
generally been ignored by Chinese researchers.  In chapter five we seek to 
address this gap in the literature by conducting an empirical analysis of the 
wealth effects that M&A activities have on the holders of B and H shares in 
Chinese target firms.  That is, in chapter five we assess whether there are any 
                                                        
1
 Many of the analytical results summarised in chapter four are based on an article entitled “A 
Modified Corrado Test for Assessing Abnormal Security Returns” jointly written by Ali Ataullah, 
Xiaojing Song and Mark Tippett that is forthcoming in the European Journal of Finance.  
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differences in the economic benefits which accrue to the holders of A shares in 
Chinese target firms in comparison to the economic benefits which accrue to 
the holders of B and H shares.  Our general conclusion is that whilst there are 
positive abnormal returns around the takeover announcement date for the 
holders of B shares in Chinese target firms, they tend to be marginal at best 
when compared to the economic benefits that accrue to the holders of A 
shares.  Moreover, the abnormal returns around the takeover announcement 
date for the holders of H shares tend to be larger than those for B shares 
though still less than those that accrue to the holders of A shares.  However, 
an important caveat here is that our sample of H shares is very small and 
possibly not representative of the wider Chinese securities market.   
 
Chapter six deals with the wealth effects which Chinese M&A activities have 
on the holders of A shares, B shares and H shares in Chinese acquiring firms.  
Our empirical results show that the shareholders of Chinese acquiring firms 
obtain virtually no economic benefits from their M&A activities and this applies 
irrespective of whether one considers the A shares, B shares or H shares of 
Chinese acquiring firms.  In this respect our results for Chinese acquiring firms 
are very similar to those obtained by researchers for western acquiring firms, 
although there are some important differences between the empirical results 
for Chinese as against western acquiring firms.  In particular, there appear to 
be statistically significant and positive abnormal returns for shareholders of 
Chinese acquiring firms around the first public announcement of the takeover 
but these generally decay away over the next ten to fifteen trading days 
thereby leaving the shareholders of Chinese acquiring firms with no significant 
benefits from their M&A activities.  We provide some possible explanations for 
this phenomenon by linking our empirical results with the Chinese political, 
economic and capital systems which, as we have previously noted, are 
fundamentally different from those of western economies.   
 
We begin our analysis in chapter seven by noting that once an acquiring firm 
has decided to make a takeover offer for a target firm it must then make a 
decision about the way in which it will finance the proposed takeover.  The 
fundamental decision the directors of the acquiring firm must make is whether 
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the consideration for the takeover ought to be in cash, the shares of the 
acquiring firm, convertible bonds in the acquiring firm, warrants issued by the 
acquiring firm, the transfer of some of the acquiring firm’s assets to the 
shareholders of the target firm, the repayment of some of the target firm’s debt 
by the acquiring firm, or some combination thereof).  The importance of this 
issue stems from the fact that prior research in western countries shows that 
the mode of consideration used in takeovers can have a significant impact on 
the abnormal returns which accrue to the shareholders of both the acquiring 
and target firms.  Until recently the tradition has always been for takeovers in 
China to be financed exclusively in cash.  However, the Shareholding 
Structure Reform (Guquan Fenzhi Gaige) which came into force in 2005 has 
created incentives for Chinese acquiring firms to offer modes of consideration 
that are other than in cash.  There are as a consequence a fairly large 
minority of Chinese acquiring firms which now conduct their M&A activities 
using modes of consideration that are other than purely in cash.  This has 
enabled us to conduct an empirical analysis of the economic benefits that 
accrue to the shareholders of Chinese target firms when the consideration is 
in cash as against when the consideration is other than purely in cash.  Our 
empirical analysis of this issue shows that when the mode of consideration is 
purely in cash the abnormal returns which accrue to the shareholders of 
Chinese target firms around the takeover announcement date are positive and 
significantly different from zero.  In contrast, there are no economic benefits 
(and indeed, probably economic losses) for the shareholders of Chinese 
target firms when the consideration for takeovers is other than purely in cash.  
 
In chapter eight the focus of our attention will be on the impact that different 
modes of consideration for takeovers can have on the economic benefits that 
accrue to the shareholders of Chinese acquiring firms.  We ask in particular 
whether the economic benefits that accrue to the shareholders of Chinese 
acquiring firms are consistent with the economic benefits that accrue to the 
shareholders of Chinese target firms when cash as against alternative modes 
of consideration are used to finance takeovers.  Our analysis of this issue 
shows that the abnormal returns that accrue to the shareholders of Chinese 
acquiring firms when alternative modes of consideration are used are positive 
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and significantly different from zero in a statistical sense.  In contrast, the 
economic benefits for shareholders of Chinese acquiring firms where cash is 
used as the sole mode of consideration tend to be insignificantly different from 
zero and occasionally, negative.  In other words, the economic benefits which 
accrue to the shareholders of Chinese acquiring firms when alternative modes 
of consideration are employed far exceed the economic benefits for 
shareholders of Chinese acquiring firms when cash is used as the sole mode 
of consideration.  These results could arise because of the peculiar nature of 
the Chinese capital gains tax and/or the information asymmetries that arise in 
Chinese takeover procedures and which are compounded by the relatively 
unsophisticated nature of the Chinese capital market.  
 
We begin our analysis in chapter nine by noting that in this dissertation the 
calculation of the abnormal returns that accrue to firms involved in Chinese 
M&A activities is based exclusively on the empirical counterpart of the Capital 
Asset Pricing Model (CAPM); namely, the one factor market model.  However, 
in recent years several authors have suggested that the CAPM has serious 
deficiencies and that these deficiencies flow through to the market model as 
well (Ashton and Tippett, 1998; Roll, 1977; Roll, 1978).  In response to this 
Fama and French (1992, 1993, 1995, 1996) have formulated an asset pricing 
model which allegedly addresses the deficiencies of the market model and 
therefore, which should be used in preference to the market model for 
isolating the abnormal returns which accrue in event studies of the kind 
employed in this dissertation.  It is our view, however, that the Fama and 
French Asset Pricing Model (1992, 1993, 1995, 1996) has numerous 
deficiencies of its own and that to base the calculation of abnormal returns 
upon this model has the potential to lead to a seriously flawed analysis of the 
abnormal returns which accrue to the shareholders of Chinese firms involved 
in M&A activities.  Hence, in chapter nine we outline the reasons for not 
employing the Fama and French Asset Pricing Model (1992, 1993, 1995, 
1996) to isolate the abnormal returns associated with Chinese firms involved 
M&A activities.  Our analysis shows that even when the CAPM is descriptively 
true it will still be possible for an empirical researcher to determine a Fama 
and French Asset Pricing Model (1992, 1993, 1995, 1996) which is based on 
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an inefficient index portfolio that leads to a set of betas which when taken in 
conjunction with such other factors as the researcher stipulates are to be 
important in the asset pricing process (e.g. firm size, market to book ratios, 
etc.) will be perfectly correlated with the ex post average returns earned by 
the firms on which the empirical analysis is based.  However, the abnormal 
returns obtained from the empirically determined Fama and French Asset 
Pricing Model (1992, 1993, 1995, 1996) will be different (and invariably 
substantially so) from those obtained under the (descriptively true) CAPM.  
Indeed, our analysis shows that the empirical researcher will always be able 
to choose a set of factors in conjunction with an inefficient index portfolio 
which leads to a Fama and French Asset Pricing Model (1992, 1993, 1995, 
1996) that is compatible with any hypothesis of the researcher’s choosing.  
This in turn will mean that the Fama and French Asset Pricing model (1992, 
1993, 1995, 1996) is never empirically falsifiable.  Since all scientific theories 
have to be potentially falsifiable this will mean that the Fama and French 
Asset Pricing Model (1992, 1993, 1995, 1996) can never form the basis of a 
scientific theory of the asset pricing process (Popper, 1963, p. 36).  Given this, 
we have elected to base our analysis on the CAPM and its empirical 
counterpart – namely, the market model – since this procedure suffers from 
fewer theoretical deficiencies when compared to using the Fama and French 
Asset Pricing Model (1992, 1993, 1995, 1996) to isolate the abnormal returns 
associated with Chinese firms involved in M&A activities. 2 
 
The final chapter in the dissertation – namely, Chapter ten – summarises the 
analysis of previous chapters and draws conclusions with regard to the issues 
which arise in our empirical analysis of Chinese M&A activities.  These issues 
mainly include the wealth effects that M&A activities have on the holders of 
shares in Chinese acquiring and target firms – although in this chapter there is 
also significant discussion of the Chinese legal, institutional and cultural 
framework and of the impact that these are likely to have on Chinese M&A 
activities, especially in comparison to the M&A activities that occur in western 
                                                        
2
 Many of the analytical results summarised in chapter nine are based on an article entitled 
“Constructing Asset Pricing Models with Specific Factor Loadings” that is jointly written by Ian 
Davidson, Qian Guo, Xiaojing Song and Mark Tippett and which is forthcoming in the journal 
Abacus.  
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economies.  Overall, our empirical analysis shows that whilst the holders of A 
shares in Chinese target firms earn statistically significant abnormal returns 
around the announcement date of the proposed takeover, these abnormal 
returns decay away over the days and weeks which follow the takeover 
announcement date.  Moreover, the abnormal returns which accrue to the 
holders of A shares in Chinese target firms are larger when cash is used as 
the sole mode of consideration in comparison to the abnormal returns which 
arise when alternative modes of consideration are used to finance Chinese 
takeovers.  In contrast, the abnormal returns that accrue to the holders of A 
shares in Chinese acquiring firms are quite modest and arise only in a very 
narrow window surrounding the takeover announcement date.  However, 
these abnormal returns are barely significant in a statistical sense and quickly 
decay away within a few days of the proposed takeover announcement date.  
Even here our empirical analysis shows, however, that the abnormal returns 
that accrue to the shareholders of Chinese acquiring firms are marginally 
larger when the mode of consideration is other than purely in cash.  That is, 
the abnormal returns that accrue to the shareholders of acquiring firms are 
lower when the mode of consideration employed to finance the takeover is 
purely in cash.  Our empirical analysis also shows that the abnormal returns 
that accrue to the holders of B and H shares in Chinese acquiring and target 
firms are much more modest when compared to those which accrue to the 
holders of A shares.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
SURVEY OF THE LITERATURE ON M&A ACTIVITIES: 
WESTERN AND CHINESE ECONOMIES 
 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
The objective of this chapter is to summarise the prior literature dealing with 
mergers and acquisitions (M&A) and to draw out its implications for the 
important issues that will be addressed in this dissertation.  We will therefore 
be concerned with the literature that deals with such things as the motivation 
for takeovers and the wealth effects it can have on the shareholders of 
acquiring and target firms, the reasons why a particular mode of consideration 
(cash, shares or a combination of cash and shares) is used in a given takeover 
and the effects which hostile as against friendly takeovers can have on the 
future profitability of acquiring and target firms, etc.  Most of the literature in 
these areas encompasses data and issues that arise in western economies.  
However, there is a growing literature dealing with the unique issues that arise 
in a Chinese M&A context and this literature is also summarised in this chapter.  
Here we would note, however, that the Chinese literature is mainly theoretical 
in nature.  The literature dealing with empirical issues in Chinese M&A 
activities is to say the least, sparse.  Moreover, the methodologies employed 
in the few empirical papers which have been published on Chinese M&A 
activities are normally very different to those applied in the western literature.  
Given this, an important emphasis in this chapter will be on the implications 
which the western literature has for the theoretical and especially, empirical 
issues that arise in the analysis we conduct of Chinese M&A activities in this 
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dissertation.  In particular, this will enable us to identify any gaps in the 
Chinese literature and any significant methodological issues which might be 
addressed by the empirical work conducted as part of this dissertation. 
   
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows.  Section 2.2 provides a 
summary of the prior literature (in both western economies and China) which 
deals with the wealth effects of mergers and acquisitions on the shareholders 
of acquiring firms.  Next, in Section 2.3 we move our attention on to the key 
literature dealing with the impact that mergers and acquisitions have on target 
firm performance in both western economies and China.  Section 2.4 
primarily focuses on the important literature dealing with the effect that the 
motivation for takeovers has on acquiring and target firms not only in western 
economies but also in China.  Section 2.5 goes on to consider the impact that 
different modes of consideration (e.g. cash, stock or a combination of cash and 
stock) can have on the profitability of both acquiring and target firms in western 
and Chinese economies.  The literature that deals with the impact that friendly 
and hostile takeovers can have on shareholder wealth is considered in Section 
2.6.  Finally, Section 2.7 provides a brief summary of this chapter, as well as 
some concluding remarks regarding what needs to be done so as to fill the 
gaps which exist in the Chinese M&A literature.  
 
2.2 The Impact of M&A Activities on Acquiring Firm Performance 
 
A considerable volume of research has been conducted in both western and 
developing countries on the wealth effects of M&A activities for the 
shareholders of acquiring firms.  In western countries in particular the 
empirical evidence on the wealth effects of mergers and acquisitions for the 
shareholders of acquiring firms is mixed and often contradictory.  For example, 
Mandelker (1974) employs a sample of 241 U.S. firms involved in M&A 
activities covering the period from 1948 until 1967 and concludes that 
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acquiring firms earn only a normal rate of return from their M&A activities, with 
any abnormal gains accruing primarily to the shareholders of the target firms.  
Similarly, Dodd and Ruback (1977) employ a sample of 172 U.S. acquiring 
firms involved in M&A activities covering the period from 1958 until 1976.  
They use an event window which begins 60 months before the first public 
announcement of the M&A proposals and concludes 60 months after the 
announcement date; that is, (-60,60).  They find that stockholders of 
successful bidding firms earn positive abnormal returns in a narrow window 
surrounding the takeover announcement date.  Likewise, the recent studies of 
Renneboog and Goergen (2003) using European data and Moeller, 
Schlingemann and Stulz (2003) and Fuller and Netter and Stegemoller (2002) 
using U.S data all find that shareholders of acquiring firms earn positive returns 
from M&A activities.  In contrast, Dodd (1980), who uses U.S. data, finds 
evidence of small but significant negative abnormal returns at the date of the 
first public announcement of the merger proposals.  Moreover, the cumulative 
average abnormal return (CAAR) from ten days before the public 
announcement of the proposed takeover through to ten days after the directors 
of the target firm approve of the intended takeover is a statistically significant 
-7.22 percent.  In similar vein, Langtieg (1978) finds evidence of negative 
abnormal returns for U.S. acquiring firms over the six months before and the 
twelve months after the merger date.  Similarly, Agrawal, Jaffe and Mandelker 
(1992) use an exhaustive sample of New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) 
acquirers and NYSE/ American Stock Exchange (AMEX) targets over the 
period from 1955 to 1987 and find that stockholders of acquiring firms suffer a 
statistically significant (negative) cumulative abnormal return of about -10% 
over the five year period following the consummation of the merger.  Agrawal, 
Jaffe and Mandelker’s (1992) findings are robust with respect to a variety of 
specifications.  In particular, their results do not seem to be caused by time 
series changes in beta in either the run up to, or after the consummation of the 
Survey of Literature 
13 
 
M&A activities.  Also, the most recent studies conducted by Mulherin and 
Boone (2000), Mitchell and Stafford (2000), Walker (2000), Houston et al. 
(2001) and Ghosh (2002) find similar results to those obtained by Agrawal, 
Jaffe and Mandelker (1992); that is, M&A activities result in statistically 
significant negative abnormal returns to the shareholders of acquiring firms.  
In contrast to these results, Asquith (1983) finds that the stocks involved in 
M&A activities that are listed on the NYSE show little or no reaction on the date 
of the first public announcement of the merger and/or acquisition proposals 
and this applies for both successful and unsuccessful bidding firms.  Likewise, 
Bruner (2003) concludes that in the aggregate, abnormal returns to 
shareholders of U.S. acquiring firms from M&A activities are essentially zero.  
A much more detailed summary of the wealth effects that M&A activities have 
for the shareholders of acquiring firms in western countries is to be found in the 
article by Martynova and Renneboog (2008). 
 
In China, as in western countries, a great deal of research has been conducted 
about the wealth effects of M&A activities on the shareholders of acquiring 
firms.  However, government restrictions have meant that M&A activities for 
publicly listed Chinese firms only commenced in the 1990’s and so, there is 
little published research on Chinese M&A activities prior to this time.  One of 
the earliest studies is that of Chen and Zhang (1999) who employed data for 
Chinese firms involved in M&A transactions on the Shanghai Stock Exchange 
covering the 1997 fiscal year.  Using the classical event study methodology 
Chen and Zhang (1999) determined the cumulative average abnormal return 
(CAAR) for their sample of Chinese firms involved in M&A activities over an 
event window which commenced ten days before the first public 
announcement of the merger and/or acquisition proposals and concluded 
twenty days after the public announcement date; that is, an event window of 
(-10, 20) trading days.  Chen and Zhang (1999) found that although the 
CAAR of Chinese firms involved in M&A activities tends to drift upwards over 
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this event window it is not significantly different from zero in a statistical sense 
at any point over the event window.  They conclude from this that the wealth 
effects for shareholders of Chinese firms involved in M&A activities are 
essentially zero.  
 
Wong (1999) based his sample on all publicly listed firms involved in M&A 
activities in Hong Kong from 1990 to 1998, irrespective of whether the mergers 
and/or acquisitions were successful or not.  Note that Wong’s (1999) analysis 
covers only H shares (refer to section 3.2.3 of chapter 3 for further details) and 
does not encompass the A and B shares traded on the mainland Chinese 
Stock Exchanges.  Wong (1999) uses an event window which starts 45 days 
before the first public announcement of the merger and/or acquisition 
proposals and concludes 45 days after the public announcement date; that is, 
an event window of (-45, 45) days.  A summary of the classical t statistics 
associated with the CAAR’s over this event window are shown below: 
 
Cumulative Period t statistic associated with CAAR 
(-1, 1) -5.83 
(-3, 3) -2.83 
(-6, 6) -4.35 
(-12, 12) -6.86 
(-24, 24) -10.70 
(-45,45) -23.32 
 
Wong (1999) reports the interesting result that whilst the CAAR randomly 
fluctuates around zero over the event window (-45,0) (that is, before the public 
announcement of the merger and/or acquisition proposals), it becomes 
negative and gradually drifts downwards over the event window (0,45) (that is, 
after the public announcement of the merger and/or acquisition proposals).  
This has the important implication that takeovers in Hong Kong have no 
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economic benefits for the shareholders of firms involved in M&A activities.  
Indeed, the evidence is that the shareholders of firms involved in M&A 
activities in Hong Kong suffer significant economic losses.  Wong (1999) 
concludes that a possible reason for this is that the management of acquiring 
firms in Hong Kong do not seek to act in the best interests of their shareholders 
(the so called agency problems which arise in takeover activities).   
 
Yu and Yang (2000) used a sample comprised of all mergers and/or 
acquisitions which occurred on the two mainland Chinese stock exchanges – 
namely, the Shanghai Stock Exchange and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange – 
over the period from 1993 until 1995.  They found that the CAARs of acquiring 
firms randomly fluctuate around zero over their event window.  In other words, 
there did not appear to be statistically significant economic benefits for the 
shareholders of acquiring firms listed on the two mainland Chinese stock 
exchanges over the period of Yu and Yang’s (2000) study (that is, from 1993 
until 1995).  Similarly Yang and Liu (2000) investigated the M&A activities on 
the Shanghai Stock Exchange using shares swap transactions in 1998.  They 
showed that for the randomly selected sample of 28 listed firms used in their 
empirical analysis, the CAARs were both significantly positive and increased 
dramatically over the 40 days prior to the first public announcement of the 
merger and/or acquisition proposals but then plummeted just as dramatically 
immediately after the announcement date of the proposals  They concluded 
that the behaviour of the CAARs for these 28 firms was compatible with the 
possible existence of insider trading activities.  
 
Li and Chen (2002) investigated the M&A activities of firms listed on the 
Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges over the period from 1999 to 2000.  
Their final sample consisted of 349 mergers and/or acquisitions.  They used 
standard market model procedures based on an event window which starts ten 
days before the first public announcement of the merger and/or acquisition 
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proposals and concludes 30 days after the public announcement date [that is, 
(-10,30) days].  In contrast to most studies in this area, they find that there are 
significant economic benefits for the shareholders of Chinese acquiring firms; 
in particular, the CAAR was a statistically significant 3% by the end of the 30 
day post announcement event window used in their study.  Moreover, Li and 
Chen (2002) find that the CAARs of acquiring firms are influenced by the 
shareholding structure of the affected firms.  In particular, acquiring firms 
whose equity is principally comprised of legal shares and/or state owned 
shares (see section 3.2.3 of this dissertation) tend to earn much larger 
abnormal returns for their shareholders than firms whose equity is mainly 
comprised of A shares.  Interestingly, Li and Chen (2002) find that the CAARs 
of target firms whose equity is principally comprised of legal shares tend to be 
significantly negative; that is, firms whose equity is principally comprised of 
legal shares tend to earn significant negative abnormal returns from their M&A 
activities. Against this, the CAARs of target firms whose equity is principally 
comprised of state owned shares and A shares are positive throughout the 
post announcement event window used in their study. 
 
Zhang and Gu (2002) also investigated M&A activities of Chinese firms which 
are listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges but for the period 
from 1996 to 2000.  Their sample consisted of 248 M&A transactions and they 
used an event window which started 60 days before the first public 
announcement of the merger and/or acquisition proposals and concluded 60 
days after the public announcement date [that is (-60,60) days].  Zhang and 
Gu (2002) find that the market reacts positively to M&A activities; in particular, 
when the mode of consideration is comprised mainly of the assets of the 
acquiring firm.  This is in contrast to Li and Chen’s (2002) results which, as we 
have noted above, did not show any significant abnormal returns for the 
shareholders of acquiring firms. 
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Zhang (2003) studied the M&A activities of Chinese firms listed on the 
Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges between 1993 and 2002 and 
computed the abnormal returns using a standard market model methodology.  
He found that over the event window (-60, 30) days the CAARs on the shares 
of acquiring firms amounted to a statistically significant -16.76%.  Zhang 
(2003) concluded from this that the M&A activities of the acquiring firms 
comprising his sample have a negative wealth effect for their shareholders.  
Fei (2004) too focuses on the M&A transactions of acquiring firms listed on 
Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges which make takeover offers for 
unlisted target firms.  Fei (2004) identifies 14 instances over the period 1997 
to 2003 in which listed acquiring firms make takeover offers for unlisted target 
firms.  He uses a standard market model methodology to determine the 
abnormal returns accruing to acquiring firms as a result of such transactions.  
He finds that the CAARs of the acquiring firms start to increase three trading 
days before the first public announcement of the takeover offer and reaches a 
(statistically significant) peak of 4.77% five days after the public announcement.  
However, the CAAR then drifts downward until 20 days after the 
announcement date at which point the CAAR is negative but insignificantly 
different from zero in a statistical sense.  Further details of the behaviour of 
the CAARs for Fei’s (2004) sample are summarised in the following table:  
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CAARs for Chinese Acquiring Firms (1997-2003) 
Window CAAR t-value 
(-20, 20) 1.18% 0.25 
(-10, 10) 5.47% 1.11 
(-5, 5) 4.23% 1.17 
(-2, 2) 3.89%*** 2.89 
(-1, 1) 1.91%* 1.73 
(-20, 0) 2.50% 1.21 
(-10, 0) 0.25% 0.11 
(-5, 0) 1.96% 1.20 
(-2, 0) 2.70%** 2.12 
(-1, 0) 1.48% 1.59 
(0, 1) 0.85% 1.30 
(0, 2) 1.61%* 1.95 
(0, 5) 2.69% 1.11 
(0, 10) 2.33% 0.76 
(0, 20) -0.90% -0.28 
(0, 90) 0.52% 0.07 
 
* Significant at 10%; ** Significant at 5%; *** Significant at 1% 
 
Fei (2004) interpreted these results as showing that at first the stock market 
reacts positively to the takeover proposals, but then on reflection takes a more 
negative view of the potential profitability arising from the takeover.  Hence, 
whilst there might be positive abnormal returns before the takeover 
announcement date, in the longer term these abnormal returns decay away 
and there are no clear benefits for the shareholders of the Chinese acquiring 
firms.  The empirical results summarised in later chapters of this dissertation 
are very much consistent with the results sumamrised in Fei’s (2004) study – 
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although there are some areas of significant difference. 
 
Li and Zhu (2005) used standard market model methodology to analyse the 
M&A activities of 1,672 firms listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock 
exchanges between 1998 and 2003.  Their event window covered ten days 
before the first public announcement of the M&A proposals until thirty days 
after the announcement date [that is, (-10, 30) days].  They concluded that 
shareholders of acquiring firms suffered significant losses for up to three years 
following the M&A activities.  They also confirm Li and Chen’s (2002) results 
that the proportion of an acquiring firm’s equity comprised of state owned 
shares has a significant association with the abnormal returns acquiring firms 
earn for their shareholders from M&A activities.  Finally, Li and Zhu (2005) find 
that there is no association between the proportion of an acquiring firm’s equity 
capital owned by the top management of the firm and the abnormal returns the 
acquiring firm earns for their shareholders from M&A activities over the long 
term.  
 
Du and Nie (2007) employed a sample of 2,128 M&A transactions covering the 
period from 1998 until 2003 for firms listed on the two mainland Chinese stock 
exchanges; namely, the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges.  They 
again used a standard market model methodology based on a (-180,-31) 
trading day estimation period and a (-30, 30) trading day event window.  They 
also use the Patell (1976) “t” test to assess the significance of the abnormal 
returns they obtained from the market model.  Their most important 
conclusion was that the shareholders of Chinese acquiring firms do not benefit 
from M&A activities.  This is evidenced by the CAARs of the acquiring and 
target firms for their sample which are shown in the following graph taken 
directly from their paper: 
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The CAARs of the target firms are denoted by the lighter (pink) square figures; 
the CAARs of the acquiring firms are denoted by the darker (blue) triangular 
figures.  Du and Nie (2007) conclude from this graph that whilst the 
shareholders of target firms gain considerable benefits from M&A activities, the 
shareholders of acquiring firms gain only marginal abnormal returns, at best.  
 
Song, Zhang and Chu (2008) selected a sample of 23 M&A share swap 
transactions which occurred on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges 
over the period from 1998 to 2007 in order to assess the abnormal returns 
which accrued to the shareholders of acquiring firms.  Their study was based 
on two event windows; namely, a shorter event window of (-30, 30) trading 
days and a longer event window (-120, -31) trading days.  They find that 
acquiring firms earned positive abnormal returns over the shorter event 
window, although none of the classical “t” statistics associated with the CAARs 
are significantly different from zero.  Song, Zhang and Chu (2008) used a 
pure Buy and Hold Abnormal Return (BHAR) strategy to assess the profitability 
of M&A activities over the longer event window.  This showed that 
shareholders of acquiring firms experienced significant negative abnormal 
returns over the longer term as a result of the M&A activities.   
 
Wu (2008) examined 1,363 M&A transactions involving 1,086 firms listed on 
the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges over the period from 2004 to 
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2005. A standard market methodology was again used with an event window 
that commenced 49 days before the first public announcement of the merger 
and/or acquisition proposals and concluded 40 days after the public 
announcement [that is (-49,40) days]. The CAARs obtained from the 
event-study approach utilised in the study showed that in sum, acquiring and 
target firms earned negative abnormal returns during 2004.  Wu (2008) 
reports CAARs separately for the acquiring and target firms in 2005.  These 
show that acquiring firms earned positive abnormal returns of 1.68% over the 
(-49, 40) event window whilst target firms earned positive abnormal returns of 
2.03% over the same period.   
 
Zhu (2009) analysed the market reaction to 1,415 M&A transactions for 
companies listed on the mainland Chinese stock exchanges over the period 
from 1998 to 2002.  His study was based on standard market model 
methodology and an event window of (-60, 60) days.  For acquiring firms Zhu 
(2009) finds that the CAAR during the event windows (-60, -1) and (-10, -1) 
reaches respectively 4.6% and 1.3%, both of which are statistically significant 
at the 1% level.  However, the CAAR for acquiring firms over the event 
window (0,60) (that is, following the announcement date) is only (a marginally 
significant) 0.7%.  An abridged summary of Zhu’s (2009) empirical results 
appears in the following table: 
 
CAAR for Acquiring Firms before and after the Announcement Date 
 
Event Window 
 N (-60, -1) (-10, -1) (0, 10) (0, 60) 
CAR 1397 0.046*** 0.013*** 0.002 0.007* 
“t” statistics (11.08) (7.97) (0.90) (1.92) 
     
* Significant at 10%; ** Significant at 5%; *** Significant at 1% 
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Zhu’s (2009) results are consistent with most of the prior empirical research in 
the area and suggest that whilst shareholders of acquiring firms do make 
abnormal returns from M&A activities, most of these abnormal returns are 
earned before the public announcement of the merger and/or acquisition 
proposals.  Thus, for most investors, purchasing shares of acquiring firms 
after the announcement of the merger and/or acquisition proposals will not 
lead to abnormal profits.  In this regard Zhu’s (2009) results confirm the 
conclusion reached by Yang (2000); namely, that the behaviour of the CAARs 
for the firms in his sample are compatible with the possible existence of insider 
trading activities.  
 
Wu and Zhang (2009) selected 238 Chinese acquiring firms listed on the 
Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges covering the period from 1999 until 
2004.  Wu and Zhang’s (2009) principal brief was to measure the short-term 
and long-term wealth effects of M&A activities for the shareholders of acquiring 
firms.  To do this Wu and Zhang (2009) measured abnormal returns using the 
CAAR and Buy and Hold Abnormal Returns (BHAR) techniques, respectively. 
Their results showed that acquiring firms suffered significant abnormal losses 
in both the short and long term periods and this applied irrespective of whether 
the abnormal returns were measured in terms of the CAAR or the BHAR 
technique.  One can illustrate this from the CAARs for acquiring firms as 
given in the following table: 
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CAAR of Acquiring Firms in the Short-term 
 
Time 
(Day) 
CAAR “t” 
value 
Sample 
Size 
Time 
(Day) 
CAAR “t” 
value 
Sample 
Size 
(-20, 20) -2.49% -2.53** 238 (-5, 5) -0.63% -1.65* 238 
(-20, 0) -0.55% -0.84 238 (-3, 3) -0.62% -0.87 238 
(0, 20) -2.11% -3.07*** 238 (-1, 1) -0.23% -0.93 238 
(-10, 10) 1.39% -2.17** 238 (0, 0) -0.17% -0.95 238 
 
* Significant at 10%; ** Significant at 5%; *** Significant at 1% 
 
Further confirmation of this can be seen from the following diagram which 
summarises the AAR and the CAARs of all acquiring firms over the short term 
period: 
 
 
 
From the Chinese literature regarding M&A activities summarised above, it is 
important to note that generally, there are few benefits from M&A activities for 
the shareholders of acquiring firms.  Such benefits as do arise are normally 
earned prior to the public announcement of the M&A proposals.  However, 
because China’s securities and capital markets are uniquely different from 
those in other industrialised and developing countries, the reasons behind the 
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losses and or absence of abnormal profits that accrue to shareholders of 
acquiring firms from M&A activities are somewhat different to those which 
apply in western economies.  These reasons will be analysed in depth in the 
section 6.6 (of chapter six) in this dissertation.  For the moment, however, we 
turn our attention to the impact that M&A activities have on the shareholders of 
target firms in the Chinese economy. 
 
2.3  The Impact of M &A Activities on Target Firm Performance 
 
In western countries, a considerable volume of research has been devoted to 
the issue of how M&A activities affect the wealth of shareholders of target firms.  
Most of these studies find that M&A activities deliver significant positive 
abnormal returns to the shareholders of target firms and this is so irrespective 
of the time period in which the study is conducted, the nature of the M&A 
transactions (shares as against cash) and the exact specification of the event 
window.  Specifically, by the end of their event windows, target firms typically 
have positive and statistically significant cumulative abnormal returns of the 
order of 20% to 30% (Jensen and Ruback, 1983).   
 
Eckbo and Langohr (1989) employed a sample of 306 French M&A 
transactions over the period from 1966 until 1982.  They use a variant of the 
standard market model methodology which allows for time varying expected 
returns and an event window which begins eight days before the first public 
announcement of the takeover offer and eight days after the end of the offer 
expiration week.  They find a median cumulative abnormal return for target 
firms which totals 16.1% on the takeover announcement date and the day 
following the announcement date, after which any additional abnormal returns 
fluctuate around zero.  Schwert (1996) employs a sample of 1,814 successful 
and unsuccessful U.S. takeovers from 1975-91 based on an event window 
which commences 126 days before the first public announcement of the 
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takeover proposals and ends 252 days after the announcement.  Using a 
standard market model methodology, Schwert (1996) calculates a statistically 
significant CAAR in excess of 20% for all (successful and unsuccessful) 
takeover deals over his chosen event window.  However, this splits into 37% 
for successful deals and -5% for unsuccessful deals.  An important aspect of 
Schwert’s (1996) study is that positive abnormal returns for target firms begin 
to emerge about 42 days prior to the first public announcement of the takeover 
announcement date.  This contrasts with the results reported by Echbo and 
Langohr (1989) who find that positive abnormal returns for French target firms 
occur only on the takeover announcement date and the day following the 
announcement of the bid. 
 
Langetieg (1978) employs a sample of 149 U.S. mergers selected from the 
CRSP (Center for Research in Security Prices) covering the period from 1929 
until 1969.   He employs four market-industry models in combination with a 
matched non-merging control group and finds that target firms have significant 
negative CAARs over the event window (-72, -19) months.  However, the 
CAAR for target firms over the event window (-6,-1) is a significantly positive 
10.7%.  Thus, Langetieg (1978) argues that the negative return over the 
event window (-72, -19) is an indication of inefficient management in the target 
firms and therefore, inefficiency may have been a motivating factor for the 
mergers examined in his study. 
 
Dodd and Ruback (1977) employ a sample of 172 U.S. target firms involved in 
M&A activities covering the period from 1958 until 1976.  Using an event 
window of (-60,60) months and a standard market model methodology they 
report that shareholders of target firms, in the month of the takeover 
announcement, earn large and significant abnormal returns of 20.58% for 
successful offers and 18.96% for unsuccessful offers.  In other words, 
shareholders of both successful and unsuccessful target firms earn large 
Survey of Literature 
26 
 
positive abnormal returns from takeover (tender) offers, most of which occur in 
the month of the offer. 
 
Dodd (1980) uses a sample of 151 merger proposals for NYSE firms covering 
the period between 1970 and 1977.  His sample includes 71 completed and 
80 cancelled (that is, unsuccessful) merger proposals.  Importantly, Dodd 
(1980) sets the announcement date (day 0) as the announcement of the 
merger proposal as first published in the Wall Street Journal, rather than the 
effective date of merger which is used by Mandelker (1974), Ellert (1976) and 
Langtieg (1978).  Dodd (1980) concludes that shareholders of target firms 
earn large positive abnormal returns from the time of the announcement of the 
merger proposals, irrespective of the outcome of the merger proposal.  
Specifically, in both completed and cancelled (that is, unsuccessful) merger 
proposals, the shareholders of target firms earn approximately 13% abnormal 
returns on the day the merger offer is initially announced.  However, target 
firms involved in successful merger proposals earn CAARs (up to the point of 
approval by stockholders) of 34%.  Conversely, target firms involved in 
cancelled (that is, unsuccessful) merger proposals earn CAARs (up to the 
point of termination of the merger proposals) of marginally less than 4%.  
 
Franks, Harris and Titman (1991) study 399 U.S. takeovers completed over the 
period from 1975 to 1984 in order to investigate share-price performance 
following corporate takeovers. They report that for the entire sample, the 
shareholders of target firms experience substantial abnormal gains of 28% on 
average around the bid announcement date. 
 
Jensen and Ruback (1983) review 13 studies which document the abnormal 
returns associated with merger and tender offers up to the year 1983 and find 
that target firms of successful M&A proposals earn substantial and statistically 
significant abnormal returns around the date on which the M&A proposals are 
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publicly announced.  In particular, the cumulative abnormal returns for target 
firms of successful tender offers in the two months surrounding the offer are 
uniformly positive and range from a minimum of 16.9% up to a maximum of 
34.1%.  It is important to note that the most recent studies conducted by 
Mulherin and Boone (2000), Renneboog and Goergen (2003), Beiten et al. 
(2002) etc. find similar results to those obtained by Dodd and Ruback (1977), 
Franks, Harris and Titman (1991) and Jensen and Ruback (1983). A much 
more detailed summary of the wealth effects that M&A activities have for the 
shareholders of target firms in both western and developing countries is to be 
found in the article by Martynova and Renneboog (2008). 
 
Since the 1990s a substantial volume of research has been conducted on the 
wealth effects which M&A activities have on the shareholders of target firms in 
China.  It is important to note that almost all Chinese academics in this field 
are of the view that shareholders of target firms experience substantial 
economic benefits from M&A activities.  For example, Zhang (2003) studied 
all 1,216 takeover transactions of firms listed on the two (Shanghai and 
Shenzhen) mainland Chinese stock exchanges over the period between 1993 
until 2002.  Using both the event-window approach based on the standard 
market model methodology and accounting-based performance measures, 
Zhang (2003) found that M&A activities do have significant wealth effects for 
the shareholders of target firms.  In particular, the CAAR accruing to target 
firm shareholders over the event window of (-60, 30) days amounts to 29.05%.  
This is considerably above the CAAR levels documented for M&A activities in 
western countries by Jensen and Ruback (1983, p. 8).  In other words, the 
shareholders of target firms in China gain significant economic benefits from 
M&A activities. 
 
Fei (2004) chose a sample of 207 Chinese M&A transactions that occurred on 
the two mainland stock exchanges between 1997 and 2003 and which 
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involved unlisted acquiring firms making takeover offers for listed target firms.  
Fei’s (2004) particular focus is with M&A activities where there is a change in 
the largest shareholder of target firms.  Fei (2004) employs an (-20, 90) days 
event-window based on a standard market model methodology as well as 
accounting-based performance measures to determine the target firms’ 
CAARs. He finds that the listed target firms have a positive and highly 
significant CAAR around the announcement date of 5.28%.  However, the 
CAAR is already statistically significant some 10 to 15 days before the first 
public announcement of the takeover proposals and this suggests the possible 
existence of significant information slippage as well as potential insider trading.  
It is important to note that over the 90 days after the announcement date, the 
CAAR for target firms gradually becomes negative, indicating that the 
economic benefits of the takeover for target shareholders gradually decays 
away.  Further details of the CAARs obtained by Fei (2004) for target firms 
over various event windows are summarised in the following table:  
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CARs for Chinese Targets (1997-2003) 
Window Mean CAR “t”-value 
(-20, 20) 4.66%*** 4.20 
(-10, 10) 2.64%*** 3.45 
(-5, 5) 2.26%*** 3.74 
(-2, 2) 0.13% 0.73 
(-1, 1) 1.04%*** 2.75 
(-20, 0) 4.67%*** 6.22 
(-10, 0) 3.42%*** 5.92 
(-5, 0) 2.68%*** 6.31 
(-2, 0) 0.26% 1.19 
(-1, 0) 0.86%*** 2.97 
(0, 1) 0.44% 1.34 
(0, 2) 0.57% 1.48 
(0, 5) -0.15% -0.32 
(0, 10) -0.52% -0.90 
(0, 20) -0.05% -0.07 
(0, 90) 0.03% 0.02 
 
* Significant at 10%; ** Significant at 5%; *** Significant at 1% 
 
Liu (2005) chose a sample of 103 M&A transactions which occurred on the two 
mainland Chinese stock exchanges in 2008 to evaluate whether M&A 
transactions have significant wealth effects for the shareholders of Chinese 
acquiring and target firms.  Liu (2005) employed an Economic Value Added 
(EVA Spread) methodology, which equals the return on investment (ROI) less 
the weighted average cost of capital (WACC), to examine the wealth effects 
from M&A activities for the acquiring and target firms in his sample.  Liu (2005) 
eschewed both the event-study and accounting-based performance 
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approaches because of the methodological inadequacies he identified with 
these two techniques.  Using this EVA Spread criterion Liu (2005) finds that 
there are significant wealth effects for the shareholders of both acquiring and 
target firms at the time when the M&A proposals are first announced.  
However, the significant wealth effects for both the acquiring and target firms 
identified by the EVA Spread criterion decay away soon after the 
announcement date.  Nevertheless it is worthwhile noting that the EVA 
Spread of target firms is apparently higher than that obtained for acquiring 
firms, and this suggests that the beneficial effects arising from M&A activities 
for Chinese target firms are far more than those that accrue to Chinese 
acquiring firms.  
 
Du and Nie (2007) use a sample of 2,128 M&A transactions covering the 
period between 1998 and 2003 for firms listed on the two mainland Chinese 
stock exchanges.  Using a standard market model methodology, they find 
over the event window (-30, -7) trading days that the CAARs of target firms 
tend to be slightly negative, although not significantly different from zero in a 
statistical sense.  However, Du and Nie (2007) also find that the CAARs of 
target firms are positive and drift upwards from the sixth day prior to the 
announcement date and then level off at about 1% on the announcement date 
itself.  These results suggest that the takeovers in Du and Nie’s (2007) 
sample occur as a result of inefficiencies in the target firms’ operations.  
Overall, Du and Nie (2007) find that there are significant economic benefits for 
the shareholders of target firms as a result of the M&A activities.  This is 
further emphasised by the CAARs of acquiring and target firms as summarised 
in the following graph: 
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图3  收购公司和目标公司CAR的时序分布图
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Note: The CAARs of the target firms are denoted by the square figures; the 
CAARs of the acquiring firms are denoted by the triangular figures. 
 
Qu, Liu and Chen (2008) selected a random sample of 81 M&A transactions 
that occurred on the Shanghai stock exchange or the Shenzhen stock 
exchange over the period from 2003 to 2004 in order to assess the impact that 
M&A activities have on the performance of both acquiring and target firms.  
Using a purely accounting-based performance methodology, they conclude 
that the performance of target firms drifts upward prior to the first public 
announcement of the M&A proposals, but then dips away in the year that 
follows the announcement.  However, one year out from the announcement of 
the M&A proposals the performance of target firms begins to drift upwards 
again.  This suggests that generally the performance of target firms has 
significantly improved as a result of the M&A activities.  
 
The dominant conclusion to be obtained from the literature summarised in the 
latter half of this section of the dissertation is that shareholders of Chinese 
target firms experience significant economic benefits from M&A activities.  
Occasionally, as in the case of Li and Chen’s (2002) study, empirical 
researchers find that there are few, if any, benefits for the shareholders of 
Chinese target firms.  However, the overwhelming weight of the empirical 
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evidence is that whether measured by the CAARs of the standard market 
model methodology, accounting-based measures (such as the abnormal 
earnings methodology of Liu (2005)) or the EVA Spread (again of Liu (2005)), 
significant benefits accrue to the shareholders of Chinese target firms that are 
involved in M&A activities.  
 
2.4 The Impact of Motivation on the Performance of Acquiring and 
Target Firms 
 
An increasingly asked question in the western finance literature relates to why 
– that is, the motivation – firms have for undertaking M&A activities.  Here 
Berkovitch and Narayanan (1993) summarised three main motivations for M&A 
activities; namely, the synergy motive, the agency motive and hubris.  The 
synergy motive suggests that takeovers occur because of economic gains that 
result by merging the resources of the two firms.  The agency motive 
suggests that takeovers occur because they enhance the acquirer 
management’s welfare at the expense of acquirer shareholders.  The hubris 
hypothesis suggests that managers make mistakes in evaluating target firms, 
and engage in acquisitions even when there is no synergy or other benefits.  
In this section, our initial focus will be on the literature dealing with the 
motivation for mergers and acquisitions in western economies.  We then 
move our focus onto considering whether the same motivations apply to 
Chinese M&A activities.  
 
Berkovitch and Narayanan (1994) present a method for distinguishing among 
different motives for mergers and acquisitions by examining the correlation 
between the wealth gains earned by target shareholders and the total wealth 
gains (that is, the abnormal gains made by the target and acquiring firm 
shareholders combined).  Berkovitch and Narayanan (1994) argue that this 
correlation should be positive if synergy is the motive, negative if agency 
considerations motivate the takeover and zero if hubris is the motive.  Their 
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empirical analysis is based on 330 successful U.S. tender offers that occurred 
over the period from 1963 to 1988.  Abnormal gains are determined using a 
standard market model methodology.  They conclude that synergy is the 
dominant motive for the takeover bids they examine but they also find some 
evidence of agency and hubris for certain sub-samples of their data. 
 
Hodgkinson and Partington (2008) investigate the motives for takeovers in the 
UK by also examining the correlations between the abnormal gains earned by 
target shareholders and the abnormal gains earned by the shareholders of 
acquiring firms in the first instance and then the correlations between the 
abnormal gains earned by target shareholders and the total abnormal gains. 
Their sample consisted of around 200 mergers and acquisitions that occurred 
in the U.K. over the period from 1984 to 1998.  Abnormal gains are 
determined using a standard market model methodology.  The results they 
obtain are sensitive to whether the gains are measured over a long or short 
window, the method of measuring abnormal returns, and whether controls are 
included for the form of the bid consideration and the sign of the total bid gains.  
More importantly, they conclude that the takeover bids on which their empirical 
analysis is based are primarily motivated by synergy, but there is also evidence 
of the presence of hubris and weak evidence of bids with an agency 
motivation. 
 
In contrast to the prior two studies, Firth (1980) examined the impact that 
takeovers have on shareholder returns and management benefits.  Firth’s 
(1980) sample consisted of 563 U.K. acquiring firms and 486 target firms 
covering the period from 1969 to 1975.  As with previous studies Firth (1980) 
isolates abnormal returns using a standard market model methodology.  Firth 
(1980) finds that whilst mergers and acquisitions give rise to benefits for the 
shareholders of target firms as well as to the acquiring firms’ managers, the 
shareholders of acquiring firms suffer losses from their M&A activities.  Thus, 
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Firth (1980) concludes that takeovers are motivated more by maximisation of 
management utility rather than by the maximisation of shareholder wealth.  In 
other words, Firth’s (1980) results are consistent with the hubris hypothesis.   
 
Roll (1986) surveys mainly the U.S. M&A literature and concludes that the 
empirical evidence largely supports Firth’s (1980) hubris hypothesis.  Roll 
(1986) finds the empirical evidence shows that there are large gains for target 
firm shareholders and only meager or even negative though statistically 
insignificant returns for the shareholders of acquiring firms.  Hence, Roll 
(1986) concludes that this evidence is not consistent with acquirer 
management creating wealth for their shareholders but rather, that managers 
of acquiring firms overestimate the gains from takeovers and overpay for the 
privilege of accessing mainly non-existent gains.  This is compatible with the 
hubris motive hypothesis for M&A activities. 
 
In contrast to Firth (1980),  Bradley, Desai and Kim’s(1988) study is based on 
a sample of 236 successful U.S. tender offers carried out between 1963 and 
1984 in which both the target and acquiring firms are listed on either NYSE or 
AMEX at the time of acquisition. They find that the average synergistic gain 
created by the 236 deals in their sample is $US117 million which represents a 
7.4% increase in the combined value of the equity of the target and acquiring 
firms.  This finding is consistent with a synergistic motive for takeover bids. 
 
Hodgkinson and Partington (2008, p. 105), note that under the agency motive 
for M&A activities the management of bidding firms will seek to expropriate 
wealth from the firm’s shareholders.  Firth (1991) examines this issue by using 
a sample of 254 U.K. acquiring firms and 215 target firms covering the period 
from 1974 to 1980.  Firth (1991) finds that managers of acquiring firms do 
appear to gain financial benefits from the takeovers they are involved with.  
Against this, Firth (1991) also finds that the acquiring firms’ shareholders 
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appear to obtain little, if anything, in terms of economic benefits from these 
takeover activities.  Hence, using the argument of Hodgkinson and Partington 
(2008, p. 105), Firth’s (1991) results are consistent with an agency motive for 
takeovers in the sample he examines.  
 
Here it will be recalled that Berkovitch and Narayanan (1993) argue that the 
existence or otherwise of agency considerations in M&A activities can be 
inferred from the correlation between the wealth gains earned by target 
shareholders and the total wealth gains.  If this correlation is positive then 
synergy is the motive for takeovers.  If the correlation is negative then agency 
considerations motivate the takeovers.  Finally, if the correlation is zero then 
hubris is the motive.  We have previously noted how studies based on 
western financial data have used this particular technique to show that agency 
considerations or hubris are often the principal factors behind western M&A 
activities.  Unfortunately, there are no Chinese studies which employ this 
particular technique to identify the motives behind Chinese M&A activities.  
We have previously noted that there are several studies which employ market 
model specifications to identify the abnormal returns which accrue to 
shareholders of Chinese acquiring and target firms.  These studies generally 
find that there are significant positive abnormal returns for the shareholders of 
Chinese target firms but also, that the shareholders of acquiring firms tend to 
suffer considerable losses from M&A activities.  These results are normally 
interpreted as meaning that M&A activities in China are largely driven by 
agency and hubris considerations.  However, none of these studies compute 
the correlation between the abnormal gains accruing to target shareholders 
and the total of the abnormal gains across both the acquiring and target firms.  
Until this is done there must be considerable uncertainty surrounding the true 
motives which underlie the growing volume of M&A activities on Chinese 
capital markets.  Given this, we now survey the empirical work that has been 
conducted on the motives which lie behind Chinese M&A activities. 
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We have previously noted how Zhang’s (2003) empirical study of M&A 
activities of firms listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges 
shows that the shareholders of acquiring firms gain little benefit from M&A 
activities.  Indeed, Zhang (2003) shows that over the event window (-60, 30) 
days the CAAR on the equity of acquiring firms amounts to a statistically 
significant -16.76%.  In contrast, the CAAR accruing to target firm 
shareholders over the same event window was a highly statistically significant 
29.05%.  Zhang (2003) argues that as China is increasingly transformed into 
a market-oriented economy there are likely to be significant potential benefits 
from a more liberal approach to the regulation M&A activities.  For example, 
Chinese firms can use M&A activities to acquire advanced technologies, 
resources and management skills that are not available in China.  Similarly 
foreign firms can use M&A activities to gain access to new and larger markets 
and cheaper labour resources.  Considerations like these mean that there are 
potentially huge synergistic effects to be gained from Chinese M&A activities.  
However, Zhang (2003) also argues that hubris and agency considerations 
play an important role in Chinese M&A activities because the managers of 
Chinese firms often lack experience and business acumen and may use M&A 
activities to enter unfamiliar business areas.  Thus, they may tend to over 
estimate the potential benefits from M&A activities and thereby make random 
acquisitions with little or no synergistic payoff for their shareholders.  
 
Wu and Zhang’s (2009) empirical study of M&A activities on the two mainland 
Chinese stock exchanges, which was considered earlier in this chapter, finds 
that acquiring firms experience huge losses not only in the short term, but also 
over the longer run.   Wu and Zhang (2009) seek to isolate whether these 
losses are due to the free cash flow hypothesis, the hubris hypothesis, the 
undue influence of large shareholders and/or government interference in the 
activities of the firm, balance sheet window dressing, diversification or some 
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combination of all of these factors, by using various ratios and regression 
specifications based on different independent variables.  Zhang (2009) 
concludes that Chinese M&As are generally motivated by a combination of 
several of these factors although the specific importance of any one factor 
varies from takeover to takeover.  In particular, he finds that the undue 
influence of large shareholders negatively affects the performance of acquiring 
firms in the longer term.  Takeovers motivated by balance sheet window 
dressing have at best a weak influence on the acquiring firm’s performance.  
Finally, government interference has no significant association with an 
acquiring firm’s performance either in the short or long term.  Here it is 
important to emphasise that none of these latter three motives appear 
amongst the list of reasons identified by Berkovitch and Narayanan (1993) as 
motives for M&A activities in western economies.  In other words, Chinese 
M&A activities can be motivated by very different factors and circumstances 
when compared to those which motivate western takeovers.  Nevertheless, 
Zhang (2009) does find some commonality between western and Chinese 
motivations for M&A activities.  In particular, he finds that excess free cash 
flows, hubris and diversification all have a significant negative impact on the 
performance of Chinese acquiring firms and these all appear amongst the list 
of reasons identified by Berkovitch and Narayanan (1993) as motives for M&A 
activities in western economies.  
 
We have previously noted how Fei (2004) determines the abnormal returns 
which arise on a sample of 221 acquiring and target firms listed on the 
Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges over the period from 1997 until 
2003.  However, Fei (2004) also uses accounting data-based performance 
measures and management turnover data to test the hypothesis that M&A 
activities in China are motivated by poor managerial performance.  Fei (2004) 
argues that if poor prior managerial performance is a significant characteristic 
of target firms, then it can be concluded that Chinese takeovers are regarded 
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as an external control mechanism on poor managerial performance.  Likewise, 
he argues that if key board members of target firms such as the CEO leave the 
firm after the consummation of the takeover process, then poor managerial 
performance is probably the motivating factor for Chinese takeovers.  Fei’s 
(2004) results show that the profitability of target firms is relatively poor before 
takeovers.  For example, compared with industry peers target firms 
underperformed in ROE (return on equity) terms by an average 13.53% in the 
two years prior to the takeover announcement.  This indicates that target 
firms are characterised by poor performance in the lead up to the takeover 
process.  Furthermore, Fei (2004) finds that there is a big improvement in the 
financial performance of target firms following successful takeovers.  This 
taken in conjunction with the high rate of top management turnover and the 
large number of new managers that come into target firms following successful 
takeovers, suggests that most takeovers in China are of a disciplinary nature; 
that is, Fei (2004) argues that the principal motivation for Chinese takeovers is 
to correct non-value-maximising behaviour on the part of target firm managers. 
 
Du, Rui and Wong (2008) note that because of the state-dominated financial 
system and the discriminatory policies of financial resource allocation 
implemented by the Chinese authorities, private firms in China tend to use the 
acquisition of block shares in listed firms as a means of gaining access to the 
formal financial system.  Du, Rui and Wong (2008) note that once private 
firms become controlling shareholders of publicly listed firms, they are able to 
enjoy the privilege of accessing external financing in both the Chinese capital 
market and the banking sectors.  In other words, Du, Rui and Wong (2008) 
argue that Chinese takeovers can be motivated by a desire to facilitate access 
to external financing.  Du, Rui and Wong (2008) test this hypothesis by 
selecting a sample of 162 M&A transactions that occurred between 1997 and 
2001 and which were taken from the China Stock Market Accounting Research 
(CSMAR) database.  Du, Rui and Wong (2008) find that the target firms in 
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their sample present a strong tendency to conduct seasoned equity offering 
(SEOs) and bank borrowing in the post-acquisition period.  This is very much 
consistent with the hypothesis that Chinese M&A activities are 
financing-motivated.  Moreover, Du, Rui and Wong (2008) find that there is no 
evidence that such financing-motivated acquisitions improve the corporate 
performance of target firms.  
 
From the literature summarised above, we can see that the motivation behind 
Chinese M&A activities have some common features with those identified for 
M&A activities in western economies; that is, Chinese takeovers are often 
characterised by a combination of agency considerations, synergy and hubris.  
However, it is also important to observe that the empirical research reviewed in 
this section shows that there are motivating factors for M&A activities in China 
that can be quite different from those which prevail in western economies.  In 
particular, our review of the empirical literature shows that Chinese M&A 
activities are also motivated by financing considerations, the undue influence 
of large shareholders, government interference in the activities of the firm and 
balance sheet window dressing or some combination of all of these.  Hence, 
not the all motives which are applicable to western economies necessarily 
apply to Chinese M&A activities.  This in turn means that the motives behind 
Chinese M&A activities need to be analysed with reference to the unique 
political and contextual factors that influence the Chinese economic system. 
 
2.5 The Impact of Consideration on the Performance of Acquiring and 
Target Firms 
 
Once an acquiring firm has decided to make a takeover offer for another firm it 
must then decide on the mode of consideration; that is, should the 
consideration be in cash, the shares of the acquiring firm, some combination of 
shares and cash or some other form of consideration.  If a listed acquiring 
firm’s shares are over-valued in the market, then it will have an incentive to 
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offer its own shares in exchange for the shares of the target firm since this 
reduces the cost of the takeover to the acquiring firm.  Likewise, if the 
acquiring firm offers cash in exchange for the shares of the target firm it will be 
a signal to the market that the acquiring firm’s shares are undervalued in the 
market (Hansen, 1987, pp. 76-77).  Moreover, consideration in the form of a 
share exchange may enable the target firm’s shareholders to defer the 
incidence of capital gains tax in contrast to an offer in cash, where capital gains 
tax would have to be paid immediately.  Hence, the mode of consideration 
and its associated tax implications can have significant differential wealth 
effects on the shareholders of both acquiring and target firms.  In this section, 
we first provide a brief summary of the main literature dealing with the impact 
of the mode of consideration on both acquiring and target firms for western 
economies.  We then move on to consider the Chinese literature that deals 
with the impact that the mode of consideration has on the shareholders of 
acquiring and target firms. 
 
Asquith, Bruner and Mullins (1990) employ a sample of 343 completed 
mergers where both the target and bidding firms were listed on either the New 
York Stock Exchange (NYSE) or the American Stock Exchange (AMEX) at the 
time of the merger and where the merger announcements were reported in the 
Wall Street Journal over the period from 1975 until 1983.  Their objective was 
to test the hypothesis that the excess return and excess dollar return on the 
announcement date of mergers where the bidding firm used its own stock as 
consideration was lower than the excess return and excess dollar return on the 
announcement date of mergers where the bidding firm used cash as the sole 
mode of consideration.  They conclude that both the excess returns and the 
excess dollar returns to bidding firms are smaller for stock (that is, share) 
financed bids than for cash mergers.  Likewise, they find that while the 
market’s average response to a merger is always positive for target firms, it is 
significantly more positive when the offer is financed with cash rather than 
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stock. 
 
Martin (1996) uses a sample of 846 acquisitions of firms listed either on NYSE 
or AMEX during the period from 1978 until 1988.  The 846 acquisitions are 
grouped into three financing categories according to the mode of consideration 
used.  The first category consists of 250 acquisitions which are financed 
solely with the stock of the acquiring firm.  The second category includes 483 
acquisitions financed exclusively with cash or cash plus debt securities in the 
acquiring firm.  The third category comprises 113 acquisitions financed jointly 
with cash and the stock of the acquiring firm, or securities that can be 
converted into the stock of the acquiring firm.  Using the logistic regression 
approach, Martin (1996) finds that the higher the acquirer’s growth 
opportunities, the more likely the acquirer is to use stock to finance an 
acquisition.  Moreover, the likelihood of stock financing increases with higher 
pre-acquisition market and acquiring firm stock returns and it decreases with 
an acquirer’s higher cash availability (e.g. large cash balances on its balance 
sheet or the availability of lines of credit that can be readily converted into 
cash), higher institutional shareholdings and block holdings and whether the 
acquiring firm makes a tender offer for the target firm. 
 
Huang and Walking (1987) employ a sample which includes 326 target firms 
listed on the CRSP (Centre for Research in Securities) tapes and where the 
proposed takeovers receive their first public announcement on the front pages 
(as distinct from the latter pages) of the financial newspapers over the period 
from 1977 to 1982.  Their brief is to test the hypothesis that CAARs 
surrounding the announcement of cash offers exceeds those surrounding 
stock offers.  Using standard market model and regression methodologies, 
Huang and Walking (1987) conclude that the abnormal returns for target firms 
associated with cash offers are significantly higher than those associated with 
stock offers.  In addition, Huang and Walking (1987) argue that when cash is 
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used as the mode of consideration shareholders of target firms will demand 
higher takeover premiums because of the capital gains tax that will have to be 
paid immediately and which would not have to be paid if the acquiring firm had 
used its own stock as the mode of consideration.  
 
Yook (2003) selects 311 U.S acquisitions which occured over the period 
between 1985 and 1996.  The consideration for 199 of these acquisitions was 
purely in cash whilst for 112 acquisitions, the consideration was in the stock of 
the acquiring firm.  Here it will be recalled that if an acquiring firm feels that its 
stock is over-valued in the market it is likely to use stock as the consideration 
for the takeover; that is, a firm that uses its stock as consideration in a takeover 
is signaling that its stock is over-valued.  Against this, acquiring firms that use 
cash as consideration for the takeover are signaling that their stock is 
under-valued.  Moreover, there are well known tax advantages from using 
debt (that is, leverage) instead of equity to raise the cash necessary to finance 
takeovers.  Yook (2003) uses the Standard and Poor’s debt rating 
reviews/changes as a proxy to investigate whether the signaling hypothesis or 
the tax advantages associated with leverage hypothesis provide a better 
explanation as to why firms use cash or stock as the mode of consideration for 
takeovers.  Yook (2003) uses a standard event study methodology to 
calculate the abnormal returns on bidding firms around the takeover 
announcement date.  Yook (2003) finds that cash tends to be used as the 
mode of consideration in hostile takeovers.  In contrast, stock is used as the 
mode of consideration in friendly takeovers.  Yook (2003) also argues that 
there is no convincing evidence from his sample that the abnormal returns 
associated with takeovers are correlated with the mode of consideration.  
That is, cash takeovers are no more likely to earn significant abnormal returns 
than stock takeovers and vice versa.  However, there is some evidence that 
stock might have been used to finance the most unsuccessful acquisitions. 
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Wansley, Lane and Yang (1983) select a total of 203 US target firms whose 
daily returns are available on the CRSP tape in order to examine the effects of 
type of acquisition and method of payment on the abnormal returns that accrue 
to target firms.  Using a standard market model methodology, Wansley, Lane 
and Yang (1983) find that shareholders of the target firms in their sample earn, 
on average, abnormal returns of 33.54% in the forty days prior to the 
announcement date.  This figure is almost twice the corresponding number, 
17.47%, for mergers employing stock as the mode of consideration.  
Importantly, Wansley, Lane and Yang (1983) attribute the difference in the 
abnormal returns between cash and stock acquisitions to tax differences and 
regulatory requirements that favour cash as the mode of consideration.  In 
particular, when cash is used as the mode of consideration shareholders of 
target firms will demand higher takeover premiums because of the capital 
gains tax that will have to be paid.  
 
Hansen (1987) formulates an asymmetric information bargaining model in 
which a firm must choose the mode of consideration for a prospective takeover 
based on some important characteristics of the acquiring and target firms.  In 
particular, the target firm knows its value better than the potential acquirer and 
so the acquirer will normally prefer to offer stock, rather than cash, which has 
desirable contingent-pricing characteristics.  Furthermore, Hansen (1987) 
shows that with information asymmetry on both sides of the transaction, a 
signaling equilibrium will develop under which firms use cash and/or stock to 
implement acquisitions and the exact proportion of stock and cash used in the 
takeover bid provides a cardinal signal of the acquiring firm’s value. 
 
Berkovitch and Narayanan (1990) formulate an asymmetric information model 
to investigate the role of the medium of exchange in determining the returns 
which accrue to target and acquiring firms’ stockholders.  Berkovitch and 
Narayanan’s (1990) model shows that shareholders of both acquiring and 
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target firms obtain higher returns when a takeover is financed with cash rather 
than stock and importantly, that the returns accruing to shareholders of target 
firms tend to increase with competition.  Moreover, Berkovitch and 
Narayanan’s (1990) model also shows that the fraction of synergy captured by 
target firms decreases with the absolute level of synergy and that the cash 
component of the offer increases in both absolute and proportionate terms as 
competition between potential bidders increases. 
 
Fishman (1989) develops a model in which competition between potential 
bidders for the acquisition of a given target firm increases when one of the 
potential bidders makes a formal offer for the given target.  Both the target 
firm and potential bidding firms have private information about the profitability 
of the acquisition process.  For example, the target firm will invariably have 
the best information about its own physical assets and prospective profitability 
and contractual arrangements.  Bidding firms will have private information 
about the intrinsic value of their own shares.  Fishman’s (1989) model shows 
that when bidding firms offer their own stock as the medium of exchange it will 
induce the target firm’s management to make an efficient accept or reject 
decision.  Against this, cash offers have the advantage of preempting 
potential competition amongst bidders by signaling a “high” valuation for the 
target firm.  Fishman’s (1989) model also shows that the target firm’s 
management is more likely to reject a stock offer as compared to a cash offer 
and also, that competing bidders are more likely to make an initial stock offer 
as compared to an initial cash offer. 
 
Our analysis to date provides a brief summary of the important literature that 
deals with the impact which the mode of consideration can have on M&A 
activities in western economies.  There is also a steadily increasing volume of 
literature which addresses this important issue of the mode of consideration for 
Chinese M&A activities.  In the rest of this section, we summarise the key 
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literature regarding the impact which the mode of consideration has on 
Chinese M&A activities.  This will enable us to evaluate past Chinese 
research in the area and also, to identify any gaps in the literature and 
significant methodological issues which might be addressed by the empirical 
work conducted for this thesis. 
 
Ge and Ping (2009) note that before 2005, around two-thirds of the shares 
issued by Chinese firms were non-tradeable.  The absence of organised 
markets for these shares means that it was extremely difficult to value them – 
especially in the context of M&A activities.  Moreover, the absence of 
organised markets for non-tradable shares and the difficulties associated with 
valuing them means that before 2005, Chinese M&A activities were normally 
conducted with cash as the mode of consideration.  That is, before 2005 
relatively few mergers and acquisitions employed the bidding firm’s stock as 
the mode of consideration.  However, as noted in Section 2.3 of Chapter 3, 
the shareholding structure reforms which came into force in April, 2005 
(Guquan Fenzhi Gaige) means that non-tradable shares are gradually being 
converted into tradable shares – that is, shares which can be freely bought and 
sold on the stock exchange.  This in turn has led to an increasing number of 
bidding firms using their own stock as the mode of consideration in M&A 
activities.  Ge and Ping (2009) examine the impact which the shareholding 
structure reforms have had on the mode of consideration used in Chinese M&A 
activities by employing a sample of 96 Chinese acquisitions that occurred in 
2006.  They group the 96 Chinese acquiring firms into two categories in terms 
of the mode of consideration employed for the takeovers.  Specifically, the 
first category consists of 87 firms and is comprised of takeovers which use only 
cash as the mode of consideration.  The second category is comprised of 9 
firms where cash was not used as the mode of consideration and consists of 6 
firms where the mode of consideration was purely in the stock of the bidding 
firm, two firms where the mode of consideration was in the form of the 
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repayment of the target firms’ debt and one firm where the bidding firm 
exchanged some of their assets for a controlling interest in the target firm.  
Here we should note that takeovers which involve the acquiring firm repaying 
the debt obligations of the target firm are unique to China and have no direct 
equivalents in western economies.  Using debt repayment as the mode of 
consideration for takeovers is relatively common in China, especially for target 
firms which are facing bankruptcy or financial distress.  Ge and Ping (2009) 
formulate a principal components model based on nine important accounting 
ratios; viz, earnings per share, rate of return on equity, debt to equity ratio, 
current ratio, rate of sales growth, rate of growth in profits, etc.  They estimate 
the variance-covariance matrix formed from these nine ratios for the entire 
sample of 96 firms based on data covering the period from 2005 until 2007.  
They then extract the eigenvalues for the variance-covariance matrix and find 
that only five principal components are necessary to explain most of the 
variation in the data.  These five principal components are used to formulate a 
performance score for each of the 96 acquiring firms in 2005; that is, before the 
takeovers occurred in 2006.  Ge and Ping (2009) also calculate performance 
scores for all 96 companies in 2007; that is the year after the takeovers 
occurred.  They find that 32 of the 87 bidding firms which used cash as a 
mode of consideration improved their performance score between 2005 and 
2007.  In contrast, five of the nine firms which used a mode of consideration 
other than cash improved their performance measures between 2005 and 
2007.  In other words, less than half of the firms that used cash as a mode of 
consideration improved their performance score.  In contrast more than half 
of the firms that used a mode of consideration other than cash improved their 
performance scores.  Ge and Ping (2009) conclude from this that non-cash 
takeovers, which are principally comprised of share swap transactions, have 
positive wealth enhancing effects for the shareholders of acquiring firms in the 
short run.  In contrast, cash based takeovers do not have significant wealth 
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enhancing effects for the shareholders of acquiring firms.  However, one must 
view Ge and Ping’s (2009) conclusions with some skepticism because their 
sample of non-cash takeovers is very small and doubts must remain about the 
generalisability of their results because of this. 
 
Wang (2003) selects a sample of fifty firms which are listed on the mainland 
(that is, Shanghai and Shenzhen) stock exchanges in China and which had 
recently been involved in Chinese M&A activities.  Wang (2003) concludes 
from his empirical analysis that Chinese firms with differing financial 
characteristics will finance their M&A activities in different ways.  For example, 
he finds that firms with low debt to equity ratios tend to use cash or cash in 
combination with the repayment of the target firm’s debt as the principal modes 
of consideration in their M&A activities.  In contrast, firms with a relatively high 
rate of return on assets employed tend to use their stock or a combination of 
cash and stock as the principal modes of consideration in their M&A activities.  
Importantly, Wang (2003) notes that whilst it is normally the case that cash is 
used as the sole mode of consideration for Chinese M&A activities many other 
modes of consideration are employed by Chinese firms in their M&A activities1.  
For example, we have previously mentioned how the repayment of the target 
firm’s debt is a uniquely Chinese mode of consideration in M&A activities.  
However, there is also the free transfer of state owned shares which can be 
initiated by the Chinese government at any time of its choosing.  The free 
transfer of state owned shares occurs when the Chinese government transfers 
the controlling rights of a state-owned firm from one Chinese entity to another 
without the payment of compensation to the former controlling entity.  The 
free transfer of state-owned shares in Chinese M&A activities normally occurs 
when the Chinese government attempts to improve the performance of an 
                                                        
1
 Since the implementation of the shareholding structure reforms (Guquan Fenzhi Gaige) in 
2005, the proportion of mergers and acquisitions where stock is used as the (sole or partial) 
mode of consideration has been steadily increasing.  However, even after 2005 it still remains 
the case that cash is the predominant mode of consideration in Chinese M&A activities. 
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unlisted state owned firm which, under its present controlling entity, has run 
into financial difficulties or is facing bankruptcy.  The objective of this 
procedure is to transfer the controlling rights of the state-owned firm from its 
current controlling entity to an alternative controlling entity which in the view of 
the Chinese government will be able to address the state-owned firm’s poor 
financial position and then improve its performance.  However, here it is 
important to emphasise that the free transfer of state-owned shares is purely 
an act of the Chinese government without any involvement of natural market 
forces.  This free transfer of state owned shares is unique to China and has 
no direct equivalent in western economies. 
 
Ding and Yang (2008) note that in Chinese M&A activities there are three 
major modes of consideration; namely, cash, shares and the combination of 
cash and shares.  Even though using shares as the mode of consideration in 
Chinese M&A activities has the advantage of both deferring the incidence of 
capital gains tax and reducing takeover costs, yet the majority of Chinese firms 
have a preference for employing cash as the mode of consideration in their 
M&A activities.  Ding and Yang (2008) note that this is a unique characteristic 
of Chinese M&A activities as in western economies, shares, cash and a 
combination of cash and shares are all widely used modes of consideration in 
M&A activities.  Ding and Yang (2008) argue that in Chinese M&A activities 
using cash as a mode of consideration can have the effect of signaling to the 
market that the acquiring firm has sufficient cash resources to improve the 
performance of the target firm after the consummation of the merger and/or 
acquisition.  Ding and Yang (2008) also argue that this ability of the acquiring 
firm to invest cash resources in the target firm will have the secondary effect of 
opening up a new cash flow stream from the target firm as its performance 
improves.  Moreover, an acquiring firm can only use its shares as the mode of 
consideration when it has the approval of the relevant Department of State 
Council – normally the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC).  
Survey of Literature 
49 
 
Obtaining the approval of the State Council is a time consuming and often 
difficult process and so, many firms involved in Chinese M&A activities will use 
cash rather than shares as the mode of consideration in order to secure the 
pre-emptive rights associated with a quick takeover.  Another difficulty that 
arises with using shares as the mode of consideration stems from the fact that 
if an acquiring firm fails to sell at least 70% of the new shares it plans to issue 
under the takeover agreement within 90 days of the offer being implemented, 
then it must cease issuing any new shares and withdraw its offer to acquire the 
target firm (Ding and Yang, 2008, p. 82).  
 
Zhang, Wang and Meng (2007) also note that using cash as the sole mode of 
consideration in M&A activities can lead to acquiring firms securing 
pre-emptive rights in the form of a quick takeover.  They note that this is the 
reason why in hostile tender offers especially, cash is typically employed as the 
mode of consideration.  Given the potential delays and difficulties noted 
earlier with seasoned share issues in China, it is hardly surprising that most 
Chinese acquiring firms seek to implement their M&A activities with purely 
cash offers.  However, Zhang, Wang and Meng (2007) also note that in China 
most acquiring firms lack the free cash flows which would enable them to 
internally finance their M&A activities through cash offers.  Hence, whilst 
share offers occasionally occur in China it is normally the case that acquiring 
firms raise debt from banks and/or other financial institutions in order that they 
can finance their M&A activities purely through cash offers.  However, raising 
the huge amounts of cash necessary to implement a cash offer will usually 
place a considerable financial burden on an acquiring firm.   
 
It should be clear from our review of the literature that there are very strong 
reasons why Chinese acquiring firms prefer to use cash as a mode of 
consideration in their M&A activities.   Foremost amongst these is that 
acquiring firms can normally only use stock as the mode of consideration with 
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the approval of the CSRC.  However, as previously noted obtaining the 
approval of the CSRC is a time consuming and often difficult process.  
Furthermore, firms that use cash rather than shares as the mode of 
consideration can often secure the pre-emptive rights associated with a quick 
takeover.   This almost exclusive use of cash as the mode of consideration in 
Chinese M&A activities is in stark contrast with M&A activities in western 
countries where the consideration is as equally likely to be in the form of 
shares or a combination of cash and shares as it is to be in cash alone.  
Moreover, in China the focus of most research is with making theoretical 
comparisons of the impact that different modes of consideration can have on 
Chinese M&A activities and there is very little in the way of empirical testing of 
the theoretical models.  Hence, in subsequent chapters we summarise the 
empirical work we have undertaken which assesses the impact that the mode 
of consideration can have on Chinese M&A activities.  In particular, we 
compute the abnormal returns that arise around the first public announcement 
date of M&A activities and make comparisons between them based on 
whether the mode of consideration was in cash, shares or a combination of 
cash and shares.  My objective here is to investigate the wealth effects for 
acquiring and target firm shareholders of the differing modes of consideration 
which are employed in Chinese M&A activities. 
 
2.6 The Impact of Friendly Offers and Hostiles Offers on the 
shareholders of Acquiring and Target Firms 
 
We now turn our attention to the potential wealth effects for acquiring and 
target firm shareholders that arise from friendly as against hostile M&A 
activities.  There is a significant strand of the western literature that deals with 
both the theoretical and empirical issues that arise in this area.  Schnitzer 
(1994), for example, formulates a model which investigates the trade-offs 
which arise between a potential hostile and a friendly takeover from the 
standpoint of the bidding (that is, raiding) firm.  Importantly, Schnitzer (1994) 
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notes that the choice which a bidding firm (raider) will make between a hostile 
and friendly takeover bid hinges crucially on the position taken by the 
incumbent management of the target firm.  In particular, in a hostile takeover, 
a raider makes a tender offer directly to the shareholders of the target firm 
without consulting the target’s incumbent management.  In this case, each 
shareholder of the target firm decides individually about whether or not to 
accept the tender offer for their shares.  Against this, in a friendly takeover the 
bidding firm obtains the agreement of the incumbent management of the target 
firm for the terms and conditions of the takeover and then facilitates the bidding 
firm’s access to the shareholders of the target firm during the takeover process.  
Thus, Schnitzer (1994) notes that if a raider makes a hostile tender offer, then 
it only has to deal with the target firm’s shareholders in which case both the 
raider and the target firm shareholders will be operating in an environment of 
symmetric information; that is, both the raider and the target firm shareholders 
will evaluate the takeover using identical information.  In contrast, with friendly 
takeovers the incumbent management of the target firm will possess private 
information which they can use in their negotiations with the bidding firm to 
increase the price of the takeover and thereby reduce the wealth effects of the 
takeover for the shareholders of the bidding firm.  Schnitzer (1994) concludes 
that the higher the uncertainty about the potential value increase of the 
proposed takeover, the more likely that a raider will choose a hostile offer.  
Moreover, the likelihood of a hostile takeover increases with the preferences 
for control of the target firm’s management (managers of the target firm may 
find themselves to be unemployed if the takeover is successful) and decreases 
with the number of shares the management holds in the target firm (thereby 
reducing the potential wealth effects of private information).  On the other 
hand, an increase in efficiency and synergy gains which are not the exclusive 
(that is, private) information of management will induce a raider to undertake a 
friendly takeover.  Similarly, the higher the transaction costs of hostile as 
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against friendly takeovers, the more likely it is that a raider will seek a friendly 
takeover. 
 
Baron (1983) also develops a model of a target firm’s resistance to a tender 
offer that is based on the assumption that the management of the target firm 
has private information on both the intrinsic value of the target firm itself and of 
its own preferences for control.  Baron’s (1983) model shows that the 
management of some target firms may develop a reputation for having such 
high preferences for control that it actually causes the market value of their 
shares to fall.  He notes, however, that a passivity rule can eliminate both the 
effect of a preference for control (the target firm’s management is prevented 
from introducing spurious arguments and information into the takeover process) 
and the externalities that arise in a value-maximising resistance strategy.  In 
addition, a passivity rule results in the first-best market value. 
 
Huang and Walking (1987) employ a sample which includes 326 target firms 
listed on the CRSP tapes and where the proposed takeovers receive their first 
public announcement on the front pages (as distinct from the latter pages) of 
the financial press over the period from 1977 to 1982.  One of their objectives 
is to test the hypothesis that the CAARs surrounding the announcement date 
of hostile offers for target firms differs from those surrounding friendly offers.  
Using a standard market methodology they find that even though the CAARs 
associated with hostile offers is 5.5% higher than is the case with friendly offers, 
yet the t-statistic for this difference is 1.60 - which is of marginal statistical 
significance, at best.  In other words, hostile offers for target firms earn 
(marginally) insignificant CAARs when compared to the CAARs of friendly 
offers.  However, Huang and Walking (1987) suggest that it is premature to 
conclude that hostile as against friendly offers have no impact on the abnormal 
returns which accrue to the shareholders of target firms. 
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Martynova, Oosting and Renneboog (2006) employ a sample of 155 European 
merger and acquisition transactions from the Mergers and Acquisitions 
Database of Securities Data Company (SDC) and Zephyr which occurred over 
the period from 1997 until 2001.  They also extract accounting data from the 
Amadeus Extended database for the sampled mergers and acquisitions in 
order to construct several cash flow measures through which to assess the 
operating performance of the firms involved in the M&A deals.  They find that 
target firms involved in hostile takeovers have lower post-merger profitability 
when compared to target firms involved with friendly offers.  Nevertheless, the 
lower post-merger profitability associated with hostile offers is statistically 
insignificant when compared with friendly offers.  Thus, Martynova, Oosting 
and Renneboog (2006) conclude that there is no clear evidence to suggest 
that hostile takeovers are able to create high synergistic values when 
compared with friendly takeovers.  
 
Gregory (1997) utilises a sample of all successful UK domestic takeovers of 
listed firms with a bid value in excess of £10 million over the period between 
1984 and 1992 in order to examine the long run post-acquisition performance 
of UK acquiring firms.  Using a standard market model methodology Gregory 
(1997) calculates the abnormal returns accruing to acquiring firms under six 
different benchmarks and concludes that friendly bids earn lower long run 
abnormal returns than hostile bids, although Gregory’s (1997) conclusions 
hinge crucially on which benchmark is used to measure the abnormal returns.  
 
The literature presented here represents a brief summary of the relevant 
research undertaken in western economies with regard to the profitability of 
hostile and friendly takeovers.  The literature follows too general strands.  
The first strand is theoretical and constructs game theory models of the 
takeover process based on considerations of asymmetric information.  These 
models use the fact that acquiring/target firms have privileged information 
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about their operations and values to predict whether a takeover offer will be 
hostile or friendly.  They also predict the mode and size of the consideration 
(cash, shares or a combination of cash and shares) that will be used in the 
takeover process according to whether the takeover offer is hostile or friendly.  
The second strand of research is purely empirical and uses a standard market 
model methodology, sometimes augmented by particular accounting 
information, to assess the (short term and/or long term) profitability of target 
and/or acquiring firms involved in the takeover process.  Unfortunately, no 
clear conclusions emerge from the empirical work conducted in this area about 
the wealth effects for shareholders of implementing hostile or friendly takeover 
procedures.  Moreover, virtually no empirical research has been conducted 
about the impact that hostile and friendly takeovers can have on the 
shareholders of Chinese firms involved in M&A activities.    
 
2.7 Summary and Conclusions  
 
This chapter provides a brief summary of the literature in both western 
economies and in China on a variety of issues dealing with M&A activities.  In 
particular, we deal with the literature that assesses the impact that the 
motivation for takeovers can have on the subsequent performance of acquiring 
and target firms, the effect of the modes of consideration used in the takeover 
on the abnormal returns that accrue to the shareholders of acquiring and target 
firms and the impact that hostile and friendly takeovers can have on the long 
run profitability of target and acquiring firms, etc.  The chapter’s principal brief 
is to summarise and compare the research that has been conducted on 
western M&A activities with the limited Chinese literature that is available in the 
area.  This will enable us to identify any gaps in the Chinese literature and 
any significant methodological issues which might be addressed by the 
empirical work conducted for this dissertation. 
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Through summarising the main literature on the differing aspects of Chinese 
M&A activities, I discover that most Chinese research conducted in this area is 
normally restricted to a theoretical consideration of the different issues that 
arise in Chinese M&A activities.  In other words, there are very few papers 
that have undertaken empirical tests of the important issues that arise with 
Chinese mergers and acquisitions.  Thus, in order to fill this gap in the 
Chinese literature, I undertake a series of empirical tests on a range of 
important issues that arise in Chinese M&A activities.  Issues considered at 
an empirical level in this dissertation include: the wealth effects of takeovers on 
the shareholders of Chinese acquiring firms in comparison to the wealth effects 
that accrue to the shareholders of target firms; the wealth effects of takeovers 
for shareholders of different classes of shares (e.g. A shares, B shares, H 
shares, state owned shares, etc) 2 ; the impact that different modes of 
consideration can have on shareholder wealth for both acquiring and target 
firms, etc.  Furthermore, I also note that it is often the case that empirical tests 
conducted on Chinese M&A activities employ an accounting (book) based 
methodology rather than the market model methodology which is invariably 
used in western empirical work.  In addition, I find that empirical research 
conducted on Chinese M&A activities is often plagued by methodological 
errors.  For example, the few empirical studies conducted on Chinese M&A 
activities are generally based on the discrete calculation of returns (the price 
“today” less the price “yesterday” divided by the price “yesterday”) rather than 
the continuously compounded (or logarithmic) return.  Our empirical work on 
Chinese M&A activities is based exclusively on the continuously compounded 
return3.  Most importantly, I will employ an hitherto unused non-parametric 
testing procedure to assess the significance of the abnormal returns which 
                                                        
2
 See section 3.2.3 of chapter 3 of this dissertation for a detailed discussion of the distinction 
between A shares, B shares, H shares and state owned shares. 
 
3
 For a detailed exposition of the dangers that can arise from basing empirical analysis on 
discretely calculated returns see chapter one of the text by Davidson and Tippett (2012). 
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accrue to the shareholders of acquiring and target firms involved in Chinese 
M&A activities.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
LAWS AND REGULATIONS RELATING TO MERGERS 
AND ACQUISITIONS IN CHINA 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
China‟s recent admission to the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and its 
generally vibrant economy has meant that merger and acquisition (M&A) 
activities in China have increased considerably over the last several years. The 
Chinese government has responded to this increased volume of M&A activities 
by seeking to establish a legal framework which, on the one hand, is in line with 
best international practice but also, meets the unique political and socio-
economic factors that have characterised the People‟s Republic of China since its 
formation in 1949.  Hence, on 31 July 2006 China‟s principal securities market 
regulator, the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC), promulgated the 
Takeover Measures, 2006.1  The Takeover Measures, 2006 is a revised version of 
the original Takeover Measures, 2002 and is designed to fill gaps and loopholes 
which experience had shown existed in the laws and regulations covering 
Chinese M&A activities.  The Takeover Measures, 2006 also aim to make 
Chinese laws in the area more compatible with best international practices.  
Furthermore, in order to address the anti-trust issues associated with mergers 
and acquisitions, the Standing Committee of the Tenth National People‟s 
Congress of China promulgated a new Anti-Monopoly Law which came into force 
on 1 August 2008. It is important to familiarise ourselves with the laws regulating 
M&A activities in China in order that we might obtain a better understanding of 
the empirical results obtained from the data we employ on Chinese mergers and 
acquisitions as summarised in later chapters of this dissertation. 
                                                        
1
 In many ways the Takeover Measures, 2006 copycats the U.S. regulations under the Williams 
Act amendments to the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934. 
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The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows: Section 3.2 briefly 
summarises the development of China‟s securities markets, including an 
introduction to China‟s main stock exchanges together with their listing rules and 
distinctive characteristics.  Next, Section 3.3 discusses the legal framework for 
M&A activities in China.  The most important of these are China‟s Securities Law, 
the Takeover Measures, 2006 and the Anti-Monopoly Law, 2008. Our 
consideration of the Takeover Measures, 2006 centres principally on the 
mandated bid rules, the disclosure of substantial shareholdings, the tender offer 
rules and the defence mechanisms which may be used in merger and acquisition 
transactions.  Section 3.4 then goes on to discuss China‟s Anti-Monopoly Laws 
and the Regulations on the Notification Thresholds of Concentration of 
Undertakings.  These laws address issues of anti-trust and declaration thresholds 
in M&A activities in China.  The laws and regulations affecting cross-border 
mergers and acquisitions are dealt with in Section 3.5.  This section provides a 
detailed description of the legal framework affecting mergers and acquisitions of 
domestic enterprises by foreign investors.  In particular, this section deals with 
issues of share swaps, the important provisions affecting special purpose 
companies (SPC) and the national economic securities review.  Finally, Section 
3.6 provides a brief summary of the chapter, along with some concluding remarks 
about the important issues affecting M&A activities in China. 
 
3.2 History of China’s Main Securities Markets 
3.2.1 Principal Chinese Stock Exchanges 
 
Over the last fifty years, China‟s economy has been transformed from the 
centrally planned economy (CPE) that was introduced in 1949, to a market 
orientated economy (MOE).  The movement towards a market orientated 
economy began in 1978 when the Chinese government implemented a 
programme of reforms which encouraged the formation of private rural 
enterprises and businesses, lifted many restrictions on foreign trade and 
investment, abolished controls over the prices of some basic commodities and 
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outputs, and boosted investment in industrial production and the education of its 
workforce.   As part of the reform process, in 1981 China‟s State Council created 
a national bond market by issuing national treasure bonds for the first time.  
Subsequent to this, several other kinds of national bonds were issued; for 
example, those issued by the Ministry of Finance to finance key construction 
projects.  According to Huang (2003), however, the new bond market only 
satisfied the liquidity requirements of the central government, leaving the needs 
of private and many state-owned enterprises unaddressed.  Hence, in order to 
solve the financial difficulties faced by private and state-owned enterprises, the 
People‟s Bank of China (PBC) authorised the establishment of two nationwide 
stock exchanges; namely, the Shanghai Stock Exchange which began operations 
in 1990 and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange which began operations in 1991 
(Wei, 2008). 
 
Initially, a variety of organisations, including the People‟s Bank of China (PBC), 
the State Council, the Ministry of Finance and local government bore 
responsibility for regulating these two stock exchanges (Wei, 2008). But the need 
for a different regulatory framework became clear after a number of regulatory 
failures of which the 810 incident on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange is probably 
the best known example.  This incident occurred on 10 August, 1992 when some 
700,000 “would be” investors packed into the Shenzhen Stock Exchange to 
subscribe for a new issue of bonds by the Chinese Government.  The prescribed 
five million subscription forms were used up within a few hours.  Violent rioting 
resulted, as it was clear that the officials of the PBC had corrupted the process of 
handling the subscription forms.  The government restored order by distributing 
another five million forms the next day.  The incident, to a large extent, was 
caused by the fact that too many organisations claimed regulatory authority over 
the Chinese securities markets and their operations.  It was inevitable that a 
regulatory framework like this would lead to confusion and corruption – as indeed 
it did (Walter and Howie, 2003).  Incidents like this necessitated the State Council 
to remove the ambiguity which had arisen in the regulation and administration of 
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China‟s securities markets.  Consequently, in 1992 the State Council created the 
China Security Regulatory Commission (CSRC) as the sole regulator of China‟s 
stock exchanges, although it took the CSRC quite a long time to rest regulatory 
control of securities markets in China away from the PBC, the Ministry of Finance 
and local government agencies.  Under China's Securities Law, the CSRC has 
"authority to implement a centralised and unified regulation of the nationwide 
securities market in order to ensure their lawful operation."2 Its powers include 
responsibility for regulating and supervising the issue of securities, as well as the 
investigation and imposition of penalties for, "illegal activities related to securities 
and futures." 3 Its role is broadly similar to that of the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) in the United States.  
 
Between them, at the end of 2008 the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges 
had more than 1,500 listed firms with a combined market capitalisation of 
$US2,658.2 billion.  Moreover, at the end of December 2007 the Hong Kong 
Stock Exchange, which operates under a different regulatory framework to the 
Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges, had 1,241 listed firms with a 
combined market capitalisation of $US2.7 trillion.  The Hong Kong Stock 
exchange is regulated by a statutory authority called the Securities and Futures 
Commission (SFC).  The SFC has a wide brief and operates independently of the 
CRSC.  Its main responsibilities include the maintenance and promotion of 
fairness and efficiency in Hong Kong‟s securities markets; encouraging 
competitiveness, transparency and orderliness in the operations of the securities 
markets; minimising crime and misconduct in the securities markets and to assist 
the Financial Secretary (who is responsible for delivering the annual budget in 
Hong Kong‟s Legislative Council) to maintain the financial stability of Hong Kong 
by taking such measures as are necessary to insure the smooth operation of 
                                                        
2
 See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/China_Securities_Regulatory_Commission, the Wikipedia 
website: 
 
3
 See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/China_Securities_Regulatory_Commission, on the Wikipedia 
website. 
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Hong Kong‟s securities markets.  Hong Kong‟s legal and regulatory framework is 
more in line with international standards and practices than is the case with the 
Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges.  Moreover, the Hong Kong Stock 
Exchange has a more active and liquid secondary market than either the 
Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges, and so more and more enterprises 
from the mainland of China as well as international investors, are tending to list 
their securities on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange. 
 
3.2.2. Listing Rules of Main Stock Exchanges in China 
 
In this section we outline the listing requirements of the three main stock 
exchanges in China.  We begin with the Shanghai Stock Exchange.  Firms 
applying to list their shares on the Shanghai Stock Exchange must conform with 
its listing requirements which are largely based on the “Securities Law of the 
People‟s Republic of China” and the “Company Law of the People‟s Republic of 
China” 4  When a firm plans a public issue of shares for the first time it must seek 
the approval of the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC). Once the 
CSRC has approved a public issue of shares then the affected firm may apply to 
have its shares listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange.  A second requirement is 
that after the public issue of shares the firm‟s total share capital must not be less 
than RMB 50 million (Yuan).  Moreover, the firm must have been in business for 
more than 3 years and have been profitable over the last three consecutive 
years.  In the case of former large and medium sized state owned enterprises re-
established as private or public firms in accordance with the “Securities Law of 
the People‟s Republic of China” and “Company Law of the People‟s Republic of 
China”, the profitability requirement can be calculated consecutively; that is, 
profits from the period when the firm was state owned can be included as a 
component of the three year profitability calculation.  There must also be at least 
1,000 individual shareholders whose investment in the shares of the firm exceeds 
RMB 1,000.  Furthermore, publicly offered shares must be more than 25% of the 
                                                        
4
 See the official website of Shanghai Stock Exchange: www.sse.com.cn. 
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firm‟s total share capital.  When the firm‟s total share capital exceeds RMB 400 
million, the minimum percentage of shares that must be issued to the public is 
reduced from 25% to 10%.  Finally, the firm must not have been involved in any 
major illegal activities or false accounting practices in the three years prior to its 
listing on the Shanghai Stock Exchange.  
The Shenzhen Stock Exchange is the smaller of the two stock exchanges 
operating in mainland China.  Its listing requirements are broadly similar to those 
of the Shanghai Stock Exchange. 5  In particular, when a firm plans a public issue 
of shares for the first time it must seek the approval of the China Security 
Regulatory Commission (CSRC). Once the CSRC has approved a public issue of 
shares then the affected firm may apply to have its shares listed on the 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange.  Public listing on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange is 
only available to firms with an issued share capital in excess of RMB 30 million 
(Yuan).  The comparable figure on the Shanghai Stock Exchange is RMB 50 
million and so it is not surprising that there is a preponderance of small and 
medium sized firms listed on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange when compared to 
the Shanghai Stock Exchange.  Furthermore, publicly offered shares must be 
more than 25% of the firm‟s total share capital (there is provision for firms with 
share capital in excess of RMB 400 million to reduce this figure as in the case of 
the Shanghai Stock Exchange).  Finally, firms listing on the Shenzhen Stock 
Exchange must have a good credit record for the three years prior to listing. This 
latter requirement also applies for firms listing on the Shanghai Stock Exchange, 
although it is stated in a slightly different way. 
As previously noted, the Hong Kong Stock is the most actively traded and liquid 
of the three stock exchanges which exist in China.  Moreover, it operates under a 
regulatory framework which is more attuned with international standards and 
practices than is the case with the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges.  
Given this, it is hardly surprising that it has slightly different listing requirements 
                                                        
5
 See http://www.szse.cn/main/en/aboutsse/listingqualifications/, the official website of Shenzhen 
Stock Exchange: 
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when compared to those for both the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges. 
6 In particular, only firms with an expected market capitalisation of HK$200 million 
or more can apply for listing on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange.  In general, at 
least 25% of the securities must be held by the public (a rule which is broadly 
compatible with the listing requirements of both the Shanghai and Shenzhen 
Stock Exchanges).  Firms must also have been conducting their commercial 
and/or business activities for a period of not less than three consecutive years 
prior to the application for listing and must also have traded under the same 
management for the prior three years.  Finally the firm must have total profits of 
at least HK$50 million over the last 3 years (including a profit of at least HK$20 
million in the most recent year and an aggregate profit of at least HK$30 million in 
the two preceding years).  If the firm does not satisfy this requirement it can still 
seek a listing on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange if it meets either a market 
capitalisation/revenue test or a revenue/cash flow test. 
3.2.3 Unique and Distinctive Characteristics of Chinese Stock Markets 
 
China‟s currency, the RMB (Yuan), is not completely and freely convertible into 
foreign currencies.  This is because the Chinese government has implemented a 
policy which restricts the amount of RMB (Yuan) that can leave the country in 
order to preserve the nation‟s foreign currency reserves.  This policy has had a 
stabilising effect on the rate at which the RMB (Yuan) trades against most foreign 
currencies and this in turn has created a degree of certainty for firms and other 
organisations which operate in export and/or import oriented markets.  However, 
this policy of restricted trading in the RMB (Yuan) means that a distinction has 
had to be made between foreign investors and investors who are Chinese 
nationals.  Chinese nationals (including individuals, legal persons and the state) 
will normally purchase “A” shares which are shares whose principal (that is, 
prices) and dividends are denominated in the RMB (Yuan) and which are 
exclusively traded on the stock market in terms of the Yuan.  Foreign investors 
                                                        
6
 Refer to the official website of Hong Kong Stock Exchange: www.hkex.com.hk. 
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usually have only very limited access to A shares.  However, foreign investors 
(including investors from Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macao) who wish to invest in 
mainland Chinese firms will normally do so by purchasing so called “B” shares.  
Whilst both the principal and dividends of B shares are normally denominated in 
the RMB (Yuan), trading on the stock market in B shares normally occurs in 
either the US dollar or the Hong Kong dollar and not the Yuan.  Foreign investors 
who buy and sell B shares must commission an authorised Chinese securities 
institution to deal with the transaction.  The authorised institutions may then enter 
into proxy agreements with approved securities institutions outside of China in 
buying and selling B shares.  Dividends, bonuses and trading earnings from B 
shares may be remitted outside of China after the deduction of relevant taxes 
(Campbell, 2006).  In summary, A shares are the main body of shares traded on 
the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges; B shares account for less than 
1% (in terms of market capitalisation) of all shares traded on these two stock 
exchanges.  This in turn means that B shares normally have only a very limited 
impact on the mainland Chinese stock markets.   
However, one potential caveat that applies to this conclusion stems from the fact 
that the prices of the B shares for a particular firm often trade at a significant 
discount in comparison to the A shares in the same firm.   This is despite the fact 
that B shares carry essentially the same rights and privileges as A shares.  This 
opens up the potential for riskless hedging opportunities a theme that has been 
developed in some detail by Bergstrom and Tang (2001).  However, if the 
Chinese government moves to a situation under which the RMB (Yuan) is 
allowed to trade freely without restrictions - and some predict that this will 
eventually be the case (Yam, 2005) - then the distinction between A shares and 
B shares will no longer exist on the mainland Chinese stock markets.  Evidence 
that this will eventually transpire arises from the fact that after China‟s admission 
to the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in 2001, domestic investors were allowed 
to participate in purchasing B shares and rules were introduced which allowed 
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qualified foreign institutional investors to purchase A shares in Chinese mainland 
firms in certain circumstances. 
Another unique feature of the mainland Chinese stock markets is that not all the 
A shares issued by firms are tradable, and this constitutes a significant difference 
from the stock markets in western countries like the USA and UK.  A shares can 
be sub-divided into three groups which are “state owned” shares, “legal person” 
shares and “public individual” shares in terms of the strictly defined groups of 
shareholdings in China.  State owned shares are those owned by the state, 
including the central government and local governments. Legal person shares 
are those held by domestic legal entities and institutions such as state-private 
mixed enterprises and non-bank financial institutions (Qi and Wu, 2000).  An 
important point that needs to be stressed here is that only public individual 
shares are freely tradable on mainland stock markets; that is, state shares and 
legal person shares cannot be traded on these markets.  Furthermore, non-
tradable A shares (that is, state shares and legal person shares) account for a 
majority of the A shares issued by most listed firms.  Li and Zhang (2007) quote 
statistics which show that in 2004, Chinese firms had 712 RMB (Yuan) billion of A 
shares on issue.  However, 454.3 RMB (Yuan) billion or 64% of these A shares 
were non-tradable.  In particular, state owned shares accounted for 74% of the 
non-tradable shares or slightly less than half of the A shares issued by Chinese 
firms.  The tradability restrictions which apply to state owned shares and legal 
person shares can act as a deterrent for takeover and merger activities and 
hence, the overall allocative efficiency of the Chinese economy.   The only way 
that non-tradable shares can be transferred is to reach a private takeover 
agreement.  This and the other factors considered above are of crucial 
importance to the research we are conducting with regard to M&A activities in 
China. 
The principal reason for the existence of such a large proportion of non-tradable 
A shares is to prevent state owned assets from falling into the hands of private or 
foreign parties.  In other words, if state owned shares were allowed to be 
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transferred to private owners, then the socialist economy on which the Chinese 
political system is founded might be threatened (Huang, 2006, p. 14).  It also 
guards against the possibility of fraud and misappropriation by private firms and 
individuals.  However, we have previously observed how the existence of a 
significant block of non-tradable shares is detrimental to the long run 
development and health of the Chinese economy.  In particular, it leads to a 
divergence in the values of the traded as against the non-traded A shares and 
weakens the stock market‟s price discovery function.  This in turn leads to a 
lowering of allocative efficiency in the Chinese economy as a whole (Huang, 
2006, p. 14).  The problems caused by this dichotomy between traded and non-
traded A shares became so acute that beginning in 2000, the Chinese 
government began implementing a reform programme under which it eventually 
aims to remove all restrictions in the trading of state owned shares (Jin and Yu, 
2009). 
According to Huang (2008, pp. 157-158), prior to 2005 the Chinese government 
made several attempts to remove the trading restrictions which applied to state 
owned shares.  However, these reforms were generally unsuccessful and along 
with some other factors, contributed to the “bear” market on Chinese stock 
markets which lasted for four years around the turn of the century7.   In April, 
2005, the CSRC issued a new plan for shareholding structure reform called 
„Guquan Fenzhi Gaige‟, under which market-based processes are gradually 
being implemented for the transfer of share ownership rather than the 
government-imposed processes which had prevailed up until that point in time.  
Under the Guquan Fenzhi Gaige reform programme, representatives of the group 
of shareholders with tradable A shares (that is, public shareholders) agree terms 
and conditions for the conversion of non-tradable A shares into tradable A shares 
with representatives of the group of shareholders who hold the non-tradable A 
shares.  These terms and conditions not only include the rate at which the non-
tradable shares are to be converted into tradable shares but also, any other 
                                                        
7
 See the official website of Shanghai Stock Exchange and Shenzhen Stock Exchange. 
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forms of compensation which are to be paid to the previously existing tradable 
shareholders.  Since the non-tradable shareholders are granted a new and 
valuable trading privilege, the Guquan Fenzhi Gaige reform measures allow the 
compensation given to previously existing tradable shareholders to take a variety 
of forms, including the issue of new tradable shares, cash payouts and the issue 
of new warrants, etc.  The rate at which non-tradable shares are converted into 
tradable shares varies from one firm to another because the terms are absolutely 
negotiable between the holders of the non-tradable shares and the holders of 
tradable (that is, public) shares.  In addition, the Guquan Fenzhi Gaige reform 
measures stipulate that a certain proportion of the non-tradable shares which are 
converted into tradable shares cannot be sold in the first few years after being 
transferred into tradable shares.   
The first firm to successfully convert its non-tradable A shares into tradable A 
shares under the Guquan Fenzhi Gaige reform measures was the Sany Heavy 
Industry Company.  The public (that is, tradable) shareholders in Sany Heavy 
Industry Company received 3.5 new shares and RMB 8 (Yuan) cash for every 10 
tradable shares that they already held.  Furthermore, non-tradable shareholders 
undertook not to sell any of their newly created tradable shares on the stock 
market for the first two years after conversion and no more than 10% of their 
newly created tradable shares in the third year after conversion.  Firms that have 
successfully been through the process of converting their non-tradable shares 
into tradable shares use the prefix „G‟ as part of their stock market names.  All 
together there are 1,333 A-share enterprises listed on either the Shanghai Stock 
Exchange or the Shenzhen Stock Exchange with non-tradable shares that need 
to implement the Guquan Fenzhi Gaige reform measures.  As of July 2007, 1,229 
of these enterprises had begun the process of implementing the Guquan Fenzhi 
Gaige reform measures (Jin and Yu, 2009). 
The impact of the Guquan Fenzhi Gaige reform measures on the stock market 
can be divided into short-term and long-term effects.  Initially, in the short-term, 
there has been an increase in the volatility of Chinese stock markets due to 
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speculative investors “treasure-hunting” for possible future reform candidates 
(Yam, 2005).8  Against this, in the long run, the Guquan Fenzhi Gaige reform 
measures involve positive and multiple benefits for investors.  The most obvious 
benefit arises from the fact that state-owned shares will ultimately be tradable 
with all the liquidity advantages that this entails.  Moreover, shareholders will be 
able to make “direct” (market based) assessments about the performance of 
enterprise managers, instead of using “indirect” (accounting based) measures, 
such as the return on net asset value (NAV), which had to be used before the 
state-owned shares were converted into tradable shares.  Secondly, whilst the 
Qualified Foreign Institutional Investor (QFII) measures which were introduced in 
November, 2002 by the CSRC, allowed a small number of foreign investors to 
purchase A shares in domestic Chinese enterprises, there numbers were so 
small as to have only a very limited impact on Chinese stock markets and the 
wider economy.  Hence, if the alleged benefits arising from foreign investment 
are to be realised in the Chinese economy, the QFII laws will have to be 
liberalised so as to allow a greater number of foreign investors to purchase the A-
shares of domestic Chinese firms.  It is only then that M&A activities and the 
efficiencies which arise from them can be expected to increase in China.  In other 
words, liberalisation of the QFII measures should enable Chinese stock markets 
to be more efficient in recognising and improving strong firms as well as weeding 
out weak and under-performing firms, thereby resulting in much better returns for 
investors and improving the overall efficiency of Chinese economy (Yam, 2005). 
In addition to the division between A shares and B shares, another unique 
characteristic of the Chinese stock markets is the existence of H shares which 
are exclusively traded on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange.  H shares are issued 
by firms incorporated in mainland China and are denominated and traded in 
Hong Kong dollars.  H shares principally cover sectors such as 
telecommunications, insurance, real estate, airlines, logistics as well as oil and 
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 Speculative investors are too short-term driven: after the conversion of non tradable shares into 
tradable shares, they simply dump the newly created tradable shares and shift their attention to 
other reform candidates. 
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mining, etc.  Here, it is important to note that an increasing number of Chinese 
firms have their shares listed simultaneously on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange 
and one of the two mainland Chinese stock exchanges; namely, the Shanghai 
Stock Exchange or the Shenzhen Stock Exchange.  Initially, only international 
investors were able to buy H shares but from 2007 onwards, the Chinese 
government has allowed investors from mainland China to invest in H shares as 
well.  This has resulted in a significant increase in the demand for H shares. 
3.3 China’s Takeover Legal Regime 
3.3.1 Framework and Overview of China’s Takeover Laws 
As discussed earlier in this chapter, following the merger of the local securities 
regulatory authorities with the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) 
in 1997, the CSRC now has exclusive authority for the regulation of securities 
markets and activities in China.  There are two main laws regulating the merger 
and acquisition (M&A) activities of listed firms in China.  The first is the Securities 
Law of the People‟s Republic of China (PRC), which came into force in 1999.  
The stated objectives of the Securities Law is to regulate the issuance, sale and 
purchase of securities, protect the lawful rights and interests of investors, 
safeguard the public interest and enhance economic order and promote the 
growth of the socialist market economy in China.9  Hence, the Securities Law 
covers a wide range of regulatory activities, including the public listing of 
securities and stock exchange regulation, on-going disclosure of information by 
listed firms, prohibited trading acts and the regulation of mergers and acquisitions 
by publicly listed firms, etc.  The Securities Law of the PRC is comprised of 
twelve chapters, only one of which - Chapter 4 - contains provisions relating to 
the regulation of mergers and acquisitions.  However, Chapter 4 of the Securities 
Law lays down only very general provisions relating to M&A activities in China.  
More detailed regulatory provisions have been promulgated by the CSRC and 
are to be found in the second important law alluded to earlier; namely, Measures 
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 Refer to Article one of the Securities Law of People‟s Republic of China. 
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for the Administration of the Takeover of Listed Companies (Shangshi Gongsi 
Ganli Banfa), 2002 as amended in 2006.  According to Huang (2008), the 
Takeover Measures, 2006 set up the most comprehensive and workable legal 
framework to date for the M&A activities of Chinese listed firms.  Furthermore, a 
number of important changes were incorporated into the 2006 amended 
Takeover Measures in order to fill gaps and loopholes which experience had 
shown existed the in the 2002 Takeover Measures.  Given this, our primary focus 
in this chapter will be on the 2006 Takeover Measures which were promulgated 
on 31 July 2006 and came into force on 1 September 2006. 
3.3.2 General Principles of Measures for the Administration of the 
Takeovers of Listed Companies, 2006. 
As previously noted Measures for the Administration of the Takeovers of Listed 
Companies 2006, which was issued by the CSRC, is the main and most 
important law associated with the regulation of takeover activities for listed firms 
in China and is a revised version of the Takeover Measures which came into 
force in 2002.  The Takeover Measures, 2006 aim to regulate takeovers of listed 
firms and the related alteration of share entitlement, protect the legitimate rights 
and interests of listed firms and investors, maintain the order and efficient 
operation of securities markets and promote the optimum distribution of 
resources throughout the Chinese economy, etc.  Moreover, protecting the 
interests of investors has a very high priority in the 2006 Takeover Measures.  
The Takeover Measures, 2006 emphasise that mergers and acquisitions shall be 
conducted in light of the principles of openness (Gong Kai), fairness (Gong Ping) 
and equity (Gong Zheng).10  It is these principles which underscore the 
requirement of the Takeover Measures, 2006 that the information disclosed by 
firms involved in mergers and acquisitions shall be truthful, accurate and 
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 See Article 3 of the Takeover Measures, 2006.  
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complete and must not contain any false record, misleading statement or 
significant omissions.11 
Article 4 of the takeover Measures, 2006 stipulates that takeovers involving 
foreign investors must have the approval of the related Department of State; this 
will normally be the CSRC but there will be circumstances in which the approval 
of other Departments of State will be required.  For example, in 2008 the Ministry 
of Commerce (MOFCOM) blocked the U.S. Coca-Cola Company from mounting 
a successful takeover bid for the Chinese fruit giant, Huiyuan Juice Group Ltd on 
the grounds that it would have been the biggest foreign takeover of a Chinese 
firm in Chinese history and that it would have infringed the Chinese Antimonopoly 
Law.  Furthermore, the Huiyuan Juice Group is a famous national Chinese brand 
closely associated with the Chinese people who would not approve of a well 
known domestic national brand like this falling into the hands of foreign owners.  
A detailed consideration of the Chinese Antimonopoly Law will be provided in the 
subsequent sections of this chapter.   Finally, foreign investors must be subject to 
Chinese laws and ordinances and also, obey the judicial and arbitral system of 
China.  As previously noted one reason MOFCOM blocked Coca Cola‟s takeover 
bid for the Huiyuan Juice Group was that it infringed the Chinese Antimonopoly 
Law.  Hence, Article 4 of the Takeover Measures, 2006 represents a significant 
barrier to foreign firms seeking to use the takeover mechanism to enter 
potentially profitable Chinese markets, to access the cheap labour force and the 
wide range of resources that are available in the Chinese economy. 
Under some circumstances bidding firms are barred from takeover activities.  
Hence under Article 6(1) of the Takeover Measures, 2006, a bidding firm will be 
prevented from using the takeover procedures to acquire another firm if, in the 
opinion of the CSRC, it has been in a continuous state of high indebtedness 
(literally, “large debts”) and has a history of not being able to meet its debts as 
they fall due for payment (literally, “has not paid off its due debts”).  However, the 
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 See Article 3 of the Takeover Measures, 2006. 
 
 Laws and Regulations 
 
72 
 
Takeover Measures, 2006 are silent as to what is meant by a continuous state of 
high indebtedness and has not paid its debts as they fall due.  Secondly, under 
Article 6(2) of the Takeover Measures, 2006 if the bidding firm has ever 
committed a major illegal act or has ever been suspected of being involved in a 
major illegal act during the 3 years prior to the takeover, then the CSRC may bar 
the bidding firm from the takeover of any listed firms.  Similarly, under Article 6(3) 
if the bidding firm has committed any serious credit-breaking act in the securities 
market during the 3 years preceding the takeover, then the CSRC may also bar 
the bidding firm from the takeover of any listed firms. There are also a few other 
circumstances under which the CSRC can refuse to sanction takeover activities 
by personal individuals.  For example under Article 147 of the Chinese Company 
Law, a person who is without or has limited capacity of civil conduct or a person 
who has a criminal conviction within 3 years prior to the takeover date will be 
barred by the CRSC from participating in any takeover activities.   As we note 
above there are several other circumstances under which the CSRC will refuse to 
sanction takeover activities by individuals or firms; further details are to be found 
in the Securities Law, the Company Law and the Takeover Measures, 2006. 
Article 9 of the Takeover Measures, 2006 also provides that the bidding firm in a 
takeover must hire a financial consultant who is to make an assessment about 
whether the proposed takeover is injurious to the legitimate rights and interests of 
either the target or bidding firms and/or their shareholders.  The financial 
consultant must be a professional institution which is registered in China and has 
a financial consultancy qualification.  Further details of the role and functions of 
financial consultants in the takeover process are to be found in a later section of 
this chapter. 
3.3.3 Definition of the Concept of Control 
The concept of control is important in empirical studies of M&A activities since it 
has a potentially crucial impact on the way that the data for the study is selected.  
 Laws and Regulations 
 
73 
 
Under Article 84 of the Takeover Measures, 2006 a bidding firm is said to acquire 
control of a listed target firm if: 
(1)  it successfully purchases more than 50% of the equity shares issued by 
the listed target firm, or 
(2)   it can exercise 30% of the voting rights associated with the equity capital 
of the listed target firm, or 
(3) it has the capacity to determine the election of more than half of the 
membership of the firm‟s board of directors, or 
(4) it has control of sufficient voting rights to either determine or have a 
“significant” impact on the outcome of resolutions tabled at a general 
assembly of shareholders. 
Hence, under the Takeover Measures, 2006 a bidding firm that satisfies any one 
of these four stated conditions is said to have gained control over the listed target 
firm.  Unfortunately, the SDC data base from which we obtained most of our 
takeover data does not contain comprehensive information on the voting rights 
acquiring firms obtained in the listed target firms.  Given this, our empirical 
analysis of mergers and acquisitions in China is based on Article 84(1) of the 
Takeover Measures, 2006; namely, as long as the acquiring firms purchase more 
than 50% of the equity shares of the listed target firms, a takeover will be 
deemed to have occurred and will be included in our subsequent empirical 
analysis. 
3.3.4 Mandatory Bid Rule 
In accordance with the equality of opportunities principle, a mandatory bid rule 
sits at the heart of China‟s takeover laws (Huang, 2008).  Hence, both the 
Securities Law and the Takeover Measures, 2006 have a clear and consistent 
definition with regard to the mandatory bid rule. Thus, under Article 61 and 
Articles 23, 24, 25 and 83 of the Takeover Measures, 2006 an investor who by 
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himself or who in conjunction with other “concerted parties” controls 30% or more 
of the equity shares issued by the listed target firm are required to make either a 
general or partial tender offer for the remaining shares in the affected listed firm.  
Article 83 defines concerted parties as those with whom the primary investor is 
acting in concert by means of private agreement or any other arrangement in 
order to boost their joint voting power in the listed target firm.  For example, the 
mandatory bid rule will apply to an investor himself or who in conjunction with 
other “concerted parties” jointly controls 30% or more of the shares in the listed 
target firm not only by means of co-jointly acquiring shares, but also by 
investment relationship, agreement, partnership cooperation, joint venture, 
simultaneously acting as directors, etc.  Hence, not only the acquirer‟s own 
shareholdings, but also the shareholdings of its concerted parties acting in 
concert (so-called Yizhi Xingdongren) will be counted when calculating an 
investor‟s shareholding in a listed target firm (Huang, 2008).  This is a great 
improvement in the means of calculating investors‟ shareholdings for takeover 
purposes in comparison to the old version; that is, the 2002 version of the 
Takeover Measures. 
Here it is important to note that the mandatory bid rule provides protection for 
shareholders of the target firm by ensuring that the control premium paid by the 
acquiring firm is shared amongst all the shareholders of the target firm.  But on 
the other hand, this kind of protection may come at the expense of the 
contestability of takeovers since the cost of the takeover may rise and some 
potential bidders may be dissuaded from being involved in the takeover because 
of it (Huang, 2008). 
Moreover, under certain circumstances the CSRC can exempt bidding firms and 
concerted parties from the mandatory tender provisions of the Takeover 
Measures, 2006.  The exact conditions under which the exemption applies are 
given detailed consideration in a subsequent section of this chapter. 
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3.3.5. Disclosure of Substantial Shareholdings 
Article 13 of the Takeover Measures, 2006 taken in conjunction with Article 86 of 
the Securities Law requires the disclosure of substantial shareholdings in listed 
firms (5% or more of the equity stock) and is meant to provide the market with an 
early warning of possible takeovers (Jennings, et. Al., 1992).  Article 22 of the 
Takeover Measures, 2006 provide that a substantial shareholding in a listed firm 
shall include not only the shares registered under the investor‟s name but also 
shares held in conjunction with other concerted parties as well as those shares 
not registered under the investor‟s name but for which the voting rights are 
actually controlled by the given investor. 
Articles 13, 14 and 15 of the Takeover Measure, 2006 require that if an investor 
coupled with his or her concerted parties come to hold 5% of the shares issued 
by a listed firm by means of transactions in the stock exchange, transfer 
agreement, as well as administrative transfer or alternation, implementation of 
court ruling, inheritance or donation, etc. then they must disclose their position to 
the market by submitting a written report which summarises the information 
specified in Article 16 of the Takeover Measures, 2006 to the Head Office of the 
CSRC in Beijing as well as to the relevant stock exchange.  They must also send 
a copy of the written report to the CSRC representative office in the locality of the 
listed firm (hereinafter referred to as the representative office) and at the same 
time formally notify the listed firm that it has submitted a report to the CSRC and 
the stock exchange.  The acquiring investor/s must also make a formal 
announcement to the general public within three business days from the date 
when the substantial shareholding occurs.  Furthermore, the investor cannot 
continue to buy or sell the shares in the listed firm until it has satisfied the 
provisions of Articles 13, 14 and 15 of the Takeover Measures, 2006; that is, until 
the market has been fully informed of its substantial shareholding in the listed 
firm (Huang, 2008).  Equally, Article 13 and Article 14 of the Takeover Measures, 
2006 provide that if a substantial shareholder along with their concerted parties 
increase or decrease their shareholding in the listed firm by 5% by means of 
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transactions in the stock exchange or transfer agreements, etc. (that is, by 5% to 
10%, 10% to 15% and so on) they again must send a copy of the written report 
specified by Article 16 to the CSRC and the stock exchange and they must also 
notify the listed target firm and the general public.  During the disclosure period 
and for two days thereafter, the investor/s cannot continue to buy or sell any 
shares in the listed target firm. 
Here it is important to note that there are two categories of disclosure for 
substantial shareholdings under Article 16 of the Takeover Measures, 2006. 
Specifically, if the investor and their concerted parties are not the largest 
shareholder or the actual controlling shareholder of the listed firm (as defined in 
Article 84 of the Takeover Measures, 2006) and  their collective shareholding is 
in excess of 5% but less than 20%, then only the simplified disclosure system as 
specified in Article 16 is required; namely: 
(1) The names and domiciles of the investor and their concerted parties as 
well as the names, places of registration and legal representatives of the 
investor and their concerted parties if the investor and concerted parties 
are legal persons; 
 
(2) The purpose of holding shares and whether or not the investor and their 
concerted parties intend to continuously increase their shareholdings of  
the listed firm over the following twelve months; 
 
(3) The name of the listed company and also the type, quantity and proportion 
of shares held; 
 
(4) The timing and the method used by the investor and their concerted 
parties to acquire or decrease their shareholding in the listed firm by 5%; 
 
(5) A brief summary of the shares in the listed target firm purchased and sold 
on the Stock Exchange in the 6 months‟ period immediately preceding the 
acquisition or disposal of the 5% shareholding in the listed firm. 
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The second category is when the substantial shareholding of the investor and 
their concerted parties exceeds 20% but is less than 30% of the total issued 
shares of the listed firm.  In this circumstance Article 17 of the Takeover 
Measures, 2006 require that a very detailed report must be submitted to the 
Head Office of the CSRC in Beijing and the stock exchange.  A copy of the 
Report must also be filed with the CSRC representative office in the locality of the 
listed target firm and the listed target firm and general public must also be notified 
within three business days from the date when the variation in the substantial 
shareholding occurs.  In addition to the contents required by the simplified report 
as specified in Article 16 of the Takeover Measures, 2006 as given above, the 
following information must also be provided: 
(1) The controlling shareholders of the investor and their concerted parties 
and a structural chart of the relationship between the shareholdings of the 
investor and their concerted parties in the listed target firm; 
 
(2) The price, the total amount of capital required and the source of the capital 
or other payment arrangements used to acquire the additional shares in the 
listed target firm; 
 
(3)  Whether or not there exists intra-industry competition or potential intra-
industry competition or continuous affiliated transactions between the 
business of the investor and their concerted parties (and their controlling 
shareholders) and the business of the listed target firm.  If the intra-industry 
competition or continuous affiliated transactions do exist, whether related 
arrangements have been made to encourage the intra-industry competition 
and also, to maintain the independence of the listed target firm; 
 
(4) The plans the investor and their concerted parties have for redeploying the 
assets, business, personnel, organisational structure, etc. of the listed target 
firm; 
 
(5)  The primary and important transactions which have occurred between the 
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investor and their concerted parties and the listed target firm over the two 
years preceding the variation of the substantial shareholding in the listed 
target firm. 
The substantial shareholding disclosure threshold and regulations in China are 
broadly similar to those which apply in most advanced industrialised countries 
(Huang, 2008).   In determining the threshold at which the market and other 
participants must be informed of a substantial shareholding, regulators must 
strike a balance across a variety of competing considerations.  For example, 
lower thresholds provide more protection for the shareholders of the target firm.  
Against this lower thresholds will make it difficult for the acquiring firm to obtain 
the “toehold” necessary to launch a successful takeover bid.  It will also more 
than likely increase the price which the acquiring firm will have to pay in order to 
mount a successful takeover bid (Huang, 2008, p. 166).  In other words, lower 
thresholds lead to a better informed market; but against this, it may make the 
takeover more costly, since if the acquirer must disclose their intentions too early, 
the share price of the target firm will tend to rise earlier than it otherwise would 
have (Fischel, 1978). 
3.3.6. Tender Offer Rules 
In section 3.2.4 we note that Articles, 23, 24, 25 and 83 of the Takeover 
Measures, 2006 provide that an investor who by himself or in conjunction with 
other concerted parties controls 30% or more of the equity shares issued by a 
listed target firm must make either a general or partial tender offer for the 
remaining shares in the affected listed firm.  A general offer is an offer made to all 
shareholders in the listed target firm to acquire the shares that is does not 
presently own.  Thus, if the acquiring firm owns 30% of the shares it will make a 
general tender offer to acquire the remaining 70% of shares that it does not 
presently own.  A partial offer is an offer made to all the shareholders of the listed 
target firm for part of the shares they hold; subject to the requirement that the 
minimum tender offer must be for at least 5% of all the shares issued by the 
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listed target firm.  Thus, if the acquiring firm owns 30% of the target firm, the 
minimum partial tender offer will be to acquire 5% of the total issued capital 
thereby increasing the acquirer‟s interest in the target firm from 30% to 35% of 
the total issued shares.   
Here it is important to note, however, that Article 62 of the Takeover Measures, 
2006 provides that under certain circumstances acquiring firms may be exempted 
by the CSRC from the mandated tender offer requirements.  The specific 
circumstances under which acquiring firms can apply for exemption are given 
detailed treatment in section 3.3.9 of this chapter of the dissertation.  The partial 
tender offer, which was not available before 2006 (only general tender offers 
existed prior to this date) represents a significant improvement in comparison to 
the takeover regimes previously available as it effectively provides more flexibility 
for potential acquirers and thus reduces the transaction costs associated with 
takeovers (Baker and McKenzie International, 2006). 
Articles 36 of the Takeover Measures, 2006 specifies that the acquirer may pay 
the consideration for a takeover in cash, securities, a combination of cash and 
securities or any other lawful means.  However, where the securities used as 
consideration for a takeover are not listed on a stock exchange the acquiring firm 
must offer a cash alternative to the shareholders of the listed target firm.  Here it 
is important to note that prior to 2006 the consideration for all takeovers had to be 
in cash.  This often caused difficulties for acquirers both in terms of financing and 
post-takeover integration (Huang, 2008, p. 162).  There are, however, several 
exceptions to this rule.  For example, Article 27 of the Takeover Measures, 2006 
provides that if the acquirer has to make a general tender offer to all 
shareholders of a target firm, and thereafter seeks to delist the target firm, or 
because the acquirer failed to obtain an exemption from making a general tender 
offer from the CSRC, then the takeover consideration has to be paid completely 
by cash. 
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Furthermore, if the consideration for the takeover is to be paid in cash there must 
be a public announcement to that effect and the acquirer must deposit not less 
than 20% of the total amount of the takeover consideration with a bank 
designated by the China Securities Depository and Clearing Corporation as the 
performance guarantee.  On the other hand, if the acquirer pays the takeover 
consideration by means of securities, the audited financial statements of the 
issuer of the said securities, as well as the valuation report prepared under Article 
67(5) of the Takeover Measures, 2006, must be made available to the listed 
target firm‟s shareholders, the CSRC and the Stock Exchange amongst others.  
The valuation report and other regulations take a slightly different form according 
to whether the securities used as consideration for the takeover are bonds or 
shares and whether or not they are listed on a stock exchange.  For example, if 
the takeover consideration paid by the acquirer is comprised wholly or partly of 
bonds not listed on the stock exchange, then Article 36 of the Takeover 
Measures, 2006 provides that the shareholders of the target firm must be offered 
a cash alternative to the bonds.  Article 36 also requires that the acquirer should 
cooperate and assist with the due-diligence investigations of the independent 
financial consultant employed by the listed target firm. 
It is also important to note that Article 35 of the Takeover Measures, 2006 places 
a lower limit on the offer price which the acquirer makes for the listed target firm‟s 
shares.  Hence, the price the acquirer pays under a tender offer must not be less 
than the maximum price the acquirer has paid for any of the shares of the listed 
target firm over the six months preceding the announcement of the tender offer.  
Article 35 also provides that if the offer price is below the arithmetic average 
value of the daily weighted average prices during the thirty trading days prior to 
the announcement of the tender offer,  a financial consultant must be hired by the 
acquirer to produce a report on issues such as whether there is manipulation of 
stock prices, whether the bidder has failed to disclose its concerted parties, 
whether there has been any other arrangement for the bidder to obtain the 
shares of the target firm during the previous six months and finally, whether the 
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offer price is “reasonable” taking account of all the circumstances and events 
surrounding the acquisition process.  However, prior to the promulgation of the 
Takeover Measures, 2006, two offer prices had to be set; one offer price for the 
tradable shares in the target listed firm and another price for the non-tradable 
shares.  The offer price for the tradable shares of the listed target firm was 
determined by reference to the market price of those shares whilst the offer price 
for the non-tradable shares was based on the net asset value of the target firm as 
summarised in the latest audited financial statements for the firm.  If the price 
offered by the acquirer was obviously unfair, then under Article 34 of the 
Takeover Measures, 2002 the CSRC could intervene and demand that the 
acquirer makes an adjustment to the offer price.  In more recent years, the 
problems arising from the distinction between tradable and non-tradable shares 
has eased following the Guquan Fenzhi Gaige (shareholding structure) reforms 
which were implemented in 200512.  Importantly, Article 34 of the Takeover 
Measures, 2002 also provided that the offer price for tradable shares could not 
be lower than 90% of the arithmetic average value of the daily weighted average 
prices during the 30 trading days prior to the announcement date of the tender 
offer.  Unfortunately, more often than not this latter price turned out to be the 
price offered by the acquiring firm for the tradable shares of the listed target firm.  
This often meant that the takeover was rejected by the shareholders of the target 
listed firm because the offer price turned out to be lower than the current market 
price of the tradable shares of the target firm at the time of the takeover offer 
(Huang, 2008). 
Under article 28 of the Takeover Measures, 2006, if the shares of the target listed 
firm are purchased by means of a tender offer, then the acquiring firm shall 
employ a financial consultant who must submit a written report to the head office 
of the CSRC in Beijing as well as to the relevant stock exchange.  The financial 
consultant must also send a copy of the report to the local representative office of 
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 See Section 3.1.3 supra for a brief discussion of the 2005 Guquan Fenzhi Gaige (shareholding 
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the CSRC, inform the target listed firm about the pending tender offer and at the 
same time make a public announcement summarising the contents of the tender 
offer report.  In addition, Article 29 of the Takeover Measures, 2006 provides that 
the tender offer report prepared by the acquiring firm should contain the following 
information: 
(1) The names and domicile of the investor and their concerted parties as well 
as the names, places of registration and legal representatives of the investor 
and their concerted parties if the investor and concerted parties are legal 
persons; 
 
(2) The reasons why and the purposes for the acquirer making the takeover 
offer and whether or not the acquirer will continue to increase their 
shareholding in the target listed firm during the following 12 months; 
 
(3) The name of the target listed firm and the category of the shares to be 
purchased; 
 
(4) The quantity and proportion of the shares to be purchased; 
 
(5)  The price the acquirer will pay for the shares purchased under the tender 
offer; 
 
(6) The amount of capital required for the takeover, the sources from which 
the capital will be obtained, the guarantees or other payment arrangements 
made by the acquirer to meet its financial commitments under the tender 
offer; 
 
(7)  Conditions (partial, general or other) stipulated in the tender offer; 
 
(8)  The terms of the tender offer; 
 
(9)  The number and proportion of shares held by the acquirer in the target 
listed firm at the time when the tender offer report is submitted; 
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(10)  Whether or not there exists intra-industry competition or potential intra-
industry competition or continuous affiliated transactions between the 
business of the investor and their concerted parties (and their controlling 
shareholders) and the business of the listed firm.  If the intra-industry 
competition or continuous affiliated transactions do exist, whether related 
arrangements have been made to encourage the intra-industry competition 
and also, to maintain the independence of the listed firm; 
 
(11) The plans the investor and their concerted parties have for redeploying 
the assets, business, personnel, organisational structure, etc. of the listed firm 
over the ensuing twelve months; 
 
(12)  The primary and important transactions which have occurred between 
the investor and their concerted parties and the listed firm over the two years 
preceding the announcement of the tender offer, and 
 
(13)   A brief summary of the shares in the listed firm purchased and sold on 
the Stock Exchange in the six months‟ period immediately preceding the 
announcement of the tender offer. 
As previously noted the acquiring firm must make a public announcement 
summarising the contents of the tender offer report.  The opinions of the financial 
consultant and lawyers hired by the acquiring firm under Article 28 of the 
Takeover Measures, 2006 must be made public fifteen days after submission of 
the tender offer report to the CSRC.  During this 15 day period the CRSC may 
object to the contents of the tender offer report if it is inconsistent with laws, 
administrative regulations or any other related provisions.  If such circumstances 
arise the CSRC shall notify the acquirer that the tender offer violates the laws, 
administrative regulations or other related provisions and the acquirer may not 
make a public announcement of the tender offer.  If, however, no objections are 
made by the CSRC then the tender offer report may be announced to the public 
after this fifteen day period.  Under Article 31 of the Takeover Measures, 2006 
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after the submission of the tender offer documents to the CSRC and during this 
15 day period the acquirer may make an application to the CSRC to cancel the 
tender offer by submitting a document to the CSRC summarising the reasons 
and explanations for the proposed cancellation.  If the CSRC agrees to allow the 
acquirer to cancel the tender offer then the acquirer may not make a tender offer 
for the same firm over the ensuing twelve months and the cancellation of the 
tender offer must be announced to the public. 
The Takeover Measures, 2006 also place specific reporting and other 
responsibilities on the directors of the target firm.  In particular, Article 32 of the 
Takeover Measures, 2006 provides that the board of directors of the target firm 
must make an investigation into the capacity, credit status and purpose of the 
takeover by the acquirer and analyse the conditions of the tender offer.  
Moreover, the board of directors of the target firm must bring forward suggestions 
about whether or not the shareholders of the target firm should accept the offer 
and they must also hire an independent financial consultant to provide a 
professional opinion about each of the above issues.  Within 20 days following 
the announcement of the tender offer report from the acquirer, the board of 
directors of the target firm must submit a report to the Beijing office of the CSRC 
which summarises all of the above information (and includes the professional 
opinions from the independent financial consultant).  The report must also be filed 
with the local office of the CSRC and the stock exchange on which the target firm 
is listed.  A public announcement about the report must be made at the same 
time.  Moreover, if the acquirer makes any major alterations to the conditions of 
the tender offer, the board of directors of the target firm shall submit the 
supplementary opinions of the board of directors and of the independent financial 
consultant on the alterations to the CSRC and the stock exchange.  A public 
announcement about the alterations must also be made at the same time. 
Moreover, Article 37 of the Takeover Measures, 2006 provides a safeguard to 
protect the shareholders of the target firm by specifying the minimum time period 
over which shareholders of the target firm may consider the terms and conditions 
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of the tender offer.  Thus, the term stipulated for acceptance of the tender offer 
should not be less than 30 days and not be more than 60 days, except where 
there is a contested offer.  The CSRC has adjudged that this period allows 
shareholders of the target firm sufficient time to make a rational decision about 
whether to accept the tender offer without prejudicing the interests of the 
acquiring firm.  Further, under Article 38 of the Takeover Measures, 2006 the 
acquirer cannot sell any shares in the target firm following the announcement of 
the tender offer, nor can the acquirer buy other shares of the target firm by any 
other means not stipulated in the tender offer or that go beyond the conditions 
stipulated in the tender offer.  To some extent, the interests of the shareholders 
of the target firm are protected through this provision since it negates the 
pressure that would otherwise arise on the target firm‟s shareholders to make a 
quick and potentially, irrational decision about whether to accept the terms and 
conditions of the tender offer.  Moreover, under Article 41 of the Takeover 
Measures, 2006 if the acquirer wants to vary or change the terms and conditions 
of the tender offer, the approval of CSRC is required.13  Importantly, the variation 
of the tender offer cannot be made 15 days prior to the expiration of the bid 
unless a competing bid occurs. 
Under Article 42 of the Takeover Measures, 2006 shareholders of the target 
listed firm who accept the tender offer must entrust a securities firm to go through 
the related procedures for preliminary acceptance of the tender offer.  The 
securities firm must apply to the China Securities Depository and Clearing 
Corporation for temporary custody of the shares under the preliminarily accepted 
tender offer.  Shares under temporary custody of the China Securities Depository 
and Clearing Corporation are held in escrow over the 30 day to 60 day period 
during which shareholders of the target firm are required to make a decision 
about whether or not to accept the tender offer. However, here it is important to 
                                                        
13
 The acquirer should submit a written report to the Beijing office of the CSRC within two 
business days after the major alteration, and simultaneously send a copy to the representative 
office of the CRSC and the stock exchange.  It must also notify the target listed company and 
make a public announcement about the change or variation in the terms and conditions of the 
tender offer.  
 
 Laws and Regulations 
 
86 
 
note that preliminary accepting shareholders can withdraw their acceptance 
within three trading days before the expiration of the bid by entrusting a securities 
firm to go through the procedures of revoking the preliminarily accepted tender 
offer. 
The Takeover Measures, 2006 pay particular attention to the interests of minority 
shareholders after the takeover has been consummated.  If the tender offer 
expires and the acquirer has sufficient acceptances (normally at least 75 percent 
of all outstanding shares), then the acquirer may initiate proceedings to delist the 
target firm (Huang, 2008).  In this circumstance, Article 44 of the Takeover 
Measures, 2006 provides that the remaining shareholders in the target firm have 
the right to enforce the sale of their shares on the same terms and conditions as 
shareholders who have accepted the tender offer before the expiration date.  
This means that the remaining minority shareholders are protected from a 
“freeze-out” takeover on terms and conditions less favourable than those 
shareholders who have alreday accepted the tender offer before the expiration 
date (Huang, 2008). 
3.3.7 Defence Mechanisms 
In section 3.1.3 of this chapter we noted how in April, 2005, the CSRC issued the 
shareholding structure reform called „Guquan Fenzhi Gaige‟.  Guquan Fenzhi 
Gaige required shareholders with tradable shares in a particular firm to agree 
terms and conditions under which the non-tradable shares in that firm will be 
converted into tradable shares.14  Importantly, prior to 2005 the large majority of 
A shares were non-tradable and were mainly held by stated-owned controlled 
entities.  This in turn made tender offers and hostile takeovers extraordinarily 
difficult.   However, the gradual conversion of non-tradable shares into tradable 
shares after 2005 has facilitated an expansion in merger and acquisition activities 
                                                        
14
 Here it will be recalled that shares in the mainland Chinese capital market are divided into A 
shares and B shares.  Further, A shares fall into two categories: tradable shares and non-tradable 
shares.  Importantly, prior to 2005 the large majority of A shares were non-tradable and were 
mainly held by stated-owned entities.  This in turn made tender offers and hostile takeovers 
extraordinarily difficult. 
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with a consequent increase in the number of tender offers and hostile takeovers 
occurring in China.  This in turn required that significant reforms be made to the 
takeover defence measures available to Chinese target firms.  In response to 
this, the CSRC incorporated some important improvements into the defence 
mechanisms available to target firms under the Takeover Measures, 2006; 
though as Huang (2008) notes, the changes made are not perfect and indeed, 
are often problematic. 
Firstly, Article 8 of the Takeover Measures, 2006 provides that when the board of 
directors of a target firm implement defensive measures against a potential 
takeover they must do so in such a way as to satisfy the fiduciary duties owed to 
the target firm and its shareholders.  In particular, the defensive measures should 
be beneficial to the target firm and its shareholders and must not pose an 
inappropriate obstacle to the attempted takeover. Moreover, the board of 
directors of the target firm must not provide financial assistance either directly or 
indirectly to the bidding firm by making use of the resources of the target firm and 
nor may they damage the legitimate rights and interests of the target firm and its 
shareholders. 
Secondly, under Article 33 of the Takeover Measures, 2006 once the acquiring 
firm has filed the provisional tender offer documents with the CSRC and before 
the completion of the tender offer, the board of directors of the target firm must 
not take any defensive measures which might have a significant effect on the 
composition or value of the target firm‟s assets, its liabilities, other entitlements or 
its business performance.  In other words, when the board of directors of the 
target firm become aware of the pending tender offer they must not dispose of 
any of the target firm‟s assets, make any significant external investments or 
adjust in any way, the main business of the target firm or give guarantees or 
loans on behalf of the target firm, etc. without the approval of the shareholders in 
general meeting.  This requirement prevents the target firm from initiating 
activities which might frustrate the acquiring firm in its efforts to consummate the 
tender offer and also, from implementing any other activities which may not be in 
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the best interests of the shareholders of the target firm (Huang, 2008).  In other 
words, it implies that the catalogue of defensive measures taken by the target 
firm in the takeover is determined by the shareholders, and not the directors, 
which is quite similar to the “shareholder-based” model which underscores the 
City Code on Takeovers and Mergers in the United Kingdom (Huang, 2008).  
Here it is important to note that Article 33 of the Takeover Measures, 2006 
overlaps with and in some areas conflicts with Article 8 of the Takeover 
Measures, 2006 which is based more on U.S. law and practice.  This raises the 
general issue of whether laws based on a melange of foreign regulations in 
relation to the selection and application of the defensive measures available to 
Chinese target firms will work in China because of the very significant differences 
in culture and social norms which exist between western countries and China 
(Huang, 2008). 
3.3.8 Agreement Takeovers 
As noted previously in section 3.1.3 of this chapter, a significant characteristic of 
the Chinese securities markets is that not all the shares of listed firms are 
tradable on the stock exchange due to the division of A shares into state owned 
shares, legal person shares and public individual shares.  In particular, before 
2005 state-owned and legal person A shares were not allowed to be traded on 
organised securities markets.  However, we have previously noted that in April, 
2005, the CSRC implemented the Guquan Fenzhi Gaige reform programme 
under which listed firms with non-tradable A shares were obliged to convert these 
shares into fully tradable A shares.  By July, 2007, 1,229 of the 1,333 firms with 
non-tradable A shares listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges 
had begun the process of implementing the reform measures.  However, 
experience has shown that for most firms it takes a considerable time to reach 
agreement on the terms and conditions of the conversion process and even 
when agreement is reached, there is often a provision which restricts trading on 
the stock exchange in the formerly non-traded A shares for several years into the 
future.  Moreover, because of the the socialist principles upon which the Chinese 
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state is organised there are certain strategic industries where it is in the best 
interests of the Chinese economy for firms to remain predominantly under state 
control.  In these industries whilst some shares may be traded by private 
individuals most shares will remain under the control of the state and will not be 
available for trading on the stock market.  As a result of these factors it is 
occasionally the case that it is impracticable for prospective acquiring firms to 
make tender offers for firms which operate in industries that are of strategic 
importance to the socialist principles upon which the Chinese state is organised.  
In such circumstances the only way a prospective acquirer can make a takeover 
offer for the target firm is to reach an agreement with the Chinese government.  
Here, the Takeover Measures, 2006 lay down detailed rules governing the way in 
which an agreement for takeover is to be reached between the prospective 
acquiring company and the non-tradable shareholders. 
First, if an acquiring firm intends to reach an agreement to purchase more than 
30% of the issued shares of the target firm, then the shares that exceed the 
aforementioned 30% threshold must be acquired by means of a tender offer 
unless the acquiring firm applies for an exemption under Article 61 of the 
Takeover Measures, 2006.  Second, the period between the signing of the 
agreement and the transfer of the related shares is called the transitional period.  
Article 52 of the Takeover Measures, 2006 provides that it is only in exceptional 
circumstances that the acquiring firm can change the composition of the board of 
directors of the target firm during the transitional period.  However, in such 
exceptional circumstances the directors from the acquiring firm must not exceed 
one third of the total number of all directors of the target firm.  Furthermore, 
article 52 also provides that the target firm must not give any guarantee (financial 
or otherwise) to the acquiring firm or any of its affiliated parties during the 
transitional period.  In addition, unless the target firm is experiencing serious 
financial difficulties, it must not publicly issue shares for the raising of capital or 
conduct significant purchases or sales of assets or involve itself in any major 
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investment or any other affiliated transactions with the acquiring firm or its 
affiliated parties during the transitional period. 
Third, where there is a controlling shareholder of the target firm who transfers 
their shareholdings to the acquirer by means of agreement, then an investigation 
as to the capacity, credit status and the purpose of the takeover by the acquirer 
must be conducted and the information obtained from the investigation must be 
disclosed in the report of the modification of entitlements provided to the CSRC 
under Article 50 of the Takeover Measures, 2006.  On the other hand, if the 
controlling shareholder or any of its affiliated (concerted) parties has not paid off 
its debts to the target firm, or has not removed any guarantees that the target firm 
has provided for its debts, or is associated with any other circumstances that may 
damage the interests of the acquiring firm, then under Article 53 of the Takeover 
Measures, 2006 the board of directors of the acquiring firm must disclose the 
aforementioned circumstances and also take effective measures to protect the 
interests of its shareholders. These two provisions of the Takeover Measures, 
2006 are designed to protect the shareholders of the acquiring firm from any 
conflicts of interest that may influence the motives of the controlling shareholder 
of the target firm. 
Finally, under Articles 54 and 55 of the Takeover Measures, 2006 related parties 
involved in the takeover agreement must appoint a securities firm to apply to the 
China Securities Depository and Clearing Corporation for temporary custody of 
the shares to be transferred under the takeover agreement.  They must also 
deposit the consideration for the purchase of the shares in the bank designated 
by the China Securities Depository and Clearing Corporation.  Moreover, in 
accordance with the business operation rules of the stock exchange and the 
China Securities Depository and Clearing Corporation, after the related parties 
have agreed to go through with the takeover, the shares are removed from the 
temporary custody of the securities firm and transferred to the acquiring firm and 
the target shareholders receive the consideration deposited with the bank 
designated by the China Securities Depository and Clearing Corporation. 
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3.3.9 Application of Waiver 
We have previously noted that under the Takeover Measures, 2006 a bidding 
firm that controls 30% or more of the equity shares of a listed target firm is 
required to make either a general or partial tender offer for the remaining shares 
in the affected target firm.  However, under certain circumstances bidding firms 
are able to apply to the China Security Regulation Committee (CSRC) for an 
exemption from the requirement to make a tender offer.  Hence, Article 62 of the 
Takeover Measures, 2006 provides that a bidding firm may apply for an 
exemption from the requirement to make either a general or partial tender offer 
under the following circumstances: 
(1) The bidding firm and the target firm can prove that the transfer of shares 
would not affect the ultimate overall control of the target firm; 
 
(2) The listed target firm is suffering from serious financial difficulties and the 
scheme for helping out the target firm which is brought forward by the bidding 
firm has obtained approval from the general assembly of shareholders of the 
target firm.  Moreover, the bidding firm promises not to transfer the 
shareholdings and entitlements gained in the target firm within 3 years; 
 
(3) The bidding firm has obtained new shares issued to them with the 
approval of the non-related shareholders of the general assembly of 
shareholders of the target firm and these newly issued shares have resulted 
in the bidding firm‟s overall interest in the target firm rising above the 30% 
threshold.  Moreover, the bidding firm promises not to transfer its 
shareholding gained in the target firm for the following 3 years. 
 
Parties other than the bidding firm may also apply for an exemption from the 
requirement for the bidding firm to make a tender offer.  The exact circumstances 
under which this may be done are summarised in Article 63 of the Takeover 
Measures, 2006.  Broadly the provisions summarised in Article 63 exempt a 
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bidding firm from making a tender offer when the actions of a third party 
unintentionally lead to the bidding firm‟s overall interest in the target firm rising 
above the 30% threshold. 
3.3.10. Financial Consultant 
We have previously noted that firms involved in takeover activities in China, 
including both target and acquiring firms, are required to appoint professional 
financial consultants to assist them in undertaking takeovers in an organised and 
efficient manner. Hence, the Takeover Measures, 2006 outline detailed 
obligations and responsibilities that must be followed by the financial consultants 
appointed by the target and acquiring firms.  First, when a financial consultant 
appointed by the acquiring firm issues a “financial consultation” report, Article 66 
of the Takeover Measures, 2006 require that the report should clearly analyse 
and explain each of the following issues: 
(1) Whether or not the contents disclosed in the takeover report prepared by 
the target firm under the provisions of Article 32 of the Takeover Measures, 
2006 or the tender offer report prepared by the acquiring firm under Article 29 
of the Takeover Measures, 2006 are true, accurate and complete; 
 
(2) The purposes for the takeover as given by the acquiring firm; 
 
(3) Whether or not the acquiring firm has provided all the necessary 
certification documents and made all appropriate statements on the strengths, 
viability and future profitability of its core business operations.  The financial 
consultant must also analyse and explain the financial status and credit 
situation of the acquiring firm and identify its controlling shareholders. The 
financial consultant must also assess whether or not the acquiring firm has 
the economic wherewithal to implement the takeover and the managerial 
ability to operate the target firm effectually if the takeover comes to fruition.  
Finally, the financial consultant must assess whether or not the acquiring firm 
needs to assume any additional obligations in relation to the takeover; 
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(4) Whether or not the directors, supervisors and senior managers of the 
acquiring firm are familiar with the securities and other laws relating to 
takeovers, the administrative regulations and provisions of the CSRC and are 
fully aware of their obligations and liabilities to file all appropriate reports, to 
make all appropriate public announcements and to fulfil all relevant statutory 
obligations; 
 
(5) The major shareholders and the related percentage of shares they own in 
the acquiring firm and a structural chart of the relationship between these 
shareholders that indicates whether they can control the acquiring firm as 
concerted parties; 
 
(6) Sources of capital that the acquiring firm intends to use for the takeover 
consideration and its legality, and whether or not the acquiring firm has made 
use of shares purchased in the takeover to obtain capital financing from a 
bank or any other financial institutions by means of pledge; 
 
(7) If the acquiring firm pays the consideration for the takeover in securities, a 
statement about whether or not the information disclosed by the issuer of 
those securities is true, accurate and complete. The financial consultant is 
also responsible for assessing the liquidity of the securities offered as 
consideration for the takeover.  
 
(8) Whether or not the acquiring firm has obtained permission from the CSRC 
to implement the takeover; 
 
(9) Whether or not arrangements have been made for the stable operation of 
the target firm over the transitional period of the takeover as defined in Article 
52 of Takeover Measures, 2006, and whether the arrangements satisfy all 
related legal provisions; 
 
(10) If there is intra-industry competition or continuous affiliated transactions 
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between the acquiring and target firms, to assess the arrangements that have 
been made to resolve any conflicts which might arise between the acquiring 
and target firms and also to evaluate the arrangements which have been 
made to maintain the operational independence of the target firm: 
 
(11) Whether any party (other than the acquirer) has a right of claim on the 
takeover target, and whether the acquirer has made supplementary 
arrangements with the target firm other than the consideration for the takeover 
specified in the tender documents; 
 
(12) Whether or not there is any business relationship between the acquiring 
firm or any of its affiliated parties and the listed target firm, and whether or not 
there is any agreement on the future employment of directors, supervisors 
and senior managers between the acquiring firm and the listed target firm; 
 
(13) Whether or not the original controlling shareholder or actual controller of 
the listed target firm has not paid off its debts to the target firm, or has not 
removed any guarantees that the target firm has provided for its debts, or is 
associated with any other circumstances that may damage the interests of the 
acquiring firm.  If any of the above circumstances do exist, whether or not 
practicable solutions have been brought forward by the parties concerned.  
 
(14) In the case that the acquiring firm intends to file for an exemption to 
make a tender offer for the target firm, then the financial consultant must 
make a statement about whether the exemption satisfies any of the 
circumstances specified under Articles 62 and/or Article 63 of the Takeover 
Measures, 2006 and whether or not the acquiring firm is capable of fulfilling 
any related commitments made under these provisions. 
 
Secondly, the independent financial consultant employed by the board of 
directors of a target firm must not simultaneously act as the financial consultant 
of the acquiring firm or have any affiliated relationship with the financial 
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consultant of the acquiring firm.  Furthermore, the independent financial 
consultant of the target firm should conduct a due diligence investigation and 
issue a professional opinion about the fairness and legality of the takeover.  
Under Article 67 of the Takeover Measures, 2006 the independent financial 
consultant‟s report for the target firm should explain and analyse the following 
issues and also give clear opinions on all of them: 
(1) Whether or not the acquiring firm has the financial wherewithal to 
purchase the target firm; 
 
(2) The possible effects of the takeover on the business independence and 
continuous development of the listed target firm; 
 
(3) Whether or not the acquiring firm intends to use (or pledge) the assets of 
or other forms of capital obtained from the target firm to raise the 
consideration necessary to finance the takeover;  
 
(4) If a tender offer is involved, the financial consultant must provide an 
analysis of the financial status of the target firm, must evaluate whether or not 
the takeover price fully reflects the value of the target firm and whether or not 
the tender offer is fair and rational.  The financial consultant must also make a 
recommendation about whether the shareholders of the target firm should 
accept the tender offer;   
 
(5) If the consideration to be paid for the takeover by the acquiring firm is in 
the form of securities, then the financial consultant must conduct a valuation 
analysis of the related securities in terms of their asset backing and their 
business and profit-making potential.  The financial consultant must then use 
the assessed value of the securities to determine whether or not the 
conditions of takeover are fair and sensible to the public shareholders of the 
target firm and whether or not the conditions for takeover put forward by the 
acquiring firm should be accepted; 
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(6) If the takeover involves a management buy-out, the financial consultant 
must provide a valuation analysis of the target firm.  The financial consultant 
must also provide an assessment of the price set for the management buy-
out, the method of payment, the sources of financing for the buy-out and the 
associated repayment plans, and the feasibility of the management buy-out in 
light of all the aforementioned factors.  A summary assessment must also be 
provided about the business relationships which exist between the target 
firm‟s management, their lineal relatives and the target firm itself within the 
prior 24 months.  Finally, the financial consultant must also provide an 
independent assessment of the information disclosed in the takeover report 
prepared by the target firm under the provisions of Article 32 of the Takeover 
Measures, 2006. 
 
3.4 China’s Anti-Monopoly Law, 2008 and Regulation on Notification 
Threshold of Concentration of Undertakings. 
 
3.4.1 General Introduction to the Anti-Monopoly Law in China and 
Notification Threshold of Concentration of Undertakings 
As noted in section 3.2.2 of this chapter, the Anti-Monopoly Law, 2008 is another 
significant strand of Chinese Law which regulates mergers and acquisitions in 
China.  The Anti-Monopoly Law became effective on 1 August 2008 and soon 
after attracted world wide attention when China-MOFCOM (that is, the Ministry of 
Commerce) blocked the U.S. Coca-Cola Company from mounting a successful 
takeover bid for the Chinese fruit giant, Huiyuan Juice Group Ltd.  Article 1 of the 
Anti-Monopoly Law provides that the objectives of the law are to prevent and 
restrain monopolistic practices, protect fair competition in the market, enhance 
economic efficiency, safeguard the interests of consumers and the general public 
and promote the healthy development of the socialist market economy in China. 
The Anti-Monopoly Law is a wide ranging law that covers antitrust legislation, the 
prohibition of horizontal agreements, the prohibition of abuse of market power 
and includes provisions on the special status of State-Owned-Enterprises (SOE) 
and the so-called “administrative monopolies”, etc. amongst many other matters.  
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The Anti-Monopoly Law has had and will continue to have a significant impact on 
foreign investment in China, particularly in relation to foreign firms who wish to 
make takeover offers for domestic Chinese firms.  Hence, the primary focus of 
this section will be on the parts of the Anti-Monopoly Law that affect mergers and 
acquisitions (M&A) in China; in particular, Chapter IV of the Anti-Monopoly Law 
which is entitled “Concentration of Business Operators”.  
Under Article 10 of the Anti-Monopoly Law, 2008 there are in total three 
enforcement agencies; namely, the Ministry of  Commerce (MOFCOM), the Fair 
Trade Bureau under the State Administration for Industry and Commerce (SAIC) 
and the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC). MOFCOM is 
responsible for examining all proposed M&A transactions in China so as to 
determine whether or not those transactions will result in the elimination or 
restriction of competition within Chinese markets.  In this regard, the SAIC has 
responsibility for carrying out investigations of any potential or reported cases of 
monopoly agreements; for example, cases of abuse of dominant market position 
by undertakings.  The SAIC also has authority to impose administrative sanctions 
as appropriate. Finally, the NDRC bears responsibility for investigating all price-
related monopoly cases.  These cases may arise, for example, from price fixing 
agreements or abuse of dominant market position by undertakings.  However, 
with regard to domestic and international mergers and acquisitions, the Ministry 
of Commerce (MOFCOM) is the main agency responsible for examining 
proposed M&A activities. 
The Anti-Monopoly Law does not specify detailed financial and other notification 
thresholds for the reporting of proposed mergers and acquisitions to MOFCOM, 
and so on 3 August, 2008 the State Council issued the “Regulation on the 
Notification Threshold of Concentration of Undertakings” (from hereon in referred 
to as the Notification Regulations) to supplement the M&A rules under the Anti-
Monopoly Law.  Article 1 of the Notification Regulations indicates that it aims to 
clarify the concentration thresholds which if exceeded would require the parties 
involved in proposed M&A activities to notify MOFCOM under the Anti-Monopoly 
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Law.  This Notification Regulation, along with the new Chinese Anti-Monopoly 
Law that became effective on 1 August, 2008 opens a new era in China‟s M&A 
control regime (Hastings, 2008). 
3.4.2 The Mandatory Pre-Merger Notification Process under the Anti-    
Monopoly Law, 2008 and Notification Threshold 
Chapter IV of the Anti-Monopoly Law which is comprised of Articles 20 through 
31, details the mandatory pre-merger notification process, the investigation 
process to be followed by MOFCOM on notification of a proposed M&A activities, 
the procedures MOFCOM is to use for promulgating its decisions and the 
appeals process to be followed by dissident parties.  Article 21 of the Anti-
Monopoly Law provides that where concentration levels in M&A activities exceed 
given thresholds a declaration must be lodged with MOFCOM and the merger 
and/or acquisition must be placed in abeyance until such time as approval is 
obtained from MOFCOM for the merger and/or acquisition to proceed. As 
previously noted, however, the affected concentration levels are only vaguely 
articulated in the Ant-Monopoly Law.  Given this, the State Council issued the 
Notification Regulations which incorporate more detailed and specific 
concentration thresholds.  In particular, Article 3 of the Notification Regulations 
provide that a mandatory pre-merger notification must be filed with MOFCOM by 
the parties involved in a merger and/or acquisition when: 
(1) the total global revenues in the preceding fiscal year of all undertakings 
involved in the merger and/or acquisition exceed RMB 10 billion and the 
China revenues of at least two of the undertakings each exceed RMB 400 
million in the preceding fiscal year; or 
 
(2) the total China revenues in the preceding fiscal year of all undertakings 
involved in the merger and/or acquisition exceed RMB 2 billion and the China 
revenues of at least two of the undertakings each exceed RMB 400 million. 
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The notification thresholds under the Notification Regulations represent a huge 
improvement over the vaguely defined thresholds of the Ant-Monopoly Law and 
the thresholds defined in the 2006 Foreign Merger and Acquisition Regulations.  
These latter thresholds were based on market share criteria and were often 
difficult and even impossible to interpret, let alone implement in any practical 
sense.  Hence, the notification thresholds specified under Article 3 of the 
Notification Regulations provide clear guidance and enable the affected firms to 
evaluate whether or not a merger and acquisition filing needs to be provided to 
MOFCOM for a given transaction; and the evaluation is based on the objective 
standard of worldwide or China-wide turnover, rather than market share which 
experience under the 2006 Foreign Merger and Acquisition Regulations has 
shown is difficult to assess (Wang, 2008). 
When a proposed merger and/or acquisition satisfies the threshold conditions 
specified in Article 3 of the Notification Regulations, then Article 23 of the Anti-
Monopoly Law provides that the documents and materials required to be 
submitted to MOFCOM must include a declaration paper, an explanation of the 
merger and/or acquisition‟s effect on market competition, a detailed summary of 
the agreed terms and conditions under which the merger and/or acquisition will 
occur and the financial reports and accounting reports of the preceding 
accounting year of the business operator. Furthermore, the declaration paper 
must include the name, domicile and business scope of the parties involved in 
the merger and/or acquisition and a precise timetable under which the merger 
and/or acquisition will be consummated.  If needed, MOFCOM is also authorised 
to demand any other documents and materials which in its opinion, will facilitate 
its investigations into the proposed merger and/or acquisition.  Here it is 
important to note, however, that Article 22 of the Anti-Monopoly Law provides 
that an exemption from filing can be obtained if the proposed M&A transaction 
satisfies the concentration provisions of Article 20 of the Anti-Monopoly Law, but 
does not result in the acquiring firm obtaining majority control of the target firm.  
Specifically, if an acquiring firm already holds in excess of 50% of the voting 
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rights of the target firm (through previous acquisitions of the equity or assets of 
the target firm) or if another totally independent firm which is not taking part in the 
M&A transaction already holds in excess of 50% of the voting rights of the target 
firm, then the acquiring firm may apply for an exemption from filing the 
documents required under Article 23 of the Anti-Monopoly Law. 
3.4.3 Factors Employed to Evaluate the Concentration of Business 
Operators 
Article 27 of the Anti-Monopoly Law outlines the issues which will be considered 
by MOFCOM in reviewing proposed M&A transactions.  These mainly relate to 
the protection of the interests of consumers, competitors and other market 
participants.  Specifically, Article 27, provides that there are five relevant 
elements involved in evaluating M&A activities; namely, the market share and 
controlling power in the relevant markets of the merging firms, the degree of 
concentration in the relevant markets, the effects of the concentration for market 
access by new firms and the potential impact on technological progress in the 
relevant industries/markets, the influences of the market concentration on 
consumers and competitors and the impact of the market concentration on 
national economic development.  However, some argue that MOFCOM may use 
Article 27 of the Anti-Monopoly Law to advance macroeconomic or even 
protectionist goals since this provision mandates that consideration must be 
given to the impact that a particular merger and/or acquisition might have on the 
development of the national economy and/or public interest.  Moreover, the 
Chinese Government has recently expressed a strong desire to protect the 
intellectual property (IP) rights of Chinese firms and citizens.  Given this, concern 
has been raised that MOFCOM could use the provisions of Article 27 (for 
example, the effects of the concentration for market access by new firms) as an 
“excuse” to block proposed mergers and/or acquisitions which it considers will 
have an adverse impact on the IP rights of Chinese firms and citizens (Zhang, et. 
al., 2007).  A significant difficulty with Article 27, however, is that it is vaguely 
worded.  In particular, clarification needs to be provided about several important 
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terms; for example, relevant market, market participants, how the calculation of 
market concentration is to be made, how the influence of market concentration 
on consumers and competitors and the impact of the market concentration on 
national economic development is to be measured, etc. (Farmer, 2009). 
In addition, Article 28 of the Anti-Monopoly Law further emphasises that where 
the proposed merger and/or acquisition might eliminate or restrict competition, 
MOFCOM shall make a decision to block the proposed M&A activities.  
Moreover, Article 4 of the Notification Regulations provides that where M&A 
activities do not reach the thresholds specified in Article 3 of the Notification 
Regulations, then MOFCOM shall nonetheless be obliged to investigate the 
proposed M&A activities in accordance with the Anti-Monopoly Law if the facts 
and evidence collected through due process demonstrate that the M&A activities 
might result in exclusion or restriction of competition.  Article 28 of the Anti-
Monopoly Law in conjunction with Article 4 of the Notification Regulations 
suggest that M&A activities shall be prohibited as long as the M&A activities have 
the effect of eliminating or restricting competition, no matter if they are conducted 
in or outside of China.  Hence, to a certain extent, the Anti-Monopoly Law has an 
extra-territorial effect in the sense that M&A activities which occur outside of 
China but will or may eliminate or restrict competition are caught by the Anti-
Monopoly Law (Seto and Chow, 2009).  More importantly, Article 28 of the Anti-
Monopoly Law provides that if the affected firms can show that the proposed 
M&A activities will have more positive effects than negative effects on 
competition or the proposed M&A activities are in harmony with the public 
interest, then MOFCOM may decide not to block the affected M&A activities.  
Thus, MOFCOM imposes the burden on the parties involved with the proposed 
M&A activities to prove that the favourable impacts on competition arising from 
the M&A activities will exceed any adverse impacts, even though it is often not 
clear how these so-called benefits and adverse impacts are to be assessed or 
measured.  
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Moreover, Article 31 of the Anti-Monopoly Law provides that where a foreign 
investor acquires or merges with a domestic enterprise or acquires the assets, 
equity or enters into contracts with a domestic Chinese firm in such a way as to 
have implications for the national security of China, then in addition to the 
examination of the concentration conducted under Article 27 of the Anti-
Monopoly Law, MOFCOM shall also carry out an investigation with the relevant 
Department of State of the implications of the concentration for national security.  
Whilst considerations of national security also probably play an important role in 
assessments of M&A activities in western countries, Chinese law is unique in that 
it incorporates national security issues explicitly into the laws affecting mergers 
and acquisitions in China.  In western countries national security issues 
associated with M&A activities are considered more covertly.  Thus, in China 
national security issues receive separate and detailed consideration from the 
economic issues affecting M&A activities (Farmer, 2009).  
3.4.4. Investigation Procedures for the review of Concentration of 
Business Operators 
As specified in section 3.2.2 of this chapter, once the required notification 
documents dealing with the notification threshold as required under Article 27 of 
the Anti-Monopoly Law have been filed with MOFCOM by the relevant M&A 
parties, then in accordance with Article 25 of Anti-Monopoly Law MOFCOM will 
spend 30 days conducting a preliminary investigation of the proposed merger 
and/or acquisition.  This preliminary investigation aims to make a decision about 
whether to carry out a further review of the proposed merger and/or acquisition 
transactions.  Within 30 days of submission of the notification documents 
MOFCOM must inform the parties involved in the M&A transactions in written 
form about whether a more detailed review will be commissioned under Article 26 
of the Anti-Monopoly Law.  If MOFCOM rules that no further review is required, 
then the M&A activities can proceed.   Moreover, Article 25 of the Anti-Monopoly 
Law implies that if MOFCOM has not made a decision on the necessity for a 
further review within the 30-day time period, then the merger transactions are 
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effectively deemed not to be prohibited and the parties concerned are allowed to 
complete the necessary transactions to consummate the M&A transactions.  
Hence, in this area, Chinese law is consistent with practices in the Untied States 
(Farmer, 2009).  If, however, MOFCOM deems a further review to be necessary, 
then the review must be completed and a decision about whether or not to 
prohibit the proposed M&A transactions must be communicated to the affected 
parties in writing within 90 days from the date of the decision about the 
requirement for a further investigation.  After the second more detailed review, if 
MOFCOM elects to block the proposed M&A activities, then in addition to the 
written notification required under the first review, it must also provide a written 
summary of the reasons behind its decision.  
Furthermore, Article 26 of Anti-Monopoly Law allows for the possibility of a third 
review of the proposed M&A transactions which must be completed within 60 
days of notification of the result of the second more detailed review.  Article 26 
provides that MOFCOM may conduct a third round review if any one of the 
following conditions is satisfied: 
(1) MOFCOM informs the parties involved in the proposed M&A activities that 
the second review has been inconclusive and the parties involved in the 
proposed M&A activities agree to allow a third round review which must be 
completed within 60 days, or 
(2) the documents or materials submitted to MOFCOM are inaccurate and 
thus require further verification.  Again, the review must be completed within 
60 days, or 
(3) the circumstances and events surrounding the proposed M&A activities 
have significantly altered after the submission of the declaration paper 
required under Article 23 of the Anti-Monopoly Law.  
Unfortunately, the circumstances which justify a third round review are not very 
well articulated and this has led to difficulties for the parties involved in identifying 
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the precise situations under which a third round review may be conducted.  
Moreover, Article 26 of the Anti-Monopoly Law provides that if  the time in either 
the 90-day (second) review or 60-day (third) review expires without any action by 
MOFCOM, then the parties concerned may implement the transactions 
necessary to consummate the merger and/or acquisition. Again, in this area, 
Chinese law is in line with practices in the Untied States (Farmer, 2009).  
3.4.5. Procedures for Promulgating Determinants of Concentration of 
Business Operators 
In general, under the Anti-Monopoly Law there are three different determinations 
on a pre-merger notification of affected concentration made by MOFCOM, which 
as previously noted, is the enforcement agency of the Anti-Monopoly Law in 
China.  These three determinations are as follows: 
(1) issuing a permit to proceed with the proposed merger and/or acquisition 
transactions; or 
(2) issuing a permit to proceed with the proposed merger and/or acquisition 
transactions under specified restrictive conditions, or  
(3) blocking the proposed merger and/or acquisition transactions. 
In particular, if markets in the area of the proposed merger and/or acquisition will 
show an unacceptably high level of concentration after the transactions, thereby 
eliminating or restricting competition, then under Article 29 of the Anti-Monopoly 
Law, MOFCOM may prohibit the affected M&A transactions from taking place or 
may impose such conditions as are necessary to reduce the adverse impact of 
the increased concentration on competition in the relevant markets.  Moreover, 
Article 31 of the Anti-Monopoly Law provides that if MOFCOM decides to prohibit 
or impose restrictive conditions on concentration, it must publicise such decisions 
to the general public in a timely manner (Seto and Chow, 2009).  Farmer (2009) 
makes the important point that the publicity requirements associated with Article 
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31 impose an accountability requirement on MOFCOM and it also adds 
transparency to the M&A review process.  
Seto and Chow (2009) note that before the Anti-Monopoly Law, 2008 came into 
force it was very rare for MOFCOM to block proposed M&A activities.  The first 
determination of a conditional approval under Article 31 of the Anti-Monopoly Law 
occurred in November 2008 when Anheuser-Busch Inc. made a takeover offer for 
InBev N.  MOFCOM approved the proposed takeover but only on the condition 
that Anheuser-Busch Inc. did not increase its shareholding in its competitor beer 
company, Tsingdao Brewery and also, InBev N. was prohibited from increasing 
its shareholding in Zhujiang Brewery.  MOFCOM imposed these conditions 
because it was likely that if the shareholdings in Tsingdao Brewery and Zhujiang 
Brewery were increased, it might intensify concentration in the brewing industry, 
thereby having an adverse impact on competition (Zhang and Zhang, 2009).  
MOFCOM published their decision on the above proposed transaction 
(conditional approval) to the general public at the end of December, 2008.  Soon 
after this in March, 2009 MOFCOM blocked Coca-Cola‟s proposed acquisition of 
China Huiyuan Juice Group Limited.  As noted in Section 3.2.2 of this chapter 
Huiyuan Juice is a Hong Kong Listed firm that is a famous national Chinese 
brand closely associated with the Chinese culture and its people.  This was the 
first merger blocked by MOFCOM after the Anti-Monopoly Law, 2008 came into 
force.  Bachrack, Huang and Modrall (2009) give the following reasons as to why 
MOFCOM blocked the proposed acquisition of Huiyuan Juice by the Coca Cola 
Company: 
(1) Coca-Cola would be able to leverage its dominant position in the 
carbonated soft-drink market into the fruit-juice drink market, thus eliminating 
and restricting competition from currently existing fruit juice manufacturers 
and in turn, damaging the lawful interests of fruit juice consumers.  Although 
the decision did not indicate how Coca-Cola could leverage its position from 
carbonated soft drinks into the fruit juice drink market, MOFCOM‟s press 
release referred to the possibility that Coca-Cola could engage in “bundling” 
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or other forms of exclusive dealing; 
(2) Coca-Cola‟s market power in the fruit juice market would be markedly 
enhanced by controlling two famous juice brands, MeiZhiYuan (Minute Maid) 
and Huiyuan.  The transaction would therefore significantly raise entry 
barriers for potential competitors in the fruit-juice drink market; 
(3) The transaction would reduce the “space” available to domestic small and 
medium-sized fruit juice manufacturers and negatively impact the ability of 
domestic enterprises to compete and innovate independently in the fruit-juice 
drink market; and 
(4) The transaction would have adverse impacts on the competitive landscape 
of China‟s fruit-juice drink market and the sustainable and healthy 
development of the domestic fruit juice industry. 
3.5. Provisions on Mergers and Acquisitions of a Domestic Enterprise by 
Foreign Investors 
On 22 June, 2009, MOFCOM revised several provisions of the Merger and 
Acquisition of Domestic Enterprises by Foreign Investors Law (“M&A Provisions 
2009”), which was originally promulgated on 8 August, 2006.  As noted in Section 
3.3 of this chapter, the revisions aim to bring the M&A Provisions into compliance 
with the Anti-Monopoly Law which came into force on 1 August, 2008 and the 
Regulation on the Notification Threshold of Concentration of Undertakings which 
came into force on 3 August, 2008.  Here we need to note that the M&A 
Provisions 2009 lay particular emphasis on takeover activities that involve foreign 
investors acquiring domestic Chinese enterprises.  The reasons behind the 
promulgation of the revised M&A Provisions are that since China‟s admission to 
the World Trade Organisation in 2001 there has been a steadily increasing 
number of international firms that have sought to invest in China by acquiring 
and/or merging with Chinese domestic firms.  This has provided foreign firms with 
immediate market access with minimal business risk.  In addition, foreign 
investors who acquire Chinese domestic firms are able to convert the acquired 
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firms into Foreign-Invested Enterprises (FIE).  FIE‟s receive preferential 
treatment in a number of areas, including under the Chinese taxation system 15.  
In the following sections we highlight issues from the M&A Provisions, 2009 
which are of practical importance for foreign firms that wish to acquire domestic 
Chinese firms. 
3.5.1 Share Swaps in the M &A Provisions, 2009 
Article 2 of the M&A Provisions, 2009 provides that foreign investors can merge 
with or acquire a Chinese domestic firm by means of purchasing assets or 
acquiring shares.  Moreover, since 2006 share swaps began to be allowed for 
foreign investors that wished to merge with or acquire Chinese domestic firms.  In 
other words, before 2006 only a cash consideration was allowed in transactions 
involving foreign investors merging with or acquiring Chinese domestic firms.  
Further, Article 27 of the M&A Provisions, 2009 provides that, with regard to 
share swaps, foreign investors can use currently issued shares or a new share 
issue of the acquiring firm to purchase an equity interest in a Chinese domestic 
firm.  Similarly, the equity interest in the Chinese domestic firm may be acquired 
from existing shareholders or through a new share issue by the Chinese 
domestic firm.  After the merger and/or acquisition, the acquired Chinese firm can 
be converted into an FIE.  Thus, Article 2 of the M&A Provisions, 2009 provides 
that foreign investors can employ disposable foreign-listed shares, cash or a 
combination of both to merge with or acquire Chinese domestic firms, although 
this is subject to certain conditions and government approval (Huang, 2007). 
Articles 28 and 29 of M&A Provisions, 2009 provide that if a foreign investor 
intends to merge with or acquire a Chinese domestic firm using a share swap, it 
must satisfy the following conditions: 
                                                        
15
 The Chinese Government has a low and preferential tax policy for FIEs in certain specified 
regions (e.g. special economic zones in China) and industries (e.g. high-advanced technology) 
where it strongly encourages foreign investment.   
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(1) The foreign firm must be legally established and its registration domicile 
must have a sound legal system of company administration; 
 
(2) The foreign firm and its management must not have been convicted of 
significant crimes by relevant regulatory authorities over the prior three years; 
 
(3) The foreign firm must be a public listed firm and the listing place must 
have a sound management system of security exchanges; 
 
(4) The equity of foreign firms must be listed on an open and lawful securities 
exchange market (excluding the OTC market); and 
 
(5) The price at which the foreign firm‟s securities have traded over the 
previous year must be relatively stable. 
Furthermore, there are an additional two conditions applicable for both the equity 
of the foreign firms and Chinese domestic firms in the case of share swap 
transactions. First, the equity of foreign firms and Chinese domestic firms must 
be lawfully held by shareholders and may be assigned according to the law.  
Secondly, there must be no outstanding disputes or pending legal proceedings 
about the ownership of the equity of both the foreign and domestic firms. 
In cross-boarder (that is, international)  share swap transactions, Article 30 of the 
M&A Provisions, 2009 require that the Chinese domestic firm must appoint an 
intermediary who is established and registered in China, such as a law firm, 
accounting firm or investment firm,  to act as its consultant to perform the due 
diligence procedures pertaining to the proposed acquisition. Specifically, the 
intermediary employed by the Chinese domestic firm is responsible for reviewing 
and verifying relevant documents and the financial status of foreign firms and 
also, ensuring that the proposed acquisition conforms to the requirements of the 
M&A Provisions, 2009.  Moreover, another responsibility of the aforementioned 
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intermediary is that they must issue an advisory report that gives clear and 
professional advice on the above mentioned issues on an item by item basis. 
An editorial in the Illinois Business Law Journal (2006) argues that, allowing for 
share swaps in across-boarder mergers and acquisitions gives foreign investors 
increased flexibility in choosing the mode of payment for the transactions and 
also, brings China, in relation to M&A regulations, into line with best international 
practice.  However, the restrictions imposed on cross-boarder share swap 
merger and acquisitions (as, for example, under Articles 28, 29 and 30 of the 
M&A Provisions, 2009) result in an increased level of regulatory scrutiny by the 
relevant authorities.  The ultimate consequence of this is that the regulations are 
so strict and often so difficult to satisfy, that cash rather than share swaps is the 
preferred mode of consideration for most cross-boarder mergers and/or 
acquisitions in China. 
All cross-boarder share swap M&A transactions are subject to examination and 
approval by MOFCOM.  With regard to cross-boarder share swap transactions, 
the declaration procedures to MOFCOM under the M&A Provisions, 2009 are 
broadly similar to those specified in the Takeover Measures, 2006.  There are, 
however, a few minor differences and one major difference between the 
declaration procedures under the two laws.  The major difference is that, under 
Article 25 of the M&A Provisions, 2009, MOFCOM has to make a decision about 
whether or not to grant approval for the proposed M&A transactions to proceed 
within thirty days following the receipt of all required documents.  More 
importantly, once MOFCOM approves the proposed M&A activities, a certificate 
of approval will be issued.  At the same time, MOFCOM has to make copies of 
the relevant approval documents separately to the foreign exchange 
administrative authority at the equity transfer‟s locality.  After this, the foreign 
exchange administrative authority must issue the relevant certificate of 
registration of share transference of foreign exchange earnings and foreign 
exchange from foreign investment, which is the documentation necessary to 
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prove that the foreign investor(s) has paid the consideration for equity 
subscription and/or purchase. 
 
3.5.2 Special Provisions on Special Purpose Companies 
Article 39 of the M&A Provisions, 2009 defines a Special Purpose Company 
(SPC) as an overseas firm directly or indirectly controlled by a Chinese domestic 
firm or a Chinese natural person and importantly, the SPC is specifically 
established for the purpose of an overseas listing of the interests of a Chinese 
domestic firm.  Moreover, the main assets of an SPC are the rights and interests 
in a Chinese domestic firm. 
According to Chao and Xu (2008), in the past ten years, a huge number of 
Chinese domestic firms have employed “round trip investment” procedures to 
facilitate private equity investments in Chinese domestic firms and have firms 
listed on overseas stock markets, such as the UK, the US, etc.  A “round trip 
investment” occurs when a domestic firm establishes or controls an offshore 
holding firm and uses this offshore holding firm to control a Chinese domestic 
firm either by direct acquisition or by a captive contractual arrangement.  It was 
previously very common for Chinese domestic firms to use funds raised through 
overseas offshore holding firms to re-invest the proceeds in Chinese domestic 
firms as Foreign-investment Enterprises (FIEs), thereby accessing the tax 
benefits and other preferential treatments that the Chinese government has 
made available to certain manufacturing FIEs.  Recently, however, the Chinese 
government has become increasingly uncomfortable with the round trip 
investment mechanism and has tightened the regulations relating to it, 
particularly in regard to provisions incorporated into the M&A Provisions, 2009.  A 
specific example is provided by Article 9 of the M&A Provisions, 2009 which 
stipulates that if any Chinese domestic firm or natural person merges with or 
acquires an affiliated domestic firm in the name of a firm legally established or 
controlled by the aforesaid domestic firm or natural person in a foreign country or 
region, then it must be subject to the approval of MOFCOM in Beijing, regardless 
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of the size of the affected transactions.  Further, Article 9 also specifies that if the 
purchase of a domestic firm by a foreign investor exceeds 25% of the domestic 
firm‟s total registered capital, then the FIE is eligible for tax benefits and other 
favourable treatments.  It is important to note here that the M&A Provisions, 2009 
consider the beneficial owner, rather than the registered investor in determining 
eligibility for favourable treatment of the FIEs (Huang, 2007).  Hence, if the 
domestic firm is merged with or acquired by an overseas firm which is 
established or controlled by a domestic firm or natural person and is thus 
affiliated with the acquired  domestic firm, then in this circumstance such a 
merger or acquisition is not entitled to FIE  tax benefits and other preferential 
treatments unless the overseas firm purchases any increased capital of the 
domestic firm, or the enterprise established after the merger or acquisition by the 
overseas firm increases its proportionate investment to 25% or more of its 
registered capital. 
Moreover, Article 42 of the M&A Provisions, 2009 also requires that a Chinese 
domestic firm intending to establish a special purpose company (SPC) overseas 
must seek the approval of MOFCOM before doing so.  In addition, Article 44 of 
the M&A Provisions, 2009 provides that when an SPC is employed as a merging 
or acquiring vehicle in order to get a Chinese domestic firm listed overseas, then 
the total value of the shares of the SPC to be issued overseas cannot be lower 
than the value of the share rights of the merged or acquired domestic firm as 
evaluated by a corresponding asset valuation institution in China.   Furthermore, 
the share swap also requires the approval from MOFCOM.  Also, Article 40 of the 
M&A Provisions, 2009 provides that where an SPC seeks an overseas listing, 
then it is subject to approval from the China Securities Regulatory Commission 
(CSRC).  Importantly, Article 47 of the M&A Provisions, 2009 provides that within 
30 days of the completion of an SPC listing on an overseas stock exchange, the 
Chinese domestic firm must report the situation relating to the overseas listing to 
MOFCOM,  including the repatriation proposal of funds raised abroad, and it 
must also apply for an FIE approval certificate.  After this, the domestic firm must 
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apply to the State Administration for Industry and Commerce (SAIC) for an FIE 
business licence and to the State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE) for 
a foreign exchange registration certificate.  Finally, the shares of the SPC can be 
used in share swap transactions to acquire further Chinese domestic firms, 
provided only that the SPC is successfully listed on an overseas stock exchange.  
Here we need to note that, in accordance with Article 49 of M&A Provisions 2009, 
if the SPC fails to consummate the listing abroad within one year of the issuance 
of the FIE business licence, or if the SPC fails to fulfil its reporting duties to 
MOFCOM, then MOFCOM will require the share swap to be reversed. 
3.5.3 National Economic Security Review 
The assessment of the impact of cross-boarder mergers or acquisitions on the 
national economic security of China plays an important role in the M&A 
Provisions, 2009.  For instance, Article 12 of the M&A Provisions, 2009 provides 
that if foreign investors merge with or acquire a Chinese domestic enterprise and 
intend to obtain actual control over the enterprise, and if such merger or 
acquisition involves any “critical industry” and/or will have an adverse or potential 
adverse impact on the security of the national economy and/or results in transfer 
of actual control over a domestic enterprise owning a “renowned trademark” or a 
Chinese “time-honoured” brand (though in this circumstance it may not have an 
impact on any major industry or the economic security of China),  then the parties 
involved with the merger or acquisition must apply to MOFCOM for approval of 
the proposed merger and/or acquisition.  Moreover, Article 12 also stipulates that 
in the case where any of the aforesaid circumstances arise, but the parties 
concerned in the merger or acquisition fail to report the related merger or 
acquisition transactions to MOFCOM, then MOFCOM may, in conjunction  with 
other relevant government agencies, demand that the parties concerned delay 
the M&A transactions, re-assign relevant equity or assets, or put any other 
effective actions into place to eliminate the adverse effects of the merger or 
acquisition on the security of the national economy.  Here, it is important to note 
that the regulations dealing with the impact of cross-border M&A activities on 
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national economic security in the M&A Provisions, 2009 are closely related to 
Article 31 of Anti-Monopoly Law which was the subject of discussion in section 
3.3.3 of this chapter.  
A recent report of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(2006) (OECD) has reviewed the latest developments in China‟s policies towards 
cross-border mergers and acquisitions.  The OECD agues that that the M&A 
Provisions, 2009 increase transparency by demanding that parties associated 
with mergers and/or acquisitions disclose whether or not they are affiliated with 
each other and also, establishes specific and detailed provisions regarding the 
use of Special Purpose Companies (SPC) by Chinese domestic firms that 
acquire overseas owned enterprises in China.  However, terms and phrases 
included in the M&A Provisions, 2009, such as “critical industry”, “impact on 
national economic security”, “renowned trademarks”16 and “time-honoured brand” 
often lack clarity and lead to potential uncertainties in the application of the 
relevant articles of the M&A Provisions, 2009.  Consequently, foreign investors 
intending to merge with and/or acquire Chinese domestic firms, Chinese 
domestic firms that have been targeted for takeover by foreign firms and even 
Chinese government agencies may find it difficult to apply some of the articles of 
the M&A Provisions, 2009 that contain these terms.  In addition, they OECD 
suggests that requiring Chinese government agencies to consider the impact of 
cross-border mergers and acquisitions on national economic security may lead to 
over zealousness in the review process as government officials place excessive 
weight on the political consequences of the decisions they make.  This in turn 
raises issues about the compatibility of the M&A Provisions, 2009 with best 
international practices in the area. 
                                                        
16
 The OECD notes that the Trademark Office of the State Administration for Industry and 
Commerce bears the principal responsibility for certifying “renowned trademarks” in China.  
However, the People‟s Court of China is the ultimate authority in these matters in the case of legal 
disputes.  The legal uncertainties surrounding the certification of “renowned trademarks” in China 
makes it difficult for foreign investors involved in proposed M&A activities to make assessments 
about whether or not a trademark will fall into the category of a “renowned trademark”.  A good 
example of this is provided by the U.S. Coca Cola Company‟s proposed takeover of the Huiyuan 
Juice Group Ltd which was blocked under the “renowned trademark” provisions of the M&A 
Provisions, 2009 (See section 3.3.2 of this chapter for further details).    
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3.5.4 Reporting Thresholds for Cross-border Mergers and 
Acquisitions in M &A Provisions, 2009 
We have already noted in section 3.4 of this chapter that in 2009 the Ministry of 
Commerce (MOFCOM) amended the M&A Provisions, 2006 in order to bring 
these Provisions into compliance with the Anti-Monopoly Law and the Regulation 
on the Notification Threshold of Concentration of Undertakings.  Both the Anti-
Monopoly Law and Notification Regulations are considered in detail in section 3.3 
of this chapter.  In particular, chapter 5 of M&A Provisions, 2006 was replaced 
with a new provision, namely Article 51 in the M&A Provisions, 2009.  Article 51 
provides that when the merger and/or acquisition of a Chinese domestic 
enterprise by a foreign investor reaches the thresholds summarised in the 
Notification Regulations, then the foreign investor must make a declaration to 
MOFCOM and must not proceed with the M&A transactions without this prior 
reporting.  It implies that the declaration thresholds brought forward in the 
Notification Regulations are not only applicable to Chinese domestic mergers 
and/or acquisitions (as noted in Section 3.3.2 of this chapter), but also are 
applicable to foreign investors merging with or acquiring Chinese domestic firms.  
It will be recalled from section 3.3.2 of this chapter that the Notification 
Regulations require that the relevant parties involved in a merger and/or 
acquisition must report the proposed transactions in advance to MOFCOM, if: 
(1) the total global revenues in the preceding fiscal year of all undertakings 
involved in the merger and/or acquisition exceed RMB 10 billion and the 
China revenues of at least two of the undertakings each exceed RMB 400 
million in the preceding fiscal year; or 
 
(2) the total China revenues in the preceding fiscal year of all undertakings 
involved in the merger and/or acquisition exceed RMB 2 billion and the China 
revenues of at least two of the undertakings each exceed RMB 400 million. 
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Huang (2009) notes that reporting thresholds under Chapter 5 of the M&A 
Provisions, 2006 were vaguely worded and were based on a combination of 
factors such as business turnover, market share, the number of Chinese 
enterprises acquired in related industries, and the absolute magnitude of the 
value of assets in China held by enterprises involved in the proposed merger 
and/or acquisition.  In other words, sometimes market share was used in 
determining the reporting threshold. On other occasions the absolute magnitude 
of the value of assets in China held by enterprises involved in the proposed 
merger and/or acquisition was used.  On still other occasions a combination of 
these two factors was used in determining thresholds.  Hence, there was often 
inconsistency in the reporting threshold that was used by MOFCOM.  Under 
Article 51 of the M&A Provisions, 2009 that replaces Chapter 5 of the M&A 
Provisions, 2006, however, business turnover has become the dominant factor in 
determining whether or not the parties involved in proposed M&A activities need 
to apply to MOFCOM for approval of the merger and acquisition transactions they 
intend to enter into.  Furthermore, it is important to note that, in order to make the 
Anti-Monopoly Law applicable to financial business operators in China, on 15 
July, 2009, MOFCOM and several other financial watchdogs in China - such as 
the People‟s Bank of China, China Banking Regulatory Commission, the China 
Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) and the China Insurance Regulatory 
Commission - have jointly issued Measures for Calculating the Business 
Turnover of Financial Business Operators for Notification of a Concentration.  
The Measures for Calculating the Business Turnover of Financial Business 
Operators for Notification of a Concentration outlines the elements which must be 
considered in calculations of “business turnover” for banks, securities firms, 
futures firms, fund management firms, insurance firms and other financial 
institutions. 
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3.6  Effects Laws and Regulations on Economic Benefits of Chinese M&A 
Activities 
Our analysis in this chapter shows that there are some unique aspects to the 
laws and regulations governing M&A activities in China.  These, in turn, have a 
potential impact on the returns that Chinese firms earn from their M&A activities.  
Whilst we examine this issue at various points in subsequent chapters of the 
dissertation we now provide a brief summary of some of the more important ways 
in which Chinese laws and regulations can impact on returns earned from M&A 
activities.  
We have previously noted (as in section 3.2.3) that a unique feature of the 
mainland Chinese stock markets is that not all the A shares issued by firms are 
tradable, and that this constitutes a significant difference from the stock markets 
in western countries like the USA and UK.  Moreover, non-tradable A shares 
account for a majority of the A shares issued by most listed firms.  The absence 
of organised markets for non-tradable shares and the difficulties associated with 
valuing them means that the shareholders of target firms in M&A activities prefer 
to receive cash as the mode of consideration rather than the non-tradable shares 
of the bidding company.  Moreover, the division of tradable shares into A 
(normally owned by Chinese nationals) and B (normally owned by foreigners) 
shares may also have a significant impact on the returns earned by both 
domestic and foreign shareholders. 
It is also needs to be emphasised that Chinese regulatory authorities, such as the 
CSRC, pay particular attention to the return on equity (ROE) as computed from a 
firm‟s balance sheet and profit and loss account in deciding whether to give 
approval for the new share issues to go ahead.  Loss making firms wishing to 
make a new share issue in order to “shore up” their deteriorating financial 
position are likely to have a poor history of ROE statistics.  Given this, it is 
unlikely that such firms will gain the approval of the CSRC for any new share 
issues.  Such firms therefore have incentives to manipulate the figures appearing 
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on their published financial statements and this could lead investors into a false 
view about the company‟s future prospects.  This in turn could lead to 
inefficiencies for Chinese M&A activities. 
3.7 Summary and Conclusions 
This Chapter deals primarily with the laws and regulations governing mergers 
and acquisition (M&A) transactions in China.  We begin our analysis in section 
3.2 of this chapter by briefly summarising the development of China‟s securities 
markets, including an introduction to China‟s main stock exchanges together with 
their listing rules and distinctive characteristics.  Probably the most important 
distinguishing characteristic of mainland Chinese stock markets is that traded 
shares are comprised of A shares and B shares.  The reason behind the division 
between A shares and B shares is that the Chinese government has 
implemented a policy of limiting the amount of RMB (Yuan) which can leave the 
country in order to preserve the nation‟s foreign currency reserves.  This in turn 
means that a distinction has had to be drawn between foreign investors and 
Chinese national investors; in particular, with rare exceptions only Chinese 
citizens can hold A shares whilst foreign investors are generally limited to holding 
B shares.  Another important characteristic of the mainland Chinese stock 
markets is that the majority of A shares in most listed Chinese firms are 
controlled by the Chinese government or its instrumentalities.  A shares 
controlled by the Chinese government are called state-owned shares and until 
recently, could not be traded on any of the Chinese mainland stock exchanges.  
However, in April, 2005, the Chinese government began implementing a reform 
programme called “GuQuan Fenzhi Gaige” (Shareholding Structure Reform) 
under which non-tradable A shares will be gradually converted into tradable 
shares.  But the conversion process will be slow and cumbersome and it will take 
several years for the conversion process to be fully implemented.  Furthermore, 
this distinction between A and B shares points to some of the unique 
characteristics that determine the laws regulating M&A activities in China and of 
how they are different from the “equivalent” laws in most western countries. 
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The most important laws and regulations governing mergers and acquisitions in 
China are the Securities Law, the Takeover Measures, 2006, the Anti-monopoly 
Law, 2008, the Declaration Thresholds which supplement the Anti-Monopoly 
Law, 2008, and finally, the Provisions on Mergers and Acquisitions of a Domestic 
Enterprise by Foreign Investors, 2009.  Our detailed discussion of these laws and 
ordinances began in section 3.3 with a consideration of the Takeover Measures, 
2006.  The Takeover Measures, 2006 cover such areas as the mandated bid 
rules, tender offer rules, the disclosure of substantial shareholdings and the 
defence mechanisms which may be mounted against takeovers and mergers, 
etc.  Section 3.4 focuses on the Anti-Monopoly Law, 2008 and the Declaration 
Thresholds which were brought in soon after as a supplement to this Law.  The 
Anti-Monopoly Law, 2008 details the mandatory pre-merger and acquisition 
notification process, the investigation procedures that are to be used by 
MOFCOM and other government agencies and the procedures MOFCOM must 
use for promulgating its decisions, etc.  Since the number of cross-border M&A 
activities in China has been increasing significantly over the last few years, 
Section 3.5 of this chapter is specifically dedicated to a consideration of the 
Provisions on Mergers and Acquisitions of a Domestic Enterprise by Foreign 
Investors, 2009 (the M&A Provisions, 2009). Importantly, the M&A Provisions, 
2009 centre on the regulations affecting share swap transactions by foreign 
investors merging with or acquiring Chinese domestic firms, and the particular 
regulations which apply to Special Purpose Companies (SPC).  An SPC is an 
foreign firm directly or indirectly controlled by a Chinese domestic firm or Chinese 
natural person and is specifically established for the purpose of an overseas 
listing of the interests of a Chinese domestic firm.  
To conclude, the most recently promulgated Anti-Monopoly Law, 2008, the 
Declaration Thresholds which supplement this Law and the M&A Provisions, 
2009, along with the Takeover Measures, 2006 and the Securities Law in China 
have made China‟s M&A legal framework more complete, mature and 
importantly, more in compliance with best international practices and norms.  
 Laws and Regulations 
 
119 
 
However, we need to note that, Chinese M&A laws do have their limitations and 
also, are not immune from criticism.  For instance, the M&A Provisions, 2009, 
lack clarity in the articulation of certain key terms and phrases such as the 
definition of what constitutes a “critical industry” or what constitutes a “time-
honoured” brand.  This will inevitably lead to significant difficulties in 
implementing these new laws pertaining to cross-border M&A activities.  
Moreover, the defence mechanisms available under the Takeover Measures, 
2006 are in many ways a mixture of those available in several different countries.  
Unfortunately, this gives rise to potential conflicts and overlaps in the defence 
mechanisms available to Chinese firms involved in the M&A process – as amply 
demonstrated by Article 8 and Article 31 of the Takeover Measures, 200617 – and 
this can only lead to trouble and confusion in the process of applying this law.  
 
 
 
 
                                                        
17
 A detailed summary of the provisions relating to Article 8 of the Takeover Measures, 2006 is to 
be found in section 3.3.7 of this chapter.  The provisions relating to Article 31 of the Takeover 
Measures, 2006 are to be found in section 3.4.3. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
LAWS AND REGULATIONS RELATING TO MERGERS 
AND ACQUISITIONS IN CHINA 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
China‟s recent admission to the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and its 
generally vibrant economy has meant that merger and acquisition (M&A) 
activities in China have increased considerably over the last several years. The 
Chinese government has responded to this increased volume of M&A activities 
by seeking to establish a legal framework which, on the one hand, is in line with 
best international practice but also, meets the unique political and socio-
economic factors that have characterised the People‟s Republic of China since its 
formation in 1949.  Hence, on 31 July 2006 China‟s principal securities market 
regulator, the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC), promulgated the 
Takeover Measures, 2006.1  The Takeover Measures, 2006 is a revised version of 
the original Takeover Measures, 2002 and is designed to fill gaps and loopholes 
which experience had shown existed in the laws and regulations covering 
Chinese M&A activities.  The Takeover Measures, 2006 also aim to make 
Chinese laws in the area more compatible with best international practices.  
Furthermore, in order to address the anti-trust issues associated with mergers 
and acquisitions, the Standing Committee of the Tenth National People‟s 
Congress of China promulgated a new Anti-Monopoly Law which came into force 
on 1 August 2008. It is important to familiarise ourselves with the laws regulating 
M&A activities in China in order that we might obtain a better understanding of 
the empirical results obtained from the data we employ on Chinese mergers and 
acquisitions as summarised in later chapters of this dissertation. 
                                                        
1
 In many ways the Takeover Measures, 2006 copycats the U.S. regulations under the Williams 
Act amendments to the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934. 
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The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows: Section 3.2 briefly 
summarises the development of China‟s securities markets, including an 
introduction to China‟s main stock exchanges together with their listing rules and 
distinctive characteristics.  Next, Section 3.3 discusses the legal framework for 
M&A activities in China.  The most important of these are China‟s Securities Law, 
the Takeover Measures, 2006 and the Anti-Monopoly Law, 2008. Our 
consideration of the Takeover Measures, 2006 centres principally on the 
mandated bid rules, the disclosure of substantial shareholdings, the tender offer 
rules and the defence mechanisms which may be used in merger and acquisition 
transactions.  Section 3.4 then goes on to discuss China‟s Anti-Monopoly Laws 
and the Regulations on the Notification Thresholds of Concentration of 
Undertakings.  These laws address issues of anti-trust and declaration thresholds 
in M&A activities in China.  The laws and regulations affecting cross-border 
mergers and acquisitions are dealt with in Section 3.5.  This section provides a 
detailed description of the legal framework affecting mergers and acquisitions of 
domestic enterprises by foreign investors.  In particular, this section deals with 
issues of share swaps, the important provisions affecting special purpose 
companies (SPC) and the national economic securities review.  Finally, Section 
3.6 provides a brief summary of the chapter, along with some concluding remarks 
about the important issues affecting M&A activities in China. 
 
3.2 History of China’s Main Securities Markets 
3.2.1 Principal Chinese Stock Exchanges 
 
Over the last fifty years, China‟s economy has been transformed from the 
centrally planned economy (CPE) that was introduced in 1949, to a market 
orientated economy (MOE).  The movement towards a market orientated 
economy began in 1978 when the Chinese government implemented a 
programme of reforms which encouraged the formation of private rural 
enterprises and businesses, lifted many restrictions on foreign trade and 
investment, abolished controls over the prices of some basic commodities and 
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outputs, and boosted investment in industrial production and the education of its 
workforce.   As part of the reform process, in 1981 China‟s State Council created 
a national bond market by issuing national treasure bonds for the first time.  
Subsequent to this, several other kinds of national bonds were issued; for 
example, those issued by the Ministry of Finance to finance key construction 
projects.  According to Huang (2003), however, the new bond market only 
satisfied the liquidity requirements of the central government, leaving the needs 
of private and many state-owned enterprises unaddressed.  Hence, in order to 
solve the financial difficulties faced by private and state-owned enterprises, the 
People‟s Bank of China (PBC) authorised the establishment of two nationwide 
stock exchanges; namely, the Shanghai Stock Exchange which began operations 
in 1990 and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange which began operations in 1991 
(Wei, 2008). 
 
Initially, a variety of organisations, including the People‟s Bank of China (PBC), 
the State Council, the Ministry of Finance and local government bore 
responsibility for regulating these two stock exchanges (Wei, 2008). But the need 
for a different regulatory framework became clear after a number of regulatory 
failures of which the 810 incident on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange is probably 
the best known example.  This incident occurred on 10 August, 1992 when some 
700,000 “would be” investors packed into the Shenzhen Stock Exchange to 
subscribe for a new issue of bonds by the Chinese Government.  The prescribed 
five million subscription forms were used up within a few hours.  Violent rioting 
resulted, as it was clear that the officials of the PBC had corrupted the process of 
handling the subscription forms.  The government restored order by distributing 
another five million forms the next day.  The incident, to a large extent, was 
caused by the fact that too many organisations claimed regulatory authority over 
the Chinese securities markets and their operations.  It was inevitable that a 
regulatory framework like this would lead to confusion and corruption – as indeed 
it did (Walter and Howie, 2003).  Incidents like this necessitated the State Council 
to remove the ambiguity which had arisen in the regulation and administration of 
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China‟s securities markets.  Consequently, in 1992 the State Council created the 
China Security Regulatory Commission (CSRC) as the sole regulator of China‟s 
stock exchanges, although it took the CSRC quite a long time to rest regulatory 
control of securities markets in China away from the PBC, the Ministry of Finance 
and local government agencies.  Under China's Securities Law, the CSRC has 
"authority to implement a centralised and unified regulation of the nationwide 
securities market in order to ensure their lawful operation."2 Its powers include 
responsibility for regulating and supervising the issue of securities, as well as the 
investigation and imposition of penalties for, "illegal activities related to securities 
and futures." 3 Its role is broadly similar to that of the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) in the United States.  
 
Between them, at the end of 2008 the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges 
had more than 1,500 listed firms with a combined market capitalisation of 
$US2,658.2 billion.  Moreover, at the end of December 2007 the Hong Kong 
Stock Exchange, which operates under a different regulatory framework to the 
Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges, had 1,241 listed firms with a 
combined market capitalisation of $US2.7 trillion.  The Hong Kong Stock 
exchange is regulated by a statutory authority called the Securities and Futures 
Commission (SFC).  The SFC has a wide brief and operates independently of the 
CRSC.  Its main responsibilities include the maintenance and promotion of 
fairness and efficiency in Hong Kong‟s securities markets; encouraging 
competitiveness, transparency and orderliness in the operations of the securities 
markets; minimising crime and misconduct in the securities markets and to assist 
the Financial Secretary (who is responsible for delivering the annual budget in 
Hong Kong‟s Legislative Council) to maintain the financial stability of Hong Kong 
by taking such measures as are necessary to insure the smooth operation of 
                                                        
2
 See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/China_Securities_Regulatory_Commission, the Wikipedia 
website: 
 
3
 See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/China_Securities_Regulatory_Commission, on the Wikipedia 
website. 
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Hong Kong‟s securities markets.  Hong Kong‟s legal and regulatory framework is 
more in line with international standards and practices than is the case with the 
Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges.  Moreover, the Hong Kong Stock 
Exchange has a more active and liquid secondary market than either the 
Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges, and so more and more enterprises 
from the mainland of China as well as international investors, are tending to list 
their securities on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange. 
 
3.2.2. Listing Rules of Main Stock Exchanges in China 
 
In this section we outline the listing requirements of the three main stock 
exchanges in China.  We begin with the Shanghai Stock Exchange.  Firms 
applying to list their shares on the Shanghai Stock Exchange must conform with 
its listing requirements which are largely based on the “Securities Law of the 
People‟s Republic of China” and the “Company Law of the People‟s Republic of 
China” 4  When a firm plans a public issue of shares for the first time it must seek 
the approval of the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC). Once the 
CSRC has approved a public issue of shares then the affected firm may apply to 
have its shares listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange.  A second requirement is 
that after the public issue of shares the firm‟s total share capital must not be less 
than RMB 50 million (Yuan).  Moreover, the firm must have been in business for 
more than 3 years and have been profitable over the last three consecutive 
years.  In the case of former large and medium sized state owned enterprises re-
established as private or public firms in accordance with the “Securities Law of 
the People‟s Republic of China” and “Company Law of the People‟s Republic of 
China”, the profitability requirement can be calculated consecutively; that is, 
profits from the period when the firm was state owned can be included as a 
component of the three year profitability calculation.  There must also be at least 
1,000 individual shareholders whose investment in the shares of the firm exceeds 
RMB 1,000.  Furthermore, publicly offered shares must be more than 25% of the 
                                                        
4
 See the official website of Shanghai Stock Exchange: www.sse.com.cn. 
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firm‟s total share capital.  When the firm‟s total share capital exceeds RMB 400 
million, the minimum percentage of shares that must be issued to the public is 
reduced from 25% to 10%.  Finally, the firm must not have been involved in any 
major illegal activities or false accounting practices in the three years prior to its 
listing on the Shanghai Stock Exchange.  
The Shenzhen Stock Exchange is the smaller of the two stock exchanges 
operating in mainland China.  Its listing requirements are broadly similar to those 
of the Shanghai Stock Exchange. 5  In particular, when a firm plans a public issue 
of shares for the first time it must seek the approval of the China Security 
Regulatory Commission (CSRC). Once the CSRC has approved a public issue of 
shares then the affected firm may apply to have its shares listed on the 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange.  Public listing on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange is 
only available to firms with an issued share capital in excess of RMB 30 million 
(Yuan).  The comparable figure on the Shanghai Stock Exchange is RMB 50 
million and so it is not surprising that there is a preponderance of small and 
medium sized firms listed on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange when compared to 
the Shanghai Stock Exchange.  Furthermore, publicly offered shares must be 
more than 25% of the firm‟s total share capital (there is provision for firms with 
share capital in excess of RMB 400 million to reduce this figure as in the case of 
the Shanghai Stock Exchange).  Finally, firms listing on the Shenzhen Stock 
Exchange must have a good credit record for the three years prior to listing. This 
latter requirement also applies for firms listing on the Shanghai Stock Exchange, 
although it is stated in a slightly different way. 
As previously noted, the Hong Kong Stock is the most actively traded and liquid 
of the three stock exchanges which exist in China.  Moreover, it operates under a 
regulatory framework which is more attuned with international standards and 
practices than is the case with the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges.  
Given this, it is hardly surprising that it has slightly different listing requirements 
                                                        
5
 See http://www.szse.cn/main/en/aboutsse/listingqualifications/, the official website of Shenzhen 
Stock Exchange: 
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when compared to those for both the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges. 
6 In particular, only firms with an expected market capitalisation of HK$200 million 
or more can apply for listing on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange.  In general, at 
least 25% of the securities must be held by the public (a rule which is broadly 
compatible with the listing requirements of both the Shanghai and Shenzhen 
Stock Exchanges).  Firms must also have been conducting their commercial 
and/or business activities for a period of not less than three consecutive years 
prior to the application for listing and must also have traded under the same 
management for the prior three years.  Finally the firm must have total profits of 
at least HK$50 million over the last 3 years (including a profit of at least HK$20 
million in the most recent year and an aggregate profit of at least HK$30 million in 
the two preceding years).  If the firm does not satisfy this requirement it can still 
seek a listing on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange if it meets either a market 
capitalisation/revenue test or a revenue/cash flow test. 
3.2.3 Unique and Distinctive Characteristics of Chinese Stock Markets 
 
China‟s currency, the RMB (Yuan), is not completely and freely convertible into 
foreign currencies.  This is because the Chinese government has implemented a 
policy which restricts the amount of RMB (Yuan) that can leave the country in 
order to preserve the nation‟s foreign currency reserves.  This policy has had a 
stabilising effect on the rate at which the RMB (Yuan) trades against most foreign 
currencies and this in turn has created a degree of certainty for firms and other 
organisations which operate in export and/or import oriented markets.  However, 
this policy of restricted trading in the RMB (Yuan) means that a distinction has 
had to be made between foreign investors and investors who are Chinese 
nationals.  Chinese nationals (including individuals, legal persons and the state) 
will normally purchase “A” shares which are shares whose principal (that is, 
prices) and dividends are denominated in the RMB (Yuan) and which are 
exclusively traded on the stock market in terms of the Yuan.  Foreign investors 
                                                        
6
 Refer to the official website of Hong Kong Stock Exchange: www.hkex.com.hk. 
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usually have only very limited access to A shares.  However, foreign investors 
(including investors from Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macao) who wish to invest in 
mainland Chinese firms will normally do so by purchasing so called “B” shares.  
Whilst both the principal and dividends of B shares are normally denominated in 
the RMB (Yuan), trading on the stock market in B shares normally occurs in 
either the US dollar or the Hong Kong dollar and not the Yuan.  Foreign investors 
who buy and sell B shares must commission an authorised Chinese securities 
institution to deal with the transaction.  The authorised institutions may then enter 
into proxy agreements with approved securities institutions outside of China in 
buying and selling B shares.  Dividends, bonuses and trading earnings from B 
shares may be remitted outside of China after the deduction of relevant taxes 
(Campbell, 2006).  In summary, A shares are the main body of shares traded on 
the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges; B shares account for less than 
1% (in terms of market capitalisation) of all shares traded on these two stock 
exchanges.  This in turn means that B shares normally have only a very limited 
impact on the mainland Chinese stock markets.   
However, one potential caveat that applies to this conclusion stems from the fact 
that the prices of the B shares for a particular firm often trade at a significant 
discount in comparison to the A shares in the same firm.   This is despite the fact 
that B shares carry essentially the same rights and privileges as A shares.  This 
opens up the potential for riskless hedging opportunities a theme that has been 
developed in some detail by Bergstrom and Tang (2001).  However, if the 
Chinese government moves to a situation under which the RMB (Yuan) is 
allowed to trade freely without restrictions - and some predict that this will 
eventually be the case (Yam, 2005) - then the distinction between A shares and 
B shares will no longer exist on the mainland Chinese stock markets.  Evidence 
that this will eventually transpire arises from the fact that after China‟s admission 
to the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in 2001, domestic investors were allowed 
to participate in purchasing B shares and rules were introduced which allowed 
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qualified foreign institutional investors to purchase A shares in Chinese mainland 
firms in certain circumstances. 
Another unique feature of the mainland Chinese stock markets is that not all the 
A shares issued by firms are tradable, and this constitutes a significant difference 
from the stock markets in western countries like the USA and UK.  A shares can 
be sub-divided into three groups which are “state owned” shares, “legal person” 
shares and “public individual” shares in terms of the strictly defined groups of 
shareholdings in China.  State owned shares are those owned by the state, 
including the central government and local governments. Legal person shares 
are those held by domestic legal entities and institutions such as state-private 
mixed enterprises and non-bank financial institutions (Qi and Wu, 2000).  An 
important point that needs to be stressed here is that only public individual 
shares are freely tradable on mainland stock markets; that is, state shares and 
legal person shares cannot be traded on these markets.  Furthermore, non-
tradable A shares (that is, state shares and legal person shares) account for a 
majority of the A shares issued by most listed firms.  Li and Zhang (2007) quote 
statistics which show that in 2004, Chinese firms had 712 RMB (Yuan) billion of A 
shares on issue.  However, 454.3 RMB (Yuan) billion or 64% of these A shares 
were non-tradable.  In particular, state owned shares accounted for 74% of the 
non-tradable shares or slightly less than half of the A shares issued by Chinese 
firms.  The tradability restrictions which apply to state owned shares and legal 
person shares can act as a deterrent for takeover and merger activities and 
hence, the overall allocative efficiency of the Chinese economy.   The only way 
that non-tradable shares can be transferred is to reach a private takeover 
agreement.  This and the other factors considered above are of crucial 
importance to the research we are conducting with regard to M&A activities in 
China. 
The principal reason for the existence of such a large proportion of non-tradable 
A shares is to prevent state owned assets from falling into the hands of private or 
foreign parties.  In other words, if state owned shares were allowed to be 
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transferred to private owners, then the socialist economy on which the Chinese 
political system is founded might be threatened (Huang, 2006, p. 14).  It also 
guards against the possibility of fraud and misappropriation by private firms and 
individuals.  However, we have previously observed how the existence of a 
significant block of non-tradable shares is detrimental to the long run 
development and health of the Chinese economy.  In particular, it leads to a 
divergence in the values of the traded as against the non-traded A shares and 
weakens the stock market‟s price discovery function.  This in turn leads to a 
lowering of allocative efficiency in the Chinese economy as a whole (Huang, 
2006, p. 14).  The problems caused by this dichotomy between traded and non-
traded A shares became so acute that beginning in 2000, the Chinese 
government began implementing a reform programme under which it eventually 
aims to remove all restrictions in the trading of state owned shares (Jin and Yu, 
2009). 
According to Huang (2008, pp. 157-158), prior to 2005 the Chinese government 
made several attempts to remove the trading restrictions which applied to state 
owned shares.  However, these reforms were generally unsuccessful and along 
with some other factors, contributed to the “bear” market on Chinese stock 
markets which lasted for four years around the turn of the century7.   In April, 
2005, the CSRC issued a new plan for shareholding structure reform called 
„Guquan Fenzhi Gaige‟, under which market-based processes are gradually 
being implemented for the transfer of share ownership rather than the 
government-imposed processes which had prevailed up until that point in time.  
Under the Guquan Fenzhi Gaige reform programme, representatives of the group 
of shareholders with tradable A shares (that is, public shareholders) agree terms 
and conditions for the conversion of non-tradable A shares into tradable A shares 
with representatives of the group of shareholders who hold the non-tradable A 
shares.  These terms and conditions not only include the rate at which the non-
tradable shares are to be converted into tradable shares but also, any other 
                                                        
7
 See the official website of Shanghai Stock Exchange and Shenzhen Stock Exchange. 
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forms of compensation which are to be paid to the previously existing tradable 
shareholders.  Since the non-tradable shareholders are granted a new and 
valuable trading privilege, the Guquan Fenzhi Gaige reform measures allow the 
compensation given to previously existing tradable shareholders to take a variety 
of forms, including the issue of new tradable shares, cash payouts and the issue 
of new warrants, etc.  The rate at which non-tradable shares are converted into 
tradable shares varies from one firm to another because the terms are absolutely 
negotiable between the holders of the non-tradable shares and the holders of 
tradable (that is, public) shares.  In addition, the Guquan Fenzhi Gaige reform 
measures stipulate that a certain proportion of the non-tradable shares which are 
converted into tradable shares cannot be sold in the first few years after being 
transferred into tradable shares.   
The first firm to successfully convert its non-tradable A shares into tradable A 
shares under the Guquan Fenzhi Gaige reform measures was the Sany Heavy 
Industry Company.  The public (that is, tradable) shareholders in Sany Heavy 
Industry Company received 3.5 new shares and RMB 8 (Yuan) cash for every 10 
tradable shares that they already held.  Furthermore, non-tradable shareholders 
undertook not to sell any of their newly created tradable shares on the stock 
market for the first two years after conversion and no more than 10% of their 
newly created tradable shares in the third year after conversion.  Firms that have 
successfully been through the process of converting their non-tradable shares 
into tradable shares use the prefix „G‟ as part of their stock market names.  All 
together there are 1,333 A-share enterprises listed on either the Shanghai Stock 
Exchange or the Shenzhen Stock Exchange with non-tradable shares that need 
to implement the Guquan Fenzhi Gaige reform measures.  As of July 2007, 1,229 
of these enterprises had begun the process of implementing the Guquan Fenzhi 
Gaige reform measures (Jin and Yu, 2009). 
The impact of the Guquan Fenzhi Gaige reform measures on the stock market 
can be divided into short-term and long-term effects.  Initially, in the short-term, 
there has been an increase in the volatility of Chinese stock markets due to 
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speculative investors “treasure-hunting” for possible future reform candidates 
(Yam, 2005).8  Against this, in the long run, the Guquan Fenzhi Gaige reform 
measures involve positive and multiple benefits for investors.  The most obvious 
benefit arises from the fact that state-owned shares will ultimately be tradable 
with all the liquidity advantages that this entails.  Moreover, shareholders will be 
able to make “direct” (market based) assessments about the performance of 
enterprise managers, instead of using “indirect” (accounting based) measures, 
such as the return on net asset value (NAV), which had to be used before the 
state-owned shares were converted into tradable shares.  Secondly, whilst the 
Qualified Foreign Institutional Investor (QFII) measures which were introduced in 
November, 2002 by the CSRC, allowed a small number of foreign investors to 
purchase A shares in domestic Chinese enterprises, there numbers were so 
small as to have only a very limited impact on Chinese stock markets and the 
wider economy.  Hence, if the alleged benefits arising from foreign investment 
are to be realised in the Chinese economy, the QFII laws will have to be 
liberalised so as to allow a greater number of foreign investors to purchase the A-
shares of domestic Chinese firms.  It is only then that M&A activities and the 
efficiencies which arise from them can be expected to increase in China.  In other 
words, liberalisation of the QFII measures should enable Chinese stock markets 
to be more efficient in recognising and improving strong firms as well as weeding 
out weak and under-performing firms, thereby resulting in much better returns for 
investors and improving the overall efficiency of Chinese economy (Yam, 2005). 
In addition to the division between A shares and B shares, another unique 
characteristic of the Chinese stock markets is the existence of H shares which 
are exclusively traded on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange.  H shares are issued 
by firms incorporated in mainland China and are denominated and traded in 
Hong Kong dollars.  H shares principally cover sectors such as 
telecommunications, insurance, real estate, airlines, logistics as well as oil and 
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tradable shares, they simply dump the newly created tradable shares and shift their attention to 
other reform candidates. 
 
 Laws and Regulations 
 
69 
 
mining, etc.  Here, it is important to note that an increasing number of Chinese 
firms have their shares listed simultaneously on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange 
and one of the two mainland Chinese stock exchanges; namely, the Shanghai 
Stock Exchange or the Shenzhen Stock Exchange.  Initially, only international 
investors were able to buy H shares but from 2007 onwards, the Chinese 
government has allowed investors from mainland China to invest in H shares as 
well.  This has resulted in a significant increase in the demand for H shares. 
3.3 China’s Takeover Legal Regime 
3.3.1 Framework and Overview of China’s Takeover Laws 
As discussed earlier in this chapter, following the merger of the local securities 
regulatory authorities with the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) 
in 1997, the CSRC now has exclusive authority for the regulation of securities 
markets and activities in China.  There are two main laws regulating the merger 
and acquisition (M&A) activities of listed firms in China.  The first is the Securities 
Law of the People‟s Republic of China (PRC), which came into force in 1999.  
The stated objectives of the Securities Law is to regulate the issuance, sale and 
purchase of securities, protect the lawful rights and interests of investors, 
safeguard the public interest and enhance economic order and promote the 
growth of the socialist market economy in China.9  Hence, the Securities Law 
covers a wide range of regulatory activities, including the public listing of 
securities and stock exchange regulation, on-going disclosure of information by 
listed firms, prohibited trading acts and the regulation of mergers and acquisitions 
by publicly listed firms, etc.  The Securities Law of the PRC is comprised of 
twelve chapters, only one of which - Chapter 4 - contains provisions relating to 
the regulation of mergers and acquisitions.  However, Chapter 4 of the Securities 
Law lays down only very general provisions relating to M&A activities in China.  
More detailed regulatory provisions have been promulgated by the CSRC and 
are to be found in the second important law alluded to earlier; namely, Measures 
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 Refer to Article one of the Securities Law of People‟s Republic of China. 
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for the Administration of the Takeover of Listed Companies (Shangshi Gongsi 
Ganli Banfa), 2002 as amended in 2006.  According to Huang (2008), the 
Takeover Measures, 2006 set up the most comprehensive and workable legal 
framework to date for the M&A activities of Chinese listed firms.  Furthermore, a 
number of important changes were incorporated into the 2006 amended 
Takeover Measures in order to fill gaps and loopholes which experience had 
shown existed the in the 2002 Takeover Measures.  Given this, our primary focus 
in this chapter will be on the 2006 Takeover Measures which were promulgated 
on 31 July 2006 and came into force on 1 September 2006. 
3.3.2 General Principles of Measures for the Administration of the 
Takeovers of Listed Companies, 2006. 
As previously noted Measures for the Administration of the Takeovers of Listed 
Companies 2006, which was issued by the CSRC, is the main and most 
important law associated with the regulation of takeover activities for listed firms 
in China and is a revised version of the Takeover Measures which came into 
force in 2002.  The Takeover Measures, 2006 aim to regulate takeovers of listed 
firms and the related alteration of share entitlement, protect the legitimate rights 
and interests of listed firms and investors, maintain the order and efficient 
operation of securities markets and promote the optimum distribution of 
resources throughout the Chinese economy, etc.  Moreover, protecting the 
interests of investors has a very high priority in the 2006 Takeover Measures.  
The Takeover Measures, 2006 emphasise that mergers and acquisitions shall be 
conducted in light of the principles of openness (Gong Kai), fairness (Gong Ping) 
and equity (Gong Zheng).10  It is these principles which underscore the 
requirement of the Takeover Measures, 2006 that the information disclosed by 
firms involved in mergers and acquisitions shall be truthful, accurate and 
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 See Article 3 of the Takeover Measures, 2006.  
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complete and must not contain any false record, misleading statement or 
significant omissions.11 
Article 4 of the takeover Measures, 2006 stipulates that takeovers involving 
foreign investors must have the approval of the related Department of State; this 
will normally be the CSRC but there will be circumstances in which the approval 
of other Departments of State will be required.  For example, in 2008 the Ministry 
of Commerce (MOFCOM) blocked the U.S. Coca-Cola Company from mounting 
a successful takeover bid for the Chinese fruit giant, Huiyuan Juice Group Ltd on 
the grounds that it would have been the biggest foreign takeover of a Chinese 
firm in Chinese history and that it would have infringed the Chinese Antimonopoly 
Law.  Furthermore, the Huiyuan Juice Group is a famous national Chinese brand 
closely associated with the Chinese people who would not approve of a well 
known domestic national brand like this falling into the hands of foreign owners.  
A detailed consideration of the Chinese Antimonopoly Law will be provided in the 
subsequent sections of this chapter.   Finally, foreign investors must be subject to 
Chinese laws and ordinances and also, obey the judicial and arbitral system of 
China.  As previously noted one reason MOFCOM blocked Coca Cola‟s takeover 
bid for the Huiyuan Juice Group was that it infringed the Chinese Antimonopoly 
Law.  Hence, Article 4 of the Takeover Measures, 2006 represents a significant 
barrier to foreign firms seeking to use the takeover mechanism to enter 
potentially profitable Chinese markets, to access the cheap labour force and the 
wide range of resources that are available in the Chinese economy. 
Under some circumstances bidding firms are barred from takeover activities.  
Hence under Article 6(1) of the Takeover Measures, 2006, a bidding firm will be 
prevented from using the takeover procedures to acquire another firm if, in the 
opinion of the CSRC, it has been in a continuous state of high indebtedness 
(literally, “large debts”) and has a history of not being able to meet its debts as 
they fall due for payment (literally, “has not paid off its due debts”).  However, the 
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Takeover Measures, 2006 are silent as to what is meant by a continuous state of 
high indebtedness and has not paid its debts as they fall due.  Secondly, under 
Article 6(2) of the Takeover Measures, 2006 if the bidding firm has ever 
committed a major illegal act or has ever been suspected of being involved in a 
major illegal act during the 3 years prior to the takeover, then the CSRC may bar 
the bidding firm from the takeover of any listed firms.  Similarly, under Article 6(3) 
if the bidding firm has committed any serious credit-breaking act in the securities 
market during the 3 years preceding the takeover, then the CSRC may also bar 
the bidding firm from the takeover of any listed firms. There are also a few other 
circumstances under which the CSRC can refuse to sanction takeover activities 
by personal individuals.  For example under Article 147 of the Chinese Company 
Law, a person who is without or has limited capacity of civil conduct or a person 
who has a criminal conviction within 3 years prior to the takeover date will be 
barred by the CRSC from participating in any takeover activities.   As we note 
above there are several other circumstances under which the CSRC will refuse to 
sanction takeover activities by individuals or firms; further details are to be found 
in the Securities Law, the Company Law and the Takeover Measures, 2006. 
Article 9 of the Takeover Measures, 2006 also provides that the bidding firm in a 
takeover must hire a financial consultant who is to make an assessment about 
whether the proposed takeover is injurious to the legitimate rights and interests of 
either the target or bidding firms and/or their shareholders.  The financial 
consultant must be a professional institution which is registered in China and has 
a financial consultancy qualification.  Further details of the role and functions of 
financial consultants in the takeover process are to be found in a later section of 
this chapter. 
3.3.3 Definition of the Concept of Control 
The concept of control is important in empirical studies of M&A activities since it 
has a potentially crucial impact on the way that the data for the study is selected.  
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Under Article 84 of the Takeover Measures, 2006 a bidding firm is said to acquire 
control of a listed target firm if: 
(1)  it successfully purchases more than 50% of the equity shares issued by 
the listed target firm, or 
(2)   it can exercise 30% of the voting rights associated with the equity capital 
of the listed target firm, or 
(3) it has the capacity to determine the election of more than half of the 
membership of the firm‟s board of directors, or 
(4) it has control of sufficient voting rights to either determine or have a 
“significant” impact on the outcome of resolutions tabled at a general 
assembly of shareholders. 
Hence, under the Takeover Measures, 2006 a bidding firm that satisfies any one 
of these four stated conditions is said to have gained control over the listed target 
firm.  Unfortunately, the SDC data base from which we obtained most of our 
takeover data does not contain comprehensive information on the voting rights 
acquiring firms obtained in the listed target firms.  Given this, our empirical 
analysis of mergers and acquisitions in China is based on Article 84(1) of the 
Takeover Measures, 2006; namely, as long as the acquiring firms purchase more 
than 50% of the equity shares of the listed target firms, a takeover will be 
deemed to have occurred and will be included in our subsequent empirical 
analysis. 
3.3.4 Mandatory Bid Rule 
In accordance with the equality of opportunities principle, a mandatory bid rule 
sits at the heart of China‟s takeover laws (Huang, 2008).  Hence, both the 
Securities Law and the Takeover Measures, 2006 have a clear and consistent 
definition with regard to the mandatory bid rule. Thus, under Article 61 and 
Articles 23, 24, 25 and 83 of the Takeover Measures, 2006 an investor who by 
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himself or who in conjunction with other “concerted parties” controls 30% or more 
of the equity shares issued by the listed target firm are required to make either a 
general or partial tender offer for the remaining shares in the affected listed firm.  
Article 83 defines concerted parties as those with whom the primary investor is 
acting in concert by means of private agreement or any other arrangement in 
order to boost their joint voting power in the listed target firm.  For example, the 
mandatory bid rule will apply to an investor himself or who in conjunction with 
other “concerted parties” jointly controls 30% or more of the shares in the listed 
target firm not only by means of co-jointly acquiring shares, but also by 
investment relationship, agreement, partnership cooperation, joint venture, 
simultaneously acting as directors, etc.  Hence, not only the acquirer‟s own 
shareholdings, but also the shareholdings of its concerted parties acting in 
concert (so-called Yizhi Xingdongren) will be counted when calculating an 
investor‟s shareholding in a listed target firm (Huang, 2008).  This is a great 
improvement in the means of calculating investors‟ shareholdings for takeover 
purposes in comparison to the old version; that is, the 2002 version of the 
Takeover Measures. 
Here it is important to note that the mandatory bid rule provides protection for 
shareholders of the target firm by ensuring that the control premium paid by the 
acquiring firm is shared amongst all the shareholders of the target firm.  But on 
the other hand, this kind of protection may come at the expense of the 
contestability of takeovers since the cost of the takeover may rise and some 
potential bidders may be dissuaded from being involved in the takeover because 
of it (Huang, 2008). 
Moreover, under certain circumstances the CSRC can exempt bidding firms and 
concerted parties from the mandatory tender provisions of the Takeover 
Measures, 2006.  The exact conditions under which the exemption applies are 
given detailed consideration in a subsequent section of this chapter. 
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3.3.5. Disclosure of Substantial Shareholdings 
Article 13 of the Takeover Measures, 2006 taken in conjunction with Article 86 of 
the Securities Law requires the disclosure of substantial shareholdings in listed 
firms (5% or more of the equity stock) and is meant to provide the market with an 
early warning of possible takeovers (Jennings, et. Al., 1992).  Article 22 of the 
Takeover Measures, 2006 provide that a substantial shareholding in a listed firm 
shall include not only the shares registered under the investor‟s name but also 
shares held in conjunction with other concerted parties as well as those shares 
not registered under the investor‟s name but for which the voting rights are 
actually controlled by the given investor. 
Articles 13, 14 and 15 of the Takeover Measure, 2006 require that if an investor 
coupled with his or her concerted parties come to hold 5% of the shares issued 
by a listed firm by means of transactions in the stock exchange, transfer 
agreement, as well as administrative transfer or alternation, implementation of 
court ruling, inheritance or donation, etc. then they must disclose their position to 
the market by submitting a written report which summarises the information 
specified in Article 16 of the Takeover Measures, 2006 to the Head Office of the 
CSRC in Beijing as well as to the relevant stock exchange.  They must also send 
a copy of the written report to the CSRC representative office in the locality of the 
listed firm (hereinafter referred to as the representative office) and at the same 
time formally notify the listed firm that it has submitted a report to the CSRC and 
the stock exchange.  The acquiring investor/s must also make a formal 
announcement to the general public within three business days from the date 
when the substantial shareholding occurs.  Furthermore, the investor cannot 
continue to buy or sell the shares in the listed firm until it has satisfied the 
provisions of Articles 13, 14 and 15 of the Takeover Measures, 2006; that is, until 
the market has been fully informed of its substantial shareholding in the listed 
firm (Huang, 2008).  Equally, Article 13 and Article 14 of the Takeover Measures, 
2006 provide that if a substantial shareholder along with their concerted parties 
increase or decrease their shareholding in the listed firm by 5% by means of 
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transactions in the stock exchange or transfer agreements, etc. (that is, by 5% to 
10%, 10% to 15% and so on) they again must send a copy of the written report 
specified by Article 16 to the CSRC and the stock exchange and they must also 
notify the listed target firm and the general public.  During the disclosure period 
and for two days thereafter, the investor/s cannot continue to buy or sell any 
shares in the listed target firm. 
Here it is important to note that there are two categories of disclosure for 
substantial shareholdings under Article 16 of the Takeover Measures, 2006. 
Specifically, if the investor and their concerted parties are not the largest 
shareholder or the actual controlling shareholder of the listed firm (as defined in 
Article 84 of the Takeover Measures, 2006) and  their collective shareholding is 
in excess of 5% but less than 20%, then only the simplified disclosure system as 
specified in Article 16 is required; namely: 
(1) The names and domiciles of the investor and their concerted parties as 
well as the names, places of registration and legal representatives of the 
investor and their concerted parties if the investor and concerted parties 
are legal persons; 
 
(2) The purpose of holding shares and whether or not the investor and their 
concerted parties intend to continuously increase their shareholdings of  
the listed firm over the following twelve months; 
 
(3) The name of the listed company and also the type, quantity and proportion 
of shares held; 
 
(4) The timing and the method used by the investor and their concerted 
parties to acquire or decrease their shareholding in the listed firm by 5%; 
 
(5) A brief summary of the shares in the listed target firm purchased and sold 
on the Stock Exchange in the 6 months‟ period immediately preceding the 
acquisition or disposal of the 5% shareholding in the listed firm. 
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The second category is when the substantial shareholding of the investor and 
their concerted parties exceeds 20% but is less than 30% of the total issued 
shares of the listed firm.  In this circumstance Article 17 of the Takeover 
Measures, 2006 require that a very detailed report must be submitted to the 
Head Office of the CSRC in Beijing and the stock exchange.  A copy of the 
Report must also be filed with the CSRC representative office in the locality of the 
listed target firm and the listed target firm and general public must also be notified 
within three business days from the date when the variation in the substantial 
shareholding occurs.  In addition to the contents required by the simplified report 
as specified in Article 16 of the Takeover Measures, 2006 as given above, the 
following information must also be provided: 
(1) The controlling shareholders of the investor and their concerted parties 
and a structural chart of the relationship between the shareholdings of the 
investor and their concerted parties in the listed target firm; 
 
(2) The price, the total amount of capital required and the source of the capital 
or other payment arrangements used to acquire the additional shares in the 
listed target firm; 
 
(3)  Whether or not there exists intra-industry competition or potential intra-
industry competition or continuous affiliated transactions between the 
business of the investor and their concerted parties (and their controlling 
shareholders) and the business of the listed target firm.  If the intra-industry 
competition or continuous affiliated transactions do exist, whether related 
arrangements have been made to encourage the intra-industry competition 
and also, to maintain the independence of the listed target firm; 
 
(4) The plans the investor and their concerted parties have for redeploying the 
assets, business, personnel, organisational structure, etc. of the listed target 
firm; 
 
(5)  The primary and important transactions which have occurred between the 
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investor and their concerted parties and the listed target firm over the two 
years preceding the variation of the substantial shareholding in the listed 
target firm. 
The substantial shareholding disclosure threshold and regulations in China are 
broadly similar to those which apply in most advanced industrialised countries 
(Huang, 2008).   In determining the threshold at which the market and other 
participants must be informed of a substantial shareholding, regulators must 
strike a balance across a variety of competing considerations.  For example, 
lower thresholds provide more protection for the shareholders of the target firm.  
Against this lower thresholds will make it difficult for the acquiring firm to obtain 
the “toehold” necessary to launch a successful takeover bid.  It will also more 
than likely increase the price which the acquiring firm will have to pay in order to 
mount a successful takeover bid (Huang, 2008, p. 166).  In other words, lower 
thresholds lead to a better informed market; but against this, it may make the 
takeover more costly, since if the acquirer must disclose their intentions too early, 
the share price of the target firm will tend to rise earlier than it otherwise would 
have (Fischel, 1978). 
3.3.6. Tender Offer Rules 
In section 3.2.4 we note that Articles, 23, 24, 25 and 83 of the Takeover 
Measures, 2006 provide that an investor who by himself or in conjunction with 
other concerted parties controls 30% or more of the equity shares issued by a 
listed target firm must make either a general or partial tender offer for the 
remaining shares in the affected listed firm.  A general offer is an offer made to all 
shareholders in the listed target firm to acquire the shares that is does not 
presently own.  Thus, if the acquiring firm owns 30% of the shares it will make a 
general tender offer to acquire the remaining 70% of shares that it does not 
presently own.  A partial offer is an offer made to all the shareholders of the listed 
target firm for part of the shares they hold; subject to the requirement that the 
minimum tender offer must be for at least 5% of all the shares issued by the 
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listed target firm.  Thus, if the acquiring firm owns 30% of the target firm, the 
minimum partial tender offer will be to acquire 5% of the total issued capital 
thereby increasing the acquirer‟s interest in the target firm from 30% to 35% of 
the total issued shares.   
Here it is important to note, however, that Article 62 of the Takeover Measures, 
2006 provides that under certain circumstances acquiring firms may be exempted 
by the CSRC from the mandated tender offer requirements.  The specific 
circumstances under which acquiring firms can apply for exemption are given 
detailed treatment in section 3.3.9 of this chapter of the dissertation.  The partial 
tender offer, which was not available before 2006 (only general tender offers 
existed prior to this date) represents a significant improvement in comparison to 
the takeover regimes previously available as it effectively provides more flexibility 
for potential acquirers and thus reduces the transaction costs associated with 
takeovers (Baker and McKenzie International, 2006). 
Articles 36 of the Takeover Measures, 2006 specifies that the acquirer may pay 
the consideration for a takeover in cash, securities, a combination of cash and 
securities or any other lawful means.  However, where the securities used as 
consideration for a takeover are not listed on a stock exchange the acquiring firm 
must offer a cash alternative to the shareholders of the listed target firm.  Here it 
is important to note that prior to 2006 the consideration for all takeovers had to be 
in cash.  This often caused difficulties for acquirers both in terms of financing and 
post-takeover integration (Huang, 2008, p. 162).  There are, however, several 
exceptions to this rule.  For example, Article 27 of the Takeover Measures, 2006 
provides that if the acquirer has to make a general tender offer to all 
shareholders of a target firm, and thereafter seeks to delist the target firm, or 
because the acquirer failed to obtain an exemption from making a general tender 
offer from the CSRC, then the takeover consideration has to be paid completely 
by cash. 
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Furthermore, if the consideration for the takeover is to be paid in cash there must 
be a public announcement to that effect and the acquirer must deposit not less 
than 20% of the total amount of the takeover consideration with a bank 
designated by the China Securities Depository and Clearing Corporation as the 
performance guarantee.  On the other hand, if the acquirer pays the takeover 
consideration by means of securities, the audited financial statements of the 
issuer of the said securities, as well as the valuation report prepared under Article 
67(5) of the Takeover Measures, 2006, must be made available to the listed 
target firm‟s shareholders, the CSRC and the Stock Exchange amongst others.  
The valuation report and other regulations take a slightly different form according 
to whether the securities used as consideration for the takeover are bonds or 
shares and whether or not they are listed on a stock exchange.  For example, if 
the takeover consideration paid by the acquirer is comprised wholly or partly of 
bonds not listed on the stock exchange, then Article 36 of the Takeover 
Measures, 2006 provides that the shareholders of the target firm must be offered 
a cash alternative to the bonds.  Article 36 also requires that the acquirer should 
cooperate and assist with the due-diligence investigations of the independent 
financial consultant employed by the listed target firm. 
It is also important to note that Article 35 of the Takeover Measures, 2006 places 
a lower limit on the offer price which the acquirer makes for the listed target firm‟s 
shares.  Hence, the price the acquirer pays under a tender offer must not be less 
than the maximum price the acquirer has paid for any of the shares of the listed 
target firm over the six months preceding the announcement of the tender offer.  
Article 35 also provides that if the offer price is below the arithmetic average 
value of the daily weighted average prices during the thirty trading days prior to 
the announcement of the tender offer,  a financial consultant must be hired by the 
acquirer to produce a report on issues such as whether there is manipulation of 
stock prices, whether the bidder has failed to disclose its concerted parties, 
whether there has been any other arrangement for the bidder to obtain the 
shares of the target firm during the previous six months and finally, whether the 
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offer price is “reasonable” taking account of all the circumstances and events 
surrounding the acquisition process.  However, prior to the promulgation of the 
Takeover Measures, 2006, two offer prices had to be set; one offer price for the 
tradable shares in the target listed firm and another price for the non-tradable 
shares.  The offer price for the tradable shares of the listed target firm was 
determined by reference to the market price of those shares whilst the offer price 
for the non-tradable shares was based on the net asset value of the target firm as 
summarised in the latest audited financial statements for the firm.  If the price 
offered by the acquirer was obviously unfair, then under Article 34 of the 
Takeover Measures, 2002 the CSRC could intervene and demand that the 
acquirer makes an adjustment to the offer price.  In more recent years, the 
problems arising from the distinction between tradable and non-tradable shares 
has eased following the Guquan Fenzhi Gaige (shareholding structure) reforms 
which were implemented in 200512.  Importantly, Article 34 of the Takeover 
Measures, 2002 also provided that the offer price for tradable shares could not 
be lower than 90% of the arithmetic average value of the daily weighted average 
prices during the 30 trading days prior to the announcement date of the tender 
offer.  Unfortunately, more often than not this latter price turned out to be the 
price offered by the acquiring firm for the tradable shares of the listed target firm.  
This often meant that the takeover was rejected by the shareholders of the target 
listed firm because the offer price turned out to be lower than the current market 
price of the tradable shares of the target firm at the time of the takeover offer 
(Huang, 2008). 
Under article 28 of the Takeover Measures, 2006, if the shares of the target listed 
firm are purchased by means of a tender offer, then the acquiring firm shall 
employ a financial consultant who must submit a written report to the head office 
of the CSRC in Beijing as well as to the relevant stock exchange.  The financial 
consultant must also send a copy of the report to the local representative office of 
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the CSRC, inform the target listed firm about the pending tender offer and at the 
same time make a public announcement summarising the contents of the tender 
offer report.  In addition, Article 29 of the Takeover Measures, 2006 provides that 
the tender offer report prepared by the acquiring firm should contain the following 
information: 
(1) The names and domicile of the investor and their concerted parties as well 
as the names, places of registration and legal representatives of the investor 
and their concerted parties if the investor and concerted parties are legal 
persons; 
 
(2) The reasons why and the purposes for the acquirer making the takeover 
offer and whether or not the acquirer will continue to increase their 
shareholding in the target listed firm during the following 12 months; 
 
(3) The name of the target listed firm and the category of the shares to be 
purchased; 
 
(4) The quantity and proportion of the shares to be purchased; 
 
(5)  The price the acquirer will pay for the shares purchased under the tender 
offer; 
 
(6) The amount of capital required for the takeover, the sources from which 
the capital will be obtained, the guarantees or other payment arrangements 
made by the acquirer to meet its financial commitments under the tender 
offer; 
 
(7)  Conditions (partial, general or other) stipulated in the tender offer; 
 
(8)  The terms of the tender offer; 
 
(9)  The number and proportion of shares held by the acquirer in the target 
listed firm at the time when the tender offer report is submitted; 
 Laws and Regulations 
 
83 
 
 
(10)  Whether or not there exists intra-industry competition or potential intra-
industry competition or continuous affiliated transactions between the 
business of the investor and their concerted parties (and their controlling 
shareholders) and the business of the listed firm.  If the intra-industry 
competition or continuous affiliated transactions do exist, whether related 
arrangements have been made to encourage the intra-industry competition 
and also, to maintain the independence of the listed firm; 
 
(11) The plans the investor and their concerted parties have for redeploying 
the assets, business, personnel, organisational structure, etc. of the listed firm 
over the ensuing twelve months; 
 
(12)  The primary and important transactions which have occurred between 
the investor and their concerted parties and the listed firm over the two years 
preceding the announcement of the tender offer, and 
 
(13)   A brief summary of the shares in the listed firm purchased and sold on 
the Stock Exchange in the six months‟ period immediately preceding the 
announcement of the tender offer. 
As previously noted the acquiring firm must make a public announcement 
summarising the contents of the tender offer report.  The opinions of the financial 
consultant and lawyers hired by the acquiring firm under Article 28 of the 
Takeover Measures, 2006 must be made public fifteen days after submission of 
the tender offer report to the CSRC.  During this 15 day period the CRSC may 
object to the contents of the tender offer report if it is inconsistent with laws, 
administrative regulations or any other related provisions.  If such circumstances 
arise the CSRC shall notify the acquirer that the tender offer violates the laws, 
administrative regulations or other related provisions and the acquirer may not 
make a public announcement of the tender offer.  If, however, no objections are 
made by the CSRC then the tender offer report may be announced to the public 
after this fifteen day period.  Under Article 31 of the Takeover Measures, 2006 
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after the submission of the tender offer documents to the CSRC and during this 
15 day period the acquirer may make an application to the CSRC to cancel the 
tender offer by submitting a document to the CSRC summarising the reasons 
and explanations for the proposed cancellation.  If the CSRC agrees to allow the 
acquirer to cancel the tender offer then the acquirer may not make a tender offer 
for the same firm over the ensuing twelve months and the cancellation of the 
tender offer must be announced to the public. 
The Takeover Measures, 2006 also place specific reporting and other 
responsibilities on the directors of the target firm.  In particular, Article 32 of the 
Takeover Measures, 2006 provides that the board of directors of the target firm 
must make an investigation into the capacity, credit status and purpose of the 
takeover by the acquirer and analyse the conditions of the tender offer.  
Moreover, the board of directors of the target firm must bring forward suggestions 
about whether or not the shareholders of the target firm should accept the offer 
and they must also hire an independent financial consultant to provide a 
professional opinion about each of the above issues.  Within 20 days following 
the announcement of the tender offer report from the acquirer, the board of 
directors of the target firm must submit a report to the Beijing office of the CSRC 
which summarises all of the above information (and includes the professional 
opinions from the independent financial consultant).  The report must also be filed 
with the local office of the CSRC and the stock exchange on which the target firm 
is listed.  A public announcement about the report must be made at the same 
time.  Moreover, if the acquirer makes any major alterations to the conditions of 
the tender offer, the board of directors of the target firm shall submit the 
supplementary opinions of the board of directors and of the independent financial 
consultant on the alterations to the CSRC and the stock exchange.  A public 
announcement about the alterations must also be made at the same time. 
Moreover, Article 37 of the Takeover Measures, 2006 provides a safeguard to 
protect the shareholders of the target firm by specifying the minimum time period 
over which shareholders of the target firm may consider the terms and conditions 
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of the tender offer.  Thus, the term stipulated for acceptance of the tender offer 
should not be less than 30 days and not be more than 60 days, except where 
there is a contested offer.  The CSRC has adjudged that this period allows 
shareholders of the target firm sufficient time to make a rational decision about 
whether to accept the tender offer without prejudicing the interests of the 
acquiring firm.  Further, under Article 38 of the Takeover Measures, 2006 the 
acquirer cannot sell any shares in the target firm following the announcement of 
the tender offer, nor can the acquirer buy other shares of the target firm by any 
other means not stipulated in the tender offer or that go beyond the conditions 
stipulated in the tender offer.  To some extent, the interests of the shareholders 
of the target firm are protected through this provision since it negates the 
pressure that would otherwise arise on the target firm‟s shareholders to make a 
quick and potentially, irrational decision about whether to accept the terms and 
conditions of the tender offer.  Moreover, under Article 41 of the Takeover 
Measures, 2006 if the acquirer wants to vary or change the terms and conditions 
of the tender offer, the approval of CSRC is required.13  Importantly, the variation 
of the tender offer cannot be made 15 days prior to the expiration of the bid 
unless a competing bid occurs. 
Under Article 42 of the Takeover Measures, 2006 shareholders of the target 
listed firm who accept the tender offer must entrust a securities firm to go through 
the related procedures for preliminary acceptance of the tender offer.  The 
securities firm must apply to the China Securities Depository and Clearing 
Corporation for temporary custody of the shares under the preliminarily accepted 
tender offer.  Shares under temporary custody of the China Securities Depository 
and Clearing Corporation are held in escrow over the 30 day to 60 day period 
during which shareholders of the target firm are required to make a decision 
about whether or not to accept the tender offer. However, here it is important to 
                                                        
13
 The acquirer should submit a written report to the Beijing office of the CSRC within two 
business days after the major alteration, and simultaneously send a copy to the representative 
office of the CRSC and the stock exchange.  It must also notify the target listed company and 
make a public announcement about the change or variation in the terms and conditions of the 
tender offer.  
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note that preliminary accepting shareholders can withdraw their acceptance 
within three trading days before the expiration of the bid by entrusting a securities 
firm to go through the procedures of revoking the preliminarily accepted tender 
offer. 
The Takeover Measures, 2006 pay particular attention to the interests of minority 
shareholders after the takeover has been consummated.  If the tender offer 
expires and the acquirer has sufficient acceptances (normally at least 75 percent 
of all outstanding shares), then the acquirer may initiate proceedings to delist the 
target firm (Huang, 2008).  In this circumstance, Article 44 of the Takeover 
Measures, 2006 provides that the remaining shareholders in the target firm have 
the right to enforce the sale of their shares on the same terms and conditions as 
shareholders who have accepted the tender offer before the expiration date.  
This means that the remaining minority shareholders are protected from a 
“freeze-out” takeover on terms and conditions less favourable than those 
shareholders who have alreday accepted the tender offer before the expiration 
date (Huang, 2008). 
3.3.7 Defence Mechanisms 
In section 3.1.3 of this chapter we noted how in April, 2005, the CSRC issued the 
shareholding structure reform called „Guquan Fenzhi Gaige‟.  Guquan Fenzhi 
Gaige required shareholders with tradable shares in a particular firm to agree 
terms and conditions under which the non-tradable shares in that firm will be 
converted into tradable shares.14  Importantly, prior to 2005 the large majority of 
A shares were non-tradable and were mainly held by stated-owned controlled 
entities.  This in turn made tender offers and hostile takeovers extraordinarily 
difficult.   However, the gradual conversion of non-tradable shares into tradable 
shares after 2005 has facilitated an expansion in merger and acquisition activities 
                                                        
14
 Here it will be recalled that shares in the mainland Chinese capital market are divided into A 
shares and B shares.  Further, A shares fall into two categories: tradable shares and non-tradable 
shares.  Importantly, prior to 2005 the large majority of A shares were non-tradable and were 
mainly held by stated-owned entities.  This in turn made tender offers and hostile takeovers 
extraordinarily difficult. 
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with a consequent increase in the number of tender offers and hostile takeovers 
occurring in China.  This in turn required that significant reforms be made to the 
takeover defence measures available to Chinese target firms.  In response to 
this, the CSRC incorporated some important improvements into the defence 
mechanisms available to target firms under the Takeover Measures, 2006; 
though as Huang (2008) notes, the changes made are not perfect and indeed, 
are often problematic. 
Firstly, Article 8 of the Takeover Measures, 2006 provides that when the board of 
directors of a target firm implement defensive measures against a potential 
takeover they must do so in such a way as to satisfy the fiduciary duties owed to 
the target firm and its shareholders.  In particular, the defensive measures should 
be beneficial to the target firm and its shareholders and must not pose an 
inappropriate obstacle to the attempted takeover. Moreover, the board of 
directors of the target firm must not provide financial assistance either directly or 
indirectly to the bidding firm by making use of the resources of the target firm and 
nor may they damage the legitimate rights and interests of the target firm and its 
shareholders. 
Secondly, under Article 33 of the Takeover Measures, 2006 once the acquiring 
firm has filed the provisional tender offer documents with the CSRC and before 
the completion of the tender offer, the board of directors of the target firm must 
not take any defensive measures which might have a significant effect on the 
composition or value of the target firm‟s assets, its liabilities, other entitlements or 
its business performance.  In other words, when the board of directors of the 
target firm become aware of the pending tender offer they must not dispose of 
any of the target firm‟s assets, make any significant external investments or 
adjust in any way, the main business of the target firm or give guarantees or 
loans on behalf of the target firm, etc. without the approval of the shareholders in 
general meeting.  This requirement prevents the target firm from initiating 
activities which might frustrate the acquiring firm in its efforts to consummate the 
tender offer and also, from implementing any other activities which may not be in 
 Laws and Regulations 
 
88 
 
the best interests of the shareholders of the target firm (Huang, 2008).  In other 
words, it implies that the catalogue of defensive measures taken by the target 
firm in the takeover is determined by the shareholders, and not the directors, 
which is quite similar to the “shareholder-based” model which underscores the 
City Code on Takeovers and Mergers in the United Kingdom (Huang, 2008).  
Here it is important to note that Article 33 of the Takeover Measures, 2006 
overlaps with and in some areas conflicts with Article 8 of the Takeover 
Measures, 2006 which is based more on U.S. law and practice.  This raises the 
general issue of whether laws based on a melange of foreign regulations in 
relation to the selection and application of the defensive measures available to 
Chinese target firms will work in China because of the very significant differences 
in culture and social norms which exist between western countries and China 
(Huang, 2008). 
3.3.8 Agreement Takeovers 
As noted previously in section 3.1.3 of this chapter, a significant characteristic of 
the Chinese securities markets is that not all the shares of listed firms are 
tradable on the stock exchange due to the division of A shares into state owned 
shares, legal person shares and public individual shares.  In particular, before 
2005 state-owned and legal person A shares were not allowed to be traded on 
organised securities markets.  However, we have previously noted that in April, 
2005, the CSRC implemented the Guquan Fenzhi Gaige reform programme 
under which listed firms with non-tradable A shares were obliged to convert these 
shares into fully tradable A shares.  By July, 2007, 1,229 of the 1,333 firms with 
non-tradable A shares listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges 
had begun the process of implementing the reform measures.  However, 
experience has shown that for most firms it takes a considerable time to reach 
agreement on the terms and conditions of the conversion process and even 
when agreement is reached, there is often a provision which restricts trading on 
the stock exchange in the formerly non-traded A shares for several years into the 
future.  Moreover, because of the the socialist principles upon which the Chinese 
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state is organised there are certain strategic industries where it is in the best 
interests of the Chinese economy for firms to remain predominantly under state 
control.  In these industries whilst some shares may be traded by private 
individuals most shares will remain under the control of the state and will not be 
available for trading on the stock market.  As a result of these factors it is 
occasionally the case that it is impracticable for prospective acquiring firms to 
make tender offers for firms which operate in industries that are of strategic 
importance to the socialist principles upon which the Chinese state is organised.  
In such circumstances the only way a prospective acquirer can make a takeover 
offer for the target firm is to reach an agreement with the Chinese government.  
Here, the Takeover Measures, 2006 lay down detailed rules governing the way in 
which an agreement for takeover is to be reached between the prospective 
acquiring company and the non-tradable shareholders. 
First, if an acquiring firm intends to reach an agreement to purchase more than 
30% of the issued shares of the target firm, then the shares that exceed the 
aforementioned 30% threshold must be acquired by means of a tender offer 
unless the acquiring firm applies for an exemption under Article 61 of the 
Takeover Measures, 2006.  Second, the period between the signing of the 
agreement and the transfer of the related shares is called the transitional period.  
Article 52 of the Takeover Measures, 2006 provides that it is only in exceptional 
circumstances that the acquiring firm can change the composition of the board of 
directors of the target firm during the transitional period.  However, in such 
exceptional circumstances the directors from the acquiring firm must not exceed 
one third of the total number of all directors of the target firm.  Furthermore, 
article 52 also provides that the target firm must not give any guarantee (financial 
or otherwise) to the acquiring firm or any of its affiliated parties during the 
transitional period.  In addition, unless the target firm is experiencing serious 
financial difficulties, it must not publicly issue shares for the raising of capital or 
conduct significant purchases or sales of assets or involve itself in any major 
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investment or any other affiliated transactions with the acquiring firm or its 
affiliated parties during the transitional period. 
Third, where there is a controlling shareholder of the target firm who transfers 
their shareholdings to the acquirer by means of agreement, then an investigation 
as to the capacity, credit status and the purpose of the takeover by the acquirer 
must be conducted and the information obtained from the investigation must be 
disclosed in the report of the modification of entitlements provided to the CSRC 
under Article 50 of the Takeover Measures, 2006.  On the other hand, if the 
controlling shareholder or any of its affiliated (concerted) parties has not paid off 
its debts to the target firm, or has not removed any guarantees that the target firm 
has provided for its debts, or is associated with any other circumstances that may 
damage the interests of the acquiring firm, then under Article 53 of the Takeover 
Measures, 2006 the board of directors of the acquiring firm must disclose the 
aforementioned circumstances and also take effective measures to protect the 
interests of its shareholders. These two provisions of the Takeover Measures, 
2006 are designed to protect the shareholders of the acquiring firm from any 
conflicts of interest that may influence the motives of the controlling shareholder 
of the target firm. 
Finally, under Articles 54 and 55 of the Takeover Measures, 2006 related parties 
involved in the takeover agreement must appoint a securities firm to apply to the 
China Securities Depository and Clearing Corporation for temporary custody of 
the shares to be transferred under the takeover agreement.  They must also 
deposit the consideration for the purchase of the shares in the bank designated 
by the China Securities Depository and Clearing Corporation.  Moreover, in 
accordance with the business operation rules of the stock exchange and the 
China Securities Depository and Clearing Corporation, after the related parties 
have agreed to go through with the takeover, the shares are removed from the 
temporary custody of the securities firm and transferred to the acquiring firm and 
the target shareholders receive the consideration deposited with the bank 
designated by the China Securities Depository and Clearing Corporation. 
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3.3.9 Application of Waiver 
We have previously noted that under the Takeover Measures, 2006 a bidding 
firm that controls 30% or more of the equity shares of a listed target firm is 
required to make either a general or partial tender offer for the remaining shares 
in the affected target firm.  However, under certain circumstances bidding firms 
are able to apply to the China Security Regulation Committee (CSRC) for an 
exemption from the requirement to make a tender offer.  Hence, Article 62 of the 
Takeover Measures, 2006 provides that a bidding firm may apply for an 
exemption from the requirement to make either a general or partial tender offer 
under the following circumstances: 
(1) The bidding firm and the target firm can prove that the transfer of shares 
would not affect the ultimate overall control of the target firm; 
 
(2) The listed target firm is suffering from serious financial difficulties and the 
scheme for helping out the target firm which is brought forward by the bidding 
firm has obtained approval from the general assembly of shareholders of the 
target firm.  Moreover, the bidding firm promises not to transfer the 
shareholdings and entitlements gained in the target firm within 3 years; 
 
(3) The bidding firm has obtained new shares issued to them with the 
approval of the non-related shareholders of the general assembly of 
shareholders of the target firm and these newly issued shares have resulted 
in the bidding firm‟s overall interest in the target firm rising above the 30% 
threshold.  Moreover, the bidding firm promises not to transfer its 
shareholding gained in the target firm for the following 3 years. 
 
Parties other than the bidding firm may also apply for an exemption from the 
requirement for the bidding firm to make a tender offer.  The exact circumstances 
under which this may be done are summarised in Article 63 of the Takeover 
Measures, 2006.  Broadly the provisions summarised in Article 63 exempt a 
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bidding firm from making a tender offer when the actions of a third party 
unintentionally lead to the bidding firm‟s overall interest in the target firm rising 
above the 30% threshold. 
3.3.10. Financial Consultant 
We have previously noted that firms involved in takeover activities in China, 
including both target and acquiring firms, are required to appoint professional 
financial consultants to assist them in undertaking takeovers in an organised and 
efficient manner. Hence, the Takeover Measures, 2006 outline detailed 
obligations and responsibilities that must be followed by the financial consultants 
appointed by the target and acquiring firms.  First, when a financial consultant 
appointed by the acquiring firm issues a “financial consultation” report, Article 66 
of the Takeover Measures, 2006 require that the report should clearly analyse 
and explain each of the following issues: 
(1) Whether or not the contents disclosed in the takeover report prepared by 
the target firm under the provisions of Article 32 of the Takeover Measures, 
2006 or the tender offer report prepared by the acquiring firm under Article 29 
of the Takeover Measures, 2006 are true, accurate and complete; 
 
(2) The purposes for the takeover as given by the acquiring firm; 
 
(3) Whether or not the acquiring firm has provided all the necessary 
certification documents and made all appropriate statements on the strengths, 
viability and future profitability of its core business operations.  The financial 
consultant must also analyse and explain the financial status and credit 
situation of the acquiring firm and identify its controlling shareholders. The 
financial consultant must also assess whether or not the acquiring firm has 
the economic wherewithal to implement the takeover and the managerial 
ability to operate the target firm effectually if the takeover comes to fruition.  
Finally, the financial consultant must assess whether or not the acquiring firm 
needs to assume any additional obligations in relation to the takeover; 
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(4) Whether or not the directors, supervisors and senior managers of the 
acquiring firm are familiar with the securities and other laws relating to 
takeovers, the administrative regulations and provisions of the CSRC and are 
fully aware of their obligations and liabilities to file all appropriate reports, to 
make all appropriate public announcements and to fulfil all relevant statutory 
obligations; 
 
(5) The major shareholders and the related percentage of shares they own in 
the acquiring firm and a structural chart of the relationship between these 
shareholders that indicates whether they can control the acquiring firm as 
concerted parties; 
 
(6) Sources of capital that the acquiring firm intends to use for the takeover 
consideration and its legality, and whether or not the acquiring firm has made 
use of shares purchased in the takeover to obtain capital financing from a 
bank or any other financial institutions by means of pledge; 
 
(7) If the acquiring firm pays the consideration for the takeover in securities, a 
statement about whether or not the information disclosed by the issuer of 
those securities is true, accurate and complete. The financial consultant is 
also responsible for assessing the liquidity of the securities offered as 
consideration for the takeover.  
 
(8) Whether or not the acquiring firm has obtained permission from the CSRC 
to implement the takeover; 
 
(9) Whether or not arrangements have been made for the stable operation of 
the target firm over the transitional period of the takeover as defined in Article 
52 of Takeover Measures, 2006, and whether the arrangements satisfy all 
related legal provisions; 
 
(10) If there is intra-industry competition or continuous affiliated transactions 
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between the acquiring and target firms, to assess the arrangements that have 
been made to resolve any conflicts which might arise between the acquiring 
and target firms and also to evaluate the arrangements which have been 
made to maintain the operational independence of the target firm: 
 
(11) Whether any party (other than the acquirer) has a right of claim on the 
takeover target, and whether the acquirer has made supplementary 
arrangements with the target firm other than the consideration for the takeover 
specified in the tender documents; 
 
(12) Whether or not there is any business relationship between the acquiring 
firm or any of its affiliated parties and the listed target firm, and whether or not 
there is any agreement on the future employment of directors, supervisors 
and senior managers between the acquiring firm and the listed target firm; 
 
(13) Whether or not the original controlling shareholder or actual controller of 
the listed target firm has not paid off its debts to the target firm, or has not 
removed any guarantees that the target firm has provided for its debts, or is 
associated with any other circumstances that may damage the interests of the 
acquiring firm.  If any of the above circumstances do exist, whether or not 
practicable solutions have been brought forward by the parties concerned.  
 
(14) In the case that the acquiring firm intends to file for an exemption to 
make a tender offer for the target firm, then the financial consultant must 
make a statement about whether the exemption satisfies any of the 
circumstances specified under Articles 62 and/or Article 63 of the Takeover 
Measures, 2006 and whether or not the acquiring firm is capable of fulfilling 
any related commitments made under these provisions. 
 
Secondly, the independent financial consultant employed by the board of 
directors of a target firm must not simultaneously act as the financial consultant 
of the acquiring firm or have any affiliated relationship with the financial 
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consultant of the acquiring firm.  Furthermore, the independent financial 
consultant of the target firm should conduct a due diligence investigation and 
issue a professional opinion about the fairness and legality of the takeover.  
Under Article 67 of the Takeover Measures, 2006 the independent financial 
consultant‟s report for the target firm should explain and analyse the following 
issues and also give clear opinions on all of them: 
(1) Whether or not the acquiring firm has the financial wherewithal to 
purchase the target firm; 
 
(2) The possible effects of the takeover on the business independence and 
continuous development of the listed target firm; 
 
(3) Whether or not the acquiring firm intends to use (or pledge) the assets of 
or other forms of capital obtained from the target firm to raise the 
consideration necessary to finance the takeover;  
 
(4) If a tender offer is involved, the financial consultant must provide an 
analysis of the financial status of the target firm, must evaluate whether or not 
the takeover price fully reflects the value of the target firm and whether or not 
the tender offer is fair and rational.  The financial consultant must also make a 
recommendation about whether the shareholders of the target firm should 
accept the tender offer;   
 
(5) If the consideration to be paid for the takeover by the acquiring firm is in 
the form of securities, then the financial consultant must conduct a valuation 
analysis of the related securities in terms of their asset backing and their 
business and profit-making potential.  The financial consultant must then use 
the assessed value of the securities to determine whether or not the 
conditions of takeover are fair and sensible to the public shareholders of the 
target firm and whether or not the conditions for takeover put forward by the 
acquiring firm should be accepted; 
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(6) If the takeover involves a management buy-out, the financial consultant 
must provide a valuation analysis of the target firm.  The financial consultant 
must also provide an assessment of the price set for the management buy-
out, the method of payment, the sources of financing for the buy-out and the 
associated repayment plans, and the feasibility of the management buy-out in 
light of all the aforementioned factors.  A summary assessment must also be 
provided about the business relationships which exist between the target 
firm‟s management, their lineal relatives and the target firm itself within the 
prior 24 months.  Finally, the financial consultant must also provide an 
independent assessment of the information disclosed in the takeover report 
prepared by the target firm under the provisions of Article 32 of the Takeover 
Measures, 2006. 
 
3.4 China’s Anti-Monopoly Law, 2008 and Regulation on Notification 
Threshold of Concentration of Undertakings. 
 
3.4.1 General Introduction to the Anti-Monopoly Law in China and 
Notification Threshold of Concentration of Undertakings 
As noted in section 3.2.2 of this chapter, the Anti-Monopoly Law, 2008 is another 
significant strand of Chinese Law which regulates mergers and acquisitions in 
China.  The Anti-Monopoly Law became effective on 1 August 2008 and soon 
after attracted world wide attention when China-MOFCOM (that is, the Ministry of 
Commerce) blocked the U.S. Coca-Cola Company from mounting a successful 
takeover bid for the Chinese fruit giant, Huiyuan Juice Group Ltd.  Article 1 of the 
Anti-Monopoly Law provides that the objectives of the law are to prevent and 
restrain monopolistic practices, protect fair competition in the market, enhance 
economic efficiency, safeguard the interests of consumers and the general public 
and promote the healthy development of the socialist market economy in China. 
The Anti-Monopoly Law is a wide ranging law that covers antitrust legislation, the 
prohibition of horizontal agreements, the prohibition of abuse of market power 
and includes provisions on the special status of State-Owned-Enterprises (SOE) 
and the so-called “administrative monopolies”, etc. amongst many other matters.  
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The Anti-Monopoly Law has had and will continue to have a significant impact on 
foreign investment in China, particularly in relation to foreign firms who wish to 
make takeover offers for domestic Chinese firms.  Hence, the primary focus of 
this section will be on the parts of the Anti-Monopoly Law that affect mergers and 
acquisitions (M&A) in China; in particular, Chapter IV of the Anti-Monopoly Law 
which is entitled “Concentration of Business Operators”.  
Under Article 10 of the Anti-Monopoly Law, 2008 there are in total three 
enforcement agencies; namely, the Ministry of  Commerce (MOFCOM), the Fair 
Trade Bureau under the State Administration for Industry and Commerce (SAIC) 
and the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC). MOFCOM is 
responsible for examining all proposed M&A transactions in China so as to 
determine whether or not those transactions will result in the elimination or 
restriction of competition within Chinese markets.  In this regard, the SAIC has 
responsibility for carrying out investigations of any potential or reported cases of 
monopoly agreements; for example, cases of abuse of dominant market position 
by undertakings.  The SAIC also has authority to impose administrative sanctions 
as appropriate. Finally, the NDRC bears responsibility for investigating all price-
related monopoly cases.  These cases may arise, for example, from price fixing 
agreements or abuse of dominant market position by undertakings.  However, 
with regard to domestic and international mergers and acquisitions, the Ministry 
of Commerce (MOFCOM) is the main agency responsible for examining 
proposed M&A activities. 
The Anti-Monopoly Law does not specify detailed financial and other notification 
thresholds for the reporting of proposed mergers and acquisitions to MOFCOM, 
and so on 3 August, 2008 the State Council issued the “Regulation on the 
Notification Threshold of Concentration of Undertakings” (from hereon in referred 
to as the Notification Regulations) to supplement the M&A rules under the Anti-
Monopoly Law.  Article 1 of the Notification Regulations indicates that it aims to 
clarify the concentration thresholds which if exceeded would require the parties 
involved in proposed M&A activities to notify MOFCOM under the Anti-Monopoly 
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Law.  This Notification Regulation, along with the new Chinese Anti-Monopoly 
Law that became effective on 1 August, 2008 opens a new era in China‟s M&A 
control regime (Hastings, 2008). 
3.4.2 The Mandatory Pre-Merger Notification Process under the Anti-    
Monopoly Law, 2008 and Notification Threshold 
Chapter IV of the Anti-Monopoly Law which is comprised of Articles 20 through 
31, details the mandatory pre-merger notification process, the investigation 
process to be followed by MOFCOM on notification of a proposed M&A activities, 
the procedures MOFCOM is to use for promulgating its decisions and the 
appeals process to be followed by dissident parties.  Article 21 of the Anti-
Monopoly Law provides that where concentration levels in M&A activities exceed 
given thresholds a declaration must be lodged with MOFCOM and the merger 
and/or acquisition must be placed in abeyance until such time as approval is 
obtained from MOFCOM for the merger and/or acquisition to proceed. As 
previously noted, however, the affected concentration levels are only vaguely 
articulated in the Ant-Monopoly Law.  Given this, the State Council issued the 
Notification Regulations which incorporate more detailed and specific 
concentration thresholds.  In particular, Article 3 of the Notification Regulations 
provide that a mandatory pre-merger notification must be filed with MOFCOM by 
the parties involved in a merger and/or acquisition when: 
(1) the total global revenues in the preceding fiscal year of all undertakings 
involved in the merger and/or acquisition exceed RMB 10 billion and the 
China revenues of at least two of the undertakings each exceed RMB 400 
million in the preceding fiscal year; or 
 
(2) the total China revenues in the preceding fiscal year of all undertakings 
involved in the merger and/or acquisition exceed RMB 2 billion and the China 
revenues of at least two of the undertakings each exceed RMB 400 million. 
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The notification thresholds under the Notification Regulations represent a huge 
improvement over the vaguely defined thresholds of the Ant-Monopoly Law and 
the thresholds defined in the 2006 Foreign Merger and Acquisition Regulations.  
These latter thresholds were based on market share criteria and were often 
difficult and even impossible to interpret, let alone implement in any practical 
sense.  Hence, the notification thresholds specified under Article 3 of the 
Notification Regulations provide clear guidance and enable the affected firms to 
evaluate whether or not a merger and acquisition filing needs to be provided to 
MOFCOM for a given transaction; and the evaluation is based on the objective 
standard of worldwide or China-wide turnover, rather than market share which 
experience under the 2006 Foreign Merger and Acquisition Regulations has 
shown is difficult to assess (Wang, 2008). 
When a proposed merger and/or acquisition satisfies the threshold conditions 
specified in Article 3 of the Notification Regulations, then Article 23 of the Anti-
Monopoly Law provides that the documents and materials required to be 
submitted to MOFCOM must include a declaration paper, an explanation of the 
merger and/or acquisition‟s effect on market competition, a detailed summary of 
the agreed terms and conditions under which the merger and/or acquisition will 
occur and the financial reports and accounting reports of the preceding 
accounting year of the business operator. Furthermore, the declaration paper 
must include the name, domicile and business scope of the parties involved in 
the merger and/or acquisition and a precise timetable under which the merger 
and/or acquisition will be consummated.  If needed, MOFCOM is also authorised 
to demand any other documents and materials which in its opinion, will facilitate 
its investigations into the proposed merger and/or acquisition.  Here it is 
important to note, however, that Article 22 of the Anti-Monopoly Law provides 
that an exemption from filing can be obtained if the proposed M&A transaction 
satisfies the concentration provisions of Article 20 of the Anti-Monopoly Law, but 
does not result in the acquiring firm obtaining majority control of the target firm.  
Specifically, if an acquiring firm already holds in excess of 50% of the voting 
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rights of the target firm (through previous acquisitions of the equity or assets of 
the target firm) or if another totally independent firm which is not taking part in the 
M&A transaction already holds in excess of 50% of the voting rights of the target 
firm, then the acquiring firm may apply for an exemption from filing the 
documents required under Article 23 of the Anti-Monopoly Law. 
3.4.3 Factors Employed to Evaluate the Concentration of Business 
Operators 
Article 27 of the Anti-Monopoly Law outlines the issues which will be considered 
by MOFCOM in reviewing proposed M&A transactions.  These mainly relate to 
the protection of the interests of consumers, competitors and other market 
participants.  Specifically, Article 27, provides that there are five relevant 
elements involved in evaluating M&A activities; namely, the market share and 
controlling power in the relevant markets of the merging firms, the degree of 
concentration in the relevant markets, the effects of the concentration for market 
access by new firms and the potential impact on technological progress in the 
relevant industries/markets, the influences of the market concentration on 
consumers and competitors and the impact of the market concentration on 
national economic development.  However, some argue that MOFCOM may use 
Article 27 of the Anti-Monopoly Law to advance macroeconomic or even 
protectionist goals since this provision mandates that consideration must be 
given to the impact that a particular merger and/or acquisition might have on the 
development of the national economy and/or public interest.  Moreover, the 
Chinese Government has recently expressed a strong desire to protect the 
intellectual property (IP) rights of Chinese firms and citizens.  Given this, concern 
has been raised that MOFCOM could use the provisions of Article 27 (for 
example, the effects of the concentration for market access by new firms) as an 
“excuse” to block proposed mergers and/or acquisitions which it considers will 
have an adverse impact on the IP rights of Chinese firms and citizens (Zhang, et. 
al., 2007).  A significant difficulty with Article 27, however, is that it is vaguely 
worded.  In particular, clarification needs to be provided about several important 
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terms; for example, relevant market, market participants, how the calculation of 
market concentration is to be made, how the influence of market concentration 
on consumers and competitors and the impact of the market concentration on 
national economic development is to be measured, etc. (Farmer, 2009). 
In addition, Article 28 of the Anti-Monopoly Law further emphasises that where 
the proposed merger and/or acquisition might eliminate or restrict competition, 
MOFCOM shall make a decision to block the proposed M&A activities.  
Moreover, Article 4 of the Notification Regulations provides that where M&A 
activities do not reach the thresholds specified in Article 3 of the Notification 
Regulations, then MOFCOM shall nonetheless be obliged to investigate the 
proposed M&A activities in accordance with the Anti-Monopoly Law if the facts 
and evidence collected through due process demonstrate that the M&A activities 
might result in exclusion or restriction of competition.  Article 28 of the Anti-
Monopoly Law in conjunction with Article 4 of the Notification Regulations 
suggest that M&A activities shall be prohibited as long as the M&A activities have 
the effect of eliminating or restricting competition, no matter if they are conducted 
in or outside of China.  Hence, to a certain extent, the Anti-Monopoly Law has an 
extra-territorial effect in the sense that M&A activities which occur outside of 
China but will or may eliminate or restrict competition are caught by the Anti-
Monopoly Law (Seto and Chow, 2009).  More importantly, Article 28 of the Anti-
Monopoly Law provides that if the affected firms can show that the proposed 
M&A activities will have more positive effects than negative effects on 
competition or the proposed M&A activities are in harmony with the public 
interest, then MOFCOM may decide not to block the affected M&A activities.  
Thus, MOFCOM imposes the burden on the parties involved with the proposed 
M&A activities to prove that the favourable impacts on competition arising from 
the M&A activities will exceed any adverse impacts, even though it is often not 
clear how these so-called benefits and adverse impacts are to be assessed or 
measured.  
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Moreover, Article 31 of the Anti-Monopoly Law provides that where a foreign 
investor acquires or merges with a domestic enterprise or acquires the assets, 
equity or enters into contracts with a domestic Chinese firm in such a way as to 
have implications for the national security of China, then in addition to the 
examination of the concentration conducted under Article 27 of the Anti-
Monopoly Law, MOFCOM shall also carry out an investigation with the relevant 
Department of State of the implications of the concentration for national security.  
Whilst considerations of national security also probably play an important role in 
assessments of M&A activities in western countries, Chinese law is unique in that 
it incorporates national security issues explicitly into the laws affecting mergers 
and acquisitions in China.  In western countries national security issues 
associated with M&A activities are considered more covertly.  Thus, in China 
national security issues receive separate and detailed consideration from the 
economic issues affecting M&A activities (Farmer, 2009).  
3.4.4. Investigation Procedures for the review of Concentration of 
Business Operators 
As specified in section 3.2.2 of this chapter, once the required notification 
documents dealing with the notification threshold as required under Article 27 of 
the Anti-Monopoly Law have been filed with MOFCOM by the relevant M&A 
parties, then in accordance with Article 25 of Anti-Monopoly Law MOFCOM will 
spend 30 days conducting a preliminary investigation of the proposed merger 
and/or acquisition.  This preliminary investigation aims to make a decision about 
whether to carry out a further review of the proposed merger and/or acquisition 
transactions.  Within 30 days of submission of the notification documents 
MOFCOM must inform the parties involved in the M&A transactions in written 
form about whether a more detailed review will be commissioned under Article 26 
of the Anti-Monopoly Law.  If MOFCOM rules that no further review is required, 
then the M&A activities can proceed.   Moreover, Article 25 of the Anti-Monopoly 
Law implies that if MOFCOM has not made a decision on the necessity for a 
further review within the 30-day time period, then the merger transactions are 
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effectively deemed not to be prohibited and the parties concerned are allowed to 
complete the necessary transactions to consummate the M&A transactions.  
Hence, in this area, Chinese law is consistent with practices in the Untied States 
(Farmer, 2009).  If, however, MOFCOM deems a further review to be necessary, 
then the review must be completed and a decision about whether or not to 
prohibit the proposed M&A transactions must be communicated to the affected 
parties in writing within 90 days from the date of the decision about the 
requirement for a further investigation.  After the second more detailed review, if 
MOFCOM elects to block the proposed M&A activities, then in addition to the 
written notification required under the first review, it must also provide a written 
summary of the reasons behind its decision.  
Furthermore, Article 26 of Anti-Monopoly Law allows for the possibility of a third 
review of the proposed M&A transactions which must be completed within 60 
days of notification of the result of the second more detailed review.  Article 26 
provides that MOFCOM may conduct a third round review if any one of the 
following conditions is satisfied: 
(1) MOFCOM informs the parties involved in the proposed M&A activities that 
the second review has been inconclusive and the parties involved in the 
proposed M&A activities agree to allow a third round review which must be 
completed within 60 days, or 
(2) the documents or materials submitted to MOFCOM are inaccurate and 
thus require further verification.  Again, the review must be completed within 
60 days, or 
(3) the circumstances and events surrounding the proposed M&A activities 
have significantly altered after the submission of the declaration paper 
required under Article 23 of the Anti-Monopoly Law.  
Unfortunately, the circumstances which justify a third round review are not very 
well articulated and this has led to difficulties for the parties involved in identifying 
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the precise situations under which a third round review may be conducted.  
Moreover, Article 26 of the Anti-Monopoly Law provides that if  the time in either 
the 90-day (second) review or 60-day (third) review expires without any action by 
MOFCOM, then the parties concerned may implement the transactions 
necessary to consummate the merger and/or acquisition. Again, in this area, 
Chinese law is in line with practices in the Untied States (Farmer, 2009).  
3.4.5. Procedures for Promulgating Determinants of Concentration of 
Business Operators 
In general, under the Anti-Monopoly Law there are three different determinations 
on a pre-merger notification of affected concentration made by MOFCOM, which 
as previously noted, is the enforcement agency of the Anti-Monopoly Law in 
China.  These three determinations are as follows: 
(1) issuing a permit to proceed with the proposed merger and/or acquisition 
transactions; or 
(2) issuing a permit to proceed with the proposed merger and/or acquisition 
transactions under specified restrictive conditions, or  
(3) blocking the proposed merger and/or acquisition transactions. 
In particular, if markets in the area of the proposed merger and/or acquisition will 
show an unacceptably high level of concentration after the transactions, thereby 
eliminating or restricting competition, then under Article 29 of the Anti-Monopoly 
Law, MOFCOM may prohibit the affected M&A transactions from taking place or 
may impose such conditions as are necessary to reduce the adverse impact of 
the increased concentration on competition in the relevant markets.  Moreover, 
Article 31 of the Anti-Monopoly Law provides that if MOFCOM decides to prohibit 
or impose restrictive conditions on concentration, it must publicise such decisions 
to the general public in a timely manner (Seto and Chow, 2009).  Farmer (2009) 
makes the important point that the publicity requirements associated with Article 
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31 impose an accountability requirement on MOFCOM and it also adds 
transparency to the M&A review process.  
Seto and Chow (2009) note that before the Anti-Monopoly Law, 2008 came into 
force it was very rare for MOFCOM to block proposed M&A activities.  The first 
determination of a conditional approval under Article 31 of the Anti-Monopoly Law 
occurred in November 2008 when Anheuser-Busch Inc. made a takeover offer for 
InBev N.  MOFCOM approved the proposed takeover but only on the condition 
that Anheuser-Busch Inc. did not increase its shareholding in its competitor beer 
company, Tsingdao Brewery and also, InBev N. was prohibited from increasing 
its shareholding in Zhujiang Brewery.  MOFCOM imposed these conditions 
because it was likely that if the shareholdings in Tsingdao Brewery and Zhujiang 
Brewery were increased, it might intensify concentration in the brewing industry, 
thereby having an adverse impact on competition (Zhang and Zhang, 2009).  
MOFCOM published their decision on the above proposed transaction 
(conditional approval) to the general public at the end of December, 2008.  Soon 
after this in March, 2009 MOFCOM blocked Coca-Cola‟s proposed acquisition of 
China Huiyuan Juice Group Limited.  As noted in Section 3.2.2 of this chapter 
Huiyuan Juice is a Hong Kong Listed firm that is a famous national Chinese 
brand closely associated with the Chinese culture and its people.  This was the 
first merger blocked by MOFCOM after the Anti-Monopoly Law, 2008 came into 
force.  Bachrack, Huang and Modrall (2009) give the following reasons as to why 
MOFCOM blocked the proposed acquisition of Huiyuan Juice by the Coca Cola 
Company: 
(1) Coca-Cola would be able to leverage its dominant position in the 
carbonated soft-drink market into the fruit-juice drink market, thus eliminating 
and restricting competition from currently existing fruit juice manufacturers 
and in turn, damaging the lawful interests of fruit juice consumers.  Although 
the decision did not indicate how Coca-Cola could leverage its position from 
carbonated soft drinks into the fruit juice drink market, MOFCOM‟s press 
release referred to the possibility that Coca-Cola could engage in “bundling” 
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or other forms of exclusive dealing; 
(2) Coca-Cola‟s market power in the fruit juice market would be markedly 
enhanced by controlling two famous juice brands, MeiZhiYuan (Minute Maid) 
and Huiyuan.  The transaction would therefore significantly raise entry 
barriers for potential competitors in the fruit-juice drink market; 
(3) The transaction would reduce the “space” available to domestic small and 
medium-sized fruit juice manufacturers and negatively impact the ability of 
domestic enterprises to compete and innovate independently in the fruit-juice 
drink market; and 
(4) The transaction would have adverse impacts on the competitive landscape 
of China‟s fruit-juice drink market and the sustainable and healthy 
development of the domestic fruit juice industry. 
3.5. Provisions on Mergers and Acquisitions of a Domestic Enterprise by 
Foreign Investors 
On 22 June, 2009, MOFCOM revised several provisions of the Merger and 
Acquisition of Domestic Enterprises by Foreign Investors Law (“M&A Provisions 
2009”), which was originally promulgated on 8 August, 2006.  As noted in Section 
3.3 of this chapter, the revisions aim to bring the M&A Provisions into compliance 
with the Anti-Monopoly Law which came into force on 1 August, 2008 and the 
Regulation on the Notification Threshold of Concentration of Undertakings which 
came into force on 3 August, 2008.  Here we need to note that the M&A 
Provisions 2009 lay particular emphasis on takeover activities that involve foreign 
investors acquiring domestic Chinese enterprises.  The reasons behind the 
promulgation of the revised M&A Provisions are that since China‟s admission to 
the World Trade Organisation in 2001 there has been a steadily increasing 
number of international firms that have sought to invest in China by acquiring 
and/or merging with Chinese domestic firms.  This has provided foreign firms with 
immediate market access with minimal business risk.  In addition, foreign 
investors who acquire Chinese domestic firms are able to convert the acquired 
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firms into Foreign-Invested Enterprises (FIE).  FIE‟s receive preferential 
treatment in a number of areas, including under the Chinese taxation system 15.  
In the following sections we highlight issues from the M&A Provisions, 2009 
which are of practical importance for foreign firms that wish to acquire domestic 
Chinese firms. 
3.5.1 Share Swaps in the M &A Provisions, 2009 
Article 2 of the M&A Provisions, 2009 provides that foreign investors can merge 
with or acquire a Chinese domestic firm by means of purchasing assets or 
acquiring shares.  Moreover, since 2006 share swaps began to be allowed for 
foreign investors that wished to merge with or acquire Chinese domestic firms.  In 
other words, before 2006 only a cash consideration was allowed in transactions 
involving foreign investors merging with or acquiring Chinese domestic firms.  
Further, Article 27 of the M&A Provisions, 2009 provides that, with regard to 
share swaps, foreign investors can use currently issued shares or a new share 
issue of the acquiring firm to purchase an equity interest in a Chinese domestic 
firm.  Similarly, the equity interest in the Chinese domestic firm may be acquired 
from existing shareholders or through a new share issue by the Chinese 
domestic firm.  After the merger and/or acquisition, the acquired Chinese firm can 
be converted into an FIE.  Thus, Article 2 of the M&A Provisions, 2009 provides 
that foreign investors can employ disposable foreign-listed shares, cash or a 
combination of both to merge with or acquire Chinese domestic firms, although 
this is subject to certain conditions and government approval (Huang, 2007). 
Articles 28 and 29 of M&A Provisions, 2009 provide that if a foreign investor 
intends to merge with or acquire a Chinese domestic firm using a share swap, it 
must satisfy the following conditions: 
                                                        
15
 The Chinese Government has a low and preferential tax policy for FIEs in certain specified 
regions (e.g. special economic zones in China) and industries (e.g. high-advanced technology) 
where it strongly encourages foreign investment.   
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(1) The foreign firm must be legally established and its registration domicile 
must have a sound legal system of company administration; 
 
(2) The foreign firm and its management must not have been convicted of 
significant crimes by relevant regulatory authorities over the prior three years; 
 
(3) The foreign firm must be a public listed firm and the listing place must 
have a sound management system of security exchanges; 
 
(4) The equity of foreign firms must be listed on an open and lawful securities 
exchange market (excluding the OTC market); and 
 
(5) The price at which the foreign firm‟s securities have traded over the 
previous year must be relatively stable. 
Furthermore, there are an additional two conditions applicable for both the equity 
of the foreign firms and Chinese domestic firms in the case of share swap 
transactions. First, the equity of foreign firms and Chinese domestic firms must 
be lawfully held by shareholders and may be assigned according to the law.  
Secondly, there must be no outstanding disputes or pending legal proceedings 
about the ownership of the equity of both the foreign and domestic firms. 
In cross-boarder (that is, international)  share swap transactions, Article 30 of the 
M&A Provisions, 2009 require that the Chinese domestic firm must appoint an 
intermediary who is established and registered in China, such as a law firm, 
accounting firm or investment firm,  to act as its consultant to perform the due 
diligence procedures pertaining to the proposed acquisition. Specifically, the 
intermediary employed by the Chinese domestic firm is responsible for reviewing 
and verifying relevant documents and the financial status of foreign firms and 
also, ensuring that the proposed acquisition conforms to the requirements of the 
M&A Provisions, 2009.  Moreover, another responsibility of the aforementioned 
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intermediary is that they must issue an advisory report that gives clear and 
professional advice on the above mentioned issues on an item by item basis. 
An editorial in the Illinois Business Law Journal (2006) argues that, allowing for 
share swaps in across-boarder mergers and acquisitions gives foreign investors 
increased flexibility in choosing the mode of payment for the transactions and 
also, brings China, in relation to M&A regulations, into line with best international 
practice.  However, the restrictions imposed on cross-boarder share swap 
merger and acquisitions (as, for example, under Articles 28, 29 and 30 of the 
M&A Provisions, 2009) result in an increased level of regulatory scrutiny by the 
relevant authorities.  The ultimate consequence of this is that the regulations are 
so strict and often so difficult to satisfy, that cash rather than share swaps is the 
preferred mode of consideration for most cross-boarder mergers and/or 
acquisitions in China. 
All cross-boarder share swap M&A transactions are subject to examination and 
approval by MOFCOM.  With regard to cross-boarder share swap transactions, 
the declaration procedures to MOFCOM under the M&A Provisions, 2009 are 
broadly similar to those specified in the Takeover Measures, 2006.  There are, 
however, a few minor differences and one major difference between the 
declaration procedures under the two laws.  The major difference is that, under 
Article 25 of the M&A Provisions, 2009, MOFCOM has to make a decision about 
whether or not to grant approval for the proposed M&A transactions to proceed 
within thirty days following the receipt of all required documents.  More 
importantly, once MOFCOM approves the proposed M&A activities, a certificate 
of approval will be issued.  At the same time, MOFCOM has to make copies of 
the relevant approval documents separately to the foreign exchange 
administrative authority at the equity transfer‟s locality.  After this, the foreign 
exchange administrative authority must issue the relevant certificate of 
registration of share transference of foreign exchange earnings and foreign 
exchange from foreign investment, which is the documentation necessary to 
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prove that the foreign investor(s) has paid the consideration for equity 
subscription and/or purchase. 
 
3.5.2 Special Provisions on Special Purpose Companies 
Article 39 of the M&A Provisions, 2009 defines a Special Purpose Company 
(SPC) as an overseas firm directly or indirectly controlled by a Chinese domestic 
firm or a Chinese natural person and importantly, the SPC is specifically 
established for the purpose of an overseas listing of the interests of a Chinese 
domestic firm.  Moreover, the main assets of an SPC are the rights and interests 
in a Chinese domestic firm. 
According to Chao and Xu (2008), in the past ten years, a huge number of 
Chinese domestic firms have employed “round trip investment” procedures to 
facilitate private equity investments in Chinese domestic firms and have firms 
listed on overseas stock markets, such as the UK, the US, etc.  A “round trip 
investment” occurs when a domestic firm establishes or controls an offshore 
holding firm and uses this offshore holding firm to control a Chinese domestic 
firm either by direct acquisition or by a captive contractual arrangement.  It was 
previously very common for Chinese domestic firms to use funds raised through 
overseas offshore holding firms to re-invest the proceeds in Chinese domestic 
firms as Foreign-investment Enterprises (FIEs), thereby accessing the tax 
benefits and other preferential treatments that the Chinese government has 
made available to certain manufacturing FIEs.  Recently, however, the Chinese 
government has become increasingly uncomfortable with the round trip 
investment mechanism and has tightened the regulations relating to it, 
particularly in regard to provisions incorporated into the M&A Provisions, 2009.  A 
specific example is provided by Article 9 of the M&A Provisions, 2009 which 
stipulates that if any Chinese domestic firm or natural person merges with or 
acquires an affiliated domestic firm in the name of a firm legally established or 
controlled by the aforesaid domestic firm or natural person in a foreign country or 
region, then it must be subject to the approval of MOFCOM in Beijing, regardless 
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of the size of the affected transactions.  Further, Article 9 also specifies that if the 
purchase of a domestic firm by a foreign investor exceeds 25% of the domestic 
firm‟s total registered capital, then the FIE is eligible for tax benefits and other 
favourable treatments.  It is important to note here that the M&A Provisions, 2009 
consider the beneficial owner, rather than the registered investor in determining 
eligibility for favourable treatment of the FIEs (Huang, 2007).  Hence, if the 
domestic firm is merged with or acquired by an overseas firm which is 
established or controlled by a domestic firm or natural person and is thus 
affiliated with the acquired  domestic firm, then in this circumstance such a 
merger or acquisition is not entitled to FIE  tax benefits and other preferential 
treatments unless the overseas firm purchases any increased capital of the 
domestic firm, or the enterprise established after the merger or acquisition by the 
overseas firm increases its proportionate investment to 25% or more of its 
registered capital. 
Moreover, Article 42 of the M&A Provisions, 2009 also requires that a Chinese 
domestic firm intending to establish a special purpose company (SPC) overseas 
must seek the approval of MOFCOM before doing so.  In addition, Article 44 of 
the M&A Provisions, 2009 provides that when an SPC is employed as a merging 
or acquiring vehicle in order to get a Chinese domestic firm listed overseas, then 
the total value of the shares of the SPC to be issued overseas cannot be lower 
than the value of the share rights of the merged or acquired domestic firm as 
evaluated by a corresponding asset valuation institution in China.   Furthermore, 
the share swap also requires the approval from MOFCOM.  Also, Article 40 of the 
M&A Provisions, 2009 provides that where an SPC seeks an overseas listing, 
then it is subject to approval from the China Securities Regulatory Commission 
(CSRC).  Importantly, Article 47 of the M&A Provisions, 2009 provides that within 
30 days of the completion of an SPC listing on an overseas stock exchange, the 
Chinese domestic firm must report the situation relating to the overseas listing to 
MOFCOM,  including the repatriation proposal of funds raised abroad, and it 
must also apply for an FIE approval certificate.  After this, the domestic firm must 
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apply to the State Administration for Industry and Commerce (SAIC) for an FIE 
business licence and to the State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE) for 
a foreign exchange registration certificate.  Finally, the shares of the SPC can be 
used in share swap transactions to acquire further Chinese domestic firms, 
provided only that the SPC is successfully listed on an overseas stock exchange.  
Here we need to note that, in accordance with Article 49 of M&A Provisions 2009, 
if the SPC fails to consummate the listing abroad within one year of the issuance 
of the FIE business licence, or if the SPC fails to fulfil its reporting duties to 
MOFCOM, then MOFCOM will require the share swap to be reversed. 
3.5.3 National Economic Security Review 
The assessment of the impact of cross-boarder mergers or acquisitions on the 
national economic security of China plays an important role in the M&A 
Provisions, 2009.  For instance, Article 12 of the M&A Provisions, 2009 provides 
that if foreign investors merge with or acquire a Chinese domestic enterprise and 
intend to obtain actual control over the enterprise, and if such merger or 
acquisition involves any “critical industry” and/or will have an adverse or potential 
adverse impact on the security of the national economy and/or results in transfer 
of actual control over a domestic enterprise owning a “renowned trademark” or a 
Chinese “time-honoured” brand (though in this circumstance it may not have an 
impact on any major industry or the economic security of China),  then the parties 
involved with the merger or acquisition must apply to MOFCOM for approval of 
the proposed merger and/or acquisition.  Moreover, Article 12 also stipulates that 
in the case where any of the aforesaid circumstances arise, but the parties 
concerned in the merger or acquisition fail to report the related merger or 
acquisition transactions to MOFCOM, then MOFCOM may, in conjunction  with 
other relevant government agencies, demand that the parties concerned delay 
the M&A transactions, re-assign relevant equity or assets, or put any other 
effective actions into place to eliminate the adverse effects of the merger or 
acquisition on the security of the national economy.  Here, it is important to note 
that the regulations dealing with the impact of cross-border M&A activities on 
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national economic security in the M&A Provisions, 2009 are closely related to 
Article 31 of Anti-Monopoly Law which was the subject of discussion in section 
3.3.3 of this chapter.  
A recent report of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(2006) (OECD) has reviewed the latest developments in China‟s policies towards 
cross-border mergers and acquisitions.  The OECD agues that that the M&A 
Provisions, 2009 increase transparency by demanding that parties associated 
with mergers and/or acquisitions disclose whether or not they are affiliated with 
each other and also, establishes specific and detailed provisions regarding the 
use of Special Purpose Companies (SPC) by Chinese domestic firms that 
acquire overseas owned enterprises in China.  However, terms and phrases 
included in the M&A Provisions, 2009, such as “critical industry”, “impact on 
national economic security”, “renowned trademarks”16 and “time-honoured brand” 
often lack clarity and lead to potential uncertainties in the application of the 
relevant articles of the M&A Provisions, 2009.  Consequently, foreign investors 
intending to merge with and/or acquire Chinese domestic firms, Chinese 
domestic firms that have been targeted for takeover by foreign firms and even 
Chinese government agencies may find it difficult to apply some of the articles of 
the M&A Provisions, 2009 that contain these terms.  In addition, they OECD 
suggests that requiring Chinese government agencies to consider the impact of 
cross-border mergers and acquisitions on national economic security may lead to 
over zealousness in the review process as government officials place excessive 
weight on the political consequences of the decisions they make.  This in turn 
raises issues about the compatibility of the M&A Provisions, 2009 with best 
international practices in the area. 
                                                        
16
 The OECD notes that the Trademark Office of the State Administration for Industry and 
Commerce bears the principal responsibility for certifying “renowned trademarks” in China.  
However, the People‟s Court of China is the ultimate authority in these matters in the case of legal 
disputes.  The legal uncertainties surrounding the certification of “renowned trademarks” in China 
makes it difficult for foreign investors involved in proposed M&A activities to make assessments 
about whether or not a trademark will fall into the category of a “renowned trademark”.  A good 
example of this is provided by the U.S. Coca Cola Company‟s proposed takeover of the Huiyuan 
Juice Group Ltd which was blocked under the “renowned trademark” provisions of the M&A 
Provisions, 2009 (See section 3.3.2 of this chapter for further details).    
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3.5.4 Reporting Thresholds for Cross-border Mergers and 
Acquisitions in M &A Provisions, 2009 
We have already noted in section 3.4 of this chapter that in 2009 the Ministry of 
Commerce (MOFCOM) amended the M&A Provisions, 2006 in order to bring 
these Provisions into compliance with the Anti-Monopoly Law and the Regulation 
on the Notification Threshold of Concentration of Undertakings.  Both the Anti-
Monopoly Law and Notification Regulations are considered in detail in section 3.3 
of this chapter.  In particular, chapter 5 of M&A Provisions, 2006 was replaced 
with a new provision, namely Article 51 in the M&A Provisions, 2009.  Article 51 
provides that when the merger and/or acquisition of a Chinese domestic 
enterprise by a foreign investor reaches the thresholds summarised in the 
Notification Regulations, then the foreign investor must make a declaration to 
MOFCOM and must not proceed with the M&A transactions without this prior 
reporting.  It implies that the declaration thresholds brought forward in the 
Notification Regulations are not only applicable to Chinese domestic mergers 
and/or acquisitions (as noted in Section 3.3.2 of this chapter), but also are 
applicable to foreign investors merging with or acquiring Chinese domestic firms.  
It will be recalled from section 3.3.2 of this chapter that the Notification 
Regulations require that the relevant parties involved in a merger and/or 
acquisition must report the proposed transactions in advance to MOFCOM, if: 
(1) the total global revenues in the preceding fiscal year of all undertakings 
involved in the merger and/or acquisition exceed RMB 10 billion and the 
China revenues of at least two of the undertakings each exceed RMB 400 
million in the preceding fiscal year; or 
 
(2) the total China revenues in the preceding fiscal year of all undertakings 
involved in the merger and/or acquisition exceed RMB 2 billion and the China 
revenues of at least two of the undertakings each exceed RMB 400 million. 
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Huang (2009) notes that reporting thresholds under Chapter 5 of the M&A 
Provisions, 2006 were vaguely worded and were based on a combination of 
factors such as business turnover, market share, the number of Chinese 
enterprises acquired in related industries, and the absolute magnitude of the 
value of assets in China held by enterprises involved in the proposed merger 
and/or acquisition.  In other words, sometimes market share was used in 
determining the reporting threshold. On other occasions the absolute magnitude 
of the value of assets in China held by enterprises involved in the proposed 
merger and/or acquisition was used.  On still other occasions a combination of 
these two factors was used in determining thresholds.  Hence, there was often 
inconsistency in the reporting threshold that was used by MOFCOM.  Under 
Article 51 of the M&A Provisions, 2009 that replaces Chapter 5 of the M&A 
Provisions, 2006, however, business turnover has become the dominant factor in 
determining whether or not the parties involved in proposed M&A activities need 
to apply to MOFCOM for approval of the merger and acquisition transactions they 
intend to enter into.  Furthermore, it is important to note that, in order to make the 
Anti-Monopoly Law applicable to financial business operators in China, on 15 
July, 2009, MOFCOM and several other financial watchdogs in China - such as 
the People‟s Bank of China, China Banking Regulatory Commission, the China 
Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) and the China Insurance Regulatory 
Commission - have jointly issued Measures for Calculating the Business 
Turnover of Financial Business Operators for Notification of a Concentration.  
The Measures for Calculating the Business Turnover of Financial Business 
Operators for Notification of a Concentration outlines the elements which must be 
considered in calculations of “business turnover” for banks, securities firms, 
futures firms, fund management firms, insurance firms and other financial 
institutions. 
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3.6  Effects Laws and Regulations on Economic Benefits of Chinese M&A 
Activities 
Our analysis in this chapter shows that there are some unique aspects to the 
laws and regulations governing M&A activities in China.  These, in turn, have a 
potential impact on the returns that Chinese firms earn from their M&A activities.  
Whilst we examine this issue at various points in subsequent chapters of the 
dissertation we now provide a brief summary of some of the more important ways 
in which Chinese laws and regulations can impact on returns earned from M&A 
activities.  
We have previously noted (as in section 3.2.3) that a unique feature of the 
mainland Chinese stock markets is that not all the A shares issued by firms are 
tradable, and that this constitutes a significant difference from the stock markets 
in western countries like the USA and UK.  Moreover, non-tradable A shares 
account for a majority of the A shares issued by most listed firms.  The absence 
of organised markets for non-tradable shares and the difficulties associated with 
valuing them means that the shareholders of target firms in M&A activities prefer 
to receive cash as the mode of consideration rather than the non-tradable shares 
of the bidding company.  Moreover, the division of tradable shares into A 
(normally owned by Chinese nationals) and B (normally owned by foreigners) 
shares may also have a significant impact on the returns earned by both 
domestic and foreign shareholders. 
It is also needs to be emphasised that Chinese regulatory authorities, such as the 
CSRC, pay particular attention to the return on equity (ROE) as computed from a 
firm‟s balance sheet and profit and loss account in deciding whether to give 
approval for the new share issues to go ahead.  Loss making firms wishing to 
make a new share issue in order to “shore up” their deteriorating financial 
position are likely to have a poor history of ROE statistics.  Given this, it is 
unlikely that such firms will gain the approval of the CSRC for any new share 
issues.  Such firms therefore have incentives to manipulate the figures appearing 
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on their published financial statements and this could lead investors into a false 
view about the company‟s future prospects.  This in turn could lead to 
inefficiencies for Chinese M&A activities. 
3.7 Summary and Conclusions 
This Chapter deals primarily with the laws and regulations governing mergers 
and acquisition (M&A) transactions in China.  We begin our analysis in section 
3.2 of this chapter by briefly summarising the development of China‟s securities 
markets, including an introduction to China‟s main stock exchanges together with 
their listing rules and distinctive characteristics.  Probably the most important 
distinguishing characteristic of mainland Chinese stock markets is that traded 
shares are comprised of A shares and B shares.  The reason behind the division 
between A shares and B shares is that the Chinese government has 
implemented a policy of limiting the amount of RMB (Yuan) which can leave the 
country in order to preserve the nation‟s foreign currency reserves.  This in turn 
means that a distinction has had to be drawn between foreign investors and 
Chinese national investors; in particular, with rare exceptions only Chinese 
citizens can hold A shares whilst foreign investors are generally limited to holding 
B shares.  Another important characteristic of the mainland Chinese stock 
markets is that the majority of A shares in most listed Chinese firms are 
controlled by the Chinese government or its instrumentalities.  A shares 
controlled by the Chinese government are called state-owned shares and until 
recently, could not be traded on any of the Chinese mainland stock exchanges.  
However, in April, 2005, the Chinese government began implementing a reform 
programme called “GuQuan Fenzhi Gaige” (Shareholding Structure Reform) 
under which non-tradable A shares will be gradually converted into tradable 
shares.  But the conversion process will be slow and cumbersome and it will take 
several years for the conversion process to be fully implemented.  Furthermore, 
this distinction between A and B shares points to some of the unique 
characteristics that determine the laws regulating M&A activities in China and of 
how they are different from the “equivalent” laws in most western countries. 
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The most important laws and regulations governing mergers and acquisitions in 
China are the Securities Law, the Takeover Measures, 2006, the Anti-monopoly 
Law, 2008, the Declaration Thresholds which supplement the Anti-Monopoly 
Law, 2008, and finally, the Provisions on Mergers and Acquisitions of a Domestic 
Enterprise by Foreign Investors, 2009.  Our detailed discussion of these laws and 
ordinances began in section 3.3 with a consideration of the Takeover Measures, 
2006.  The Takeover Measures, 2006 cover such areas as the mandated bid 
rules, tender offer rules, the disclosure of substantial shareholdings and the 
defence mechanisms which may be mounted against takeovers and mergers, 
etc.  Section 3.4 focuses on the Anti-Monopoly Law, 2008 and the Declaration 
Thresholds which were brought in soon after as a supplement to this Law.  The 
Anti-Monopoly Law, 2008 details the mandatory pre-merger and acquisition 
notification process, the investigation procedures that are to be used by 
MOFCOM and other government agencies and the procedures MOFCOM must 
use for promulgating its decisions, etc.  Since the number of cross-border M&A 
activities in China has been increasing significantly over the last few years, 
Section 3.5 of this chapter is specifically dedicated to a consideration of the 
Provisions on Mergers and Acquisitions of a Domestic Enterprise by Foreign 
Investors, 2009 (the M&A Provisions, 2009). Importantly, the M&A Provisions, 
2009 centre on the regulations affecting share swap transactions by foreign 
investors merging with or acquiring Chinese domestic firms, and the particular 
regulations which apply to Special Purpose Companies (SPC).  An SPC is an 
foreign firm directly or indirectly controlled by a Chinese domestic firm or Chinese 
natural person and is specifically established for the purpose of an overseas 
listing of the interests of a Chinese domestic firm.  
To conclude, the most recently promulgated Anti-Monopoly Law, 2008, the 
Declaration Thresholds which supplement this Law and the M&A Provisions, 
2009, along with the Takeover Measures, 2006 and the Securities Law in China 
have made China‟s M&A legal framework more complete, mature and 
importantly, more in compliance with best international practices and norms.  
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However, we need to note that, Chinese M&A laws do have their limitations and 
also, are not immune from criticism.  For instance, the M&A Provisions, 2009, 
lack clarity in the articulation of certain key terms and phrases such as the 
definition of what constitutes a “critical industry” or what constitutes a “time-
honoured” brand.  This will inevitably lead to significant difficulties in 
implementing these new laws pertaining to cross-border M&A activities.  
Moreover, the defence mechanisms available under the Takeover Measures, 
2006 are in many ways a mixture of those available in several different countries.  
Unfortunately, this gives rise to potential conflicts and overlaps in the defence 
mechanisms available to Chinese firms involved in the M&A process – as amply 
demonstrated by Article 8 and Article 31 of the Takeover Measures, 200617 – and 
this can only lead to trouble and confusion in the process of applying this law.  
 
 
 
 
                                                        
17
 A detailed summary of the provisions relating to Article 8 of the Takeover Measures, 2006 is to 
be found in section 3.3.7 of this chapter.  The provisions relating to Article 31 of the Takeover 
Measures, 2006 are to be found in section 3.4.3. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
THE METHODOLOGY OF ABNORMAL EQUITY 
RETURNS AS APPLIED TO A SHARES OF TARGET 
FIRMS INVOLVED IN CHINESE M&A ACTIVITIES
1
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
Our principal objective in this chapter is to formulate and then apply 
procedures for assessing the significance of the abnormal returns earned by 
target firms involved in Chinese merger and acquisition (M&A) activities.  Our 
analysis is based on a standard market model methodology using both the 
Dimson (1979) and Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimates of equity betas.  
In particular, we employ nonparametric testing procedures in order to enhance 
the robustness of our empirical analysis.  Here Corrado (1989) has introduced 
a nonparametric rank test for assessing abnormal security-price performance 
which, it is claimed, is preferable to the conventional parametric “t” tests that 
appear in the literature (e.g. Patell, 1976).  The Corrado (1989) test is valid 
when applied to skewed and/or leptokurtic distribution functions and avoids 
many of the limitations implicit in alternative nonparametric tests of abnormal 
security-price performance (e.g. the symmetry assumptions on which the 
Wilcoxon signed rank test is founded).  Yet for all its virtues the Corrado 
(1989) test is computationally cumbersome and lacks power in comparison to 
the Patell (1976) “t” test which is the traditionally used parametric test in the 
area.  Moreover, little is known about the small sample properties of the 
Corrado (1989) test.  We address these issues by modifying the Corrado 
(1989) test so as to increase its power relative to the benchmark Patell (1976) 
“t” test.  In particular, we employ a consistent estimator for the variance of the 
ranks of abnormal security returns and then use this consistent estimator to 
                                            
1
 Section 4.2 of this chapter is based on an article entitled “A Modified Corrado Test for 
Assessing Abnormal Security Returns” jointly written by Ali Ataullah, Xiaojing Song and Mark 
Tippett that is forthcoming in the European Journal of Finance.   
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obtain an exact closed form expression for the Corrado (1989) test statistic.  
This simplifies the computational procedures behind the Corrado (1989) test 
considerably – to the point where they can be implemented using only a hand 
held calculator.  We also demonstrate how a second order Edgeworth 
expansion can be employed to determine the small sample properties of the 
Corrado (1989) test statistic. 
 
Our empirical analysis shows that there are significant abnormal returns 
around the takeover announcement date for target firms involved in Chinese 
M&A activities.  We also find, however, that a significant proportion of these 
abnormal returns decay away within a few weeks following the takeover 
announcement date.  Moreover, our modification of the original Corrado 
(1989) test shows significantly more power in detecting these abnormal 
returns than the originally specified Corrado (1989) test.  Indeed, the modified 
Corrado test employed in our empirical analysis has almost the same power 
as the Patell (1976) “t” test but is not based on the assumption of normally 
distributed returns.  Moreover, a question of some significance that often 
arises in the M&A literature (Goergen and Renneboog, 2004) is what 
determines the wealth effects that accrue to the shareholders of target firms.  
In so far as the limited data available on Chinese firms permits, we seek to 
address this issue by following the methodological procedures laid down in 
the paper by Goergen and Renneboog (2004).  In particular, we regress the 
abnormal returns that accrue to Chinese target firms over the period 
surrounding the takeover announcement date against a number of potential 
determining variables.   
 
The next section of the chapter identifies the “base line” market model 
methodology employed in our empirical analysis of Chinese target firms.  
Section 4.3 identifies our data sources and the sampling procedures we 
employ and then summarises the empirical evidence relating to the abnormal 
returns identified by our market model methodology.  Section 4.4 briefly 
outlines some important issues relating to the power of our testing 
procedures.  Section 4.5 provides a rudimentary analysis of the potential 
determinants of the abnormal returns earned by Chinese target firms.   Finally, 
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section 4.6 concludes our analysis.  This chapter provides only a brief 
summary analysis of the wealth effects that M&A activities have on the 
shareholders of Chinese target firms.  A more detailed analysis of the more 
important issues identified in this chapter is deferred until subsequent 
chapters of this dissertation. 
4.2 Base Line Methodology 
 
The standard hypothesis tested in the literature is that no rents (that is, excess 
returns) are earned by target firms involved in M&A activities.  Hence our 
“base-line” methodology involves using the “market model” to determine the 
expected return on target firms around the “announcement date” for the 
affected takeovers.  Here it will be recalled that the Capital Asset Pricing 
Model (CAPM) takes the following form: 
 
                                             E(Ri) = Rf + [E(Rm) – Rf]i                                      (4.1) 
 
where E(Ri) is the expected return on the i
th equity security, E(Rm) is the 
expected return on the market portfolio, Rf is the risk free rate of return and i 
is the equity security’s beta.  The Chinese target firms on which our analysis is 
based were mainly listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange and/or the 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange.  For these firms the Shanghai SE Composite 
Index or the Shenzhen SE Composite index was used as a proxy for the 
market portfolio. The market proxy used for firms listed on other stock 
exchanges was the most inclusive index available for the particular stock 
market.2  Moreover, a little algebra applied to the CAPM shows: 
 
                       E(Ri) = Rf + [E(Rm) – Rf]i = Rf – Rfi + E(Rm)i                    (4.2a) 
 
                                            
2 As an example consider the acquisition of a 65.68% stake in Pacific Century Regional 
Developments Limited by Pacific Century Group Holdings Limited on 21 July, 1995.  Pacific 
Century Regional Developments Limited was a Chinese firm listed on the Singapore Stock 
Exchange at the time of the takeover offer.  The S&P Singapore BMI Index (DS Mnemonic: 
SBBSNGL(RI)) was used as the proxy for the market portfolio. 
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or: 
 
                                         E(Ri) = Rf(1 - i) + E(Rm)i                               (4.2b) 
 
Now, suppose one uses the OLS or the Dimson (1979) regression procedure 
to estimate beta, i, for a given equity security.  The market model then takes 
the following form: 
 
                                                     Rit = ai + biRmt + eit                                (4.3) 
 
where Rit is the actual return on the equity security during the t
th time period 
(in our case, tth day), Rmt is the actual return on the proxy for the market 
portfolio during the tth time period (in our case, tth day), and eit is an error term 
with zero mean.  Taking expectations across the market model will thus imply: 
 
                                                  E(Rit) = ai + biE(Rmt)                                 (4.4) 
 
since E(eit) = 0 by assumption.  This will also mean that ai = Rf(1 - i) and 
bi = i are the estimates of the constant term and the equity security’s beta, 
respectively.  One can then determine the “unexpected” or “abnormal” return 
on the given equity security during the tth time period from the following 
equation: 
 
                                                    eit = Rit – ai – biRmt                                  (4.5) 
 
That is, the abnormal return, ARit, on the i
th security for the tth day is 
approximated by eit.  In other words, ARit = eit is the abnormal return for the i
th 
security during the tth day.  Moreover, if there are N target firms with tradable 
A shares on issue, then the average abnormal return on the tth day across the 
N target firms in our sample will be AARt = 
1
N
 
i=1
N
 ARit.  Similarly, the 
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cumulative abnormal return, CARi, for the i
th security on the th day is 
obtained by summing the abnormal returns, ARit, for the given security up to 
and including the th day of the event window.  Since we use an event window 
comprised of 24 days (that is, from six days before the takeover 
announcement date until 17 days after the takeover announcement date) this 
means that the cumulative abnormal return for the ith  security on the th day 
will be computed as CARi = 
t=1

 ARit.  This in turn means that the cumulative 
average abnormal return on the th day across the N firms in our sample will 
be CAAR = 
1
N
 
t=1

  
i=1
N
 ARit = 
t=1

 AARt.  The abnormal return and cumulative 
abnormal return as computed here are used in the calculations we make of 
the Patell (1976) “t” statistics in our subsequent empirical analysis of Chinese 
target firms. 
 
Now suppose one estimates the above market model and then computes the 
abnormal returns, ARit, for each of the i = 1, 2, 3, ____, N firms comprising our 
sample of Chinese mergers and acquisitions across the t = 1, 2, 3, ____, T 
daily time periods on which our analysis is based.  One can then follow 
Corrado (1989) in letting 1  K(ARit)  T be the rank for the i
th firm of the 
abnormal return during the tth time period as summarised in the following 
matrix:   
 
K = 








K(AR11) K(AR12) K(AR13) _______ K(AR1T)
K(AR21) K(AR22) K(AR23) _______ K(AR2T)
     
    
K(ARN1) K(ARN2) K(ARN3) _______ K(ARNT)
 
 
We emphasise here that each row summarises the ranks pertaining to the 
abnormal returns of a given firm only.  Thus, the first row contains the ranks 
from 1 to T of the abnormal returns of the first firm.  The second row contains 
the ranks from 1 to T of the abnormal returns of the second firm.  The third 
row contains the ranks from 1 to T of the abnormal returns of the third firm and 
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so on.  Moreover, we follow Corrado (1989, p. 388) in assuming that the ranks 
for each firm are randomly allocated across the T elements comprising each 
row of the above matrix.  It then follows that the average of the ranks allocated 
to each of the i = 1, 2, 3, ____, N rows (or firms) must be (Freund, 1971, p. 
421): 
 
                               E[K(ARit)] = 
1
T
 
t=1
T
 K(ARit) = 
1
T
 
t=1
T
 t = 
T + 1
2
                     (4.6) 
 
where E(.) is the expectations operator.3   Likewise, the variance of the ranks 
allocated to each row must be (Freund, 1971, p. 421): 
 
          Var[K(ARit)] = 
1
T
 
t=1
T
 [K(ARit) – 
T + 1
2
]
2
 = 
1
T
 
t=1
T
 (t – 
T + 1
2
)
2
 =  
T2 – 1
12
    (4.7) 
 
where Var(.) is the variance operator.  Next consider the sum of the ranks, 

i=1
N
 K(ARit),  allocated to each of the t = 1, 2, 3, ____, T columns of the above 
matrix; that is, the sum of the ranks across the N firms comprising the sample 
for a fixed time period (t).  It then follows that the variance of the sum of the 
ranks for this sample of firms will be: 
 
            Var[
i=1
N
 K(ARit)] = 
i=1
N
 Var[K(ARit)] + 
i=1
N
  
j=1
N
 
ij
Cov[K(ARit),K(ARjt)]       (4.8) 
 
                                            
3
 The important point here is that the elements of the matrix, K, are not based on a global 
ranking across all NT abnormal returns arising on the N firms across the T available periods.  
Rather each row ranks the abnormal returns from 1 to T for a given firm.  Since there are N 
firms the total of the ranks will thus be 
NT(T + 1)
2
. The average of these ranks is 
1
NT
. 
NT(T + 1)
2
 = 
T + 1
2
 - as captured by equation (4.6) of the text.   Against this, using a global 
ranking across all NT abnormal returns shows that the total of the ranks will be 
NT(NT + 1)
2
.   
The average of the ranks based on this global ranking procedure will then be 
1
NT
.
NT(NT + 1)
2
 = 
NT + 1
2
.  We emphasise again that our analysis is not based on this global 
ranking approach. 
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Here Cov[K(ARit),K(ARjt)] is the covariance between the rank of the abnormal 
return contained in the ith row of column (t) and the rank of the abnormal 
return contained in the jth row of column (t).  Since the rank allocated to the ith 
firm during the tth time period is independent of the rank allocated to the jth firm 
for the same time period it necessarily follows that the covariance between the 
ranks allocated to the different elements of each column will be 
Cov[K(ARit),K(ARjt)] = 0.
4  One can then use equations (4.7) and (4.8) to show 
that the variance of the sum of ranks across the N firms will be:  
 
                        Var[
i=1
N
 K(ARit)] = 
i=1
N
 Var[K(ARit)] = 
N(T2 - 1)
12
                       (4.9) 
 
Now consider the Corrado (1989, p. 388) expression for the variance of the 
sum of excess ranks across these N firms:   
 
                                   S2(K) = 
1
T
 
t=1
T
 [
1
N
 
i=1
N
 {K(ARit) - 
T + 1
2
}]2                     (4.10) 
 
One can use this expression to compute the standardised variable: 
 
                                         zc = 
1
N
 
i=1
N
 {K(ARit) - 
T + 1
2
}
S(K)
                                (4.11) 
 
However, the previously made assumption that the ranks are randomly 
distributed across the T elements of each row of the above matrix (Corrado, 
1989, p. 388) implies that a simpler expression exists for the standardised 
variable defined by equation (4.11).  This can be demonstrated by taking 
expectations across equation (4.10) in which case it follows that: 
 
                                            
4 Since by assumption the first T integers (ranks) are randomly allocated to each row of the 
matrix, summing the columns is equivalent to a random drawing of N of these T integers but 
with replacement after each drawing is made; that is, after an integer is drawn (for a particular 
element of a given column) it is replaced before the next random drawing occurs (for the 
immediately ensuing element of the given column).  Freeman (1963, pp. 187-191) shows that 
the act of replacement means Cov[K(AR
it
),K(AR
jt
)] = 0 for all i  j. 
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        E[S2(K)] = 
1
TN2
 
t=1
T
  
i=1
N
 Var[K(ARit)] = 
1
TN2
 
t=1
T
 
N(T2 - 1)
12
 = 
(T2 - 1)
12N
     (4.12) 
 
provides a closed form expression for the expected variance of the sum of the 
excess ranks across the N firms.  Moreover, using this result it follows that 
S2(K) is a consistent estimator of the population variance, or (Freeman, 1963, 
pp. 235-36): 
 
                                     plim
N  
 S2(K) = 
(T2 - 1)
12N
 = E[S2(K)]                         (4.13) 
 
Substituting this latter result into equation (4.11) leads to the following 
computationally more convenient modified Corrado test statistic: 
 
        z1 = 
1
N
 
i=1
N
 [K(ARit) - 
T + 1
2
]
(T2 - 1)
12N
 = 
3
N(T2 - 1)
 
i=1
N
 [2K(ARit) - (T + 1)]       (4.14) 
 
Note also that one can apply the Central Limit Theorem to show that the 
distribution function, FN( z1), of the random variable, z1, can be approximated 
by the standard normal distribution function, (z1) = 
1
2
 

-
z1
exp(
-x2
2 )dx, as 
N   (Fisz, 1963, p. 197). 5  Moreover, the theorem of Berry (1941) and 
Esseen (1945) shows that the absolute value of the error associated with 
approximating FN(z1) by the standard normal distribution function, (z1), will 
be: 
 
                                            
5
 If, however, there are different sample sizes for each of the i = 1, 2, 3, ____, N firms then the 
above result takes the following “equivalent” form: 
 
z1 = 
3
N
 
i=1
N
  
[2K(AR
it
) - (T
i
 + 1)]
T
2
i  - 1
 
 
where T
i
 is the number of abnormal returns computed for the i
th
 firm (Fisz, 1963, p. 203).   
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                                 FN(z1) – (z1)   c.
27
N
(1  – 
1
T2
)                              (4.15) 
 
where 0.4097  c  0.7056 is known as the Berry-Esseen constant 
(Shevtsova, 2007).  Note how this result implies that the rate of convergence 
of FN(z1) towards the standard normal distribution function is of the order of 
1
N
.  The Berry-Esseen bound formalised through equation (4.15) will also 
enable those who use the modified Corrado (1989) test to make assessments 
about how reliable the normal approximation is likely to be in their empirical 
work. 
4.3 Data and Analysis 
 
It will be recalled, however, that our principal purpose in the above analysis is 
to lay down testing procedures to assess the significance of the abnormal 
returns earned by target firms involved in Chinese M&A activities.  We use the 
definition of a takeover laid down in Chapter 3; namely, that under Article 
84(1) of the Measures for the Administration of Takeovers of Listed 
Companies promulgated by the China Securities Regulation Committee 
(CSRC) in 2006, a takeover is said to have occurred when an acquiring firm 
successfully purchases more than 50% of the equity shares the listed target 
firm has on issue.  Data on Chinese mergers and acquisitions are available 
from the Securities Data Company Mergers and Acquisitions [SDC (M&A)] 
Database.  The information summarised on this database includes the 
announcement date of the given takeover, the date the takeover becomes 
effective, the date the takeover is declared to be unconditional and the terms 
(cash, share exchange, etc.) associated with the takeover.  Over the period 
from 1 January, 1990 until 31 December, 2008 there were 198 Chinese target 
firms on the SDC (M&A) database that satisfied the definition for a takeover 
under Article 84(1) of the Measures for the Administration of Takeovers of 
Listed Companies and which were also listed on one or both of the two 
mainland Chinese stock exchanges (that is, the Shanghai Stock Exchange 
and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange) or alternatively, an international stock 
exchange.  However, not all of these firms had their share price data available 
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on the Datastream system and this reduced our final sample size down to 82 
Chinese target firms.  These 82 target firms cover a wide and randomly 
chosen spectrum of industries.  Here, Table 4.1 provides a summary the 
industrial classifications of the N = 82 target firms as well as a summary of the 
years in which the takeovers occurred. Thus, for example, for the Industrial 
Engineering classification there were two takeovers in 2003, one takeover in 
2007 and two takeovers in 2008 - or five takeovers in total.  Data for the other 
industry classifications are to be similarly interpreted.  Prices for the A shares 
(adjusted for rights issues and other stock splits) for these 82 Chinese target 
firms were downloaded from the Datastream system (B and H shares are 
analysed separately in chapter 5 of this dissertation).6  The parameters of the 
OLS and Dimson (1979) versions of the market model were then estimated for 
each firm comprising our sample using the continuously compounded share 
returns from 207 trading days prior to the announcement of the merger and/or 
acquisition until seven trading days before the announcement date; that is, (-
207,-7) trading days.7  The event window encompasses six trading days prior 
                                            
6
 Here we need to note that eleven of these 82 firms were not listed on the two mainland 
Chinese stock exchanges; that is, they were not listed on either the Shanghai Stock 
Exchange or the Shenzhen Stock Exchange.  Three of these firms were listed on the 
Singapore Stock Exchange, four were listed on the NASDAQ, three were listed on the 
Frankfurt Stock Exchange and one was listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange.  Returns 
on the equity securities of these eleven firms were first computed in the currency of the stock 
exchange on which they were listed.  The returns were then converted into returns based on 
the Chinese RMB (Yuan) using the official exchange rate for the affected currency.  Our 
analysis of the abnormal returns for the Chinese target firms was conducted across the entire 
sample of 82 firms and then across the sample of 71 firms that were listed on either of the two 
mainland Chinese Stock exchanges (that is, excluding the eleven firms listed on foreign stock 
exchanges).  There were no significant differences between the results based on the entire 
sample of 82 firms and the sample of 71 firms which excluded the eleven firms listed on 
foreign stock exchanges.  Given this, our analysis in this Chapter reports only the results for 
the entire sample of 82 firms.  
 
7
 As previously noted, the parameters of the market model were estimated using both 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and the Dimson (1979) technique.   The Dimson (1979) 
estimate of the betas was based on five observations of the return on the proxy for the market 
portfolio; namely, the return on the market proxy one and two trading days prior to the current 
day, the return on the market proxy during the current day and the return on the market proxy 
one and two days subsequent to the current day.  We assessed the robustness of this 
procedure by estimating Dimson (1979) betas based on seven observations of the return on 
the market proxy (the current day’s return and three forward and three prior returns).  There 
were no significant differences between the betas obtained from this expanded estimation 
period and those based on only the five trading days reported in the text.  Moreover, there 
were no significant differences between the betas obtained under the OLS procedure and the 
betas obtained under the Dimson (1979) technique. 
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Table 4.1 Industrial classifications and Dates of Takeovers for N=82 Chinese Acquiring firms 
INDUSTRY 1995 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 TOTAL
AUTOMOBILES & PARTS 1 1 1 1 4
BEVERAGES 1 1 1 3
CHEMICALS 1 1 1 3 6
CONSTRUCTION & MATERIALS 1 3 1 5
ELECTRICITY 1 2 1 4
FINANCIAL SERVICES 1 1
FIXED LINE TELECOMMUNICATIONS 1 1
FOOD & DRUG RETAILERS 1 1
FOOD PRODUCERS 1 1
GENERAL INDUSTRIALS 1 1
GENERAL RETAILERS 1 1 1 3
HOUSEHOLD GOODS & HOME CONSTRUCT 2 1 3
INDUSTRIAL ENGINEERING 2 1 2 5
INDUSTRIAL METALS & MINING 1 1 1 4 7
INDUSTRIAL TRANSPORTATION 1 1 2
LIESURE GOODS 1 1 2
MEDIA 1 1
MINING 1 1
MOBILE TELECOMMUNICATIONS 1 1 1 3
PERSONAL GOODS 1 1
OIL & GAS PRODUCERS 1 1
PHARMACEUTICALS & BIOTECHNOLOGY 2 2 3 7
REAL ESTATE INVESTMENT & SERVICES 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 10
SOFTWARE & COMPUTER SERVICES 1 1 1 3
SUPPORT SERVICES 1 1
TECHNOLOGY, HARDWARE & EQUIPMENT 1 1 2
TRAVEL & LIESURE 1 1 1 3
TOTALS 2 1 0 0 1 5 10 6 7 14 10 25 82
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to the announcement of the merger and/or acquisition until 17 trading days 
subsequent to the announcement date; that is (-6,+17) trading days.  Thus, 
our analysis is based on an estimation period of 201 trading days and an 
event (or test) window of 24 trading days.8 
 
We determined the excess average ranks for each trading day over the event 
window and the Corrado (1989) estimate of the variance of the excess 
average ranks [equation (4.10)] across the T = 201 + 24 = 225 trading days 
constituting the sum of our event window (M = 24 days) and our estimation 
window (T – M = 201 days) based on the N = 82 Chinese target firms 
comprising our sample.  The results are summarised in Table 4.2.  Thus, the 
first and second columns of Table 4.2 show that based on Dimson (1979) 
estimates of beta the average abnormal return across these target firms 
varies from a high of 2.82% on the first trading day after the takeover 
announcement (event) day (time period one) to a low of -0.82% eight trading 
days after the takeover announcement (event) day.9  Moreover, substituting 
the affected data into equation (4.11) returns a Corrado (1989) test statistic for 
the average ranks of the abnormal returns on the announcement date of the 
takeover of zc = 2.0687 based on the Dimson (1979) estimates of beta and 
                                            
8
  Only daily continuously compounded returns are used in our analysis.  However, one 
problem with the calculation of daily returns is that trading does not occur over weekends.  In 
a typical week, share prices are available at the close of trading on Friday but then no prices 
are available until trading opens on the following Monday.  If the return computed over the 
period from the close of business on Friday until the close of business on Monday is included 
in our empirical analysis, then in a typical week our estimation procedures will be based on 
four daily returns and one three-day return.  We addressed this problem by first, including all 
three-day returns in our estimation procedures and empirical analysis.  We then replicated our 
analysis by excluding all the three-day returns – that is, only the four daily returns occurring in 
each week were used in our estimation procedures and empirical analysis.  There were no 
significant differences in the results of our empirical analysis when the three-day returns were 
included and our empirical results when the three-day returns were excluded.  As noted 
earlier the results reported in the text are based only on the daily returns in our sample – that 
is, the three-day returns have been excluded from both the estimation procedures and our 
empirical analysis. 
 
9
 A disproportionate number (eleven out of 82) of the Chinese mergers and acquisitions in our 
sample were announced over the weekend period.   Since trading does not occur on the 
Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges on weekends (and indeed on most international 
stock exchanges), this means that the abnormal returns associated with these takeover 
announcements will be captured in the trading days following the announcement date (time 
zero).  This provides at least a partial explanation as to why the average abnormal return is 
highest on the first trading day after the announcement date and not the announcement date 
itself. 
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zc = 2.0597 based on the OLS estimates of beta.  The “equivalent” figures for 
the modified Corrado test statistic [equation (4.14)] are z1 = 2.1017 using the 
Dimson (1979) estimates of beta and z1 = 2.2838 using the OLS estimates of 
beta.  Finally, the conventionally applied Patell (1976, p. 257) “t” test returns a 
test statistic of zp = 2.0957 based on the Dimson (1979) betas and 
zp = 2.3567 based on the OLS betas.  The reader will be able to confirm that 
Table 4.2 shows statistically significant positive abnormal returns three trading 
days before the takeover announcement date, on the takeover date itself and 
on the trading day immediately after the announcement date.  Against this 
there are statistically significant negative abnormal returns on the eighth, 
sixteenth and seventeenth trading days after the takeover announcement 
date.  Thus the general picture portrayed by Table 4.2 is that significant 
positive abnormal returns are earned around the takeover announcement date 
(time zero) but that these initial abnormal returns gradually decay away in the 
few weeks following the takeover announcement.  Here it is also interesting to 
note that the modified Corrado statistic performs as well, if not better, than 
both the Patell (1976) and Corrdao (1989) statistics in identifying significant 
abnormal returns. For example, when betas are estimated using the Dimson 
(1979) technique, Table 4.2 shows that the modified Corrado statistic is 
significant at the 5% level three days before the announcement date, on the 
announcement date itself and one day after the announcement date.  In 
contrast, both the Patell (1976) and Corrado (1989) tests are significant at the 
5% level on only two of these three days; on the third of these three days the 
Patell (1976) and Corrado (1989) tests are significant at only the 10% level. 
 
The abnormal returns summarised in Table 4.2 are given pictorial 
representation in Figure 4.1 which shows how the average daily abnormal 
returns across the N = 82 Chinese target firms on which our analysis is based 
are predominantly negative from day eight onwards in the event window; and 
this is so irrespective of whether Dimson (1979) or OLS betas are employed. 
A point of significance to be taken from Table 4.2 is that the Corrado (1989) 
test provides generally weaker results than either the modified Corrado test or 
the Patell (1976) “t” test.  Moreover, while the modified Corrado test returns 
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Table 4.2: Average Abnormal Returns Across N = 82 Chinese Target Firms Covering the Period from 1 January, 1990 until 31 
December, 2008 
 
 Dimson Betas  OLS Betas 
Time 
Relative to 
Announce 
Date (0) 
Average 
Abnormal 
Return 
Patell 
Statistic  
Corrado 
Statistic  
Modified 
Corrado 
Statistic 
Time 
Relative to 
Announce 
Date (0) 
Average 
Abnormal 
Return 
Patell 
Statistic  
Corrado 
Statistic  
Modified 
Corrado 
Statistic  
          
-6 0.0040 0.9430 0.7101 1.0169 -6 0.0040 0.7981 0.8803 1.0601 
-5 0.0024 0.7915 0.7958 0.6438 -5 0.0024 0.9273 0.7847 0.8888 
-4 0.0067 1.1395 1.0029 1.1117 -4 0.0065 1.1983 0.8819 0.8256 
-3 0.0063 2.5583# 1.8650* 2.0169# -3 0.0066 2.5801$ 1.8213* 1.7581* 
-2 -0.0041 -0.5808 -0.9479 -1.0570 -2 -0.0040 -0.7011 -0.9601 -0.8323 
-1 -0.0055 1.1391 -0.0857 0.1762 -1 -0.0047 1.0317 -0.0128 0.1517 
0 0.0116 2.0957# 2.0687# 2.1017# 0 0.0117 2.3567# 2.0597# 2.2838# 
1 0.0282 1.7850* 2.1868# 2.1705# 1 0.0281 1.7735* 1.8962* 2.1501# 
2 -0.0004 0.2240 -1.1986 -1.1011 2 0.0006 0.3809 -1.1945 -1.5484 
3 0.0180 1.0798 0.7376 0.3716 3 0.0165 1.0191 0.6443 0.3242 
4 0.0013 -0.2531 -1.3069 -0.9052 4 0.0012 -0.1911 -1.2121 -0.9611 
5 0.0055 -0.6211 -0.7311 -0.9904 5 0.0056 -0.6421 -0.6188 -0.9031 
6 0.0005 -0.0511 0.0356 -0.0212 6 -0.0001 0.0325 0.0989 -0.0627 
7 0.0020 -0.7847 -1.6369 -1.3727 7 0.0029 -0.5381 -1.4050 -1.1264 
8 -0.0082 -3.0077$ -1.1436 -1.9617# 8 -0.0105 -3.2209$ -1.4561 -1.8023* 
9 0.0030 0.9655 0.7651 1.2231 9 0.0015 0.7866 0.6284 0.5558 
10 -0.0042 0.2791 0.4788 0.4049 10 -0.0052 0.1051 0.2647 0.5814 
11 0.0006 -0.6021 -0.1957 -0.2129 11 0.0000 -0.5951 -0.1722 -0.5883 
12 -0.0058 -0.7426 0.0712 -0.0908 12 -0.0073 -1.1684 -0.2408 -0.2410 
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13 0.0022 -0.1698 -0.7052 -0.1712 13 -0.0001 -0.2766 -1.0319 -0.8968 
14 -0.0011 1.0913 0.0679 -0.3465 14 0.0007 1.1236 0.2775 0.5961 
15 0.0012 0.2386 -0.0032 0.3030 15 0.0021 0.3835 0.0159 -0.2755 
16 -0.0054 -1.9730# -1.5744 -1.9975# 16 -0.0061 -1.9296# -1.7122* -2.0811# 
17 -0.0019 -1.9662# -2.5253# -2.1150# 17 -0.0022 -2.0320# -2.5024# -2.5847$ 
          
 
* significant at 10%; # significant at 5%; $ significant at 1% (two tailed test) 
Methodology of Abnormal Equity Returns 
 
135 
 
 
slightly less compelling results when compared with those obtained from the 
Patell (1976) “t” test, it makes no assumptions about the nature of the 
underlying returns distribution – in particular, the modified Corrado test does 
not assume the returns process is normally distributed as is the case with the 
Patell (1976) test.  Indeed, we show in a subsequent section that whilst the 
modified Corrado test will always provide a satisfactory level of efficiency 
relative to the “t” test, there is no guarantee that the “t” test will always provide  
 
Figure 4.1: Average Abnormal Returns Across N = 82 Chinese Target 
Firms Covering the Period from 1 January, 1990 until 31 December, 2008 
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a satisfactory level of efficiency when compared to the modified Corrado test.  
This in turn will mean it is always “safer” to employ the modified Corrado test 
over the Patell (1976) “t” test.  There is, however, a caveat that must be 
applied here.  Substituting T = 225 and N = 82 into the Berry (1941) and 
Esseen (1945) theorem as formalised through equation (4.15) shows that the 
absolute value of the error associated with approximating the distribution 
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function for the modified Corrado test statistic, FN(z1), by the standard normal 
distribution function, (z1), will be: 
 
FN(z1) – (z1)   0.7056×0.5703 = 0.4024 
 
This means that the difference between the actual distribution function for the 
modified Corrado test statistic and its normal approximation could be as high 
as 40.24%; in other words, there is good reason to believe that the normal 
approximation for both the modified Corrado and Corrado (1989) test itself 
might be an unsatisfactory basis for making assessments about the 
significance of the abnormal returns earned over the event window.  
Fortunately, our further analysis based on the actual distribution of the 
modified Corrado test statistic shows that the results summarised in Table 4.2 
based on the normal approximation give reliable estimates of the affected 
probabilities. 
 
We have previously observed how the focus of the testing procedures applied 
in this area is on whether the sum (or average) of the abnormal returns for a 
particular sample of firms beyond a particular event period or date is 
significantly different from zero.  We thus define the accumulated abnormal 
return for the ith firm, CARitM, for M periods beyond the event period (t) as: 
  
                                                  CARitM = 
j=1
M
 ARi(t+j) 
 
where, as previously, ARit is the abnormal return for the i
th firm during the tth 
time period.  Under the Corrado (1989) test, however, our concern is not so 
much with the abnormal return during any particular time period as it is with its 
rank relative to the other T abnormal returns for the particular firm and period 
under investigation.  Given this, let: 
 
                                              K(CARitM) = 
j=1
M
 K(ARi(t+j))                           (4.16) 
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be the sum of the ranks of the individual abnormal returns over the M periods 
beyond the event date (t) for the ith of the N firms on which the empirical 
analysis is based.  Then standard results show that the expected sum of the 
ranks, K(CARitM), for the abnormal returns arising beyond this event date 
must be (Freund, 1971, p. 195): 
 
                                     E[K(CARitM)] = 
j=1
M
 E[K(ARi(t+j))] = M.
T + 1
2
           (4.17) 
 
Furthermore, the variance of the sum of the ranks, 
Var[K(CARitM)] = Var[
j=1
M
 K(ARi(t+j))], for the particular segment of the row 
containing the M abnormal returns beyond the event date turns out to be 
(Freund, 1971, pp. 44-45): 
 
Var[
j=1
M
 K(ARi(t+j))] = 
j=1
M
 Var[K(ARi(t+j))] + 
j=1
M
  
k=1
M
 
jk
Cov[K(ARi(t+j)),K(ARi(t+k))] 
                                                                                                                  (4.18) 
 
Here Cov[K(ARi(t+j)),K(ARi(t+k))] is the covariance between the rank of the 
abnormal return contained in the (t + j)th element of the ith row and the rank of 
the abnormal return contained in the (t + k)th element of the the ith row, where i 
denotes the ith of the N firms on which the empirical analysis is based.  
However, from equation (4.7) we know 
Var[K(ARi(t+j))] = 
T2 – 1
12
 = 
(T + 1)(T – 1)
12
.  Moreover, Freeman (1963, p. 190) 
shows for (j  k) that Cov[K(ARi(t+j)),K(ARi(t+k))] = – 
(T + 1)
12
.10  Hence 
substituting these latter two results into equation (4.18) shows that: 
                                            
10
 We are here summing the ranks beyond the announcement date for a given firm; that is, we 
are summing the ranks across a given row.  Recall, however, that a given rank can only 
appear once in each row.  Hence, summing the rows is equivalent to a random drawing of M 
of the T integers (ranks) but without replacement; that is, after an integer is drawn it is not 
replaced before the next random drawing occurs.  Freeman (1963, pp. 187-191) shows that 
non-replacement induces the negative serial correlation in the sum of ranks across the given 
row reported here.  
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  Var[K(CARitM)] = M.
(T + 1)(T – 1)
12
 – M(M – 1)
(T + 1)
12
 = M.
(T + 1)(T – M)
12
  
                             (4.19) 
 
will be the variance of the sum of the ranks of the individual abnormal returns 
beyond the event date (t) for the ith of the N firms on which the empirical 
analysis is based.  It then follows that: 
 
z2 = 
K(CARitM) – M.
T + 1
2
M.
(T + 1)(T – M)
12
 = 
3
M(T + 1)(T – M)
[2K(CARitM) – M(T + 1)]      
                                                                                                                  (4.20) 
 
will be a standardised random variable with a mean of zero and unit variance.   
 
It is not hard to show that the third moment of the standardised variable, z2, 
given here is zero.  However, more complicated algebraic procedures also 
show that its excess fourth moment will be (Fix and Hodges, 1955, p. 311):  
 
                                       E(z
4
2) – 3 = - 
6
5
[
T
M(T – M)
 – 
1
T + 1
]                       (4.21) 
 
Now in most applications the “test window”, M, surrounding the event period is 
relatively “small”.  In contrast, the market model parameter estimation period, 
T – M, is normally relatively “large”.  It is readily observed that the limiting 
value (T  ) of equation (4.21) in such circumstances is - 
6
5M
.  This shows 
that it is unlikely that the standardised variate, z2, can be normally distributed 
for small values of M.  Fortunately, it is not hard to show that for small values 
of M the approximation to the distribution function, FM(z2), of the random 
variable, z2, can be improved considerably by employing the second order 
Edgeworth expansion: 
 
FM(z2)  (z2) – 
1
20
[
T
M(T – M)
 – 
1
T + 1
](3)(z2) + 
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[(T + 1)4 – 5(T + 1)2 + 5(T + 1) + (M4 + (T – M)4) – 5M(T - M)(T + 1) + 4]
210[M(T – M)(T + 1)]2
(5)(z2) 
                                                                                                                               (4.22)             
 
where: 
 
(3)(z2) = 
–1
2
(z
3
2 – 3z2)exp(
-z
2
2
2 ) 
 
and:  
 
(5)(z2) = 
–1
2
(z
5
2 – 10z
3
2 + 15z2)exp(
-z
2
2
2 ) 
 
are the third and fifth derivatives (in terms of the “Hermite” polynomials) 
respectively of the standard normal distribution (Fix and Hodges, 1955, p. 
312).    
 
One can illustrate the application of this result by considering the acquisition 
of a majority interest in the Chinese company Beijing C&W Technology 
Company Limited by the U.S. corporation Lucent Technologies Inc. on 20 
December, 2002 (the event date).  The parameters of the one factor market 
model were estimated using the daily continuously compounded returns on 
Beijing C&W Technology Company Limited “A” ordinary stock and the 
Shanghai Stock Exchange Composite Price Index over the period from 20 
December, 2001 until 6 December, 2002.11   Abnormal returns were then 
determined on a daily trading basis over the period from 25 December, 2001 
until 20 January, 2003.  The event window encompasses six trading days 
prior to the (takeover announcement) event date and 16 trading days 
subsequent to the (takeover announcement) event date and covers the period 
from 11 December, 2002 until 20 January, 2003 – a total of 23 trading days.  
Moreover, there are T = 224 daily abnormal returns over the period from 20 
                                            
11
  Again there were no significant differences between the results obtained using ranks based 
on the OLS procedure and ranks based on the Dimson (1979) technique. 
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December, 2001 until 20 January, 2003 and these were ranked from lowest or 
most negative daily abnormal return (with a rank of 1) to highest or most 
positive daily abnormal return (with a rank of 224).  A detailed summary of the 
rank test as it applies to the abnormal returns for the Beijing C&W Technology 
Company Limited is to be found in Table 4. 3.   
 
The first column in this Table represents the trading day relative to the 
(takeover announcement) event date (20 December, 2002 – time period zero).  
The second column gives the rank of the abnormal return on the given trading 
day relative to the T = 224 abnormal returns covering the sum of the 
estimation period and the event window.  The third column summarises the 
standardised sum of the ranks, z2 [equation (4.20)], corresponding to the 
given trading day.  Column four gives the accumulated probability on the 
assumption that the standardised sum of ranks in column three is normally 
distributed.  Thus, on the takeover announcement date (time period zero), the 
normal approximation shows that the probability of a standardised sum of 
ranks of 2.0828 or less is 0.9814.  Column five gives the second order 
Edgeworth approximation to the accumulated probability, FM(z2) [equation 
(4.22)], for the standardised sum of the ranks (0.9825).  Finally, column six 
gives the exact accumulated probability for the standardised sum of the ranks, 
FM(z2) (0.9823).  Note how this Table shows that for this example the 
probability distribution of the standardised sum of ranks quickly converges 
towards the normal distribution.  Indeed, by the fourth trading day (-3) of the 
test period (M = 4) there is virtually no difference between the normal 
approximation to the probability distribution for the standardised sum of ranks 
(0.6714) and the actual probability distribution for the standardised sum of the 
ranks (0.6648).  Indeed, it is only on the first trading day (-6) of the test 
window (M = 1) that there is a significant difference between the normal 
approximation (0.2129) and the actual probability (0.2723).  Fortunately, one 
can always use the second order Edgeworth approximation to get a much 
better approximation (0.2602) for the actual probability (0.2723) when the 
normal approximation returns poor estimates.  Indeed, our analysis here 
shows that the Edgeworth approximation should always be taken whenever 
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Table 4.3: Rank of Abnormal Returns Surrounding Announcement Date (20 
December, 2002) of Takeover of Winsan (Shanghai) Industrial Company 
Limited by Pacific Concord Holdings Limited 
 
Time 
Relative 
to 
Announce 
Date (0) 
Rank of 
Abnormal 
Residual 
z2 
Equation 
(20) 
 
Accum 
Prob 
z2  
Normal 
Approx 
 
Accum 
Prob 
z2  
Edge 
Approx 
 
Accum 
Prob 
z2  
Exact 
      
-6 61 -0.7964 0.2129 0.2602 0.2723 
-5 172 0.0877 0.5349 0.5311 0.5330 
-4 198 0.8386 0.7992 0.7880 0.7886 
-3 76 0.4437 0.6714 0.6645 0.6648 
-2 212 1.0922 0.8626 0.8579 0.8569 
-1 199 1.5517 0.9396 0.9389 0.9382 
0 221 2.0828 0.9814 0.9825 0.9823 
1 191 2.3889 0.9916 0.9926 0.9926 
2 48 1.9189 0.9725 0.9731 0.9729 
3 8 1.3030 0.9037 0.9022 0.9018 
4 202 1.6723 0.9528 0.9527 0.9523 
5 24 1.1996 0.8849 0.8833 0.8831 
6 114 1.1619 0.8774 0.8758 0.8752 
7 209 1.5333 0.9374 0.9370 0.9365 
8 153 1.6519 0.9507 0.9506 0.9502 
9 178 1.8655 0.9689 0.9692 0.9694 
10 52 1.5786 0.9428 0.9425 0.9422 
11 87 1.4412 0.9252 0.9247 0.9252 
12 25 1.0824 0.8605 0.8593 0.8591 
13 41 0.7990 0.7879 0.7864 0.7867 
14 174 0.9992 0.8412 0.8400 0.8395 
15 220 1.3511 0.9117 0.9111 0.9110 
16 74 1.1939 0.8837 0.8829 0.8823 
 
there is a significant difference between the normal and Edgeworth 
approximations to the actual probability for the standardised variable, z2. 
 
Now, suppose one has computed the z2 statistic defined by equation (4.20) 
for all i = 1, 2, 3,____, N firms comprising the sample on which the empirical 
analysis is based.  It then follows that the sum of these z2 statistics will 
possess a mean of zero and a standard deviation of N.  One can then use 
the Central Limit Theorem to show that for a fixed event window, M, the 
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distribution function, FN(z3), of the standardised random variable: 
 
z3 = 
3
M(T + 1)(T – M)
 
i=1
N
 [2K(CARitM) – M(T + 1)]
N
 =  
 
3
MN(T + 1)(T – M)
 
i=1
N
 [2K(CARitM) – M(T + 1)] 
                                                                                                                  (4.23) 
 
can be approximated by the standard normal distribution function, 
(z3) = 
1
2
 

-
z3
exp(
-x2
2 )dx, as N   (Fisz, 1963, p. 197).
12  Again one can also 
apply the theorem of Berry (1941) and Esseen (1945) to show that the rate at 
which the distribution function, FN(z3), converges towards to the standard 
normal distribution, (z3), is of the order of 
1
N
.  However, since previous 
analysis shows that for individual firms the standardised random variable 
defined by equation (4.20) converges quickly towards the normal distribution 
for quite modest values of M, it necessarily follows that the sum (or average) 
of these standardised random variables across many firms will converge even 
more quickly towards the normal distribution.    
 
We demonstrate the implementation of the above result by again considering 
the abnormal returns arising around the takeover announcement date for 
Chinese target firms.  We begin by determining the excess ranks for the 
abnormal returns for each of the N = 82 firms across the T = 225 trading days 
                                            
12
 If, however, there are different sample sizes for each of the firms then the above result 
takes the following “equivalent” form: 
 
z3 = 
3
MN
 
i=1
N
 
[2K(CAR
iaM
) - M(T
i
 + 1)]
(T
i
 + 1)(T
i
 - M)
 
 
where T
i
 is the number of abnormal returns computed for the i
th
 firm (Fisz, 1963, p. 203).     
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which constitutes the sum of our estimation and event period windows.  We 
then determine the sum of the excess ranks for the abnormal returns from six 
trading days before the takeover announcement date (M = 1) until seventeen 
trading days (M = 24) after the takeover announcement date.  The results are 
summarised in Table 4.4.  Thus, the first and second columns of Table 4.4 
show that based on Dimson (1979) estimates of beta the average cumulative 
abnormal return across the N = 82 Chinese target firms comprising our 
sample rises to a high of 7.65% on the seventh trading day after the takeover 
announcement date.  Moreover, substituting the affected data into equation 
(4.23) returns the modified Corrado test statistics summarised in Table 4.4.  
Thus, on the takeover announcement date (time zero or M = 6) the modified 
Corrado test statistic associated with the sum of the ranks for the abnormal 
returns is z3 = 2.4891 based on the Dimson (1979) estimates of beta and 
z3 = 2.3963 based on the OLS estimates of beta.  The conventionally applied 
Patell (1976, p. 257) “t” test returns a test statistic of zp = 2.5626 based on 
Dimson (1979) betas and zp = 2.6248 based on OLS betas.  Finally, Campbell 
and Wasley (1993, p. 85) determine the distributional properties of the 
Corrado (1989, p. 388) test statistic for multi-period event windows.  Applying 
this test to the accumulated ranks of the abnormal returns at the takeover 
announcement date (time zero or M = 6) shows the Corrado test statistic to be 
zc = 1.6172 if Dimson (1979) betas are used and zc = 1.6225 if OLS betas are 
used.  The important point here is that the Corrado (1989) test provides much 
less compelling results when compared to both the modified Corrado and 
Patell (1976) “t” tests.  Of course the Patell (1976) test assumes that abnormal 
returns are normally distributed.  In contrast, the modified Corrado test is a 
distribution free test which returns results that are significantly better than the 
original Corrado test and almost as compelling as the Patell (1976) test.  
Finally, note how Table 4.4 largely confirms conclusions reached on the basis 
of the average abnormal returns summarised in Table 4.2; namely, that 
significant positive abnormal returns occur around the takeover 
announcement date (time zero) but that these initial abnormal returns 
gradually decay away in the first few weeks following the takeover  
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Table 4.4: Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns Across N = 82 Chinese Target Firms Covering the Period from 1 January, 
1990 until 31 December, 2008 
  
 Dimson Betas  OLS Betas 
Time 
Relative to 
Announce 
Date (0) 
Cumulative 
Average 
Abnormal 
Return 
Patell 
Statistic  
Corrado 
Statistic  
Modified 
Corrado 
Statistic 
Time 
Relative to 
Announce 
Date (0) 
Cumulative 
Average 
Abnormal 
Return 
Patell 
Statistic  
Corrado 
Statistic  
Modified 
Corrado 
Statistic  
          
-6 0.0040 0.9430 -0.0881 1.0169 -6 0.0040 0.7981 0.0101 1.1165 
-5 0.0064 1.3962 0.3876 1.3309 -5 0.0064 1.4135 0.4613 1.6007 
-4 0.0131 1.7105 0.8371 1.7337* -4 0.0129 1.7302* 0.8405 1.8215* 
-3 0.0195 2.7738$ 1.5827 2.4194# -3 0.0195 2.7939$ 1.5662 2.4799# 
-2 0.0153 1.8596* 1.0579 1.6283 -2 0.0155 1.8296* 1.0378 1.7586* 
-1 0.0098 2.0725# 0.9470 1.5270 -1 0.0108 2.0359# 0.9560 1.6556* 
0 0.0214 2.5626# 1.6172 2.4891# 0 0.0225 2.6248$ 1.6225 2.3963# 
1 0.0496 2.8344$ 2.2537# 2.8108$ 1 0.0506 2.8507$ 2.1618# 2.8956$ 
2 0.0492 2.9040$ 1.7590* 2.2627# 2 0.0512 2.9651$ 1.6731* 2.1511# 
3 0.0672 2.9799$ 1.8996* 2.2827# 3 0.0677 3.0182$ 1.7895* 2.0686# 
4 0.0685 2.6844$ 1.4414 1.9030* 4 0.0689 2.7322$ 1.3634 1.5927 
5 0.0740 2.4601# 1.1821 1.5350 5 0.0745 2.4954# 1.1383 1.2703 
6 0.0745 2.3970# 1.1486 1.4747 6 0.0744 2.4506# 1.1233 1.2055 
7 0.0765 2.2292# 0.6870 1.0464 7 0.0774 2.3197# 0.7225 0.8609 
8 0.0684 1.7594* 0.3793 0.4811 8 0.0668 1.8225* 0.3355 0.4043 
9 0.0714 1.7763* 0.5535 0.7864 9 0.0683 1.8033* 0.4779 0.5079 
10 0.0672 1.7372* 0.6508 0.8596 10 0.0631 1.7422* 0.5268 0.6066 
11 0.0678 1.6800* 0.5885 0.7869 11 0.0630 1.6850* 0.4733 0.4788 
12 0.0620 1.5561 0.5895 0.7469 12 0.0558 1.5152 0.4074 0.4191 
13 0.0642 1.4898 0.4214 0.6923 13 0.0557 1.4386 0.1724 0.2352 
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14 0.0631 1.6456 0.4262 0.5937 14 0.0564 1.5977 0.2276 0.3490 
15 0.0643 1.6715* 0.4162 0.6504 15 0.0585 1.6401 0.2260 0.2928 
16 0.0589 1.4119 0.0860 0.2668 16 0.0524 1.3894 -0.1283 -0.1052 
17 0.0571 2.0892# -0.4208 0.2009 17 0.0502 2.0267# -0.6262 0.0735 
          
 
 (two tailed test) 
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announcement date.  The cumulative average abnormal returns (CAARs) 
summarised in Table 4.4 are given pictorial representation in Figure 4.2 which 
shows how the CAARs across the N = 82 Chinese target firms on which our 
empirical analysis is based reach a peak on day seven of the event window 
(7.65% for Dimson (1979) betas and 7.74% for OLS betas) and then gradually 
decay away over the remaining nine days of the event window.   
 
4.4  Comparisons with the Parametric “t” Test 
 
The Patell (1976) “t” test is typical of the parametric tests used for assessing 
the significance of abnormal returns in market type models of the equity 
pricing process.  These tests assume normally distributed random returns in 
addition to the other assumptions on which the asset pricing models employed 
in the empirical analysis are based.  In contrast, the modified Corrado test is a 
distribution free (that is, non-parametric) test which is almost as powerful as  
 
Figure 4.2: Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns Across N = 82 Chinese 
Target Firms Covering the Period from 1 January, 1990 until 31 December, 
2008 
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the “t” test when the normality assumption turns out to be true.  This is 
demonstrated by the fact that if the abnormal returns are generated by a 
normal distribution, then the (Pitman) Asymptotic Relative Efficiency (ARE) 13 
of the modified Corrado test is 
3

  0.9549 when compared with the 
conventional “t” tests applied in the literature (Hodges and Lehmann, 1956).14  
Moreover, the corresponding ARE of the modified Corrado test is at least unity 
in comparison with several other well known probability distributions (Hodges 
and Lehmann, 1956).  In addition, an important safeguard provided by the 
modified Corrado test is that its ARE relative to the “t” test can never fall below 
108
125
 = 0.864.  In contrast, the ARE of the “t” test relative to the modified 
Corrado test may be as small as zero.  These considerations mean that the 
modified Corrado test will always provide a satisfactory level of efficiency 
relative to the conventional “t” tests.  In contrast, there is no guarantee that the 
“t” test will always provide a satisfactory level of efficiency relative to the 
modified Corrado test.  Thus, based on this (Pitman) ARE criterion it is always 
preferable to employ the modified Corrado test over parametric tests such as 
the Patell (1976) “t” test.  
 
4.5  Possible Determinants of Short-Term Wealth Effects 
 
A question of some significance that often arises in the M&A literature is what 
determines the wealth effects that accrue to the shareholders of target firms.  
In so far as the limited data available on Chinese firms permits, we seek to 
address this issue by following the methodological procedures laid down in 
the paper by Goergen and Renneboog (2004).  In particular, we regress the 
CAARs that accrue to Chinese target firms over the period comprising one 
                                            
13
 Suppose n
1
 and n
2
 are the sample sizes necessary for two tests, T
1
 and T
2
, to have 
equivalent power under the same level of significance, .  If the level of significance, , and 
the probability of a type II error, , remain fixed then the limit 
n
1
n
2
, as n1 approaches infinity, is 
called the asymptotic relative efficiency (A.R.E.) of the first test relative to the second test, if 
that test is independent of and  (Nikitin, 1995, p. 15). 
 
14
 Both this result and those which follow assume there is “slippage” in the location parameter 
on which the two distributions are based (Hodges and Lehmann, 1956, pp. 325-26). 
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trading day before the takeover announcement date and two trading days 
after the takeover announcement date (that is [-1, 2]), as well as the period 
comprising six trading days before the takeover announcement date and two 
trading days after the announcement date (that is [-6, 2]), against a number of 
potential determining variables for the CAARs.  These determining variables 
are comprised of the ratio of the target firm’s cash reserves to its market 
capitalisation (Cash/Mark), the market to book ratio for the equity of the target 
firm (Mark/Book), the accounting rate of return (that is, the return on equity) 
for the target firm (ROE), the ratio of interest paid to the accounting profit 
made by the target firm (Int Cover) and finally, a dummy variable which takes 
a value of one if the takeover consideration is purely in cash and zero if the 
takeover consideration is other than purely in cash (Consid) (Goergen and 
Renneboog, 2004).  All accounting data was downloaded from Datastream for 
the affected target firms and is the latest accounting information available to 
the market given the date on which the takeover offer was first announced.  
For example, if the takeover offer was announced on 1 June, 2005 and the 
firm’s latest financial statement (balance sheet) date was 31 December, 2004 
then the accounting information on which the regressions are based will be 
that contained in the financial statements for the year ended 31 December, 
2004.  Unfortunately, for 16 of the 82 firms comprising our sample of Chinese 
target firms the information for all five independent variables were not 
available on Datastream.  This in turn means that our regression procedures 
are based on a sample of 66 (rather than 82) Chinese target firms.  Summary 
statistics relating to these 66 target firms on which the empirical analysis of 
this section is based are given in Table 4.5.  Thus from the first row and sixth 
column of the table, the consideration for 50% of the N = 66 takeovers 
comprising our sample was purely in cash.  Moreover, from column four the 
average accounting rate of return across the N = 66 target firms comprising 
our sample was 4.42% (per annum).  The standard deviation of the 
accounting rate of return across these N = 66 firms was 23.43%.  The other 
figures appearing in this table are to be similarly interpreted. 15 
                                            
15
 The average market capitalisation (that is, the market value of equity) on the takeover 
announcement date across the N = 66 Chinese target firms comprising this table amounts to 
RMB (Yuan) 7,144,687. The median market capitalisation amounts to RMB (Yuan) 3,262,826. 
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Table 4.5 
SUMMARY STATISTICS OF CAAR DETERMINING VARIABLES FOR 
N = 66 CHINESE TARGET FIRMS COVERING THE PERIOD FROM 1 
JANUARY, 1990 UNTIL 31 DECEMBER, 2008 
 
 
Cash/Mark Mark/Book ROE Int Cover Consid 
      AVERAGE 0.0932 13.6098 4.42 548.20 0.5000 
MEDIAN 0.0495 4.4353 6.57 3.17 
 STDEV 0.1103 43.1233 23.43 4409.84 
 MAXIMUM 0.5171 341.4523 43.89 35830.62 
 MINIMUM 0.0009 0.5744 -158.88 -137.09 
  
 
The precise form of the regression equation is as follows: 
 
CAAR
j
 = a
0
 + a
1
CASH/MARK
j
 + a
2
MARK/BOOK
j
 + a
3
ROE
j
 + a
4
INTCOVER
j
 + a
5
CONSID
j
 + e
j
 
 
where j = 1, 2, 3, ___, 66 is the sample of target firms comprising our sample, 
the ak, for k = 1, 2,___,5 are the regression coefficients associated with the 
independent variables and ej is the stochastic error term.  The results of the 
above regression are summarised in Table 4.6.  Since there are no significant 
differences in the results obtained from using the OLS or Dimson (1979) 
betas, we report only the results relating to the OLS betas.  These results 
show that none of the traditional variables employed in the literature have a 
significant association with the CAARs earned by Chinese target firms.  Whilst 
the regression coefficients associated with the cash to market capitalisation 
ratio (a1) and the return on equity (a3) have relatively high “t” statistics, neither 
is significant at conventional levels.   
 
There are two potential conclusions that one can draw from these results.  
                                                                                                                             
The standard deviation of the market capitalisation across these N = 66 firms amounts to 
RMB (Yuan) 8,942,771. The largest (maximum) market capitalisation across these N = 66 
firms amounts to RMB (Yuan) 46,692,417.  The smallest (minimum) market capitalisation 
amounts to RMB (Yuan) 633,473. 
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The first is that none of the affected independent variables influence the 
magnitude of the CAARs.  However, here we should note that the results 
reported in subsequent sections of this dissertation using a much more 
sophisticated testing procedure show that some of the affected independent 
variables do appear to have a significant impact on the magnitude of the 
CAARs earned by Chinese acquiring firms.  For example, in chapter 7 we 
 
Table 4.6 
DETERMINANTS OF SHORT TERM WEALTH EFFECTS FOR N = 66 
CHINESE TARGET FIRMS COVERING THE PERIOD FROM 1 JANUARY, 
1990 UNTIL 31 DECEMBER, 2008 
     
 CAAR[-1,2] CAAR[-6,2] 
Independent Variables coeff t value coeff 
 
t value 
     
Intercept (a0) 0.0266 0.7512 0.0388 1.0159 
Cash to Market Capital (a1) 0.2167 1.2613 0.1486 0.8034 
Market to Book Ratio (a2) 0.0001 0.1892 0.0004 0.5379 
Return on Equity (a3) 0.0014 1.0141 0.0021 1.4533 
Interest Coverage (a4) 0.0000 -0.6833 0.0000 -0.7633 
Consideration (a5) -0.0112 -0.6833 -0.0062 -0.1558 
     
     
show that there are some highly significant differences between the CAARs 
earned by Chinese target firms when cash is the sole mode of consideration 
and the CAARs earned by Chinese target firms when the consideration is 
other than purely in cash.  This contrasts with the regression results 
summarised in Table 4.6 which are generally compatible with the hypothesis 
that the mode of consideration has no influence on the magnitude of the 
CAARs earned by Chinese target firms.  The probable explanation for the 
differences in the results summarised in Table 4.6 and those reported in 
Chapter 7 is that there is no logical reason why the relationship between the 
CAAR’s and the mode of consideration should be linear as is assumed in the 
regression procedures that underscore the results summarised in Table 4.6 - 
and indeed we might add, much of the literature in the area (Goergen and 
Renneboog, 2004).  Given this, we defer a more detailed consideration of the 
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fundamental determinants of the magnitude of the CAARs for target firms to 
later chapters of this dissertation – and in particular, chapter 7.  
 
4.6.  Summary and Conclusions 
 
Our principal objective in the current chapter has been to assess the 
significance of the abnormal returns earned by target firms involved in 
Chinese M&A activities.  We employ nonparametric testing procedures in 
order to enhance the robustness of our analysis.  A significant difficulty here, 
however, is that the standard nonparametric testing procedures in the area – 
of which Corrado (1989) is probably the best exemplar – have only limited 
power in comparison to the traditionally employed parametric tests.  We 
address this issue by modifying the Corrado (1989) test so as to increase its 
power relative to the benchmark Patell (1976) “t” test.  In particular, we 
employ a consistent estimator for the variance of the ranks of the abnormal 
security returns and then use it to obtain an exact closed form expression for 
the Corrado (1989) test statistic.  This simplifies the computational procedures 
behind the Corrado (1989) test considerably – to the point where they can be 
implemented using only a hand held calculator.  Moreover, we also extend the 
original Corrado (1989) analysis by determining the distributional properties of 
the sum of the ranks of the individual abnormal returns over a given event 
window.  We apply both the original Corrado (1989) test and our modification 
of it to data on Chinese target firms involved in M&A activities that occurred 
over the period from 1 January, 1990 until 31 December, 2008.  Our empirical 
analysis of this data shows that there are significant abnormal returns around 
the takeover announcement date – although a big proportion of these 
abnormal returns decay away within a few weeks following the takeover 
announcement date.  Moreover, our modification of the original Corrado 
(1989) test shows significantly more power in detecting these abnormal 
returns than the original Corrado (1989) test itself.  Indeed, the modified 
Corrado test employed in our empirical analysis has almost the same power 
as the Patell (1976) “t” test but is not based on the potentially false 
assumption of normally distributed returns (Harris and Küçüközmen, 2001; 
Ashton and Tippett, 2006).  In this chapter, we also attempted to find the 
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possible determinants for the CAARs which accrue to the shareholders of 
Chinese target firms.  However, our results show that none of the affected 
independent variables (the market to book ratio for the equity of the target 
firm, the ratio of the target firm’s cash reserves to its market capitalisation, the 
accounting rate of return (that is, the return on equity) for the target firm, the 
ratio of interest paid to the accounting profit made by the target firm and 
finally, a dummy variable which takes the value one if the takeover 
consideration is purely in cash and zero if the takeover consideration is other 
than purely in cash) influences the magnitude of the premium paid to Chinese 
target firms.  A detailed analysis of the wealth effects of M&A activities on the 
holders of “B” and “H” shares in Chinese target firms occurs in the next 
chapter (five) of this dissertation. 16 
 
 
  
  
                                            
16
  I should also emphasise that I checked whether the results reported in this chapter 
might be afflicted by a confounding events problem by recourse to the Chinese financial press 
around the relevant takeover announcement dates (e.g. Business China, China Economic 
Times, China Securities Journal, the Hong Kong Economic Times, etc).  In particular, I 
checked whether there were any major financial news stories affecting target firms around the 
relevant takeover announcement date (e.g, a significant increase in the dividend rate paid by 
the firm).  Under the conventional definitions of a confounding event (Huang and Walking, 
1987, p. 337) I uncovered only one or two instances where there might have been an 
confounding event but eliminating these  firms from my empirical analysis had an 
imperceptible effect on the empirical results reported in this chapter.  Hence, there is no 
reason to believe that the abnormal returns on which my empirical analysis is based have 
been affected in any significant way by a confounding events problem. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
ANALYSIS OF THE IMPACT OF M&A ACTIVITIES ON 
SHAREHOLDER WEALTH FOR CHINESE TARGET 
FIRMS: B SHARES AND H SHARES 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
We have previously noted, in chapter three of this dissertation, that shares 
listed on stock exchanges in China fall into three broad categories; namely, A 
shares which are normally denominated in the Chinese Yuan and normally 
can only be purchased by Chinese nationals; B shares which are 
denominated in either the U.S dollar or the Hong Kong dollar and normally 
can only be purchased by foreign investors; and H shares which are listed 
exclusively on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange.  Moreover, our review of the 
literature in chapter two shows that most research that deals with Chinese 
M&A activities is restricted to a consideration of A shares.  In other words, 
M&A activities that involve B shares and H shares have been seriously 
ignored by Chinese researchers.  Since in chapter four of this dissertation we 
have empirically analysed the wealth effects that M&A activities have on the 
holders of A shares in Chinese target firms, this chapter will deal primarily with 
the impact that M&A activities have on the holders of B and H shares in the 
Chinese target firms comprising the sample on which our analysis in chapter 
four is based. 
 
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows: section 5.2 provides a 
brief summary of the prior literature regarding the wealth effects that M&A 
activities have for the shareholders of target firms in both western and 
Chinese economies.  Section 5.3 summarises how the data used in our 
empirical analysis is selected.  Next, section 5.4 discusses the methodology 
employed to compute the abnormal returns which arise on the Chinese target 
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firms comprising our sample and the statistical methodology used to evaluate 
the significance of these abnormal returns.  Here we need to recall that the 
statistical methodology upon which our empirical analysis is based was 
discussed in detail in section 4.2 of chapter four and thus, we give only a brief 
summary of this material in this section.  The primary focus of Section 5.5 is 
on providing a detailed analysis of the empirical results we obtain on the 
wealth effects that M&A activities have for the holders of B shares and H 
shares in Chinese target firms.  Finally, Section 5.6 provides a brief summary 
of this chapter and makes a few concluding comments about the impact that 
Chinese M&A activities have on the shareholders of Chinese target firms. 
5.2 A Brief Summary of Prior Literature  
 
We have previously noted in our review of the literature in chapter two that in 
western economies like the United States and the United Kingdom, M&A 
activities result in significant and positive abnormal returns for the 
shareholders of target firms.  This result applies irrespective of the time period 
in which the study is conducted, the mode of consideration used (shares as 
against cash) and the exact specification of the event window.  For instance, 
Dodd and Ruback (1977) employ a sample of 172 U.S. target firms involved in 
M&A activities covering the period from 1958 until 1976.  They find that in the 
month of the announcement of the proposed takeover, shareholders of target 
firms earn large and significant abnormal returns of 20.58% for successful 
offers and 18.96% for unsuccessful offers.  In other words, shareholders of 
target firms in both successful and unsuccessful takeovers earn large positive 
abnormal returns, most of which occur in the month of the offer.  Furthermore, 
Franks, Harris and Titman (1991) study 399 U.S. takeovers completed over 
the period from 1975 to 1984 to investigate share-price performance following 
corporate takeovers.  They conclude that across the entire sample, the 
shareholders of target firms experience substantial abnormal gains of 28% on 
average around the announcement date of the proposed takeover. 
 
Chinese research also shows that shareholders of target firms experience 
substantial economic benefits from M&A activities.  For example, Zhang 
(2003) studied all 1,216 M&A transactions of firms listed on the two mainland 
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Chinese stock exchanges over the period between 1993 and 2002 and found 
that the cumulative average abnormal return (CAAR) that accrued to target 
firm shareholders over the event window of (-60, 30) days amounts to 
29.05%.  Moreover, Fei (2004) chooses a sample of 207 Chinese M&A 
transactions that occurred on the Shanghai stock exchange or the Shenzhen 
stock exchange between 1997 and 2003 and which involved unlisted bidding 
firms making takeover offers for listed target firms.  He finds that the listed 
target firms have a positive and highly significant CAAR around the 
announcement date of 5.28%.  Fei (2004) also finds that over the 90 days 
following the takeover announcement date, the CAAR for target firms 
gradually becomes negative, indicating that the economic benefits of the 
takeover for target shareholders gradually decays away. 
5.3 Data Selection 
 
In this chapter we continue to use the definition of takeovers which is specified 
in chapters three and four to obtain the data we need for our empirical 
analysis of the impact that M&A activities have on the shareholders of 
Chinese target firms.  That is, as given in Article 84(1) of the Measures for the 
Administration of Takeovers of Listed Companies promulgated by the China 
Securities Regulation Committee (CSRC) in 2006, a takeover is said to have 
occurred when an acquiring firm successfully purchases more than 50% of the 
equity shares the listed target firm has on issue.  Data on Chinese mergers 
and acquisitions are available from the Securities Data Company Mergers and 
Acquisitions [SDC (M&A)] Database. The information summarised on this 
database includes the announcement date of the given takeover, the date the 
takeover becomes effective, the date the takeover is declared to be 
unconditional and the terms (cash, share exchange, etc.) associated with the 
takeover.  Over the period from 1 January, 1990 until 31 December, 2008 
there were 198 Chinese target firms on the SDC database that satisfied our 
definition for a takeover.  However, not all of these firms had share price data 
available on the Datastream system and this reduced our sample size down to 
only 13 target firms with B shares on issue and 4 target firms with H shares on 
issue.   
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5.4 Methodology 
 
We begin our analysis by downloading daily closing share price data (adjusted 
for rights issues and other stock splits) from the Datastream system for the 13 
target firms with B shares on issue and the 4 target firms with H shares on 
issue.  Here, it is important to recall that B shares are normally denominated 
in either the U.S or the Hong Kong dollar, whilst H shares are always 
denominated in the Hong Kong dollar.  Given this, the closing daily prices of B 
and H shares were converted into the Chinese Yuan at the official exchange 
rate prevailing at the close of business on the relevant date.  We then 
computed the continuously compounded daily returns for the B and H shares 
equity of all the target firms comprising our analysis.  Likewise, closing values 
for the particular stock exchange index which is used to approximate the 
return on the market portfolio were also downloaded from the Datastream 
system.  The index used to proxy for the market index was the most inclusive 
index available for the particular stock market and type of share (B share and 
H shares) being analysed. For example, the Shanghai Stock Exchange B 
Share Price Index was employed as a proxy for the return on the market index 
for B shares listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange; the Shenzhen Stock 
Exchange B Share Price Index was employed as a proxy for the return on the 
market index for B shares listed on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange; the Hong 
Kong Stock Exchange Composite Index was used as a proxy for the return on 
the market index for H shares.  Where necessary, the values of these indices 
were converted into the Chinese Yuan at the exchange rate prevailing at the 
close of business on the relevant date.   
 
Having downloaded all the needed data, we estimated the parameters of the 
one-factor market model using the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and the 
Dimson (1979) techniques for each target firm comprising our sample.  All 
parameters were estimated using the continuously compounded returns from 
207 trading days preceding the announcement of the proposed merger and/or 
acquisition until seven trading days prior to the announcement date; that is, 
the estimation period was (-207, -7) trading days.  It is important to note that 
day zero (0) is defined as the first public announcement date of the proposed 
Impact of M&A Activities on Target Firms 
157 
 
merger and/or acquisition as downloaded from the SDC (M&A) data base.  
Our event window encompasses six trading days prior to the announcement 
of the merger and/or acquisition until 17 trading days subsequent to the 
announcement date (-6, +17) trading days.  Next, the abnormal returns for 
each of the firms comprising our sample of Chinese target firms is calculated 
using the actual daily continuously compounded return on the affected firm’s 
(B or H) shares less the expected daily continuously compounded return on its 
(B or H) shares.  The market model is used to determine the expected daily 
continuously compounded return on the (B and H) shares comprising our 
sample.  Here it will be recalled that the statistical methodology upon which 
our empirical analysis is based was discussed in detail in section 4.2 of 
chapter four.  Hence, in this section we provide only a very basic summary of 
the methodology used in our empirical research; further details of the 
methodology used to calculate the abnormal returns and the cumulative 
abnormal returns for Chinese target firms and the statistical methodology 
employed to test the significance of these abnormal returns are to be found in 
section 4.2 of chapter four. 
5.5 Detailed Analysis of the Empirical Results for Chinese Target Firms 
 
We have previously noted that shares issued by Chinese listed firms are 
comprised of A shares, B shares and H shares.  Moreover, our empirical 
analysis summarised in section 4.3 of chapter four shows that the holders of A 
shares in Chinese target firms earn statistically significant positive abnormal 
returns around the first public announcement of the takeover, but that these 
positive abnormal returns gradually decay away subsequent to the 
announcement date.  In other words, the holders of A shares in Chinese 
target firms obtain significant economic benefits from M&A activities.  Here it 
will be recalled that we have already provided a detailed analysis of the 
impact of M&A activities for the holders of A shares in Chinese target firms in 
section 4.3 of chapter four.  Hence, in the rest of this section our primary focus 
will be on the wealth effects of M&A activities for the holders of B shares and 
H shares in Chinese target firms. 
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5.5.1 Analysis of B Shares for Chinese Target Firms  
 
We begin our analysis of the impact that M&A activities have on the holders of 
B shares in Chinese target firms by noting that over the period from 1 
January, 1990 until 31 December, 2008 there were 198 Chinese target firms 
on the SDC (M&A) database that satisfied our definition of a takeover.   It will 
be recalled that we base our definition of a takeover on Article 84(1) of the 
Measures for the Administration of Takeovers of Listed Companies 
promulgated by the China Securities Regulation Committee (CSRC) in 2006.  
Under this article a takeover is said to have occurred when an acquiring firm 
successfully purchases more than 50% of the equity shares issued by the 
listed target firm.  However, only 13 of the 198 Chinese target firms on the 
SDC (M&A) database had B shares on issue.  Table 5.1 provides a summary 
of our empirical results in relation to the B shares of these 13 Chinese target 
firms.   
 
Table 5.1 shows that there are marginally significant positive average 
abnormal returns (AARs) around the takeover announcement date for the 
holders of B shares in the Chinese target firms comprising our sample.  The 
Patell (1976) test statistic based on Dimson (1979) betas on the day 
subsequent to the takeover announcement date (that is, time 1) is 2.1085 and 
is significant at the 5% level.  Similarly, the modified Corrado test statistic is 
1.7564 and is significant at the 10% level.  However, the Corrado (1989) test 
statistic itself is not significantly different from zero.  Likewise, when betas are 
based on the OLS technique both the Corrado (1989) and modified Corrado 
test statistics for time 1 abnormal returns are significant at the 10% level.  
However, the Patell (1976) test statistic based on the OLS technique is 
insignificant.  These results are in stark contrast with those obtained for the 
holders of A shares in target firms, where Table 4.2 in chapter 4 shows that 
the Patell (1976), Corrado (1989) and modified Corrado test statistics are all 
significantly different from zero at the 5% level on the takeover announcement 
date (that is, time zero), irrespective of whether Dimson (1979) or OLS betas 
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Table 5.1: Average Abnormal Returns Across N = 13 Chinese Target Firms with B Shares on issue and Covering the 
Period from 1 January, 1990 until 31 December, 2008 
 
 Dimson Betas  OLS Betas 
Time 
Relative to 
Announce 
Date (0) 
Average 
Abnormal 
Return 
Patell 
Statistic  
Corrado 
Statistic  
Modified 
Corrado 
Statistic 
Time 
Relative to 
Announce 
Date (0) 
Average 
Abnormal 
Return 
Patell 
Statistic  
Corrado 
Statistic  
Modified 
Corrado 
Statistic  
          
-6 0.0012 0.0418 -0.1359 -0.0173 -6 0.0004 -0.0497 -0.6579 -0.0657 
-5 -0.0008 -0.6840 0.0304 -0.4053 -5 0.0002 -0.1556 -0.3321 -0.3410 
-4 0.0008 0.4550 -0.1197 0.0064 -4 0.0000 0.1106 0.0146 0.0150 
-3 0.0096 -0.2342 -0.5660 -0.4611 -3 0.0086 -0.0895 -0.5326 -0.5469 
-2 0.0052 0.4714 0.8582 0.8900 -2 0.0056 0.1467 0.8208 0.8428 
-1 -0.0005 0.5029 -0.4484 -0.3925 -1 0.0001 0.1407 -0.3822 -0.3925 
0 0.0020 -0.6254 -1.5926 -1.4219 0 0.0016 -0.1831 -1.2552 -1.2889 
1 0.0204 2.1085# 1.6088 1.7564* 1 0.0198 0.5682 1.6937* 1.7393* 
2 0.0064 0.6160 -0.2495 -0.2338 2 0.0064 0.1741 -0.1149 -0.1180 
3 0.0135 1.2348 1.5398 1.6063 3 0.0145 0.3560 1.5559 1.5977 
4 0.0157 1.3456 1.0894 1.0659 4 0.0154 0.3653 0.9795 1.0058 
5 -0.0001 0.0229 -0.5295 -0.6155 5 -0.0007 -0.0085 -0.7581 -0.7785 
6 -0.0037 -0.5138 0.1562 -0.1351 6 -0.0028 -0.1129 0.1316 0.1351 
7 -0.0042 -0.6191 -0.7770 -0.1608 7 -0.0053 -0.1962 -0.2903 -0.2981 
8 -0.0181 -1.9011* -1.9212* -2.0953# 8 -0.0181 -0.5366 -2.0488# -2.1038# 
9 -0.0017 0.3338 0.0872 -0.3410 9 -0.0014 0.0925 -0.3321 -0.3410 
10 0.0117 1.4342 1.0367 1.0487 10 0.0106 0.3851 1.0004 1.0273 
11 -0.0101 -1.1663 -1.6129 -1.8637* 11 -0.0104 -0.3311 -1.8357* -1.8851* 
12 0.0010 0.2204 1.5845 1.2717 12 0.0009 0.0708 1.3345 1.3704 
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13 -0.0022 -0.8385 -0.9921 -1.0101 13 -0.0016 -0.1944 -0.9001 -0.9243 
14 -0.0073 -1.4988 -1.5926 -1.1860 14 -0.0075 -0.4048 -1.1633 -1.1945 
15 0.0183 1.8405* 1.5804 1.7050* 15 0.0178 0.5166 1.6687* 1.7135* 
16 0.0084 1.4190 0.5782 0.8042 16 0.0078 0.4116 0.8876 0.9115 
17 -0.0034 -1.0714 -0.5961 -0.4890 17 -0.0026 -0.3217 -0.4670 -0.4206 
          
 
Note: *refers to the significance at 10% level; # represents the significance at 5% level; $ refers to the significance at 1% level (two 
tailed test. 
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are employed.  Moreover, Table 4.2 also shows that on the day subsequent to 
the announcement date (that is, time one), the Patell test statistic is significant 
at the 10% level, the Corrado (1989) statistic is significant at the 10% or 5% 
level (depending on whether beta is estimated by the OLS or Dimson (1979) 
techniques) and the modified Corrado test statistic is significant at the 5% 
level (regardless of whether beta is estimated by the OLS or Dimson (1979) 
techniques).  These results may, of course, reflect the differences in the 
sample sizes (82 target firms with A shares and 13 target firms with B shares) 
on which our empirical analysis is based.   However, the fact remains that the 
AAR on the day subsequent to the announcement date (that is, time 1) is 
significantly larger for the holders of A shares (2.8%) when compared to the 
AAR for the holders of B shares (2.0%).  Furthermore, the AAR on the 
announcement date itself (that is, time 0) is 1.2% for the holders of A shares 
and a miserly 0.2% for the holders of B shares.  Hence, whilst the holders of A 
shares in Chinese target firms appear to gain significant economic benefits 
from M&A activities, the holders of B shares in these same firms obtain only 
marginal economic benefits at best. 
 
Note that Table 5.1 also shows that the AARs tend to fluctuate randomly 
around zero beyond the announcement date.  However, on the eighth day 
after the announcement date a significant negative AAR of 1.81% occurs and 
this is so irrespective of whether the calculation of the abnormal returns is 
based on OLS or Dimson (1979) betas.  A pictorial description of the AARs for 
the 13 Chinese target firms with B shares on issue is given in Figure 5.1.  
Figure 5.1 confirms our previous conclusion that there are positive but 
statistically insignificant abnormal returns for the holders of B shares in 
Chinese target firms around the takeover announcement date.  However, we 
would emphasise again that our sample (of 13 Chinese target firms with B 
shares on issue) is very small and possibly not representative of the wider 
Chinese securities market.  Hence, one must therefore interpret our 
conclusions with caution.  Nevertheless, to the best of our knowledge this is 
the first study to have been conducted on the wealth effects of M&A activities 
for the holders of B shares in Chinese target firms.  
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Figure 5.1: Average Abnormal Returns Across N = 13 Chinese Target 
Firms with B Shares on issue and Covering the Period from 1 January, 
1990 until 31 December, 2008 
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We now focus our attention on the cumulative average abnormal returns 
(CAARs) during the event window for our sample of Chinese target firms with 
B shares on issue.  As usual, we first summarise the main empirical results 
relating to the CAARs for these firms in tabular form – as in Table 5.2.  This 
table shows that the CAARs tend to be positive and to grow in magnitude over 
the period surrounding the takeover announcement date.  In particular, Table 
5.2 shows that the CAARs peak at roughly 7.3% on the fourth trading day 
after the takeover announcement date.  However, none of the CAARs are 
statistically significant from zero using the Corrado (1989) and modified 
Corrado test statistics over the entire event window.  Against this, the CAARs 
on the third and fourth days beyond the takeover announcement date are 
marginally significant (at the 10% level) using the Patell (1979) test statistic 
based on Dimson (1979) betas.  Hence the general picture portrayed by Table 
5.2 is that whilst the CAARs are positive they are not significantly different  
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Table 5.2: Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns Across N = 13 Chinese Target Firms with B Shares on issue and 
Covering the Period from 1 January, 1990 until 31 December, 2008 
 
 Dimson Betas  OLS Betas 
Time 
Relative to 
Announce 
Date (0) 
Cumulative 
Average 
Abnormal 
Return 
Patell 
Statistic  
Corrado 
Statistic  
Modified 
Corrado 
Statistic 
Time 
Relative to 
Announce 
Date (0) 
Cumulative 
Average 
Abnormal 
Return 
Patell 
Statistic  
Corrado 
Statistic  
Modified 
Corrado 
Statistic 
          
-6 0.0012 0.0418 -0.1359 -0.0173 -6 0.0004 -0.0497 -0.0657 -0.0657 
-5 0.0004 -0.5586 -0.0746 -0.3286 -5 0.0006 -0.1292 -0.2876 -0.2793 
-4 0.0012 -0.0087 -0.1300 -0.1956 -4 0.0006 0.0104 -0.2261 -0.1542 
-3 0.0107 -0.1314 -0.3956 -0.3874 -3 0.0093 -0.0475 -0.4693 -0.4116 
-2 0.0159 0.2703 0.0299 0.1015 -2 0.0149 0.0781 -0.0428 0.0577 
-1 0.0154 0.6364 -0.1557 -0.1508 -1 0.0149 0.1826 -0.1993 -0.1872 
0 0.0174 0.2609 -0.7461 -0.6885 0 0.0166 0.0745 -0.6717 -0.6703 
1 0.0378 1.2836 -0.1291 0.0048 1 0.0364 0.3456 -0.0134 0.0153 
2 0.0442 1.5464 -0.2049 -0.1058 2 0.0427 0.4200 -0.0519 -0.0572 
3 0.0577 1.6527* 0.2925 0.4198 3 0.0573 0.4603 0.4560 0.4637 
4 0.0735 1.7053* 0.6074 0.7206 4 0.0726 0.4737 0.7380 0.7445 
5 0.0733 1.4958 0.4287 0.5022 5 0.0719 0.4130 0.4819 0.4751 
6 0.0696 1.4532 0.4552 0.4522 6 0.0691 0.4050 0.5004 0.5051 
7 0.0654 1.5501 0.2310 0.4050 7 0.0638 0.4258 0.4026 0.4169 
8 0.0473 1.1804 -0.2729 -0.1737 8 0.0458 0.3236 -0.1543 -0.1644 
9 0.0456 1.1319 -0.2424 -0.2663 9 0.0444 0.3112 -0.2346 -0.2576 
10 0.0573 1.3201 0.0162 0.0126 10 0.0551 0.3595 0.0215 0.0150 
11 0.0472 1.0403 -0.3644 -0.4543 11 0.0447 0.2811 -0.4234 -0.4573 
12 0.0482 1.1573 0.0088 -0.1327 12 0.0456 0.3145 -0.0977 -0.1114 
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13 0.0460 1.0725 -0.2132 -0.3676 13 0.0440 0.2969 -0.3019 -0.3263 
14 0.0387 0.9026 -0.5556 -0.6338 14 0.0365 0.2500 -0.5553 -0.5959 
15 0.0569 1.2756 -0.2059 -0.2333 15 0.0543 0.3491 -0.1772 -0.1943 
16 0.0654 1.5304 -0.0808 -0.0496 16 0.0621 0.4222 0.0167 0.0130 
17 0.0620 0.5698 -0.2008 -0.4060 17 0.0595 0.1788 -0.0695 -0.3641 
          
 
Note: *refers to the significance at 10% level; # represents the significance at 5% level; $ refers to the significance at 1% level (two 
tailed test) 
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from zero in a statistical sense over the entire event window.  The lack of 
statistical significance might, however, be caused by the small sample of B 
shares in Chinese target firms that is available to us.  The following chart 
gives a pictorial summary of the CAARs that arise on the B shares of the 
target firms comprising our sample:  
 
Figure 5.2:  Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns Across N = 13 
Chinese Target Firms with B Shares Covering the Period from 1 January, 
1990 until 31 December, 2008 
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Note how this graph confirms our previous observation that the CAARs on the 
B shares of Chinese target firms comprising our sample tend to be positive 
and to grow in magnitude in the four day period beyond the takeover 
announcement date.  After this period, however, the CAARs have largely 
“levelled off” and fluctuate randomly without any discernible trend.   
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5.5.2 Analysis of H Shares for Chinese Target Firms 
 
It will be recalled from chapter three of this dissertation that one of the 
important differences between H shares and A shares is that H shares are 
denominated and traded in the Hong Kong dollar whereas A shares are 
traded in the Chinese Yuan.  Furthermore, an increasing number of mergers 
and acquisitions (M&A) involve H shares due to the fact that a growing 
number of mainland Chinese firms have chosen to list their shares on the 
Hong Kong Stock Exchange.  Thus, M&A activities involving H shares are of 
increasing importance in China and should not be ignored in empirical 
research.   
 
There were a total of four Chinese target firms in our sample that had H 
shares on issue.  The abnormal returns which accrue to the holders of H 
shares in the four target firms which make up our sample are summarised in 
Table 5.3.  The table shows that the average abnormal returns (AARs) which 
accrue to the holders of H shares in our sample of Chinese target firms is 
quite volatile in the run up to the takeover announcement date and the first 
few days thereafter.  This, however, could be a product of the small sample of 
target firms with H shares on issue that is available to us.  Nevertheless, there 
is a sharp spike of 26.8% in the AAR on the second trading day following the 
takeover announcement date and this is so irrespective of whether the 
Dimson (1979) or OLS techniques are used to estimate betas.  The AARs on 
this second trading day after the takeover announcement date (that is, time 2) 
have a Patell (1976) test statistic of 1.8746 using Dimson (1979) betas and 
1.8717 using OLS betas.  These statistics are both significant at the 5% level.  
In contrast, the Corrado (1989) test statistic is 2.6241 using Dimson (1979) 
betas and 2.6644 using OLS betas.  Both these statistics are significant at the 
1% level.  The most compelling results, however, are obtained using the 
modified Corrado test which returns test statistics of 2.8447 and 2.8602 under 
the Dimson (1979) and OLS betas, respectively.  Again, these are both 
significant at the 1% level.   
 
The volatile nature of the returns process for M&A activities based on H 
shares is underscored by the fact that the AAR goes from being a highly 
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Table 5.3: Average Abnormal Returns Across N = 4 Chinese Target Firms with H Shares on issue and Covering the Period 
from 1 January, 1990 until 31 December, 2008 
 
 Dimson Betas  OLS Betas 
Time 
Relative to 
Announce 
Date (0) 
Average 
Abnormal 
Return 
Patell 
Statistic  
Corrado 
Statistic  
Modified 
Corrado 
Statistic 
Time 
Relative to 
Announce 
Date (0) 
Average 
Abnormal 
Return 
Patell 
Statistic  
Corrado 
Statistic  
Modified 
Corrado 
Statistic  
          
-5 0.0004 0.5594 0.1430 0.1609 -5 -0.0005 0.4426 0.1011 0.1145 
-4 0.0187 1.7647* 1.2799 1.3915 -4 0.0203 1.7946* 1.3575 1.4611 
-3 0.0010 0.6321 -0.3003 -0.3184 -3 0.0004 0.5615 -0.3321 -0.3492 
-2 0.0019 -0.2370 -0.7436 -0.8016 -2 0.0024 0.0073 -0.7148 -0.7628 
-1 -0.0050 -1.5170 -1.3228 -1.4285 -1 -0.0056 -1.4459 -1.4080 -1.5058 
0 0.0010 -0.5819 0.1573 0.1702 0 0.0017 -0.5409 0.2094 0.2244 
1 -0.0153 -0.3740 -0.0143 -0.0082 1 -0.0178 -0.4401 -0.0794 -0.0778 
2 0.2687 1.8746* 2.6241$ 2.8447$ 2 0.2684 1.8717* 2.6644$ 2.8602$ 
3 -0.0739 -2.6246$ -2.4096# -2.6040$ 3 -0.0716 -2.4141# -2.2889# -2.4494# 
4 -0.0278 -1.0675 -0.8223 -0.8882 4 -0.0280 -1.0758 -0.8304 -0.8882 
5 0.0035 2.1769# 0.3361 0.3681 5 0.0024 1.5504 0.2166 0.2368 
6 0.0257 0.6219 1.1655 1.2613 6 0.0254 0.6584 1.1553 1.2381 
7 0.0126 0.2991 0.0215 0.0244 7 0.0130 0.3131 0.0289 0.0321 
8 0.0046 2.3100# 0.6793 0.7390 8 0.0055 2.1067# 0.7293 0.7854 
9 0.0021 0.1026 -0.8795 -0.9485 9 0.0021 0.1043 -0.9026 -0.9640 
10 0.0231 1.1627 1.3943 1.5119 10 0.0222 1.0910 1.3502 1.4498 
11 -0.0146 -0.7588 -0.4505 -0.4828 11 -0.0149 -0.7250 -0.4188 -0.4439 
12 -0.0115 -0.7544 -0.4076 -0.4388 12 -0.0112 -0.7338 -0.4043 -0.4310 
13 0.0009 0.6386 0.0858 0.1003 13 0.0003 0.5898 0.0361 0.0461 
Impact of M&A Activities on Target Firms 
168 
 
14 0.0119 1.0992 1.1226 1.2217 14 0.0120 1.0904 1.1264 1.2139 
15 0.0013 0.7482 0.3289 0.3620 15 -0.0007 0.4172 0.1589 0.1762 
16 0.0139 1.4056 0.6292 0.6853 16 0.0141 1.4279 0.6643 0.7163 
          
 
Note: *refers to the significance at 10% level; # represents the significance at 5% level; $ refers to the significance at 1% level (two 
tailed test) 
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positive and significant 26.8% on the second trading day after the takeover 
announcement date to a highly negative and significant - 7.3% on the third 
trading day after the takeover announcement date.  Moreover, the Patell 
(1976), Corrado (1989) and modified Corrado test statistics for the AARs on 
this third trading day after the takeover announcement date are all significantly 
different from zero at the 5% level or better.  The AARs are also negative on 
the fourth trading day after the takeover announcement date but not 
statistically so.  The AARs then tend to “level off” and fluctuate randomly as 
depicted in the following graph: 
 
Figure 5.3: Average Abnormal Returns Across N = 4 Chinese Target 
Firms with H Shares on issue and Covering the Period from 1 January, 
1990 until 31 December, 2008 
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Note how the above graph confirms that there is a sharp spike in the AAR on the 
second trading day following the takeover announcement date.  Beyond this 
date, however, the abnormal returns tend to decay away but then “level off” and 
fluctuate randomly.  However, our small sample is small being comprised of only 
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four Chinese target firms with H shares on issue.  Hence, the results reported in 
this section may not be representative of the abnormal returns for all Chinese 
target firms with H shares on issue.   
 
We now turn our attention to the analysis of the cumulative average abnormal 
returns (CAARs) which accrue to the holders of H shares in Chinese target firms.  
A summary of the main empirical results relating to the CAARs of acquiring firms 
with H shares on issue is given in Table 5.4.  This table shows that the CAARs 
accruing to the holders of H shares in Chinese target firms reach a peak of nearly 
26% on the second trading day after the takeover announcement date.  However, 
whilst the Patell (1976) test statistic on this date is marginally significant (at the 
10% level), neither the Corrado (1989) statistic nor the modified Corrado statistic 
is significant at any reasonable level, irrespective of whether Dimson (1979) or 
OLS beats are employed.  Beyond the second trading day after the takeover 
announcement date the CAARs tend initially to decay away but then “level off” 
and fluctuate randomly around a slight upward trend.  The CAARs for Chinese 
target firms with H shares on issue are given pictorial representation in Figure 
5.4.  Note how the Figure 5.4 confirms that there is a sharp spike of around 26% 
in the CAARs on the second trading day following the takeover announcement 
date.  Beyond this date, however, the CAARs tend initially to decay away but 
then “level off” and fluctuate randomly around a slight upward trend.  However, a 
note of caution is in order here - our sample is small being comprised of only four 
Chinese target firms with H shares on issue.  Hence, the results reported in this 
section may not be representative of the abnormal returns for all Chinese target 
firms with H shares on issue.   
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Table 5.4: Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns Across N = 4 Chinese Target Firms with H Shares on issue and 
Covering the Period from 1 January, 1990 until 31 December, 2008 
 
 Dimson Betas  OLS Betas 
Time 
Relative to 
Announce 
Date (0) 
Cumulative 
Average 
Abnormal 
Return 
Patell 
Statistic  
Corrado 
Statistic  
Modified 
Corrado 
Statistic 
Time 
Relative to 
Announce 
Date (0) 
Cumulative 
Average 
Abnormal 
Return 
Patell 
Statistic  
Corrado 
Statistic  
Modified 
Corrado 
Statistic 
          
-5 -0.0120 0.3608 0.3994 -0.2191 -5 -0.0137 0.2515 0.3268 -0.2654 
-4 0.0068 1.3751 1.0651 0.7869 -4 0.0066 1.3849 1.0505 0.8034 
-3 0.0077 1.1872 0.7722 0.4437 -3 0.0070 1.1806 0.7437 0.4393 
-2 0.0096 1.2968 0.3581 -0.0275 -2 0.0095 1.3026 0.3455 -0.0118 
-1 0.0046 1.1521 -0.2131 -0.6774 -1 0.0039 1.1301 -0.2594 -0.6982 
0 0.0056 1.9790# -0.1378 -0.5730 0 0.0055 2.1130# -0.1610 -0.5696 
1 -0.0097 0.1943 -0.1340 -0.5590 1 -0.0122 0.1762 -0.1787 -0.5825 
2 0.2590 1.8220* 0.7484 0.4776 2 0.2562 1.8409* 0.7196 0.4611 
3 0.1851 1.2368 -0.0520 -0.4196 3 0.1846 1.2622 -0.0411 -0.3827 
4 0.1573 1.0950 -0.2975 -0.6761 4 0.1566 1.1256 -0.2896 -0.6410 
5 0.1608 1.1221 -0.1878 -0.5370 5 0.1590 1.1493 -0.2147 -0.5440 
6 0.1864 1.0965 0.1428 -0.1526 6 0.1844 1.1277 0.1141 -0.1661 
7 0.1991 1.0396 0.1433 -0.1338 7 0.1975 1.0695 0.1177 -0.1446 
8 0.2037 1.0594 0.3139 0.0685 8 0.2030 1.0906 0.3020 0.0708 
9 0.2057 1.0145 0.0840 -0.1818 9 0.2050 1.0469 0.0668 -0.1837 
10 0.2289 1.0813 0.4197 0.2082 10 0.2273 1.1062 0.3923 0.1903 
11 0.2142 1.0512 0.3017 0.0855 11 0.2124 1.0785 0.2825 0.0778 
12 0.2027 1.0008 0.2001 -0.0296 12 0.2011 1.0351 0.1822 -0.0351 
13 0.2036 1.1638 0.2142 -0.0015 13 0.2015 1.1902 0.1857 -0.0199 
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14 0.2156 1.4132 0.4541 0.2819 14 0.2135 1.4396 0.4270 0.2622 
15 0.2169 1.4823 0.5137 0.3613 15 0.2128 1.4901 0.4511 0.2995 
16 0.2308 1.5102 0.6336 0.5069 16 0.2270 1.5219 0.5797 0.4533 
17 0.2597 0.4937 1.0961 1.2105 17 0.2578 0.4808 1.0568 1.1144 
          
 
Note: * refers to the significance at 10% level; # represents the significance at 5% level; $ refers to the significance at 1% level (two 
tailed tes 
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Figure 5.4:  Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns Across N = 4 Chinese 
Target Firms with H Shares Covering the Period from 1 January, 1990 until 
31 December, 2008 
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 5.6      Summary and Conclusions 
 
This chapter provides a detailed analysis of the wealth effects that M&A activities 
have for the holders of B and H shares in Chinese target firms.  We begin the 
chapter by explaining how the data on which our empirical analysis of Chinese 
M&A activities is based was selected.  We then discuss the methodology used to 
calculate the abnormal returns which arise on the Chinese target firms 
comprising our sample as well as the statistical methodology used to assess the 
significance of these abnormal returns.  A more detailed analysis of the statistical 
methodology which underlies the testing procedures employed in our empirical 
work is to be found in section 4.2 of chapter four of this dissertation.  
 
We then turn the focus of our attention to the wealth effects that M&A activities 
have for the holders of B shares and H shares in Chinese target firms, 
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respectively.  Our general conclusion is that whilst there are positive abnormal 
returns around the takeover announcement date for the holders of B shares in 
Chinese target firms, they tend to be marginal at best.  In contrast, the abnormal 
returns around the takeover announcement date for the holders of H shares tend 
to be larger than those for B shares.  Moreover, the abnormal returns for H 
shares immediately after the takeover announcement date tend to be statistically 
significant at any reasonable level, irrespective of whether one employs the Patell 
(1976) test, the Corrado (1989) test or the modified Corrado test.  However, 
whilst the CAARs for H shares are highly positive on the second trading day after 
the takeover announcement date and beyond, they are not statistically significant 
from zero.  This is probably because the sample of H shares used in our 
empirical analysis is very small and possibly, not representative of the wider 
Chinese securities market.   
 
Impact of M&A Activities on Acquiring Firms 
 
175 
 
CHAPTER SIX 
 
ANALYSIS OF THE IMPACT OF M&A ACTIVITIES ON 
SHAREHOLDER WEALTH FOR CHINESE ACQUIRING 
FIRMS: A SHARES, B SHARES AND H SHARES 
 
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
 Whilst the volume of M&A activities in China has increased considerably over 
the last decade, due amongst other reasons to the phenomenal growth rate in 
China’s economic output as well as China’s admission to the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO) in 2001, research conducted into the area of Chinese 
M&A activities remains relatively sparse.  Moreover, our review of the 
literature in chapter 2 shows that such research as has been conducted on 
Chinese M&A activities is relatively unsophisticated, especially when 
compared to the equivalent research conducted on western M&A activities.  
Hence, in order to redress the relatively unsophisticated nature of the prior 
research conducted into Chinese M&A activities and also, to provide concrete 
empirical evidence of the impact that Chinese M&A activities have on the 
shareholders of acquiring firms, we now summarise information about the 
abnormal and cumulative abnormal returns which accrue to shareholders 
around the relevant takeover announcement dates of a randomly selected 
sample of 279 Chinese acquiring firms.  In particular, this chapter deals with 
the wealth effects which Chinese M&A activities have on the shareholders of 
Chinese acquiring firms.  In addition, we compare our empirical results with 
those obtained for western economies in order that we might identify the 
underlying reasons for the significant differences which appear to exist 
between the wealth effects of Chinese and western M&A activities.  We seek 
to do this by rationalising our empirical results in terms of the Chinese 
political, economic and capital systems which are fundamentally different from 
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those of western economies.  Moreover, a question which often arises in the 
M&A literature is what determines the wealth effects of the takeover process 
for Chinese acquiring firms (Goergen and Renneboog, 2004).  In this chapter 
we seek to address this issue by following the methodological procedures laid 
down in the paper by Goergen and Renneboog (2004).  In particular, we 
regress the abnormal returns obtained for Chinese acquiring firms over the 
period surrounding the takeover announcement date against a number of 
potential determining variables.   
 
We have previously noted, in chapter three of this dissertation, that shares 
listed on stock exchanges in China fall into three broad categories; namely, A 
shares which are denominated in the Chinese Yuan and only Chinese 
nationals are entitled to purchase them; B shares which are denominated in 
either the U.S dollar or the Hong Kong dollar and it is normally the case that 
only foreign investors are permitted to purchase them; and H shares which 
are listed exclusively on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange.  Our review of the 
literature in chapter two shows that most research that deals with Chinese 
M&A activities is restricted to a consideration of A shares.  In other words, 
M&A activities that involve B shares and H shares have been seriously 
ignored by Chinese researchers.  Thus in this chapter, we will not only 
empirically analyse the impact that Chinese M&A activities have on the 
holders of A shares in Chinese acquiring firms but also, we examine the 
impact that M&A activities have on the holders of B and H shares in Chinese 
acquiring firms as well. 
 
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows: section 6.2 provides a 
brief reiteration of the prior literature regarding the wealth effects that M&A 
activities have for shareholders of acquiring firms in both western and Chinese 
economies.  Section 6.3 summarises how the data used in our empirical 
analysis is selected.  Next, section 6.4 discusses the methodology employed 
to compute the abnormal returns which arise on the Chinese acquiring firms 
comprising our sample.  We also discuss how the event window was 
determined over which our empirical analysis is conducted.  We assess the 
significance of the abnormal returns obtained for our sample of Chinese 
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acquiring firms by using the Patell (1976) “t” test, the Corrado (1989) rank test 
and my modification of the Corrado (1989) rank test.  The relative power of 
these tests was discussed in chapter four where we dealt with the abnormal 
returns that arise on Chinese target firms involved in M&A activities.  It will be 
recalled that whilst our analysis showed that the modified Corrdao test had 
slightly less power than the Patell (1976) test it did not invoke the 
(undoubtedly false) assumption that equity returns are normally distributed 
(Harris and Küçüközmen, 2001; Ashton and Tippett, 2006).  Moreover, the 
empirical analysis summarised in chapter four shows that the modified 
Corrdao test is much more effective in detecting the significance of the 
abnormal returns that accrue on Chinese target firms than is the Corrado 
(1989) test itself.  The empirical analysis of Chinese acquiring firms 
summarised in the current chapter also confirms that the modified Corrado 
test is much more effective in detecting the significance of abnormal returns 
than is the Corrado (1989) test.   
 
Section 6.5 focuses primarily on providing a detailed analysis of our empirical 
results obtained on the wealth effects that Chinese M&A activities have for the 
holders of A shares, B shares and H shares in Chinese acquiring firms 
respectively.  In section 6.6 we compare the results obtained in our empirical 
analysis of Chinese acquiring firms with the results obtained by researchers 
for western acquiring firms.  We also seek to identify possible reasons for the 
differences which exist between our empirical results for Chinese acquiring 
firms and those obtained by western researchers for western acquiring firms.  
Here it will be recalled that Chinese political, economic and capital systems 
are unique and fundamentally different from those in western economies.  
Section 6.7 provides an analysis of the potential determinants of the abnormal 
returns earned by Chinese acquiring firms.  Finally, Section 6.8 presents a 
brief summary of this chapter and makes a few concluding remarks about the 
impact that Chinese M&A activities have on the shareholders of acquiring 
firms in China. 
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6.2 A Brief Summary of Prior Literature  
 
In chapter two we review the literature that deals with the wealth effects for 
acquiring and target firm shareholders of mergers and acquisition (M&A) 
activities.  The western literature in this area is voluminous, at both an 
empirical and theoretical level, but we also note that there is a limited but 
growing literature that deals with the wealth effects for shareholders of 
Chinese M&A activities.  In chapter two we note that much of the Chinese 
literature is theoretical in nature and that the sparse Chinese empirical 
literature in the area is invariably based on inappropriate methodologies.  In 
general the empirical evidence dealing with the wealth effects of M&A 
activities for the shareholders of acquiring firms is mixed and inconsistent – 
and this applies irrespective of whether one is dealing with the western or 
Chinese literature in the area.  For example, Dodd and Ruback (1977) employ 
a sample of 172 U.S. acquiring firms covering the period from 1958 until 1976.  
They find that stockholders of successful bidding (that is, acquiring) firms earn 
positive abnormal returns in the month of the takeover announcement.  In 
contrast, Langtieg (1978) finds evidence of negative abnormal returns for 
acquiring firms over the six months before and the twelve months after the 
merger date.   One can compare these previous two studies with Asquith 
(1983) who finds that the stock market shows little or no reaction on the date 
of the first public announcement of the merger and/or acquisition proposals 
and this applies for both successful and unsuccessful bidding firms.  Likewise, 
Bruner (2003) concludes that in the aggregate, abnormal returns to 
shareholders’ of acquiring firms from M&A activities are essentially zero. 
 
It is only since the run up to China’s admission into the World Trade 
Organisation in 2001 that there have been significant M&A activities in China.  
This also explains why no research of any significance was undertaken into 
Chinese M&A activities before 2000 and why the research that has been 
conducted in this area since that date is not as sophisticated in terms of 
methodology and the way of dealing with data as that which has been 
conducted in western economies.  Here we need to emphasise, however, that 
the Chinese economy and its securities systems are very different to those 
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operated in western economies.  For example, the shares of most Chinese 
firms are under the predominant control of the government and as noted in 
chapter 3, this means that in China the shares of a majority of firms cannot be 
traded on the stock exchange (the so called untradeable shares).  The main 
research which has been conducted on the impact that M&A activities have on 
the wealth of shareholders in acquiring firms in China may be summarised as 
follows. 
 
Chen and Zhang (1999) employ data for M&A transactions on the Shanghai 
Stock Exchange covering the 1997 fiscal year.  Using a standard event study 
methodology Chen and Zhang (1999) find that although the cumulative 
average abnormal return (CAAR) associated with the acquiring firms 
comprising their sample tended to drift upwards over the event window, it was 
not significantly different from zero in any statistical sense.  They conclude 
from this that the wealth effects for shareholders of the Chinese acquiring 
firms comprising their sample are essentially zero.   Yu and Yang (2000) used 
a sample comprised of all mergers and/or acquisitions which occurred on the 
two mainland Chinese stock exchanges – namely, the Shanghai Stock 
Exchange and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange – over the period from 1993 
until 1995.  They found that the CAAR associated with the acquiring firms 
comprising their sample randomly fluctuated around zero over their event 
window.  In contrast, Li and Chen (2002) investigated the M&A activities of 
firms listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges over the period 
from 1999 to 2000.  They find that there are significant economic benefits for 
the shareholders of acquiring firms; in particular, the CAAR was a statistically 
significant 3% by the end of the 30 day post announcement event window 
used in their study.  Finally, Li and Zhu (2005) used a standard market model 
methodology to analyse the abnormal returns associated with the M&A 
activities of acquiring firms listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock 
exchanges and covering the period between 1998 and 2003.  They concluded 
that shareholders of acquiring firms suffered significant losses for up to three 
years following the completion of the M&A transactions.  Hence, based on the 
limited empirical evidence that is available in the literature, it can readily be 
observed that M&A activities in China do not appear to have positively 
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enhancing wealth effects for the shareholders of acquiring firms. 
 6.3 Data Selection 
 
We have previously noted in both chapters 3 and 4 that in all our empirical 
work we use the definition of a takeover given in Article 84(1) of the Measures 
for the Administration of Takeovers of Listed Companies promulgated by the 
China Securities Regulation Committee (CSRC) in 2006.  Article 84(1) 
provides that a takeover is said to have occurred when an acquiring firm 
successfully purchases more than 50% of the equity shares the listed target 
firm has on issue.  Data on Chinese mergers and acquisitions are available 
from the Securities Data Company Mergers and Acquisitions Database [SDC 
(M&A)].  The information summarised on this data base includes the 
announcement date of the given takeover, the date the takeover becomes 
effective, the date the takeover is declared to be unconditional and the terms 
(cash, share exchange, etc.) associated with the takeover.  Over the period 
from 1 January, 1990 until 31 December, 2008 there were 2,448 Chinese 
acquiring firms on the SDC database that satisfied our definition for a 
takeover.  We chose every fifth takeover amongst these 2,448 acquiring firms 
for analysis.  However, not all of these firms had share price data available on 
the Datastream system and this reduced our sample size down to 279 
acquiring firms with A shares on issue, 12 acquiring firms with B shares on 
issue and 27 acquiring firms with H shares on issue.  Due to very small 
sample avialable to us of acquiring firms with B shares and H shares on issue, 
our focus in this chapter will mainly be on the 279 Chinese acquiring firms with 
A shares on issue.   These 279 Chinese acquiring firms cover a wide and 
randomly chosen spectrum of industries.  Table 6.1 provides a summary the 
industrial classifications of the N = 279 acquiring firms as well as a summary 
of the years in which the takeovers occurred.  Thus, for example, for the 
Household Goods and Home Construction classification there were two 
takeovers in 2006, one takeover in 2007 and two takeovers in 2008 - or five 
takeovers in total.  Data for the other industry classifications are to be similarly 
interpreted.  
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Table 6.1 Industrial classifications and Dates of Takeovers for N=279 Chinese Acquiring firms 
INDUSTRY 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 TOTAL
AUTOMOBILES & PARTS 1 2 1 2 2 8
BEVERAGES 1 1 3 2 7
CHEMICALS 1 1 2 3 2 10 19
CONSTRUCTION & MATERIALS 1 1 2 1 3 5 5 18
ELECTRONIC & ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT 1 1 1 1 4 8
ELECTRICITY 2 2 1 1 4 4 14
FINANCIAL SERVICES 1 1 2
FOOD PRODUCERS 2 1 4 2 2 3 14
FORESTRY & PAPER 1 1 2 1 4 9
GENERAL INDUSTRIALS 1 1 1 2 5
GENERAL RETAILERS 1 1 2 1 5
GAS, WATER & MULTIUTILITIES 2 1 3
HOUSEHOLD GOODS & HOME CONSTRUCT 2 1 2 5
INDUSTRIAL ENGINEERING 2 1 4 3 9 19
INDUSTRIAL METALS & MINING 1 4 2 1 3 8 19
INDUSTRIAL TRANSPORTATION 1 1 1 1 4
LIESURE GOODS 1 2 1 3 7
MEDIA 1 1 1 3
MINING 1 1 2 6 10
OIL & GAS PRODUCERS 1 1 1 1 1 5
PERSONAL GOODS 3 2 2 1 2 10
PHARMACEUTICALS & BIOTECHNOLOGY 1 4 1 2 4 7 19
REAL ESTATE INVESTMENT & SERVICES 1 2 2 2 1 10 11 29
SOFTWARE & COMPUTER SERVICES 1 2 3 1 1 8
SUPPORT SERVICES 2 1 1 3 4 11
TECHNOLOGY, HARDWARE & EQUIPMENT 1 1 1 1 2 3 9
TRAVEL & LIESURE 1 2 1 5 9
TOTALS 1 0 1 3 2 4 2 10 21 32 24 28 55 96 279
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6.4 Methodology 
 
We begin our analysis by downloading daily closing share price data (adjusted 
for rights issues and other stock splits) from the Datastream system for the 
279 Chinese acquiring firms with A shares on issue, the 12 acquiring firms 
with B shares on issue and the 27 acquiring firms with H shares on issue. 
Here, it is important to note that B shares are denominated in the U.S or the 
Hong Kong dollar, whilst H shares are denominated in the Hong Kong dollar.  
Given this, the closing daily prices of B and H shares were converted into the 
Chinese Yuan at the exchange rate prevailing at the close of business on the 
relevant date.  We then computed the continuously compounded daily returns 
for the equity securities of all acquiring firms comprising our sample.  
Likewise, closing values for the particular stock exchange index used to 
approximate the return on the market portfolio were also downloaded from the 
Datastream system.  The index used to proxy for the market index was the 
most inclusive index available for the particular stock market and type of share 
being analysed (A share, B share and H shares).  For example, the Shanghai 
Stock Exchange Composite Index was selected as a proxy for the return on 
the market index for A shares traded on the Shanghai Stock Exchange; the 
Shanghai Stock Exchange B Share Price Index was employed as a proxy for 
the return on the market index for B shares listed on the Shanghai Stock 
Exchange; the Shenzhen Stock Exchange Composite Index was employed as 
a proxy for the return on the market index for A shares listed on the Shenzhen 
Stock Exchange; the Shenzhen Stock Exchange B Share Price Index was 
employed as a proxy for the return on the market index for B shares listed on 
the Shenzhen Stock Exchange; the Hong Kong Stock Exchange Composite 
Index was used as a proxy for the return on the market index for H shares.  
Where necessary, the values of these indices were converted into the 
Chinese Yuan at the exchange rate prevailing at the close of business on the 
relevant date.   
 
Having downloaded all the needed data, we estimated the parameters of the 
one-factor market model using the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and the 
Dimson (1979) techniques for each acquiring firm comprising our sample.  All 
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parameters were estimated using the continuously compounded returns from 
207 trading days preceding the announcement of the proposed merger and/or 
acquisition until seven trading days prior to the announcement date; that is, 
the estimation period was (-207, -7) trading days.  It is important to note that 
day zero (0) is defined as the first public announcement date of the proposed 
merger and/or acquisition as downloaded from the SDC (M&A) data base.  
Our event window encompasses six trading days prior to the announcement 
of the merger and/or acquisition until 17 trading days subsequent to the 
announcement date; that is, (-6, +17) trading days.  Next, the abnormal 
returns for the ith firm comprising our sample of Chinese acquiring firms is 
calculated using the actual daily continuously compounded return on the firm’s 
shares less the expected daily continuously compounded return on its shares, 
which is expressed as follows: 
 
eit = Rit - ai - biRmt  
 
where Rit is the actual return on the i
th firm’s equity security during the tth time 
period, Rmt is the actual return on the market during the t
th time period and eit 
is an error term with zero mean.  Moreover, ai = Rf(1 - i) and bi = i are the 
estimates of the constant term and the equity security’s beta.  Here, Rf is the 
risk free rate of return.  The abnormal return, ARit, on the i
th equity security for 
the tth trading day is approximated by eit; that is, ARit = eit.  Similarly, the 
average abnormal return on the tth day across the N acquiring firms in our 
sample will be 
1
N
 
i=1
N
 ARit.  Thus for the N = 279 acquiring firms with A shares 
on issue the average abnormal return during the tth day will be 
1
279
 
i=1
279
 ARit.  
Similarly, the Cumulative Abnormal Return, CARi, for the i
th security on the th 
trading day is obtained by summing the abnormal returns, ARit, for the given 
security up to and including the th trading day of the event window.  Since we 
use an event window comprised of 24 days (that is, from six trading days 
before the announcement date until 17 trading days after the announcement 
Impact of M&A Activities on Acquiring Firms 
 
184 
 
date) this means that the cumulative abnormal return for a given security on 
the th trading day will be computed as CARi = 
t=1

 ARit.  This in turn means 
that the cumulative average abnormal return on the th day across the N 
acquiring firms in our sample will be CAAR = 
1
N
 
t=1

 
i=1
N
 ARit. Thus for the 
N = 279 acquiring firms with A shares on issue the cumulative average 
abnormal return during the announcement date (time zero or the seventh day, 
 = 7, of the event window) will be CAAR7 = 
1
279
 
t=1
7
 
i=1
279
 ARit.  The abnormal 
return and cumulative abnormal return as computed here are used in the 
calculations we make of the Patell (1976) statistics in our subsequent 
empirical analysis of acquiring firms.  Furthermore, the Corrado (1989) and 
Modified Corrado ranking procedures are applied to the abnormal returns and 
cumulative abnormal returns as computed here in the same manner as with 
the target firms treated in chapter 4.   
 
We have previously noted in chapter 4 of this dissertation, however, that the 
Corrado (1989) test lacks power in comparison to the Patell (1976) “t” test 
which is the traditionally used parametric test.  Fortunately, the modified 
Corrado test developed in chapter 4 addresses this problem of the lack of 
power in the original Corrado (1989) test.  We have also demonstrated that 
the modified Corrado test has substantially more power in detecting abnormal 
security returns and simplifies considerably the computational procedures 
behind the original Corrado (1989) test.  This combined with the fact that the 
modified Corrado test makes only minimal assumptions about the distribution 
of the abnormal returns means that our testing procedures will focus mainly 
on the modified Corrado test.   
6.5 Detailed Analysis of the Empirical Results for Chinese Acquiring 
Firms 
 
6.5.1 Analysis of A Shares for Chinese Acquiring Firms  
 
As previously noted in section 6.4 of this chapter, our estimation period 
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commences 207 trading days prior to the announcement of the proposed 
merger and/or acquisition and concludes seven trading days before the 
announcement date; that is, the estimation period is (-207, -7) trading days.  
Our event window starts six trading days prior to the announcement of the 
merger and/or acquisition and finishes 17 trading days after the 
announcement date; that is, the event window is (-6, +17) trading days.  In 
other words, there are 24 trading days comprising our event window.  It will 
also be recalled from section 6.3 of this chapter that our sample is comprised 
of N = 279 Chinese acquiring firms with A shares on issue.  Table 6.2 
provides a summary of the average abnormal returns (AARs) across the 
N = 279 Chinese acquiring firms with A shares on issue over the 24 trading 
days comprising our event window.  It is readily observed from this table that 
relatively small but statistically significant abnormal returns accrue to the 
holders of A shares in Chinese acquiring firms on the day prior to the takeover 
announcement date (that is, time -1).  For example, the average abnormal 
return which accrues to the holders of A shares one day before the takeover 
announcement date is 0.29% based on Dimson (1979) betas and 0.20% 
based on OLS betas.  However, both the significance and magnitude of the 
average abnormal returns hinge on the method used to estimate the 
parameters of the market model (OLS or Dimson) and the testing procedure 
(Patell, Corrdao or modified Corrado) employed to assess the significance of 
the average abnormal returns.  Thus, if one uses the Dimson (1979) 
technique for parameter estimation, then the Corrado (1989) and modified 
Corrado test statistics for the abnormal returns on the day before the takeover 
announcement date (that is, time -1 in Table 6.2) are both statistically 
significant.  Specifically, the Corrado (1989) test statistic is 2.3221 whilst the 
modified Corrado test statistic is higher at 2.4223.  Both of these test statistics 
are significant at the 5% level.  However, when parameter estimation is based 
on OLS, the Corrado test statistic declines to 1.7611.  The modified Corrado 
Test statistic also declines but to the marginally higher level of 1.8535.  Whilst 
both Corrado test statistics are statistically significant under the OLS 
parameter estimation procedure, the level of significance has declined from 
5% under the Dimson (1979) technique to 10% under the OLS technique. 
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Table 6.2: Average Abnormal Returns Across N = 279 Chinese Acquiring Firms with A Shares on issue and Covering the 
Period from 1 January, 1990 until 31 December, 2008 
 Dimson Betas  OLS Betas 
Time 
Relative to 
Announce 
Date (0) 
Average 
Abnormal 
Return 
Patell 
Statistic  
Corrado 
Statistic  
Modified 
Corrado 
Statistic 
Time 
Relative to 
Announce 
Date (0) 
Average 
Abnormal 
Return 
Patell 
Statistic  
Corrado 
Statistic  
Modified 
Corrado 
Statistic  
          
-6 -0.0001 0.2135 -0.2920 0.0025 -6 -0.0015 -0.1328 -0.5127 -0.3741 
-5 0.0016 0.1453 -0.5658 -0.5840 -5 0.0031 1.0236 -0.4818 -0.4993 
-4 0.0033 1.7039* 0.6209 0.6476 -4 0.0031 1.6136 0.6009 0.6357 
-3 0.0027 1.0393 0.9373 0.9849 -3 0.0028 1.0145 1.0514 1.1088 
-2 0.0029 1.2196 0.8324 0.8734 -2 0.0041 1.7108* 1.2674 1.3372 
-1 0.0029 1.0892 2.3221# 2.4223# -1 0.0020 0.7385 1.7611* 1.8535* 
0 0.0006 0.6056 1.3200 1.1378 0 0.0014 0.8516 1.8667* 1.6310 
1 0.0026 0.9736 1.1880 1.2422 1 0.0027 0.6986 1.3097 1.3803 
2 -0.0042 -1.6246 -1.6048 -1.6664* 2 -0.0036 -1.4164 -1.3564 -1.4191 
3 -0.0002 -1.4624 -1.4697 -1.5011 3 0.0006 -1.1875 -1.1545 -1.2074 
4 -0.0022 -1.9709# -2.0297# -2.1061# 4 -0.0013 -1.7983* -1.7497* -1.8319* 
5 -0.0040 -0.6765 -0.4084 -0.4218 5 -0.0043 -0.5462 -0.6520 -0.6803 
6 0.0038 0.8670 1.7959* 1.8805* 6 0.0038 0.6689 1.8061* 1.9011* 
7 -0.0045 -1.5054 -1.8359* -1.9166* 7 -0.0039 -1.3615 -1.7267* -1.8083* 
8 0.0015 0.4193 -0.3542 -0.3660 8 0.0017 0.5670 -0.3055 -0.3158 
9 -0.0018 -1.4105 -0.6280 -0.6631 9 -0.0022 -1.5106 -0.4298 -0.4475 
10 -0.0046 -2.0290# -2.2733# -2.3641# 10 -0.0044 -1.8115* -2.5114# -2.6320$ 
11 0.0011 1.5625 1.2706 1.3253 11 0.0002 0.8272 1.1819 1.2468 
12 -0.0009 0.3540 -0.9382 -0.9702 12 -0.0011 0.4996 -0.7904 -0.8259 
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13 -0.0019 -0.8500 -1.6288 -1.6981* 13 -0.0018 -0.8045 -1.6315 -1.7074* 
14 0.0010 0.2273 -0.6573 -0.6711 14 0.0021 0.5133 -0.6679 -0.6971 
15 0.0015 0.9645 0.0262 0.0294 15 0.0003 0.5444 0.1821 0.1946 
16 0.0005 0.5651 0.5764 0.6133 16 0.0002 0.4480 -0.0269 -0.0229 
17 0.0021 0.9005 0.3494 0.2777 17 0.0010 0.7662 -0.0924 0.0097 
          
 
Note: *refers to the significance at 10% level; # represents the significance at 5% level; $ refers to the significance at 1% level (two 
tailed test) 
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Just as important, however, is the fact that the Patell (1976) test statistic (at 
reasonable level of significance and this applies irrespective of whether 
parameter estimation is based on the OLS or the Dimson (1979) techniques.    
 
It is important to compare the results summarised in Table 6.2 (for Chinese 
acquiring firms) with the equivalent results for our sample of Chinese target 
firms as summarised in Table 4.2 of Chapter 4.  A cursory inspection of Table 
4.2 shows that the Patell (1976) statistic, the Corrado (1989) statistic and the 
modified Corrado test statistic are all statistically significant three days before 
the takeover announcement date (that is, time -3), on the announcement date 
itself (that is, time zero) and the day following the announcement date (that is 
time 1) regardless of which method is employed to estimate beta (Dimson 
(1979) or OLS).  Table 4.2 also shows that the average abnormal returns for 
the shareholders of target firms are around six tenths of one percent three 
days before the takeover announcement date, 1.2% on the announcement 
date itself and 2.8% the day after the announcement date.  These abnormal 
returns are all substantially higher than the returns which accrue to the 
shareholders of acquiring firms around the takeover announcement date – 
which as we have previously noted from Table 6.2, are a miserly three tenths 
of one percent on the day before the takeover announcement date.   
  
The average abnormal returns (AARs) for acquiring firms which are 
summarised in Table 6.2 are given graphical representation in Figure 6.1.  
This graph shows that the AARs for the holders of A shares in the Chinese 
acquiring firms comprising our sample are small and positive (though 
generally insignificant at a statistical level) in the days leading up to the 
takeover announcement date.  Beyond the takeover announcement date, 
however, the AARs are generally small and negative culminating with a 
statistically significant negative abnormal return of just under one half of one 
per cent on the tenth day after the announcement date.  Hence, any 
significant abnormal returns which accrue to the holders of A shares in the 
Chinese acquiring firms comprising our sample decay away in the few trading 
days subsequent to the takeover announcement date, so much so that the 
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Figure 6.1: Average Abnormal Returns Across N = 279 Chinese Acquiring 
Firms with A Shares on issue and Covering the Period from 1 January, 
1990 until 31 December, 2008 
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total of the abnormal returns is close to zero by the end of our event window.  
In summary, whilst our analysis in Chapter 4 shows that there are significant 
economic benefits for those holding A shares in Chinese target firms, our 
analysis here shows that there are almost no economic benefits for those 
holding A shares in Chinese acquiring firms.  
 
We now move our attention to an analysis of the cumulative average 
abnormal returns (CAARs) for the shareholders of Chinese acquiring firms.  
We begin by providing a summary of the CAARs which accrue to the holders 
of A shares in the 279 Chinese acquiring firms comprising our sample.  A 
summary of the CAARs and of their statistical significance is to be found in 
Table 6.3. This table shows that there are significant positive CAARs for the 
holders of A shares in Chinese acquiring firms around the takeover 
announcement date.  In particular, these significant positive CAARs occur on 
the trading day immediately preceding the announcement date (that is, time -
1) and on the first and second trading days subsequent to the announcement 
date (that is, time 1 and time 2, respectively).  Thus, for Dimson (1979) betas 
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Table 6.3: Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns Across N = 279 Chinese Acquiring Firms with A Shares on issue and 
Covering the Period from 1 January, 1990 until 31 December, 2008 
 
 Dimson Betas  OLS Betas 
Time 
Relative to 
Announce 
Date (0) 
Cumulative 
Average 
Abnormal 
Return 
Patell 
Statistic 
Corrado 
Statistic 
Modified 
Corrado 
Statistic 
Time 
Relative to 
Announce 
Date (0) 
Cumulative 
Average 
Abnormal 
Return 
Patell 
Statistic 
Corrado 
Statistic 
Modified 
Corrado 
Statistic 
          
-6 -0.0001 0.2135 -0.2920 0.0025 -6 -0.0015 -0.0254 -0.5127 -0.4236 
-5 0.0015 0.1819 -0.6065 -0.4773 -5 0.0017 0.8541 -0.7032 -0.7669 
-4 0.0049 1.0694 -0.1368 -0.0020 -4 0.0048 1.5256 -0.2273 -0.2902 
-3 0.0075 1.5228 0.3502 0.5758 -3 0.0075 1.9418* 0.3289 0.5158 
-2 0.0104 1.8627* 0.6855 0.8877 -2 0.0116 2.5004# 0.8609 1.0332 
-1 0.0134 2.2598# 1.5738 1.8414* -1 0.0136 2.6168$ 1.5049 1.6708* 
0 0.0140 1.4461 1.9560# 1.2116 0 0.0149 1.9486* 2.0988# 1.3998 
1 0.0166 2.6900$ 2.2496# 2.4877# 1 0.0176 2.9769$ 2.4263# 2.5081# 
2 0.0124 1.6530* 1.5860 1.7593* 2 0.0140 1.9878# 1.8354* 1.8763* 
3 0.0122 1.0777 1.0399 1.1589 3 0.0146 1.4528 1.3761 1.1910 
4 0.0101 0.4368 0.3795 0.4287 4 0.0133 0.8014 0.7845 0.5966 
5 0.0061 0.2423 0.2455 0.2761 5 0.0090 0.6049 0.5629 0.5097 
6 0.0099 0.4324 0.7339 0.8093 6 0.0128 0.7264 1.0417 0.8986 
7 0.0054 0.0781 0.2166 0.2369 7 0.0088 0.3606 0.5424 0.4199 
8 0.0069 0.1693 0.1178 0.1314 8 0.0105 0.4699 0.4451 0.2712 
9 0.0052 -0.1240 -0.0430 -0.0487 9 0.0083 0.1329 0.3235 0.1745 
10 0.0006 -0.4642 -0.5930 -0.6506 10 0.0039 -0.1943 -0.2953 -0.4549 
11 0.0017 -0.2119 -0.2768 -0.3058 11 0.0041 -0.0509 -0.0084 -0.1893 
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12 0.0008 -0.1541 -0.4847 -0.5384 12 0.0030 0.0352 -0.1895 -0.2054 
13 -0.0010 -0.2847 -0.8366 -0.9324 13 0.0013 -0.1023 -0.5495 -0.7878 
14 -0.0001 -0.2559 -0.9599 -1.0732 14 0.0034 -0.0167 -0.6820 -0.8223 
15 0.0014 -0.0855 -0.9323 -1.0445 15 0.0037 0.0825 -0.6275 -0.7386 
16 0.0019 -0.0006 -0.7916 -0.8843 16 0.0039 0.1514 -0.6193 -0.6587 
17 0.0040 0.8483 -0.7036 -0.6604 17 0.0049 1.3665 -0.6251 -0.6772 
          
 
Note: *refers to the significance at 10% level; # represents the significance at 5% level; $ refers to the significance at 1% level (two 
tailed test) 
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the Patell statistic on the first trading day after the takeover announcement 
date amounts to 2.6900 and this is significant at the 1% level.  The Corrado 
(1989) and modfified Corrado statistics are significant at the 5% level at 
2.2496 and 2.4877, respectively.  Nevertheless, these positive CAARs begin a 
process of gradual decay on the third and subsequent trading days following 
the takeover announcement date.  Specifically, we can even see some 
negative CAARs on the thirteenth and fourteenth trading days after the 
takeover announcement date using the Dimson (1979) estimate of beta, 
though they are not statistically significant.  A pictorial description of the 
CAARs for the 279 Chinese acquiring firms with A shares on issue that 
comprise our sample is provided in Figure 6.2.  One can clearly see from the 
this graph that the CAARs for the Chinese acquiring firms reach a statistically 
significant peak of 1.66% on the first trading day following the takeover 
announcement date.  However, these CAARs gradually decay away from the  
 
Figure 6.2: Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns Across N = 279 Chinese 
Acquiring Firms with A Shares on issue and Covering the Period from 1 
January, 1990 until 31 December, 2008 
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third trading day subsequent to the takeover announcement date.  In 
summary, our analysis in this section shows that there are virtually no 
economic benefits from M&A activities for the holders of A shares in Chinese 
acquiring firms.  
 
6.5.2 Is the Sample Size Large Enough? 
 
Our analysis in the previous section is based on a randomly chosen sample of 
N = 279 Chinese acquiring firms with A shares on issue drawn from a 
potential sample of M = 2,448 acquiring firms that were involved in Chinese 
M&A activities which occurred over the period from 1 January, 1990 until 31 
December, 2008.  This raises an important question; namely, if we had based 
our empirical analysis of the A shares on the full sample of M = 2,448 Chinese 
acquiring firms might we have obtained different results from those obtained 
from the smaller sample of N = 279 Chinese acquiring firms employed in our 
empirical analysis?  Here it will be recalled that the CAAR during the th day of 
the event window across the full sample of M = 2,448 Chinese acquiring firms 
amounts to: 
 
CAAR = 
1
M
{
t=1

 
i=1
M-N
 ARit + 
t=1

 
i=1
N
 ARit} 
 
The first term on the right hand side of this expression, 
t=1

 
i=1
M-N
 ARit, is the total 
of the CAARs across the M – N = 2,448 – 279 = 2,169 Chinese acquiring 
firms that were excluded from our empirical analysis.  The second term, 

t=1

 
i=1
N
 ARit, is the total of the CAARs across the N = 279 Chinese acquiring 
firms that were included in our empirical analysis.  Moreover, the probability of 
a negative CAAR across the full sample of M = 2,448 Chinese acquiring firms 
can be represented as:  
 
P[
1
M
{ 
t=1

 
i=1
M-N
 ARit + 
t=1

 
i=1
N
 ARit}  0] = P[
1
M
 
t=1

 
i=1
M-N
 ARit   - 
1
M
 
t=1

 
i=1
N
 ARit] 
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where P(.) is the probability measure for the particular event.  Now from Table 
6.3 the reader will be able to confirm that the CAAR across our sample of 
N = 279 Chinese acquiring firms on the first trading day after the takeover 
announcement date is 
1
279
 
t=1
8
 
i=1
279
 ARit = 0.0166; that is, 1.66%.  It follows from 
this that the typical total CAAR across the N = 279 Chinese acquiring firms 
comprising our sample during this day of the event window is 

t=1

 
i=1
N
 ARit = 
t=1
8
 
i=1
279
 ARit = 2790.0166 = 4.6314 or 463.14%.  From this it also 
follows that 
1
M
 
t=1

 
i=1
N
 ARit = 
1
2448
 
t=1
8
 
i=1
279
 ARit = 
2790.0166
2448
 = 
4.6314
2448
 = 0.0020 
and so, the probability of a negative CAAR across the full sample of M = 2,448 
acquiring firms can be re-stated as:   
 
P[
1
M
 
t=1

 
i=1
M-N
 ARit  - 
1
M
 
t=1

 
i=1
N
 ARit] = P[
1
2448
 
t=1
8 
 
i=1
2169
 ARit  
-1
2448
 
t=1
8
 
i=1
279
 ARit] 
 
or equivalently: 
 
P[
1
2448
 
t=1
8
 
i=1
2169
 ARit ≤ 
-2790.0166
2448
 = 
-4.6314
2448
 = -0.0020] 
 
Now here one can use Cantelli’s Inequality to show that the probability of a 
negative CAAR across this full sample of M = 2,448 Chinese acquiring firms 
can be re-stated as (Savage, 1961, p. 216):   
 
P[
1
M
 
t=1

 
i=1
M-N
 ARit  ] ≤ 
Var(
1
M
 
t=1

 
i=1
M-N
 ARit)
Var(
1
M
 
t=1

 
i=1
M-N
 ARit) + 
2
 
 
where  = 
1
M
 
t=1

 
i=1
N
 ARit = 
-2790.0166
2448
 = 
-4.6314
2448
 = -0.0020 and Var(.) is the 
Impact of M&A Activities on Acquiring Firms 
 
195 
 
variance of the affected variable.  We would emphasise that the above 
inequality does not depend on the probability distribution which generates the 
abnormal returns and as such, provides a non-parametric test of the specific 
hypothesis relating to .  Now, one can evaluate the variance term appearing 
on the right hand side of the Cantelli Inequality given above as follows 
(Freund, 1971, pp. 195-197): 
 
Var(
1
M
 
t=1

 
i=1
M-N
 ARit) = 
1
M2
Var(
t=1

 
i=1
M-N
 ARit) = 
1
M2

i=1
M-N
 Var(
t=1

 ARit) 
 
Moreover, our calculations show that the average variance of the CAAR 
across the N = 279 Chinese acquiring firms comprising our sample is 
Var(
t=1

 ARit)
_________
 = ×Var(ARit)
_______
 = 0.00018×.  It follows from this that as a rough 
approximation we have:  
 

i=1
M-N
 Var(
t=1

 ARit) = (M - N)Var(
t=1

 ARit)
_________
  = (2448 - 279)0.00018× = 0.39×. 
 
We then have that: 
 
Var(
1
M
 
t=1

 
i=1
M-N
 ARit), = 
1
24482

i=1
2169
 Var(
t=1
8
 ARit) = 
0.39×8
24482
 = 0.0000005 
 
One can then use Cantelli’s Inequality in conjunction with the above result and 
the fact that  = -0.0020 to show that a bound for the probability of a negative 
CAAR on the first trading day after the takeover announcement date across 
the full sample of M = 2,448 Chinese acquiring firms will be: 
 
P[
1
2448
 
t=1
8
 
i=1
2169
 ARit ≤ -0.0020] ≤ 
0.0000005
0.0000005 + (-0.0020)2
 = 0.10 
 
This shows that the probability of a negative CAAR on the first trading day 
after the takeover announcement date across the full sample of M = 2,448 
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acquiring firms, conditional on the CAAR on the first trading day after the 
takeover announcement date across the N = 279 Chinese acquiring firms 
employed in our empirical work being 
1
279
 
t=1
8
 
i=1
279
 ARit = 0.0166, will be at most, 
10% (and almost certainly less).  In other words, there is only a small 
probability that if we had based our empirical analysis on the full sample of 
M = 2,448 Chinese acquiring firms involved in takeovers over the period from 
1 January, 1990 until 31 December, 2008 that we would have obtained 
different results from those obtained from the smaller sample of N = 279 
Chinese acquiring firms summarised in the empirical analysis in this chapter 
of the dissertation.  And here we would again emphasise that this conclusion 
does not depend on the probability distribution which generates the abnormal 
returns and as such, constitutes a non-parametric test of the given hypothesis. 
 
6.5.3 Analysis of B Shares for Chinese Acquiring Firms  
 
We have previously noted in chapter four of this dissertation, that the Chinese 
securities market is uniquely different to those in western economies.  In 
particular, the shares which are listed on the two mainland Chinese stock 
exchanges fall into one of two categories.  The first is A shares which we have 
analysed in the previous section of this chapter.  We now turn our attention to 
the second category of shares which is traded on the two mainland Chinese 
stock exchanges; namely, B shares which normally can only be purchased by 
foreign investors (including investors from Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macao).  
The most important and only major difference between A shares and B shares 
is that B shares are usually denominated and traded in either the US or Hong 
Kong dollar, rather than in the Chinese Yuan as is the case with A shares.  
Despite the equal standing of the A and B shares traded on the mainland 
Chinese stock exchanges very little research has been conducted on the 
wealth effects for holders of B shares of Chinese target and acquiring firms 
involved in M&A activities; that is, most empirical work in the M&A area is 
concerned with the wealth effects for holders of A shares in acquiring and 
target firms.  In other words, the impact of M&A activities for the holders of B 
shares is a seriously neglected area of empirical research in China.  Given 
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this, we now provide summary information about the wealth effects of M&A 
activities for the holders of B shares in our sample of Chinese acquiring firms. 
 
There were a total of 12 Chinese acquiring firms in our sample that had B 
shares on issue.  This is consistent with the fact that there are far more firms 
with A shares on issue than there are firms with B shares on issue.  The 
abnormal returns which accrue to the holders of B shares in the 12 acquiring 
firms which make up our sample are summarised in Table 6.4.  This table 
shows that whilst the average abnormal returns for B shares are generally 
positive in the run up to and around the takeover announcement date, apart 
from the sixth trading day before the takeover announcement date they are 
not statistically significant if based on Dimson betas and only weakly 
significant if based on OLS betas. The abnormal returns on B shares follow 
the pattern already observed for A shares in Table 6.2 of the previous section; 
namely, that there are very weakly significant positive abnormal returns in the 
run up to and shortly after the takeover announcement date.  However, 
beyond this date the abnormal returns gradually decay away culminating on 
the tenth trading day following the announcement date where a weakly 
significant and negative abnormal return of around 1.15% accrues to the 
holders of B shares.  A pictorial description of the average abnormal returns 
for the 12 Chinese acquiring firms with B shares on issue is as summarised in 
Figure 6.3. 
 
This graph confirms that the holders of B shares in Chinese acquiring firms do 
not gain economic benefits from takeovers after the takeover announcement 
date.  It is important to note, however, that the highest average abnormal 
return across the twelve acquiring firms with B shares on issue occurs on the 
sixth trading day before the takeover announcement date.  This indicates the 
existence of potential insider trading by foreign investors in China.  However, 
we also have to note that our sample is very small and possibly, not 
representative of the wider Chinese securities market.  One must therefore 
interpret our conclusions with considerable caution.  Nevertheless, to the best 
of our knowledge this is the first study to have been conducted on the wealth 
effects of M&A activities for the holders of B shares in Chinese acquiring  
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Table 6.4: Average Abnormal Returns Across N = 12 Chinese Acquiring Firms with B Shares on issue and Covering the 
Period from 1 January, 1990 until 31 December, 2008 
 
 Dimson Betas  OLS Betas 
Time 
Relative to 
Announce 
Date (0) 
Average 
 Abnormal 
Return 
Patell 
Statistic  
Corrado 
Statistic  
Modified 
Corrado 
Statistic 
Time 
Relative to 
Announce 
Date (0) 
Average 
Abnormal 
Return 
Patell 
Statistic  
Corrado 
Statistic  
Modified 
Corrado 
Statistic  
          
-6 0.0272 1.8858* 1.9474* 2.1980# -6 0.0217 1.5522 1.5594 1.4380 
-5 0.0005 0.4886 0.6491 0.6539 -5 -0.0013 0.2740 0.5331 0.5378 
-4 0.0036 0.7976 0.9826 0.9910 -4 0.0024 0.7371 1.2351 1.2455 
-3 -0.0035 -0.0071 -0.8981 -0.9004 -3 -0.0002 0.1764 -0.7597 -0.7618 
-2 -0.0030 -0.0675 -0.3868 -0.3879 -2 -0.0043 -0.2103 -0.5331 -0.5353 
-1 0.0073 1.3403 1.2938 1.3027 -1 0.0075 1.5063 1.3728 1.3831 
0 0.0070 1.1176 1.4915 1.4368 0 0.0091 1.4377 1.7521* 1.6885* 
1 0.0043 0.1763 0.4090 0.4143 1 0.0041 0.1824 0.5109 0.5170 
2 0.0057 0.7903 0.1289 0.1303 2 0.0077 0.9480 0.1910 0.1928 
3 -0.0161 -1.3018 -0.9248 -0.9253 3 -0.0166 -1.3599 -1.0440 -1.0460 
4 0.0056 0.8956 0.2401 0.2431 4 0.0068 0.9728 0.6042 0.6098 
5 0.0036 0.9790 0.5780 0.5834 5 0.0030 0.8094 0.4398 0.4451 
6 0.0025 0.9549 0.7870 0.7917 6 0.0014 0.7618 0.7108 0.7158 
7 -0.0011 -0.5144 -0.7470 -0.7472 7 -0.0017 -0.5918 -0.9596 -0.9616 
8 0.0109 0.8492 0.9115 0.9181 8 0.0082 0.5699 0.4976 0.5029 
9 -0.0055 0.0811 0.4357 0.4409 9 -0.0031 0.2741 0.5154 0.5211 
10 -0.0113 -1.6327 -1.8585* -1.8649* 10 -0.0120 -1.7394* -1.9326* -1.9410* 
11 -0.0022 -1.0432 -0.7559 -0.7584 11 -0.0034 -1.2743 -1.2528 -1.2584 
12 -0.0041 0.1199 0.4891 0.4953 12 -0.0052 -0.0832 0.3332 0.3390 
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13 -0.0114 -1.5970 -1.1427 -1.1446 13 -0.0111 -1.6294 -1.2262 -1.2293 
14 0.0027 0.1991 -0.0578 -0.0562 14 0.0033 0.3402 0.1866 0.1892 
15 -0.0074 -1.2319 -1.1516 -1.1558 15 -0.0092 -1.5126 -1.4839 -1.4905 
16 0.0098 1.1363 1.3561 1.3641 16 0.0107 1.1994 1.3461 1.3551 
17 0.0006 0.4165 0.3735 0.2652 17 0.0002 0.2656 0.2488 0.1768 
 
Note: *refers to the significance at 10% level; # represents the significance at 5% level; $ refers to the significance at 1% level (two 
tailed test) 
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Figure 6.3: Average Abnormal Returns Across N = 12 Chinese Acquiring 
Firms with B Shares on issue and Covering the Period from 1 January, 
1990 until 31 December, 2008 
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firms.   It shows that the gains for the holders of B shares in Chinese acquiring 
firms are marginal at best. 
 
We now focus our attention on the cumulative average abnormal returns 
(CAARs) during the event window for Chinese acquiring firms with B shares 
on issue.  As usual, we begin by summarising the main empirical results 
relating to the CAARs for our sample of Chinese acquiring firms with B shares 
on issue in Table 6.5.  One can readily observe from this table that there are 
some significantly positive CAARs for Chinese acquiring firms with B shares 
on issue on the first and second trading day following the takeover 
announcement date.  However, after the second trading day following the 
takeover announcement date the positive CAARs tend to decay away very 
slowly as the event window progresses, though the CAARs remain positive 
over the entire event window.  Moreover, the CAARs are statistically 
significant on the fourth through to the ninth trading day after the takeover 
announcement date.  Importantly, we can see some significantly positive  
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Table 6.5: Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns Across N = 12 Chinese Acquiring Firms with B Shares on issue and 
Covering the Period from 1 January, 1990 until 31 December, 2008 
 
 Dimson Betas  OLS Betas 
Time 
Relative to 
Announce 
Date (0) 
Cumulative 
Average 
 Abnormal 
Return 
Patell 
Statistic  
Corrado 
Statistic  
Modified 
Corrado 
Statistic 
Time 
Relative to 
Announce 
Date (0) 
Cumulative 
Average 
 Abnormal 
Return 
Patell 
Statistic  
Corrado 
Statistic  
Modified 
Corrado 
Statistic  
          
-6 0.0272 1.8858* 1.9474* 2.1980# -6 0.0217 1.5522 1.5594 1.4380 
-5 0.0277 2.0786# 1.8361* 1.7906* -5 0.0204 1.6555* 1.4796 1.2619 
-4 0.0313 2.6991$ 2.0664# 2.0980# -4 0.0228 2.0196# 1.9212* 1.7999* 
-3 0.0278 1.4386 1.3405 1.3035 -3 0.0227 1.2227 1.2839 1.1336 
-2 0.0248 1.1835 1.0260 0.9638 -2 0.0183 0.9599 0.9100 0.7404 
-1 0.0321 1.2653 1.4648 1.4429 -1 0.0258 1.1380 1.3911 1.2772 
0 0.0391 1.1082 1.9199* 1.6007 0 0.0349 1.0649 1.9502* 1.4799 
1 0.0434 1.6362 1.9405* 1.9099* 1 0.0390 1.6240 2.0048# 1.8981* 
2 0.0491 2.0310# 1.8725* 1.8614* 2 0.0466 2.0508# 1.9539* 1.8691* 
3 0.0331 1.6158 1.4840 1.4700 3 0.0301 1.4524 1.5234 1.4373 
4 0.0386 1.7419* 1.4873 1.4636 4 0.0369 1.6738* 1.6347 1.5499 
5 0.0422 1.8852* 1.5908 1.5755 5 0.0399 1.7966* 1.6921* 1.6161 
6 0.0447 1.9609* 1.7467* 1.7502* 6 0.0413 1.8492* 1.8229* 1.7682* 
7 0.0437 1.8745* 1.4835 1.4716 7 0.0396 1.7266* 1.5001 1.4299 
8 0.0546 2.1545# 1.6686* 1.6756* 8 0.0478 1.8300* 1.5777 1.5239 
9 0.0491 1.8399* 1.7245* 1.7374* 9 0.0447 1.6827* 1.6564* 1.6105 
10 0.0378 1.5468 1.2223 1.2163 10 0.0327 1.3624 1.1383 1.0727 
11 0.0356 1.4682 1.0097 0.9963 11 0.0294 1.2316 0.8109 0.7334 
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12 0.0315 1.3688 1.0949 1.0913 12 0.0242 1.1142 0.8657 0.7963 
13 0.0201 1.0123 0.8117 0.7993 13 0.0131 0.8004 0.5696 0.4905 
14 0.0228 1.0659 0.7795 0.7711 14 0.0164 0.8570 0.5966 0.5259 
15 0.0154 0.8558 0.5161 0.4923 15 0.0072 0.6153 0.2665 0.1767 
16 0.0253 1.0320 0.7875 0.7825 16 0.0179 0.7997 0.5413 0.4708 
17 0.0258 1.7377 0.8472 0.4381 17 0.0181 2.2441# 0.5807 0.6324 
 
Note: *refers to the significance at 10% level; # represents the significance at 5% level; $ refers to the significance at 1% level (two 
tailed test) 
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CAARs at least four or five trading days before the announcement date.  As 
we have previously noted this indicates the possible existence of insider 
trading in Chinese takeovers on the part of foreign investors who hold B 
shares in Chinese acquiring firms.    
 
Figure 6.4 provides a pictorial representation of the CAARs over the event 
window for the B shares comprising our sample.  Note how this graph 
confirms that the CAARs tend to decay away very slowly as the event window 
progresses though, as we have previously noted, the CAARs remain positive 
over the entire event window.  However, we again note that since we have 
only a small sample of twelve acquiring firms with B shares on issue, the 
results reported in this section may not be representative of the CAARs for all 
Chinese acquiring firms with B shares on issue. 
 
Figure 6.4: Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns Across N = 12 Chinese 
Acquiring Firms with B Shares on issue and Covering the Period from 1 
January, 1990 until 31 December, 2008 
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6.5.4 Analysis of H Shares for Chinese Acquiring Firms  
 
In addition to the two mainland Chinese stock exchanges (namely, the 
Shanghai Stock Exchange and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange), the Hong 
Kong Stock Exchange is another important stock exchange in China.  Shares 
which are listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange are called “H” shares.  As 
we have mentioned in section 6.5.1 of this chapter, H shares are equivalent to 
A shares with the exception that H shares are denominated and traded in the 
Hong Kong dollar rather than in the Chinese Yuan.  Moreover, an increasing 
number of mergers and acquisitions (M&A) involve H shares due to the fact 
that a growing number of mainland Chinese firms have chosen to list their 
shares on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange.  Thus, M&A activities involving H 
shares are of increasing importance in China and ought not be ignored in 
empirical research.  Unfortunately, little empirical work has been conducted in 
China regarding the wealth effects of takeovers for the holders of H shares in 
acquiring firms.  We seek to fill this gap in the Chinese M&A literature by 
providing summary information about the wealth effects of M&A activities for 
the holders of H shares in our sample of acquiring firms. 
 
There were a total of 27 Chinese acquiring firms in our sample with H shares 
on issue.  The average abnormal returns (AARs) which accrue to the holders 
of H shares in the 27 Chinese acquiring firms comprising our sample are 
summarised in Table 6.6.  This table shows that the abnormal returns which 
accrue to the holders of H shares in Chinese acquiring firms are 
predominantly negative before the takeover announcement date.  In 
particular, the AAR on the third trading day preceding the takeover 
announcement date is significantly negative, regardless of whether the 
Dimson (1979) or OLS technique is employed to estimate the abnormal 
returns.  However, on and after the takeover announcement date the 
abnormal returns are generally positive until one approaches the end of the 
event window.  In particular, the AAR the day after the takeover 
announcement date (that is, time 1 in the Table 6.6) is a relatively large 1.39% 
or 1.63% (depending on whether one uses the Dimson (1979) or OLS betas).  
However, none of the positive AARs beyond the announcement date are 
significantly different from zero in a statistical sense.  Moreover, these positive  
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Table 6.6: Average Abnormal Returns Across N = 27 Chinese Acquiring Firms with H Shares on issue and Covering the 
Period from 1 January, 1990 until 31 December, 2008 
 
 Dimson Betas  OLS Betas 
Time 
Relative to 
Announce 
Date (0) 
Average 
Abnormal 
Return 
Patell 
Statistic  
Corrado 
Statistic  
Modified 
Corrado 
Statistic 
Time 
Relative to 
Announce 
Date (0) 
Average 
Abnormal 
Return 
Patell 
Statistic  
Corrado 
Statistic  
Modified 
Corrado 
Statistic  
          
-6 0.0051 0.4085 0.7261 0.0525 -6 0.0046 0.1439 0.7234 -0.0968 
-5 -0.0160 -1.9346* -1.4323 -1.6100 -5 -0.0148 -2.0332# -1.4719 -1.6633* 
-4 0.0233 1.4751 1.8370* 2.0718# -4 0.0210 1.4270 1.5910 1.7773* 
-3 -0.0119 -2.1504# -1.9058* -2.1397# -3 -0.0109 -2.2857# -1.9031* -2.1426# 
-2 -0.0042 -0.7333 -0.5568 -0.6235 -2 -0.0053 -0.8838 -0.5991 -0.6743 
-1 -0.0005 -0.0456 -0.2314 -0.2588 -1 -0.0017 -0.2542 -0.3716 -0.3899 
0 0.0067 0.6609 -0.0854 -0.0856 0 0.0030 0.3906 -0.2965 -0.3227 
1 0.0139 1.3288 0.8583 0.9690 1 0.0163 1.5217 1.0011 1.1116 
2 0.0006 0.1336 0.6890 0.7769 2 -0.0016 -0.0802 0.4748 0.5314 
3 0.0082 0.6442 0.5594 0.6339 3 0.0090 0.8426 0.4351 0.5535 
4 0.0015 0.6408 0.4166 0.4746 4 0.0004 0.5294 0.2182 0.2514 
5 -0.0063 -0.9066 -0.6308 -0.7091 5 -0.0074 -1.1630 -0.8239 -0.9327 
6 0.0070 1.0863 0.9430 1.0642 6 0.0068 1.1621 0.8927 1.0312 
7 0.0043 0.2396 0.9033 1.0176 7 0.0043 0.0531 0.9905 1.1010 
8 -0.0002 0.2103 -0.4695 -0.5275 8 0.0006 0.2661 -0.4351 -0.4742 
9 -0.0018 -0.0566 -0.0040 -0.0015 9 -0.0021 -0.2260 -0.1812 -0.2020 
10 0.0014 0.6261 0.8186 0.9235 10 0.0026 0.6961 0.7975 0.9005 
11 0.0108 1.2330 1.0144 1.1444 11 0.0086 1.0949 0.8795 0.9874 
12 0.0013 -0.3125 -0.0463 -0.0489 12 -0.0014 -0.6947 -0.1812 -0.1988 
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13 -0.0016 -0.7037 -0.4087 -0.4581 13 -0.0034 -0.8072 -0.5594 -0.6276 
14 -0.0074 -1.5791 -0.6361 -0.7120 14 -0.0077 -1.4876 -0.8266 -0.9245 
15 0.0073 1.2791 1.3159 1.4856 15 0.0059 0.9888 0.7340 0.8347 
16 -0.0082 -2.0065# -2.1465# -2.4143# 16 -0.0099 -2.5711$ -2.2707# -2.5608$ 
17 -0.0164 -2.0556# -2.8704$ -2.2411# 17 -0.0123 -1.4359 -3.0186$ -2.3569# 
 
Note: *refers to the significance at 10% level; # represents the significance at 5% level; $ refers to the significance at 1% level (two 
tailed test) 
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AARs gradually decay away in the last few days of the event window so much 
so, that towards the end of the event window some of the AARs are 
significantly negative in a statistical sense.  From this it follows that the gains 
that accrue to the holders of H shares in Chinese acquiring firms are marginal 
at best.  One can confirm this from Figure 6.5 which provides a pictorial 
representation of the AARs for the 27 Chinese acquiring firms with H shares 
on issue that comprises our sample.  Note how Figure 6.5 shows that the 
insignificant but positive AARs which accrue to the holders of H shares 
immediately after the takeover announcement date tend to decay away quite 
drastically towards the end of the event window. 1   
 
Figure 6.5:  Average Abnormal Returns Across N = 27 Chinese Acquiring 
Firms with H Shares on Issue and Covering the Period from 1 January, 
1990 until 31 December, 2008 
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1
 Note also that it is difficult to make any direct comparisons between the AARs for Chinese 
acquiring firms with H shares on issue and Chinese target firms with H shares on issue, given 
that the empirical analysis of Chinese target firms summarised in section 5.5.2 of chapter 5 is 
based on only 4 firms. 
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However, we must emphasise that our sample of N = 27 Chinese acquiring 
firms with H shares on issue is relatively small and possibly, not 
representative of the wider Chinese securities market.  One must therefore 
interpret our conclusions with caution.   
 
We now turn our attention to the analysis of the cumulative average abnormal 
returns (CAARs) which accrue to the holders of H shares in Chinese acquiring 
firms.  A summary of the main empirical results relating to the CAARs of 
Chinese acquiring firms with H shares on issue is summarised in Table 6.7. 
This table shows that most of the CAARs before the takeover announcement 
date are negative, although they are not significantly so in a statistical sense.  
However, from the takeover announcement date and beyond the CAARs are 
positive, although again not significantly so.  The CAARs continue to increase 
until around the fifteenth day after the takeover announcement date at which 
point they decay sharply away.  This confirms the conclusion reached as a 
result of our analysis of the AARs for H shares; that any gains that accrue to 
the holders of H shares in Chinese acquiring firms are marginal at best.  
Figure 6.6 gives a pictorial representation of the CAARs for the Chinese 
acquiring firms with H shares on issue that comprises our sample. Note how 
this Figure confirms that the CAARs of Chinese acquiring firms with H shares 
on issue generally tend to increase in the first couple of days after the 
takeover announcement date, even though they are insignificantly different 
from zero.  The CAARs then grow continuously until around the fifteenth day 
after the takeover announcement date at which point they decay sharply 
away.  Obviously, the 27 Chinese acquiring firms on which our analysis is 
based represent a very small sample.  Hence, even though we gain some 
insights into the impact of takeovers for the holders of H shares in Chinese 
acquiring firms, the sample is too small for us to reach definitive conclusions 
about the Chinese takeover market as a whole.     
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Table 6.7: Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns Across N = 27 Chinese Acquiring Firms with H Shares on Issue and 
Covering the Period from 1 January, 1990 until 31 December, 2008 
 
 Dimson Betas  OLS Betas 
Time 
Relative to 
Announce 
Date (0) 
Cumulative 
Average 
Abnormal 
Return 
Patell 
Statistic  
Corrado 
Statistic  
Modified 
Corrado 
Statistic 
Time 
Relative to 
Announce 
Date (0) 
Cumulative 
Average 
Abnormal 
Return 
Patell 
Statistic  
Corrado 
Statistic  
Modified 
Corrado 
Statistic  
          
-6 0.0051 0.4085 0.7261 0.0525 -6 0.0046 0.1439 0.7234 -0.0968 
-5 -0.0108 -1.2093 -0.4994 -1.1557 -5 -0.0103 -1.3443 -0.5293 -1.2768 
-4 0.0124 0.6776 0.6528 0.2374 -4 0.0107 0.4833 0.4864 -0.0308 
-3 0.0005 0.0730 -0.3875 -0.8920 -3 -0.0002 -0.0751 -0.5303 -1.1223 
-2 -0.0037 -0.1279 -0.5956 -1.0658 -2 -0.0055 -0.3324 -0.7423 -1.2976 
-1 -0.0042 -0.1244 -0.6382 -1.0959 -1 -0.0073 -0.3460 -0.8293 -1.3627 
0 0.0025 0.1730 -0.6231 -0.9155 0 -0.0042 -0.1554 -0.8799 -1.2917 
1 0.0165 0.6915 -0.2794 -0.6176 1 0.0121 0.4575 -0.4691 -0.8726 
2 0.0171 0.7912 -0.0338 -0.3023 2 0.0105 0.4711 -0.2840 -0.6296 
3 0.0253 1.0186 0.1449 -0.0911 3 0.0195 0.8232 -0.1318 -0.4314 
4 0.0267 1.1732 0.2638 0.0687 4 0.0199 0.9572 -0.0599 -0.3274 
5 0.0205 0.9718 0.0704 -0.1369 5 0.0125 0.7094 -0.2952 -0.5852 
6 0.0274 1.2015 0.3292 0.1796 6 0.0193 0.9630 -0.0360 -0.2614 
7 0.0317 1.2169 0.5586 0.4567 7 0.0236 0.9188 0.2300 0.0551 
8 0.0315 1.2315 0.4185 0.2988 8 0.0242 0.9414 0.1099 -0.0766 
9 0.0297 1.0947 0.4042 0.2932 9 0.0220 0.8004 0.0611 -0.1231 
10 0.0310 1.2109 0.5907 0.5195 10 0.0247 0.9198 0.2527 0.1090 
11 0.0418 1.6083 0.8131 0.7912 11 0.0333 1.2350 0.4529 0.3528 
12 0.0431 1.5637 0.7808 0.7638 12 0.0318 1.1431 0.3992 0.2998 
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13 0.0415 1.4090 0.6697 0.6390 13 0.0284 0.9635 0.2640 0.1462 
14 0.0341 1.0452 0.5147 0.4599 14 0.0207 0.6134 0.0773 -0.0709 
15 0.0414 1.1426 0.7834 0.7884 15 0.0266 0.7237 0.2320 0.1218 
16 0.0332 0.8778 0.3186 0.2373 16 0.0167 0.4294 -0.2466 -0.4483 
17 0.0168 -0.7051 -0.2740 -0.48332 17 0.0044 -0.7807 -0.8576 -0.6885 
 
Note: *refers to the significance at 10% level; # represents the significance at 5% level; $ refers to the significance at 1% level (two 
tailed test) 
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Figure 6.6:  Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns Across N = 27 Chinese 
Acquiring Takeover Companies with H Shares Covering the Period from 1 
January, 1990 until 31 December, 2008 
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6.6 Analysis of the Possible Reasons for Empirical Results obtained for 
Chinese Acquiring Firms 
 
The empirical analysis summarised in this chapter shows that the holders of A 
shares, B shares and H shares in Chinese acquiring firms do not obtain 
significant economic benefits from their M&A activities.  Here, it is important to 
note, however, that whilst there are generally significant positive abnormal 
returns for the shareholders of Chinese acquiring firms around the takeover 
announcement date, subsequent abnormal returns are generally negative so 
much so that by the end of the event window (that is, seventeen trading days 
beyond the takeover announcement date) the accumulated average abnormal 
returns (CAARs) are insignificantly different from zero.  Whilst there are slight 
variations in the time series patterns of the abnormal returns according to 
whether one is dealing with A shares, B shares or H shares, yet the overall 
conclusion from our empirical analysis is the same irrespective of share type; 
and this is that the shareholders of Chinese acquiring firms do not obtain 
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significant economic benefits from their M&A activities.   
 
Martynova and Renneboog (2008, pp. 2159-2163) show that shareholders of 
western acquiring firms have also obtained virtually no economic benefits from 
their M&A activities.  Yet there are two important differences between the 
results obtained for Chinese acquiring firms as against western acquiring 
firms.  The first is that Chinese acquiring firms tend to earn statistically 
significant positive abnormal returns around the takeover announcement date.  
This is in contrast with the result for western acquiring firms where Martynova 
and Renneboog (2008, pp. 2159) report that “on average, bidder shareholders 
realize announcement abnormal returns which are statistically 
indistinguishable from zero.”  Moreover, a second difference arises out of the 
fact that the abnormal returns earned by western acquiring firms continue to 
be indistinguishable from zero in the period after the takeover announcement 
date (Martynova and Renneboog, 2008).  In contrast our empirical analysis 
shows that Chinese acquiring firms tend to have a run of negative abnormal 
returns after the takeover announcement date; so much so that the CAAR for 
A shares (see Table 6.3) becomes statistically indistinguishable from zero 
within three weeks of the first public announcement of the proposed takeover.  
In summary, whilst shareholders of western and Chinese acquiring firms 
appear to obtain virtually no economic benefits from M&A activities, there are 
nonetheless some significant differences between the results obtained by 
Chinese and western researchers in the M&A area.  
 
It is important that we identify the underlying reasons for the significant 
differences which appear to exist between the wealth effects of Chinese and 
western M&A activities for acquiring firms.  In order to do this, some possible 
explanations will be provided in the rest of this section by linking our empirical 
results with the Chinese political, economic and capital systems which are 
fundamentally different from those of western economies.   
 
6.6.1 Inefficiency Resulting from State-Owned Shares in Chinese 
Listed Firms 
 
As we have noted in chapter three most listed firms in China are controlled by 
the Chinese government through the mechanism of so called “state-owned 
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shares”.  State-owned shares normally constitute a majority of the shares on 
issue for most firms in China and so, a firm which wishes to make a 
successful takeover offer for a listed Chinese target firm can only do so if it 
has the approval of the Chinese government through the participation and 
support of the local government authorities where the listed target firm is 
located.  This in turn means that it is the Chinese government and/or local 
Chinese government authorities rather than market forces that determine the 
course of most Chinese M&A activities.  The restrictions placed on the 
operation of market forces by the Chinese government will necessarily mean 
that there are economic inefficiencies in Chinese M&A activities.  Moreover, it 
is a common phenomenon for the Chinese government to mandate particular 
takeover activities in order to facilitate the rehabilitation of target firms which 
are heading for bankruptcy or other financial difficulties.  In such 
circumstances there are few, if any economic benefits, for the acquiring firm 
but often, substantial economic benefits for the target firm.  This provides a 
possible explanation as to why the CAARs for acquiring firms exhibited in 
Figure 6.2 (A shares), Figure 6.4 (B shares) and Figure 6.6 (H shares) tend to 
be insignificantly different from zero towards the end of the given event 
windows.  The uncertainty surrounding the motives behind a given takeover 
(that is, government mandated or otherwise) might be the cause of the spike 
in the CAARs at the time the takeover is first announced but once it becomes 
clear that the Chinese government is the driving force behind a particular 
takeover then the market will not expect any significant economic benefits for 
the acquiring firm and the CAARs of the acquiring firm will decay away and 
possibly, even become negative.    
 
6.6.2 Undue Influence of Large Non-Tradable Shareholders in 
Acquiring Firms  
 
 We noted in section 3.3.6. of chapter three dealing with the tender offer rules 
of the Takeover Measures, 2006 that when an acquiring firm makes a 
takeover offer for a listed target firm two offer prices must be set for the 
shares of the listed target firm.  One offer price must be set for the tradable 
shares and another offer price must be set for the non-tradable shares in the 
listed target firm.  The offer price for the tradable shares of the listed target 
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firm is determined by reference to the market price of those shares on the 
stock exchange whilst the offer price for the non-tradable shares is based on 
the net asset (book) value of the target firm as summarised in its latest set of 
audited financial statements.  We have previously noted in section 3.3.6 of 
chapter 3 that non-tradable shares account for a majority of the shares on 
issue by most listed firms and that most of these non-tradable shares tend to 
be held by the Chinese government, its instrumentalities and other large 
Chinese firms and financial institutions.  The holders of these non-tradable 
shares have only one way of influencing the values of their shares; and this is 
by pushing up their net asset (book) values since as we have previously 
noted, under the takeover Measures, 2006 the offer price which a potential 
acquiring firm can tender for these shares is based on their net asset (book) 
values.  Given this, it is often the case that Chinese takeovers are motivated 
by the interests of the majority non-tradable shareholders of acquiring firms 
who are seeking to increase the net asset value of their non-tradable shares 
and hence of their potential value in the takeover process.  This, in turn, will 
mean that a significant proportion of the M&A activities which occur in China 
are not based on economic considerations and therefore, cannot be expected 
to lead to positive wealth effects for the acquiring firms’ tradable shareholders 
as depicted in Figures 6.2, (A shares), Figure 6.4 (B shares) and Figure 6.6 (H 
shares) – all of which show that the holders of tradable shares in Chinese 
acquiring firms do not earn significant economic benefits from the M&A 
activities of the acquiring firms in which they own their tradable shares. 
 
6.6.3 Balance Sheet Window Dressing Hypothesis  
 
In section 2.5 of chapter 2 we note that balance sheet window dressing can 
often be a motivation for the M&A activities of acquiring firms.  Balance sheet 
window dressing involves the deceptive practice of manipulating the figures 
appearing on a firm’s balance sheet in order to present the firm’s financial 
position in a better (or, sometimes worse) light than it really is.  Wu and Zhang 
(2009, pp. 9-10) note that the China Securities Regulatory Commission 
(CSRC) must approve all new share issues that are made by Chinese listed 
firms.  They also note (p. 10) that the CSRC pays particular attention to the 
return on equity (ROE) as computed from the firm’s balance sheet and profit 
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and loss account in deciding whether to give approval for the new share issue 
to go ahead.  Loss making firms wishing to make a new share issue in order 
to “shore up” their deteriorating financial position are likely to have a poor 
history of ROE statistics and it is unlikely that such firms will gain the approval 
of the CSRC for any new share issues.  Such firms therefore have incentives 
to manipulate the figures appearing on their balance sheets and in their profit 
and loss accounts in order to present more favourable ROE statistics.  M&A 
activities are of potential importance to such firms in the window dressing of 
their ROE calculations.  If, for example, an acquiring firm uses its own shares 
as consideration for a takeover, and the par value of the shares it issues is 
less than their market value, then the acquiring firm can boost its ROE by 
recording the issue of the new shares at par (rather than their market) value.  
As an example, consider an acquiring firm, X, whose equity has a book value 
of 50 Yuan.  The par value of a single share in X is one yuan; however, the 
market value of its equity is 10 Yuan per share.  X earns one Yuan in profit 
each year.  Hence, X has an ROE of 
1
50
 = 2%.  Now, X makes a successful 
takeover bid for Y by issuing two new shares with a market value of 210 = 20 
Yuan.  Y has earnings of 2 Yuan per year.  X records the issue of the new 
shares at their par value in its accounting records and so after the successful 
takeover bid X’s ROE is boosted to 
1 + 2
50 + 2
  5.8%.  So X has been able to use 
a creative accounting (that is, a window dressing) procedure to increase its 
ROE and hence, also increase the probability that a government 
instrumentality like the CSRC will approve an application from X for a new 
share issue.  However, whilst window-dressing procedures like this may boost 
a firm’s ROE there is no guarantee that they will result in economic benefits 
for the shareholders of the acquiring firm.  Hence, the CSRC’s fascination with 
the ROE as an important criterion for determining whether or not it will 
approve an application for a new share issue could also lead to inefficiencies 
in M&A activities in China.   We should emphasise here that there are several 
other examples one could give of how the CSRC’s fixation on the ROE as a 
measure of performance could lead to inefficiencies in Chinese M&A activities 
(for example, the de-listing of firms with a persistent history of losses). 
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6.7 Possible Determinants of Short-Term Wealth Effects 
 
We have previously noted (as in section 4.5 of chapter 4) that a question 
which often arises in the M&A literature is what determines the magnitude of 
the wealth effects accruing to the shareholders of Chinese acquiring firms.  
We again seek to address this question by following the methodological 
procedures laid down in the paper by Goergen and Renneboog (2004).  In 
particular, we regress the CAARs that accrue on the A shares of Chinese 
acquiring firms over the period comprising two trading days before the 
takeover announcement date and one trading day after the takeover 
announcement date (that is [-1, 2]), as well as the period comprising six 
trading days before the takeover announcement date and one trading day 
after the takeover announcement date (that is [-6, 2]), against a number of 
potential determining variables.  These determining variables are comprised 
of the ratio of the acquiring firm’s cash reserves to its market capitalisation 
(Cash/Mark), the market to book ratio for the equity of the acquiring firm 
(Mark/Book), the accounting rate of return (that is, the return on equity) for the 
acquiring firm (ROE), the ratio of interest paid to the accounting profit made by 
the acquiring firm (Int Cover) and finally, a dummy variable which takes a 
value of one if the takeover consideration is purely in cash and zero if the 
takeover consideration is other than purely in cash (Consid) (Goergen and 
Renneboog, 2004).  All accounting data was downloaded from Datastream for 
the affected acquiring firms and is the latest accounting information available 
given the date on which the takeover offer was first announced.  For example, 
if the takeover offer was announced on 1 June, 2005 and the firm’s latest 
financial statement (balance sheet) date was 31 December, 2004 then the 
accounting information on which the regressions are based will be that 
contained in the financial statements for the year ended 31 December, 2004.  
Unfortunately, for 104 of the 279 firms comprising our sample of Chinese 
acquiring firms the information for all five independent variables were not 
available on Datastream.  This in turn means that our regression procedures 
are based on a sample of 175 (rather than 279) Chinese acquiring firms.  
Summary statistics relating to the 175 acquiring firms on which the empirical 
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analysis of this section is based are given in Table 6.8.  Thus from the first 
row and sixth column of the table, the consideration for 84% of the N = 175  
 
Table 6.8 
SUMMARY STATISTICS OF CAAR DETERMINING VARIABLES FOR 
N = 175 CHINESE ACQUIRING FIRMS COVERING THE PERIOD FROM 1 
JANUARY, 1990 UNTIL 31 DECEMBER, 2008 
 
 
Cash/Mark Mark/Book ROE Int Cover Consid 
      AVERAGE 0.1062 10.0990 7.33 30.47 0.8400 
MEDIAN 0.0597 5.6532 8.97 4.28 
 STDEV 0.2162 13.5500 22.07 200.21 
 MAXIMUM 2.2214 110.0400 61.64 2490.20 
 MINIMUM 0.0007 0.3255 -200.70 -88.68 
  
takeovers comprising our sample was purely in cash.  Moreover, from column 
four the average accounting rate of return across the N = 175 acquiring firms 
comprising our sample was 7.33% (per annum).  The standard deviation of 
the accounting rate of return across these N = 175 firms was 22.07%.  The 
other figures appearing in this table are to be similarly interpreted. 2 
 
The precise form of the regression equation is as follows: 
 
CAAR
j
 = a
0
 + a
1
CASH/MARK
j
 + a
2
MARK/BOOK
j
 + a
3
ROE
j
 + a
4
INTCOVER
j
 + a
5
CONSID
j
 + e
j
 
 
where j = 1, 2, 3, ___, 175 is the sample of acquiring firms comprising our 
sample, the ak, for k = 1, 2,___,5 are the regression coefficients associated 
with the independent variables and ej is the stochastic error term.  The results 
of the above regression are summarised in Table 6.9.  Since there are no 
                                            
2
 The average market capitalisation (that is, the market value of equity) on the takeover 
announcement date across the N = 175 Chinese acquiring firms comprising this table 
amounts to RMB (Yuan) 18,026,005. The median market capitalisation amounts to RMB 
(Yuan) 4,749,023. The standard deviation of the market capitalisation across these N = 175 
firms amounts to RMB (Yuan) 61,644,891. The largest (maximum) market capitalisation 
across these N = 175 firms amounts to RMB (Yuan) 566,668,647.  The smallest (minimum) 
market capitalisation amounts to RMB (Yuan) 64,325. 
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significant differences in the results obtained from using the OLS or Dimson 
(1979) betas, we report only the results relating to the OLS betas.  The 
regression results based on the OLS betas are summarised in Table 6.9.  
 
Table 6.9 
DETERMINANTS OF SHORT TERM WEALTH EFFECTS FOR N = 175 
CHINESE ACQUIRING FIRMS COVERING THE PERIOD FROM 1 
JANUARY, 1990 UNTIL 31 DECEMBER, 2008 
 
     
 CAAR[-1,2] CAAR[-6,2] 
Independent Variables coeff t value coeff 
 
t value 
     
Intercept (a0) 0.0211 1.3551 0.0137 0.7105 
Cash to Market Capital (a1) -0.0657 -2.5234 0.0167 0.5195 
Market to Book Ratio (a2) -0.0002 -0.4208 -0.0001 -0.1555 
Return on Equity (a3) -0.0003 -1.0922 -0.0001 -0.4027 
Interest Coverage (a4) 0.0000 -0.4794 0.0000 0.7526 
Consideration (a5) -0.0118 -0.7694 -0.0072 -0.3805 
     
     
Note how the above table shows that the coefficient (a1) associated with the 
ratio of cash reserves to the market capitalisation of acquiring firms has a 
significant negative t value over the event window (-1, 2).  This suggests that 
the more cash reserves Chinese acquiring firms have, the higher will be the 
premiums they tend to pay for the target firms that they are seeking to 
acquire.  However, since the regression coefficient associated with the ratio of 
cash reserves to the market capitalisation over the event window (-6, 2) is not 
significant at conventional levels, the association between the CAARs and the 
cash reserves to the market capitalisation ratio is at best, weak.  Moreover, 
Table 6.9 shows that all three of the remaining traditional variables employed 
in our empirical analysis do not have a significant association with the CAARs 
earned by Chinese acquiring firms.    
 
Here we should note, however, that results reported in subsequent sections of 
this dissertation using a more refined and sophisticated testing procedure 
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show that some of the affected independent variables summarised in Table  
6.9 do in fact appear to have a significant impact on the magnitude of the 
CAARs earned by Chinese acquiring firms.  For example, in chapter 8 we 
show that there are some highly significant differences between the CAARs 
earned by Chinese acquiring firms when cash is the sole mode of 
consideration and the CAARs earned by Chinese acquiring firms when the 
consideration is other than purely in cash.  This contrasts with the regression 
results summarised in Table 6.9 which are generally compatible with the 
hypothesis that the mode of consideration has no influence on the magnitude 
of the CAARs earned by Chinese acquiring firms. However, we defer a more 
detailed consideration of the fundamental determinants of the magnitude of 
the CAARs for acquiring firms to later chapters of this dissertation – and in 
particular, chapter 8.  
6.8 Summary and Conclusions 
 
This chapter provides a detailed analysis of the wealth effects that M&A 
activities have for the shareholders of Chinese acquiring firms.  We begin the 
chapter by explaining how the data on which our empirical analysis of Chinese 
M&A activities was selected.  We then outline and discuss the methodology 
used to calculate the abnormal returns which arise on the Chinese acquiring 
firms comprising our sample as well as the statistical methodology used to 
assess the significance of these abnormal returns.  We assess the 
significance of the abnormal returns obtained for our sample of Chinese 
acquiring firms by using the Patell (1976) “t” test, the Corrado (1989) rank test 
and my modification of the Corrado (1989) rank test.  The empirical analysis 
of Chinese acquiring firms summarised in the current chapter confirms 
previous results (as in chapter 4 for target firms) that the modified Corrado 
test provides a much more robust statistic for detecting the significance of 
abnormal returns than both the Patell (1976) “t” test and the original Corrado 
(1989) test.  
 
We then move on to provide a detailed analysis of the empirical results 
obtained on the wealth effects that Chinese M&A activities have for the 
holders of A shares, B shares and H shares in Chinese acquiring firms, 
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respectively.  Our empirical results show that the shareholders of Chinese 
acquiring firms obtain no significant economic benefits from their M&A 
activities.  In this respect our results for Chinese acquiring firms are very 
similar to those obtained by researchers for western acquiring firms, although 
there are some important differences between the empirical results for 
Chinese as against western acquiring firms.  In particular, there appear to be 
statistically significant abnormal returns for the shareholders of Chinese 
acquiring firms around the first public announcement of the takeover but these 
generally decay away over the next ten to fifteen trading days thereby leaving 
the shareholders of the Chinese acquiring firms with no significant economic 
benefits from their M&A activities.  We provide some possible explanations for 
this phenomenon by linking our empirical results with the Chinese political, 
economic and capital systems which are fundamentally different from those of 
western economies.   
 
In this chapter, we also seek to identify the determinants of the CAARs which 
accrue to the shareholders of Chinese acquiring firms.  Our results show that 
the ratio of the acquiring firm’s cash reserves to its market capitalisation has a 
significantly negative association with the CAARs earned over the event 
window (-1,2).  However, the other four independent variables (the market to 
book ratio for the equity, the accounting rate of return (that is, the return on 
equity), the ratio of interest paid to the accounting profit made by the acquiring 
firm and finally, a dummy variable which takes the value one if the takeover 
consideration is purely in cash and zero if the takeover consideration is other 
than purely in cash) do not seem to influence the magnitude of the premium 
paid to Chinese target firms.  However, we do find that the consideration 
employed by Chinese acquiring firms in financing takeovers does have the 
right (negative) sign, even though the t value is not statistically significant. 3 
                                            
3
  As noted in footnote 16 of chapter 4 (page 152) I checked whether there were any major 
financial news stories affecting acquiring firms around the relevant takeover announcement 
date (e.g, a significant increase in the dividend rate paid by the firm).  Under the conventional 
definitions of a confounding event (Huang and Walking, 1987, p. 337) I uncovered only one or 
two instances where there might have been a confounding event but eliminating these 
acquiring firms from my empirical analysis had an imperceptible effect on the empirical results 
reported in this chapter.  Hence, there is no reason to believe that the abnormal returns on 
which my empirical analysis is based have been affected in any significant way by a 
confounding events problem.   
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
 
THE ANALYSIS OF ABNORMAL RETURNS EARNED 
BY CHINESE TARGET FIRMS: CASH VERSUS OTHER 
MODES OF CONSIDERATION 
 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
Once a bidding (acquiring) firm has decided to make a takeover offer for a 
target firm it must then make a decision about the way in which it will finance 
the proposed takeover; that is, should the consideration the acquiring firm 
offers to the shareholders of the target firm be in cash, the shares of the 
acquiring firm, convertible bonds issued by the acquiring firm, warrants issued 
by the acquiring firm, the transfer of some of the acquiring firm’s assets to the 
shareholders of the target firm, the repayment of some of the target firm’s debt 
by the acquiring firm, or some combination thereof.  The importance of this 
issue stems from the fact that prior research shows that the mode of 
consideration used in a takeover can have a significant impact on the 
abnormal returns which accrue to the shareholders of both the acquiring and 
target firms (Huang and Walking, 1987; Ge and Ping, 2009).  This explains 
why acquiring firms will often devote considerable resources towards 
choosing the mode of consideration they will use for a proposed takeover.   
 
In China, the tradition has always been for takeovers to be financed 
exclusively through cash.  However, in 2005 the Chinese Government 
implemented the Shareholding Structure Reform (Guquan Fenzhi Gaige) 
which facilitated and encouraged M&A activities where the consideration is in 
the shares of the acquiring firm.   Whilst the Shareholding Structure Reforms 
have resulted in an increase in M&A activities where the mode of 
consideration is in the shares of the acquiring firm, it is nonetheless still the 
case that cash predominates as the mode of consideration for the large 
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majority of takeovers which are consummated on the mainland of China 
(Wang, 2003).   This contrasts with the wide variety of modes of consideration 
that are used in addition to cash for the takeovers which occur in western 
economies (Huang and Walking, 1987; Lane and Yang, 1983). 
 
An important consideration here is that the research conducted on the wealth 
effects of the mode of consideration in takeovers in China is relatively 
unsophisticated as compared to the equivalent research which has been 
conducted in western economies.  In particular, Chinese research generally 
focuses on theoretical comparisons of the impact that different modes of 
consideration can have on firms involved in M&A activities.  Indeed, in China 
very little empirical work of any substance has been conducted in this area.   
Because of this, there is an urgent need for a thorough empirical study which 
deals with the impact that the mode of consideration can have on the 
shareholders of firms involved in Chinese M&A activities.  Given this, the 
principal brief of this chapter is to conduct a more refined empirical study than 
has previously been the case, of the wealth effects which the mode of 
consideration used in takeovers has on the shareholders of Chinese target 
firms.  The next chapter examines how the mode of consideration shapes the 
abnormal returns which accrue to the shareholders of Chinese acquiring firms. 
 
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows: section 7.2 provides a 
brief summary of the prior literature regarding the impact that the mode of 
consideration can have on target firms in both western and Chinese 
economies.  Section 7.3 summarises how the data used in our empirical 
analysis is selected.  Next, section 7.4 provides an analysis of the average 
abnormal returns (AARs) that arise over the event window when cash is used 
as the sole mode of consideration as against the AARs which arise when 
alternative modes of consideration are used (e.g. the shares of the acquiring 
firm, convertible bonds issued by the acquiring firm, warrants issued by the 
acquiring firm, the transfer of some of the acquiring firm’s assets to the 
shareholders of the target firm, the repayment of some of the target firm’s debt 
by the acquiring firm, or some combination thereof).  Our analysis of the AARs 
is applied in terms of the Patell (1976) “t” statistic, the original Corrado (1989) 
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statistic and also, the modified Corrado statistic as developed in Chapter 4 of 
this dissertation.   Our particular interest, however, is with the differences 
which arise in these statistics for Chinese target firms where the takeover 
consideration is solely in cash as against Chinese target firms where 
alternative modes of consideration have been used in the takeover.  In section 
7.5 our primary focus is on the analysis of the cumulative average abnormal 
returns (CAARs) for Chinese target firms where the takeover consideration is 
solely in cash as against the CAARs of target firms where alternative modes 
of consideration have been used in the takeovers.  Again, our analysis is 
based on a comparison of the Patell (1976) “t” statistics, the Corrado (1989) 
statistics and the modified Corrado statistics which arise for the CAARs of 
Chinese target firms where the takeover consideration is solely in cash as 
against the Chinese target firms where alternative modes of consideration 
have been employed.  Section 7.6 links the empirical results we obtain as 
summarised in sections 7.4 and 7.5 to the prior Chinese literature in the area 
as reviewed in section 2.6 (of chapter 2) of this dissertation.  Finally, section 
7.7 provides a brief summary of this chapter and makes a few concluding 
remarks about the economic impact that the mode of consideration used in 
takeovers can have on the shareholders of Chinese target firms. 
7.2 A Brief Summary of the Prior Literature  
 
It will be recalled from chapter two, which summarises the more important 
literature dealing with mergers and acquisition (M&A) activities that, in western 
countries a great deal of research has been conducted on the impact that the 
mode of consideration (cash as against stock) can have on the economic 
benefits which accrue to the shareholders of both target and acquiring firms.  
Importantly, the conclusion reached from most of the research conducted in 
this area is quite consistent; and this is that the abnormal returns for target 
firms where cash is used as the sole mode of consideration are significantly 
larger than the abnormal returns where modes of consideration other than 
purely cash are used (stocks in particular).  For example, using standard 
market model and regression methodologies, Huang and Walking (1987) 
conclude that the abnormal returns for U.S. target firms associated with cash 
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offers are significantly higher than those associated with stock offers.  They 
argue that, when cash is used as the sole mode of consideration, 
shareholders of target firms tend to demand much higher takeover premiums 
because of the capital gains tax that will have to be paid immediately and 
which would not have to be paid if the acquiring firm had used its own stock 
as the mode of consideration.  
 
Furthermore, using a similar market model methodology to Huang and 
Walking (1987), Wansley, Lane and Yang (1983) find that shareholders of the 
U.S. target firms in their sample where cash is the sole mode of consideration 
earn abnormal returns of 33.54% on average in the forty days prior to the 
takeover announcement date.  This figure is almost twice the corresponding 
figure, 17.47%, for takeovers that employ stock as the sole mode of 
consideration.  Importantly, Wansley, Lane and Yang (1983) attribute the 
difference in the abnormal returns between cash and stock acquisitions to tax 
differences and regulatory requirements that favour cash as the mode of 
consideration.  As noted in chapter two of this dissertation, the literature in this 
area is voluminous but the results of the studies by Huang and Walking (1987) 
and Wansley, Lane and Yang (1983) summarised here are typical of the 
results obtained by western researchers in this area.  We refer the reader to 
chapter two of this dissertation for a more exhaustive summary of the relevant 
literature in this area. 
 
In contrast to the western literature in this area, most of the research 
conducted in China focuses primarily on the circumstances under which 
various modes of consideration are employed in takeovers and the 
advantages and disadvantages of using different ways of payment for specific 
kinds of takeovers.  In other words, relatively little work has been carried out in 
China which compares the economic benefits that accrue to the shareholders 
of target firms from using different modes of consideration (e.g. cash, the 
shares of the acquiring firm, convertible bonds issued by the acquiring firm, 
warrants issued by the acquiring firm, the transfer of some of the acquiring 
firm’s assets to the shareholders of the target firm, the repayment of some of 
the target firm’s debt by the acquiring firm, or some combination thereof) in 
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Chinese M&A activities.  Moreover, such work as has been conducted in this 
area by Chinese researchers often comes to conclusions that are different 
and inconsistent with the results obtained by researchers in western 
economies.  A good example is provided by Ge and Ping (2009) who examine 
the impact which the Chinese shareholding structure reforms (Guquan Fenzhi 
Gaige) have had on the mode of consideration used in Chinese M&A 
activities.  Ge and Ping (2009) find that less than half of the target firms 
included in their sample where cash was used as the sole mode of 
consideration improved their performance after the consummation of the 
takeover.  In contrast, more than half of the target firms included in their 
sample where modes of consideration other than cash were used improved 
their performance after the consummation of the takeover.  This is 
diametrically opposed to the typical conclusion reached by western 
researchers (Huang and Walking, 1987; Lane and Yang, 1983) which is that 
the abnormal returns for target firms where cash is used as the sole mode of 
consideration are significantly larger than the abnormal returns for target firms 
where the mode of consideration is other than purely in cash.  We have 
previously noted in section 2.8 (of chapter 2) of this dissertation, however, that 
the empirical research conducted on Chinese M&A activities is notoriously 
unreliable.  For example, the few empirical studies conducted on Chinese 
M&A activities are generally based on the discrete calculation of returns (the 
price “today” less the price “yesterday” divided by the price “yesterday”) rather 
than the continuously compounded (or logarithmic) return.  The inappropriate 
calculation of the periodic returns on a given target firm will in turn induce 
biases in the calculation of the abnormal returns which accrue to the 
shareholders of the firm.1  Hence, given the unreliable nature of the 
methodology employed in the prior Chinese research in this area and the 
inconsistency of the conclusions it reaches in comparison to the “equivalent” 
research conducted in western economies, there is an urgent need for a 
properly conducted methodological study of the impact that using different 
modes of consideration in M&A activities can have on the abnormal returns 
                                            
1
 See chapter one of the book by Davidson and Tippett (2012) for further details of the 
problems which can arise from the averaging of discrete returns.  
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which accrue to the shareholders of Chinese target firms.  Our particular brief 
is to examine whether using cash as the sole mode of consideration as 
against modes of consideration other than purely in cash leads to larger 
abnormal returns for the shareholders of Chinese target firms.  
7.3 Data Selection 
 
It will be recalled that we use the definition of a takeover laid down in Chapter 
3 of this dissertation; namely, that under Article 84(1) of the Measures for the 
Administration of Takeovers of Listed Companies promulgated by the China 
Securities Regulation Committee in 2006, a takeover is said to have occurred 
when an acquiring firm successfully purchases more than 50% of the equity 
shares the listed target firm has on issue.  Over the period from 1 January, 
1990 until 31 December, 2008 there were 198 Chinese target firms that 
satisfied our definition for a takeover in the Securities Data Company Mergers 
and Acquisitions [SDC (M&A)] Database.  However, not all of these firms had 
their share price data available on the Datastream system and this reduced 
our final sample down to 82 Chinese target firms.  We then divide our final 
sample of 82 target firms into two categories in terms of the mode of 
consideration employed for the takeover.   
 
The first category is comprised of 44 Chinese target firms where cash is the 
sole mode of consideration.  Of these, 38 target firms are listed on one of the 
two (Shanghai and Shenzhen) Chinese mainland stock exchanges whilst the 
remaining six Chinese target firms have their shares listed on foreign stock 
exchanges.  We conduct our empirical analysis with and without the inclusion 
of these six Chinese target firms that were listed on foreign stock exchanges.  
There are no significant differences between the results we obtain from 
including these six Chinese target firms listed on foreign stock exchanges and 
the results we obtain from excluding them from our empirical analysis.  The 
second category involves those Chinese target firms where the mode of 
consideration for the takeover is other than purely in cash.  These alternative 
modes of consideration include the shares of the acquiring firm, convertible 
bonds issued by the acquiring firm, warrants issued by the acquiring firm, the 
transfer of some of the acquiring firm’s assets to the shareholders of the target 
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firm, the repayment of some of the target firm’s debt by the acquiring firm, or 
some combination thereof.  There are 39 target firms in this second category, 
including 23 target firms where the mode of consideration for the takeover is 
not explicitly specified on the SDC (M&A) data base.  Again, we conduct our 
empirical analysis with and without the inclusion of these 23 Chinese target 
firms for which the mode of consideration is not explicitly given.   However, we 
now find that there are significant differences in the results based on the entire 
sample of 39 Chinese firms and the sample of 16 firms which excludes the 23 
target firms which do not explicitly specify the exact mode of consideration.   
Given this, only the results based on the 16 Chinese target firms where the 
alternative modes of consideration are explicitly specified on the SDC (M&A) 
database are summarised in this chapter. 
 
Now, it will be recalled that our principal brief in this chapter is to examine 
whether using cash as the sole mode of consideration in takeovers as against 
alternative modes of consideration, leads to larger abnormal returns for the 
shareholders of Chinese target firms.  Given this, we tested whether the 
differences in the average abnormal returns (AAR) and the differences in the 
cumulative average abnormal returns (CAAR) across the two categories of 
firms (solely cash as against alternative modes of consideration) during the 
event window which commenced six trading days prior to the first 
announcement date of the proposed takeover and concluded seventeen 
trading days subsequent to the announcement date - that is, (-6, +17) trading 
days - are significantly different in a statistical sense.  Further details on how 
the AARs and CAARs were calculated are to be found in section 4.2 (of 
chapter 4) of this dissertation.  Our analysis shows that both the AARs and the 
CAARs around the takeover announcement date are significantly larger for 
target firms where the mode of consideration is solely in cash when compared 
to target firms where the consideration is other than purely in cash.  Our 
testing procedures are based on the Patell (1976) “t” statistics, the Corrado 
(1989) statistics and the modified Corrado statistics for the AARs and CAARs 
obtained across the 44 Chinese target firms where cash was the sole mode of 
consideration and 16 Chinese target firms where modes of consideration 
other than purely cash are used.  We would emphasise here that our 
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conclusions apply irrespective of whether the AARs and CAARs are estimated 
using Dimson (1979) or OLS betas. 
7.4 Average Abnormal Returns for Cash as against Alternative Modes of 
Consideration for Chinese Target Firms  
 
We begin our analysis by dividing our sample of 82 Chinese target firms into 
three categories.  The first category is comprised of the N = 44 Chinese target 
firms where cash is the sole mode of consideration.  Here we would 
emphasise that six of these 44 target firms were not listed on the two 
mainland Chinese stock exchanges; that is, they were not listed on either the 
Shanghai Stock Exchange or the Shenzhen Stock Exchange.  Three of these 
firms were listed on the Frankfurt Stock Exchange, two were listed on the 
NASDAQ and one was listed on the Singapore Stock Exchange. There were 
no significant differences between the results we obtain from including these 
six Chinese target firms listed on foreign stock exchanges and the results we 
obtain from excluding them from our empirical analysis.  The second category 
of firms is comprised of the M = 16 firms where alternative modes of 
consideration are used for the takeovers.  These alternative modes of 
consideration include the stock of the acquiring firm, where the acquiring firm 
exchanges some of their assets for a controlling interest in the target firm, 
where the acquiring firm repays debt of the target firm, etc. or a mixture of 
them.  Finally, there is a third category of 22 firms where the mode of 
consideration is not explicitly given on the SDC (M&A) database.  Because of 
the uncertainty associated with the mode of consideration for these firms they 
were excluded from all subsequent empirical analysis.  
 
The abnormal returns and the accumulated abnormal returns for the first two 
categories of target firms (cash as against alternative modes of consideration) 
were then determined over the event window (-6, +17) trading days; that is, 
six trading days before the first announcement of the proposed takeover up 
until seventeen trading days after the takeover announcement date.  We refer 
the reader to section 4.2 of this dissertation for a more detailed treatment of 
the way the AARs and CAARs were computed.  We then employ the Patell 
(1976) “t” test, the Corrado (1989) test and the modified Corrado test 
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respectively to determine the significance of the abnormal returns for our 
sample of N = 43 Chinese target firms where cash is used as the sole mode of 
consideration for the takeover.  We also determine the Patell (1976), Corrado 
(1989) test and modified Corrado test statistics for the M = 16 target firms 
where the mode of consideration is other than purely in cash.  
 
7.4.1 Average Abnormal Returns and Patell (1976) “t” Statistics 
 
A summary of the average abnormal returns (AARs) over the event window 
using O.L.S betas and their associated Patell (1976) “t” scores is provided in 
Table 7.1(a).  Table 7.1(b) contains the AARs and their associated Patell 
(1976) “t” scores using Dimson (1979) betas.  Further details on how the 
Patell (1976) “t” scores were calculated are to be found in section 4.3 of 
chapter 4 of this dissertation.  The reader will see that there is very little 
difference between the information summarised in both these tables.  Given 
this, we confine our attention to the data for OLS betas as summarised in 
Table 7.1(a).  Thus, the second column of Table 7.1(a) shows that based on 
OLS estimates of beta the AAR across the N = 44 firms where the mode of 
consideration is solely in cash varies from a high of 3.42% on the third trading 
day after the takeover announcement day (time period three) to a low of -
1.20% eight and twelve trading days after the takeover announcement day.  In 
contrast, the third column of Table 7.1(a) shows that the AAR across the 
M =16 firms where the mode of consideration is other than purely in cash 
varies from a high of 6.87% on the first trading day after the takeover 
announcement date (time period one) to a low of -2.33% seventeen trading 
days after the takeover announcement date.   Further details of the abnormal 
returns over the event window for cash as against alternative modes of 
consideration are to be found in Figure 7.1(a) for OLS betas and Figure 7.1(b) 
for Dimson (1979) betas.  Note how both these graphs show that when cash 
is used as the sole mode of consideration the AARs around the takeover 
announcement date are predominantly positive.  Against this, when modes of 
consideration other than cash are used, the AARs are primarily negative even 
though there is a “spike” in the AAR on the first trading day following the 
takeover announcement date.   
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Table 7.1 (a):  Average Abnormal Returns and Associated Patell (1976) 
Statistics Based on OLS Betas for Chinese Target Firms over the Period 
from 1 January, 1990 until 31 December, 2008  for Cash (N = 44) as against 
Alternative (M = 16) Modes of Consideration  
 
Time 
Relative to  
Announce 
Date (0) 
Average 
Abnormal 
Return  
Cash 
Average  
Abnormal 
Return  
Alternatives 
Patell  
“t” Score  
Cash  
Patell  
“t” Score  
Alternatives 
 
Z Score  
Cash vs  
Alternatives 
      
-6 0.0088 -0.0073 1.4684 -2.1170# 2.5353$ 
-5 -0.0009 0.0015 -0.2026 -0.0047 -0.1399 
-4 0.0058 0.0073 -0.4340 1.0478 -1.0478 
-3 0.0027 0.0148 1.7068* 1.0941 0.4333 
-2 0.0039 -0.0213 0.4497 -1.2526 1.2037 
-1 -0.0077 -0.0042 1.3100 -0.3716 1.1891 
0 0.0123 -0.0069 1.0146 -1.5134 1.7876* 
1 0.0251 0.0687 2.7854$ 0.9383 1.3061 
2 0.0098 -0.0166 2.1134# -1.3741 2.4660$ 
3 0.0342 -0.0124 1.6232 -1.3221 2.0826# 
4 0.0126 -0.0204 0.9821 -1.7265* 1.9153* 
5 0.0176 0.0029 0.3422 0.0263 0.2234 
6 0.0014 -0.0098 0.3677 -0.9816 0.9541 
7 0.0105 -0.0048 0.0649 -0.6659 0.5168 
8 -0.0120 -0.0145 -2.3961# -1.6874* -0.5011 
9 0.0018 -0.0016 1.0359 -0.5290 1.1065 
10 -0.0107 0.0005 -0.2307 -0.2215 -0.0065 
11 -0.0043 0.0079 -1.3285 0.5698 -1.3423 
12 -0.0120 -0.0044 -1.7871 0.1397 -1.3625 
13 -0.0046 0.0164 -0.4079 0.6029 -0.7148 
14 -0.0036 -0.0013 -0.1982 0.3159 -0.3635 
15 0.0014 0.0029 -0.1697 0.8124 -0.6944 
16 -0.0026 -0.0115 -1.0210 -1.2806 0.1836 
17 0.0040 -0.0233 -1.4380 -2.2029# 0.5408 
      
 
* significant at 10%; # significant at 5%; $ significant at 1% (two tailed test) 
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Table 7.1 (b):  Average Abnormal Returns and Associated Patell (1976) 
Statistics Based on Dimson (1979) Betas for Chinese Target Firms over the 
Period from 1 January, 1990 until 31 December, 2008  for Cash (N = 44) as 
against Alternative (M = 16) Modes of Consideration  
 
Time 
Relative to  
Announce 
Date (0) 
Average 
Abnormal 
Return  
Cash 
Average  
Abnormal 
Return  
Alternatives 
Patell  
“t” Score  
Cash  
Patell  
“t” Score  
Alternatives 
 
Z Score  
Cash vs  
Alternatives 
      
-6 0.0079 -0.0070 1.3772 -2.0019# 2.3894# 
-5 -0.0006 0.0010 -0.0813 -0.3054 0.1584 
-4 0.0062 0.0071 -0.5409 1.1408 -1.1891 
-3 0.0023 0.0142 1.6409 0.9940 0.4575 
-2 0.0041 -0.0225 0.4551 -1.3616 1.2846 
-1 -0.0094 -0.0037 1.1869 -0.2761 1.0345 
0 0.0125 -0.0069 1.0083 -1.5448 1.8053* 
1 0.0253 0.0686 2.9011$ 0.9432 1.3844 
2 0.0086 -0.0170 2.0876# -1.4726 2.5174$ 
3 0.0354 -0.0098 1.6503* -1.1888 2.0075# 
4 0.0125 -0.0220 0.9715 -1.8352* 1.9846* 
5 0.0175 0.0022 0.3674 -0.0506 0.2955 
6 0.0033 -0.0093 0.4061 -0.9951 0.9908 
7 0.0105 -0.0073 0.0453 -0.8955 0.6653 
8 -0.0102 -0.0120 -2.3287# -1.5387 -0.5586 
9 0.0020 -0.0009 1.1363 -0.4652 1.1324 
10 -0.0109 0.0017 -0.0567 -0.1940 0.0971 
11 -0.0042 0.0085 -1.2634 0.5503 -1.2825 
12 -0.0118 -0.0051 -1.6783* 0.1374 -1.2839 
13 -0.0020 0.0161 -0.4277 0.5826 -0.7144 
14 -0.0064 -0.0020 -0.2276 0.3147 -0.3835 
15 -0.0012 0.0029 -0.3485 0.8254 -0.8301 
16 -0.0019 -0.0111 -1.1022 -1.2028 0.0712 
17 0.0048 -0.0238 -1.3037 -2.1122# 0.5717 
      
 
* significant at 10%; # significant at 5%; $ significant at 1% (two tailed test) 
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Figure 7.1 (a):  Average Abnormal Returns Based on OLS Betas for 
Chinese Target Firms over the Period from 1 January, 1990 until 31 
December, 2008 for Cash (N = 44) as against Alternative (M = 16) Modes of 
Consideration 
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Figure 7.1 (b):  Average Abnormal Returns Based on Dimson (1979) Betas 
for Chinese Target Firms over the Period from 1 January, 1990 until 31 
December, 2008 for Cash (N = 44) as against Alternative (M = 16) Modes of 
Consideration  
-0.04
-0.02
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
-6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16
EVENT WINDOW DAY
A
V
E
R
A
G
E
 A
B
N
O
R
M
A
L
 
R
E
T
U
R
N
AR CASH
AR NON-CASH
 
Target Firms: Mode of Consideration 
 
 
 
233 
 
The fourth column of Table 7.1(a) summarises the Patell (1976) “t” scores 
associated with the AARs of Chinese target firms where cash is the sole mode 
of consideration.  This shows that when cash is used as the sole mode of 
consideration, the abnormal returns are positive and the Patell (1979) “t” 
scores statistically significant on the first [Patell (1976) “t” statistic, 2.7854] and 
second [Patell (1976) “t” statistic, 2.1134] trading days following the 
announcement date.  After this and up until the seventh trading day after the 
takeover announcement date the AARs are positive although not statistically 
different from zero.  However, beyond this point the AARs are generally 
negative and occasionally significantly so as on the eighth trading day where 
the Patell (1979) “t” statistic is a statistically significant -2.3961.  Hence, from 
the third trading day after the takeover announcement date shareholders of 
Chinese target firms obtain no significant economic benefits (and probably 
marginal losses) when cash is used as the sole mode of consideration for the 
takeover.  
 
The fifth column of Table 7.1(a) summarises the Patell (1976) “t” scores 
associated with the AARs of Chinese target firms where the mode of 
consideration is other than purely in cash.  This shows that there is a 
significantly negative AAR on the sixth trading day prior to the takeover 
announcement date [Patell (1976) “t” statistic, -2.1170].  This may suggest 
that the market has a negative perception of M&A activities when the 
consideration is other than purely in cash.  This interpretation of our results is 
supported by the fact that the AARs on the fourth [Patell (1976) “t” statistic, -
1.7265] and eighth [Patell (1976) “t” statistic, -1.6874] trading days after the 
takeover announcement date are both negative and marginally significant 
whilst the AAR on the seventeenth trading day after the announcement date is 
both negative and highly significant [Patell (1976) “t” statistic, -2.2029].  Thus, 
the predominance of insignificant AARs over the event window suggests that 
the shareholders of Chinese target firms obtain no economic benefits from 
M&A activities when the consideration is other than purely in cash.  Indeed, 
our empirical evidence suggests that the shareholders of the affected target 
firms bear economic losses by the end of the event window as a result of their 
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M&A activities.   
Our analysis to date indicates that the AARs for the shareholders of Chinese 
target firms will on average be larger when the mode of consideration is solely 
in cash as against when the consideration is other than purely in cash.  We 
now use the Patell (1976) “t” statistics associated with the AARs over the 
event window for the Chinese target firms comprising our sample to formally 
test this hypothesis. Thus let z
c
it be the Patell (1976) “t” statistic corresponding 
to the abnormal return for the ith firm on the tth day of the event window when 
the takeover consideration is solely in cash.  It then follows that z
c
it
__
 = 
1
N
 
i=1
N
 z
c
it 
will be the average Patell (1976) “t” statistic for the AARs across the N = 44 
firms during the tth day of the event window when the takeover consideration 
is solely in cash.  Moreover, sˆ2(z
c
it) = 
1
N
 
i=1
N
 (z
c
it - z
c
it
__
)2 will be the variance of the 
Patell (1976) “t” statistics for the tth day of the event window when the 
takeover consideration is solely in cash.  Finally, 
z
c
it
__
N
sˆ(z
c
it)
 will be asymptotically 
distributed as a standard normal variate as N   (Fisz, 1963, p. 197).     
 
One can also define z
o
it to be the Patell (1976) “t” statistic corresponding to the 
abnormal return for the ith firm on the tth day of the event window where the 
takeover consideration is other than purely in cash.  It then follows that 
z
o
it
__
 = 
1
M
 
i=1
M
 z
o
it will be the average Patell (1976) “t” statistic across the M = 16 
firms during the tth day of the event window where the takeover consideration 
is other than purely in cash.  Moreover, sˆ2(z
o
it) = 
1
M
 
i=1
M
 (z
o
it - z
o
it
__
)2 will be the 
variance of the Patell (1976) “t” statistics for the tth day of the event window 
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where the takeover consideration is other than purely in cash.  Finally, 
z
o
it
__
M
sˆ(z
o
it)
 
will be asymptotically distributed as a standard normal variate as M   (Fisz, 
1963, p. 197).       
 
Now, one can test the hypothesis that the mean Patell (1976) “t” statistic, z
c
it
__
, 
for takeovers where the consideration is solely in cash is identical to the mean 
Patell (1976) “t” statistic, z
o
it
__
, for takeovers where the consideration is other 
than purely in cash by using the statistic: 
 
z
co
t
__
 = 
1
2
{
z
c
it
__
N
sˆ(z
c
it)
 - 
z
o
it
__
M
sˆ(z
o
it)
} 
 
This statistic is asymptotically distributed as a standard normal variate (Fisz, 
1963, p. 197).  Moreover, testing the hypothesis that z
co
t
__
 is insignificantly 
different from zero is equivalent to testing the hypothesis that the mean 
abnormal return on the tth day of the event window for Chinese target firms 
where the consideration is solely in cash is the same as the mean abnormal 
return on the tth day of the event window for Chinese target firms where the 
consideration is other than purely in cash. 
The sixth column of Table 7.1(a) summarises the z
co
t
__
 statistics for each 
trading day, t = -6, -5, -4,____, 15, 16, 17, of the event window.   We 
emphasise again that the z
co
t
__
 statistic is distributed as a standard normal 
variate (Fisz, 1963, p. 197).  The sixth column of Table 7.1(a) shows that the 
z
co
-6
__
 = 2.5353 statistic is positive and significantly different from zero on the 
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sixth trading day (t = -6) prior to the takeover announcement date.  This 
implies that even before the takeover is announced, the market expects 
Chinese target firms where cash is the sole mode of consideration to provide 
larger economic benefits for its shareholders than Chinese target firms where 
the consideration is other than purely in cash.  Column six of Table 7.1(a) also 
shows that there are significant and positive z
co
t
__
 statistics on the 
announcement date itself (z
co
0
__
 = 1.7876) and the second (z
co
2
__
 = 2.4660), third 
(z
co
3
__
 = 2.0826) and fourth (z
co
4
__
 = 1.9153) trading days after the takeover 
announcement date.  This in turn suggests that around the takeover 
announcement date, the shareholders of Chinese target firms where cash is 
the sole mode of consideration obtain larger economic benefits from 
takeovers than the shareholders of Chinese target firms where the 
consideration is other than purely in cash.  However, beginning on the fifth 
trading day after the takeover announcement date, the z
co
t
__
 statistics gradually 
decay away and become insignificantly different from zero.  From this, we 
conclude that apart from the period immediately surrounding the takeover 
announcement date there are virtually no differences between the AARs 
accruing to the shareholders of Chinese target firms where the consideration 
is solely in cash and the AARs for the shareholders of Chinese target firms 
where the consideration is other than purely in cash.   
 
7.4.2 Average Abnormal Returns and Corrado (1989) “z” Statistics 
 
In this section we implement procedures similar to those applied in the 
previous section in order to assess whether the Corrado (1989) test statistics 
are compatible with the hypothesis that the AARs over the event window for 
the shareholders of Chinese target firms where cash is the sole mode of 
consideration are larger than the AARs for Chinese target firms where the 
mode of consideration is other than purely in cash.  A summary of the AARs 
over the event window using OLS betas and their associated Corrado (1989) 
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test statistics is provided in Table 7.2(a).  Table 7.2(b) summarises the AARs 
and their associated Corrado (1989) test statistics using Dimson (1979) betas.  
Here we need to emphasise that the AARs summarised in the second and 
third columns of Table 7.2(a) are the same as the AARs summarised in the 
second and third columns of Table 7.1(a).  Likewise, the AARs summarised in 
the second and third columns of Table 7.2(b) are the same as the AARs 
summarised in the second and third columns of Table 7.1(b).  A pictorial 
summary of the AARs based on OLS betas is to be found in Figure 7.1(a) 
above and for Dimson (1979) betas in Figure 7.1(b) above.  Moreover, given 
the similarity of the results summarised in columns four, five and six of Table 
7.2(a) and Table 7.2(b) we again confine the discussion of our results to the 
OLS betas as summarised in Table 7.2(a).  
 
The fourth column of Table 7.2(a) summarises the Corrado (1989) “z” scores 
associated with the AARs of firms where cash is the sole mode of 
consideration.  Thus, one can follow the analysis in section 4.2 of chapter four 
of this dissertation by letting:  
 
z
c
ct = 
1
N
i=1
N
 {K(ARit) - 
T + 1
2
}
S(K)
 
 
be the Corrado (1989) “z” statistic corresponding to the AARs on the tth day of 
the event window for the N = 43 target firms where the takeover consideration 
is solely in cash.  From section 4.2 of this dissertation it will be recalled that 
ARit is the abnormal return for firm  i = 1,2,3, ____, N = 43 in our sample on 
day t = 1,2,3, ____,T of the period covering the combined estimation and 
event windows.  Moreover, 1  K(ARit)  T is the rank of the i
th firm’s abnormal 
return during the tth day of the combined estimation and event windows.  The 
Corrado (1989, p. 388) expression for the variance of the sum of the excess 
ranks across the N = 44 firms where the takeover consideration is solely in 
cash will then be given by:  
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Table 7.2 (a):  Average Abnormal Returns and Associated Corrado (1989) 
Statistics Based on OLS Betas for Chinese Target Firms over the Period 
from 1 January, 1990 until 31 December, 2008  for Cash (N = 44) as against 
Alternative (M = 16) Modes of Consideration  
 
Time 
Relative to  
Announce 
Date (0) 
Average 
Abnormal 
Return  
Cash 
Average  
Abnormal 
Return  
Alternatives 
Corrado 
Z Score  
Cash  
Corrado  
Z Score  
Alternatives 
 
Z Score  
Cash vs  
Alternatives 
      
-6 0.0088 -0.0073 1.4909 -0.5754 1.4611 
-5 -0.0009 0.0015 -0.5789 -0.1723 -0.2876 
-4 0.0058 0.0073 -0.4722 0.8993 -0.9698 
-3 0.0027 0.0148 1.3888 1.0819 0.2170 
-2 0.0039 -0.0213 -0.6903 -1.1749 0.3427 
-1 -0.0077 -0.0042 0.0290 -0.5272 0.3933 
0 0.0123 -0.0069 1.8404* -0.9547 1.9764# 
1 0.0251 0.0687 2.5444$ -1.3541 2.7566$ 
2 0.0098 -0.0166 1.2148 -1.3954 1.8457* 
3 0.0342 -0.0124 0.6950 -1.4230 1.4976 
4 0.0126 -0.0204 0.1473 -1.7055* 1.3102 
5 0.0176 0.0029 0.0290 0.8717 -0.5959 
6 0.0014 -0.0098 -0.5906 -0.1998 -0.2763 
7 0.0105 -0.0048 -0.6996 -0.6236 -0.0537 
8 -0.0120 -0.0145 -2.2056# -0.4720 -1.2258 
9 0.0018 -0.0016 0.7855 0.0345 0.5310 
10 -0.0107 0.0005 -0.5859 0.3239 -0.6433 
11 -0.0043 0.0079 -1.2101 0.4962 -1.2065 
12 -0.0120 -0.0044 -1.2960 0.8441 -1.5133 
13 -0.0046 0.0164 -1.0384 1.0750 -1.4944 
14 -0.0036 -0.0013 -1.2635 -0.5651 -0.4939 
15 0.0014 0.0029 -0.6254 0.7856 -0.9977 
16 -0.0026 -0.0115 -0.8388 -1.4781 0.4520 
17 0.0040 -0.0233 -1.7946* -1.7238* -0.0501 
      
 
* significant at 10%; # significant at 5%; $ significant at 1% (two tailed test) 
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Table 7.2 (b):  Average Abnormal Returns and Associated Corrado (1989) 
Statistics Based on Dimson (1979) Betas for Chinese Target Firms over the 
Period from 1 January, 1990 until 31 December, 2008  for Cash (N = 44) as 
against Alternative (M = 16) Modes of Consideration  
 
Time 
Relative to  
Announce 
Date (0) 
Average 
Abnormal 
Return  
Cash 
Average  
Abnormal 
Return  
Alternatives 
Corrado 
Z Score  
Cash  
Corrado  
Z Score  
Alternatives 
 
Z Score  
Cash vs  
Alternatives 
      
-6 0.0088 -0.0073 1.2912 -0.5115 1.2747 
-5 -0.0009 0.0015 -0.5865 -0.2730 -0.2217 
-4 0.0058 0.0073 -0.4226 1.0056 -1.0099 
-3 0.0027 0.0148 1.3708 1.0678 0.2142 
-2 0.0039 -0.0213 -0.7246 -1.2752 0.3893 
-1 -0.0077 -0.0042 -0.1253 -0.4734 0.2462 
0 0.0123 -0.0069 1.8289* -0.8520 1.8957* 
1 0.0251 0.0687 2.9160$ -1.4307 3.0736$ 
2 0.0098 -0.0166 1.2537 -1.2406 1.7638* 
3 0.0342 -0.0124 0.8206 -1.1853 1.4184 
4 0.0126 -0.0204 0.1229 -1.7797* 1.3454 
5 0.0176 0.0029 -0.1323 0.7879 -0.6507 
6 0.0014 -0.0098 -0.2095 -0.2350 0.0180 
7 0.0105 -0.0048 -0.8417 -0.6670 -0.1235 
8 -0.0120 -0.0145 -2.1902# -0.3559 -1.2970 
9 0.0018 -0.0016 0.8042 0.0829 0.5100 
10 -0.0107 0.0005 -0.4249 0.4562 -0.6230 
11 -0.0043 0.0079 -0.9822 0.3732 -0.9584 
12 -0.0120 -0.0044 -1.2046 0.8467 -1.4504 
13 -0.0046 0.0164 -0.7714 1.0678 -1.3006 
14 -0.0036 -0.0013 -1.4083 -0.5737 -0.5902 
15 0.0014 0.0029 -0.6614 0.7810 -1.0199 
16 -0.0026 -0.0115 -0.5584 -1.4341 0.6193 
17 0.0040 -0.0233 -1.7790* -1.7502* -0.0204 
      
 
* significant at 10%; # significant at 5%; $ significant at 1% (two tailed test) 
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S2(K) = 
1
T
 
t=1
T
 [
1
N
 
i=1
N
 {K(ARit) - 
T + 1
2
}]2 
 
Finally, from section 4.2 of this dissertation we also know that the Corrado 
(1989) statistic, z
c
ct, defined earlier is asymptotically distributed as a standard 
normal variate as N   (Fisz, 1963, p. 197).   
 
The results summarised in the fourth column of Table 7.2(a) show that when 
cash is used as the sole mode of consideration the AARs are positive and the 
Corrado (1989) “z” statistics are significantly different from zero on the 
takeover announcement date (z
c
c0 = 1.8404) and the first  trading day following 
the takeover announcement date (z
c
c1 = 2.5444).  After this and up until the 
seventh trading day after the takeover announcement date the AARs are 
generally positive although not statistically different from zero. However, 
beyond this point the AARs are generally negative and occasionally 
significantly so as on the eighth and seventeenth trading days after the 
announcement date where the Corrado (1989) “z” statistics are a statistically 
significant z
c
c8 = -2.2056 and z
c
c17 = -1.7946, respectively.  Hence, our 
analysis of the Corrado (1989) “z” statistics indicates that from the second 
trading day after the announcement date shareholders of Chinese target firms 
obtain no significant economic benefits (and probably marginal losses) when 
cash is used as the sole mode of consideration for the takeover.  
 
The fifth column of Table 7.2(a) summarises the Corrado “z” statistics 
associated with the abnormal returns of target firms where the consideration is 
other than purely in cash.  Thus, one can again follow the analysis in section 
4.2 of chapter four of this dissertation by letting:  
 
z
o
ct = 
1
M
 
i=1
M
 {K(ARit) - 
T + 1
2
}
S(K)
 
 
be the Corrado (1989) “z” statistic corresponding to the abnormal returns on 
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the tth day of the event window for the M = 16 target firms where the takeover 
consideration is other than purely in cash.  As previously, ARit is the abnormal 
return for firm  i = 1,2,3, ____, M = 16 in our sample on day t = 1,2,3, ____,T 
of the period covering the combined estimation and event windows.  
Moreover, 1  K(ARit)  T is the rank of the i
th firm’s abnormal return during 
the tth day of the combined estimation and event windows.  The expression for 
the variance of the sum of the excess ranks across these M = 16 firms where 
the takeover consideration is other than purely in cash is given by: 
 
S2(K) = 
1
T
 
t=1
T
 [
1
M
 
i=1
M
 {K(ARit - 
T + 1
2
}]2 
 
Finally, the Corrado (1989) statistic, z
o
ct, is asymptotically distributed as a 
standard normal variate as M   (Fisz, 1963, p. 197).     
 
The results summarised in the fifth column of Table 7.2(a) show that when the 
consideration is other than purely in cash, the Corrado (1989) “z” scores 
associated with the AARs which accrue to the shareholders of Chinese target 
firms over the event window are generally insignificantly different from zero.  
Indeed, the only AARs which are significantly different from zero occur on the 
fourth and seventeenth trading days after the takeover announcement date 
and have Corrado (1989) “z” scores that are both negative and marginally 
significant at z
o
c4 = -1.7055 and z
o
c17 = -1.7238, respectively.  The 
predominance of insignificant but negative AARs over the event window 
suggests that the shareholders of Chinese target firms obtain no economic 
benefits from M&A activities when the consideration is other than purely in 
cash.  Hence, the analysis of the Corrado (1989) “z” statistics summarised in 
this section confirms the conclusion made from our analysis of the Patell 
(1979) “t” statistics in the previous section that the shareholders of Chinese 
target firms bear economic losses by the end of the event window as a result 
of their M&A activities.    
 
Now one can test the hypothesis that the mean Corrado (1989) “z” statistic, 
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z
c
ct, for Chinese target firms where the consideration is solely in cash is 
identical to the mean Corrado (1989) “z” statistic, z
o
ct, for Chinese target firms 
where the consideration is other than purely in cash by using the test statistic: 
        
                                                      z
co
ct  = 
z
c
ct - z
o
ct
2
 
 
This test statistic is asymptotically distributed as a standard normal variate 
(Fisz, 1963, p. 197).  Moreover, testing the hypothesis that z
co
ct  is 
insignificantly different from zero is equivalent to testing the hypothesis that 
the mean AAR on the tth day of the event window for Chinese target firms 
where the consideration is solely in cash is the same as the mean AAR on the 
tth day of the event window for Chinese target firms where the consideration is 
other than purely in cash. The sixth column of Table 7.2(a) summarises the 
z
co
ct  statistics for each trading day, t = -6, -5, -4,____, 15, 16, 17 over the event 
window.  This particular column of the table shows that there are no significant 
z
co
ct  statistics before the takeover announcement date (t = 0).  However, on the 
takeover announcement date itself the z
co
ct  is positive and significantly different 
from zero at z
co
c0 = 1.9764.  Moreover, on the first and second trading days 
after the announcement date the z
co
ct  is also positive and significantly different 
from zero at z
co
c1 = 2.7566 and z
co
c2 = 1.8457, respectively.  These statistics 
imply that Chinese target firms where cash is the sole mode of consideration 
earn significantly larger AARs around the takeover announcement date than 
Chinese target firms where the consideration is other than purely in cash.  
However, beyond this period the z
co
ct  scores gradually decline and become 
insignificantly different from zero.  From this, we conclude that apart from the 
period immediately surrounding the takeover announcement date there are 
virtually no differences between the AARs accruing to the shareholders of 
Chinese target firms where the consideration is solely in cash and the AARs 
for the shareholders of Chinese target firms where the consideration is other 
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than purely in cash.  
 
7.4.3 Average Abnormal Returns and Modified Corrado “z” Statistics 
 
It will be recalled from chapter four of this dissertation that we developed a 
modified Corrado test based on the original Corrado (1989) testing methods 
but which considerably simplifies the computational procedures behind the 
original Corrado (1989) test.  More importantly, the modified Corrado test has 
greater power in detecting abnormal returns when compared to the original 
Corrado (1989) test.  We now apply the statistical methodology of the 
modified Corrado test in order to assess whether there are any differences in 
the AARs of Chinese target firms where the consideration is solely in cash as 
against the AARs of Chinese target firms where the consideration is other 
than purely in cash.  A summary of the AARs over the event window using 
OLS betas and their associated modified Corrado “z” scores is provided in 
Table 7.3(a).  Table 7.3(b) summarises the AARs and their associated 
modified Corrado “z” scores using Dimson (1979) betas.  Further details on 
how the modified Corrado (1989) “z” scores were calculated are to be found in 
section 4.2 of chapter four of this dissertation.  We again emphasise that the 
AARs summarised in the second and third columns of Table 7.3(a) are the 
same as the AARs summarised in the second and third columns of Table 
7.1(a) and Table 7.2(a), respectively.  Likewise, the AARs summarised in the 
second and third columns of Table 7.3(b) are the same as the AARs 
summarised in the second and third columns of Table 7.1(b) and 7.2(b), 
respectively.  A pictorial summary of the AARs based on OLS betas is to be 
found in Figure 7.1(a) and for Dimson (1979) betas in Figure 7.1(b) above.  
Moreover, given the similarity of the results summarised in columns four, five 
and six of Table 7.3(a) and Table 7.3(b) we again confine the discussion of 
our results to the OLS. Betas as summarised in Table 7.3(a).   
   
The fourth column of Table 7.3(a) summarises the modified Corrado “z” 
scores associated with the AARs of firms where cash is the sole mode of 
consideration.   
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Table 7.3 (a):  Average Abnormal Returns and Associated Modified Corrado 
Statistics Based on O.L.S Betas for Chinese Target Firms over the Period 
from 1 January, 1990 until 31 December, 2008  for Cash (N = 44) as against 
Alternative (M = 16) Modes of Consideration 
 
Time 
Relative to  
Announce 
Date (0) 
Average 
Abnormal 
Return  
Cash 
Average  
Abnormal 
Return  
Alternatives 
Modified 
Corrado  
Z Score  
Cash  
Modified 
Corrado  
Z Score  
Alternatives 
 
Z Score  
Cash vs  
Alternatives 
      
-6 0.0088 -0.0073 1.6593* -1.0026 1.8823* 
-5 -0.0009 0.0015 -0.5861 -0.1933 -0.2778 
-4 0.0058 0.0073 -0.4776 1.0091 -1.0513 
-3 0.0027 0.0148 1.4138 1.2140 0.1413 
-2 0.0039 -0.0213 -0.6991 -1.3184 0.4379 
-1 -0.0077 -0.0042 0.0322 -0.5915 0.4411 
0 0.0123 -0.0069 1.7138* -0.8883 1.8400* 
1 0.0251 0.0687 2.5881$ -1.5194 2.9044$ 
2 0.0098 -0.0166 1.2351 -1.5658 1.9805# 
3 0.0342 -0.0124 0.7078 -1.5968 1.6295 
4 0.0126 -0.0204 0.1520 -1.9138* 1.4607 
5 0.0176 0.0029 0.0297 0.9782 -0.6706 
6 0.0014 -0.0098 -0.5967 -0.2242 -0.2634 
7 0.0105 -0.0048 -0.7082 -0.6998 -0.0060 
8 -0.0120 -0.0145 -2.2407# -0.5297 -1.2099 
9 0.0018 -0.0016 0.8011 0.0387 0.5391 
10 -0.0107 0.0005 -0.5929 0.3634 -0.6762 
11 -0.0043 0.0079 -1.2291 0.5567 -1.2628 
12 -0.0120 -0.0044 -1.3152 0.9472 -1.5998 
13 -0.0046 0.0164 -1.0535 1.2063 -1.5979 
14 -0.0036 -0.0013 -1.2816 -0.6341 -0.4578 
15 0.0014 0.0029 -0.6344 0.8815 -1.0719 
16 -0.0026 -0.0115 -0.8516 -1.6586* 0.5706 
17 0.0040 -0.0233 -1.6455* -1.7436* 0.0693 
      
 
* significant at 10%; # significant at 5%; $ significant at 1% (two tailed test) 
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Table 7.3 (b):  Average Abnormal Returns and Associated Modified Corrado 
Statistics Based on Dimson (1979) Betas for Chinese Target Firms over the 
Period from 1 January, 1990 until 31 December, 2008  for Cash (N = 44) as 
against Alternative (M = 16) Modes of Consideration  
 
Time 
Relative to  
Announce 
Date (0) 
Average 
Abnormal 
Return  
Cash 
Average  
Abnormal 
Return  
Alternatives 
Modified 
Corrado  
Z Score  
Cash  
Modified 
Corrado  
Z Score  
Alternatives 
 
Z Score  
Cash vs  
Alternatives 
      
-6 0.0088 -0.0073 1.4366 -0.9408 1.6811* 
-5 -0.0009 0.0015 -0.5885 -0.3054 -0.2002 
-4 0.0058 0.0073 -0.4234 1.1251 -1.0949 
-3 0.0027 0.0148 1.3831 1.1947 0.1333 
-2 0.0039 -0.0213 -0.7274 -1.4266 0.4944 
-1 -0.0077 -0.0042 -0.1233 -0.5297 0.2873 
0 0.0123 -0.0069 1.6881* -0.7904 1.7525* 
1 0.0251 0.0687 2.9395$ -1.6006 3.2103$ 
2 0.0098 -0.0166 1.2635 -1.3880 1.8748* 
3 0.0342 -0.0124 0.8280 -1.3261 1.5232 
4 0.0126 -0.0204 0.1261 -1.9911* 1.4971 
5 0.0176 0.0029 -0.1330 0.8815 -0.7174 
6 0.0014 -0.0098 -0.2074 -0.2629 0.0393 
7 0.0105 -0.0048 -0.8450 -0.7462 -0.0699 
8 -0.0120 -0.0145 -2.2054# -0.3982 -1.2779 
9 0.0018 -0.0016 0.8129 0.0928 0.5092 
10 -0.0107 0.0005 -0.4255 0.5103 -0.6617 
11 -0.0043 0.0079 -0.9885 0.4176 -0.9942 
12 -0.0120 -0.0044 -1.2114 0.9472 -1.5264 
13 -0.0046 0.0164 -0.7753 1.1947 -1.3929 
14 -0.0036 -0.0013 -1.4160 -0.6418 -0.5474 
15 0.0014 0.0029 -0.6652 0.8738 -1.0882 
16 -0.0026 -0.0115 -0.5616 -1.6045 0.7374 
17 0.0040 -0.0233 -1.6168 -1.7650* 0.1048 
      
 
* significant at 10%; # significant at 5%; $ significant at 1% (two tailed test).
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This particular column shows that there are marginally significant positive 
AARs on the sixth trading day prior to the announcement date (modified 
Corrado “z” statistic, 1.6593).  This may suggest that the market has a positive 
perception of M&A activities when the consideration is solely in cash.  This 
interpretation of our results is supported by the fact that when cash is used as 
the sole mode of consideration the modified Corrado “z” scores are positive 
and statistically different from zero on the takeover announcement date itself 
(modified Corrado “z” statistic, 1.7138) and the first  trading day following the 
takeover announcement date (modified Corrado “z” statistic, 2.5881).  
Moreover, after this and up until the seventh trading day after the takeover 
announcement date the AARs are generally positive although not statistically 
different from zero. Beyond this point, however, the AARs are generally 
negative and occasionally significantly so as on the eighth and seventeenth 
trading days after the takeover announcement date where the modified 
Corrado “z” statistics are a statistically significant -2.2407 and -1.6455, 
respectively.  Hence, our analysis shows that there are significant economic 
benefits for the shareholders of Chinese target firms around the takeover 
announcement date when the takeover consideration is paid solely in cash but 
as the event window proceeds beyond the takeover announcement date these 
same shareholders earn no significant abnormal returns (and indeed, 
probably incur marginal losses).  
 
The fifth column of Table 7.3(a) summarises the modified Corrado “z” 
statistics associated with the AARs of firms where the mode of consideration 
is other than purely in cash.  The AARs accruing to the shareholders of these 
Chinese target firms are not significantly different from zero other than on the 
fourth, sixteenth and seventeenth days after the takeover announcement date 
where they are negative and significant with modified Corrado “z” scores of -
1.9138, -1.6586 and -1.7436, respectively.  This suggests that the 
shareholders of Chinese target firms where the consideration is other than 
purely in cash are not able to benefit economically from their M&A activities 
and in fact at some point over the event window suffer significant losses.  
Hence, our analysis in this section of the modified Corrado “z” statistics is 
consistent with our analysis of the Corrado (1989) “z” statistics and Patell 
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(1979) “t” statistics in the previous two sections and shows that the 
shareholders of Chinese target firms obtain no economic benefits from M&A 
activities when the consideration is not purely in cash.  Indeed, if anything our 
analysis shows that it is more likely that the shareholders of Chinese target 
firms where the consideration is other than purely in cash bear economic 
losses as a result of the M&A activities they enter into.    
 
Our analysis of the modified Corrado “z” statistics indicates that the AARs for 
the shareholders of Chinese target firms will on average be larger when the 
consideration for the takeover is solely in cash as against when alternative 
modes of consideration are employed.  Given this, we now use the modified 
Corrado “z” statistics associated with the AARs over the event window for 
target firms comprising our sample to formally test this hypothesis.  Thus, let 
z
c
it be the modified Corrado “z” statistic corresponding to the abnormal return 
of for the ith target firm on the tth day of the event window where the takeover 
consideration is purely in cash.  It then follows that z
c
it
__
 = 
1
N
 
i=1
N
 z
c
it will be the 
average modified Corrado “z” statistic for the abnormal returns across the 
N = 43 firms during the tth day of the event window where the takeover 
consideration is solely in cash.  Moreover, z
c
it
__
N will be asymptotically 
distributed as a standard normal variate as N   (Fisz, 1963, p. 197).     
 
One can also define z
o
it to be the modified Corrado “z” statistic corresponding 
to the abnormal return for the ith target firm on the tth day of the event window 
where the takeover consideration is other than purely in cash.  It then follows 
that z
o
it
__
 = 
1
M
 
i=1
M
 z
o
it will be the average modified Corrado “z” statistic across the 
M = 16 firms during the tth day of the event window where the takeover 
consideration is other than purely in cash.  Moreover, z
o
it
__
M will be 
asymptotically distributed as a standard normal variate as M   (Fisz, 1963, 
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p. 197).       
 
Now, one can test the hypothesis that the mean modified Corrado “z” score 
for target firms where the consideration is solely in cash is identical to the 
mean modified Corrado “z” score for target firms where the consideration is 
other than purely in cash by using the statistic: 
 
z
co
t
__
 = 
1
2
{z
c
it
__
N - z
o
it
__
M} 
 
which will be asymptotically distributed as a standard normal variate (Fisz, 
1963, p. 197).  It will be recalled from previous sections that this is equivalent 
to testing the hypothesis that the AAR on the tth day of the event window for 
target firms where the consideration is solely in cash is the same as the AAR 
on the tth day of the event window for target firms where the consideration is 
other than purely in cash.  Now, the sixth column of Table 7.3(a) summarises 
the z
co
t
__
 statistic for each trading day of the event window.  This column of the 
table shows that the test statistic (z
co
-6
__
 = 1.8823) is marginally significant six 
days before the takeover announcement date; that is, at t = -6.  This may 
suggest that even before the public announcement of takeovers, investors 
have an expectation that Chinese target firms where cash is the sole mode of 
consideration are likely to generate significantly higher economic benefits for 
their shareholders when compared to target firms where the consideration is 
other than purely in cash.  However, on the takeover announcement date itself 
(t = 0) the test statistic (z
co
0
__
 = 1.8400) is positive and marginally significant.  
Moreover, on the first (t = 1) trading day after the takeover announcement 
date the test statistic (z
co
1
__
 = 2.9044) is positive and significantly different from 
zero.  Likewise, on the second (t = 2) trading day after the announcement 
date the test statistic (z
co
2
__
 = 1.9805) is positive and significantly different from 
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zero.  These results imply that Chinese target firms where cash is the sole 
mode of consideration earn significantly larger AARs around the takeover 
announcement date than Chinese target firms where the consideration is 
other than purely in cash.  However, beyond this period the test statistics, z
co
t
__
, 
gradually decline and become insignificantly different from zero.  From this, 
we conclude that apart from the period immediately surrounding the takeover 
announcement date there are virtually no differences between the AARs 
accruing to the shareholders of Chinese target firms where the consideration 
is solely in cash and the AARs for the shareholders of Chinese target firms 
where the consideration is other than purely in cash.  These results are 
broadly compatible with the results obtained using the Patell (1976) “t” 
statistics as summarised in section 7.4.1 and the Corrado (1989) “z” statistics 
as summarised in section 7.4.2. 
 
7.4.4 A Summary and Comparison of Results Based on the Patell, 
Corrado and Modified Corrado Test Statistics 
 
From the analysis conducted in section 7.4.1, section 7.4.2 and section 7.4.3, 
one can conclude that no matter whether our methodology is based on the 
Patell (1976) “t” scores, the Corrado (1989) “z” statistics or the modified 
Corrado “z” statistics associated with the abnormal returns, there are 
significant positive AARs around the takeover announcement date for the 
shareholders of Chinese target firms when the consideration is solely in cash.  
However, after two days following the takeover announcement date, the AARs 
accruing to the shareholders of Chinese target firms begin to decline and 
become insignificantly different from zero.  Indeed, as the event window 
proceeds there is an increasing tendency for the abnormal returns to become 
negative and occasionally, significantly so in a statistical sense.  On the other 
hand, the AARs accruing to the shareholders of Chinese target firms where 
the consideration is other than purely in cash are generally not significantly 
different from zero or marginally negative in a statistical sense over the entire 
event window.  More important, however, is that all three tests (Patell, 
Corrado and modified Corrado) show that on the takeover announcement 
date and the trading days immediately after the takeover announcement date 
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the shareholders of Chinese target firms where the consideration is solely in 
cash obtain significantly larger AARs in a statistical sense than the 
shareholders of Chinese target firms where the consideration is other than 
purely in cash.  However, as the event window proceeds beyond this period, 
all three tests show that there appears to be no difference between the AARs 
obtained for the shareholders of Chinese target firms where the consideration 
is solely in cash and the AARs for the shareholders of Chinese target firms 
where the consideration is other than purely in cash.  Finally, a comparison of 
the results summarised in the sixth column of Tables 7.1(a) and 7.1 (b), 7.2(a) 
and 7.2(b) and 7.3(a) and 7.3(b), shows that the modified Corrado test is more 
powerful than the original Corrado (1989) test and that the Patell (1976) test 
has more power than both the Corrado (1989) and modified Corrado tests.  
Here it must be remembered, however, that the Patell (1976) “t” test is based 
on the unlikely assumption that equity returns are normally distributed (Harris 
and Küçüközmen, 2001; Ashton and Tippett, 2006).  In contrast, the modified 
Corrado test is a nonparametric test and makes no assumptions about the 
underlying distribution for equity returns.  
7.5 Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns for Cash as against 
Alternative Modes of Consideration for Chinese Target Firms 
 
We commence our analysis of the Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns 
(CAARs) associated with the mode of consideration for the shareholders of 
Chinese target firms by again emphasising that our event window starts six 
trading days before the takeover announcement date and concludes 
seventeen trading days after the announcement date; that is, (-6, +17) trading 
days.  Furthermore, as noted in section 7.3 of this chapter there are N = 43 
Chinese target firms in total where cash is the sole mode of consideration for 
the takeover.  Importantly, six of the 44 Chinese target firms are listed on 
foreign stock exchanges.  Since there are no significant differences between 
the empirical results obtained from including these six firms listed on foreign 
stock exchanges and the empirical results obtained from excluding them from 
our analysis, we report only our empirical results with these six firms included 
in our empirical analysis.   
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In contrast, there are 39 Chinese target firms where the mode of consideration 
is either not explicitly stated on the SDC (M&A) database or where the 
consideration is other than purely in cash.  It will be recalled that these 
alternative modes of consideration include the shares of the acquiring firm, 
convertible bonds issued by the acquiring firm, warrants issued by the 
acquiring firm, the transfer of some of the acquiring firm’s assets to the 
shareholders of the target firm, the repayment of some of the target firm’s debt 
by the acquiring firm, or some combination thereof.  Since we find significant 
differences in the empirical results based on the entire sample of 39 Chinese 
target firms and the sample of 16 Chinese target firms which excludes the 23 
target firms that do not clearly specify the particular mode of consideration, as 
in previous sections we only report empirical results relating to the sample of 
M = 16 Chinese target firms where the SDC (M&A) database explicitly states 
that the takeover consideration is other than purely in cash.   We now proceed 
to our analysis the CAARs for firms where the mode of consideration is solely 
in cash as against not purely in cash based on the Patell (1976) “t” statistics.   
Subsequent sections will summarise our analysis of the CAARs for cash as 
against alternative modes of consideration based on the Corrado (1989) “z” 
statistics and the modified Corrado “z” statistics.  
 
7.5.1 Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns and Patell (1976) “t” 
Statistics 
 
A summary of the CAARs over the event window using OLS betas and their 
associated Patell (1976) “t” scores is provided in Table 7.4(a).  Table 7.4(b) 
contains the CAARs and their associated Patell (1976) “t” scores using 
Dimson (1979) betas.  The reader will see that there is very little difference 
between the information summarised in both these tables.  Given this, we 
again confine our attention to the data for OLS. betas as summarised in Table 
7.4(a).  The second column of the Table 7.4(a) shows that the CAARs which 
accrue to the shareholders of Chinese target firms where the consideration is 
solely in cash are all positive over the event window.   
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Table 7.4 (a):  Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns (CAARs) and 
Associated Patell (1976) Statistics Based on OLS Betas for Chinese Target 
Firms over the Period from 1 January, 1990 until 31 December, 2008  for 
Cash (N = 44) as against Alternative (M = 16) Modes of Consideration 
 
Time 
Relative to  
Announce 
Date (0) 
  
CAAR 
Cash 
CAAR 
Alternatives 
Patell  
“t” Score  
Cash  
Patell  
“t” Score  
Alternatives 
 
Z Score  
Cash vs  
Alternatives 
      
-6 0.0088 -0.0073 1.4684 -2.1170# 2.5353$ 
-5 0.0078 -0.0057 0.6941 -0.5445 0.8758 
-4 0.0136 0.0016 0.4099 0.4407 -0.0218 
-3 0.0163 0.0164 1.1771 0.8914 0.2020 
-2 0.0201 -0.0049 1.1566 0.0977 0.7487 
-1 0.0125 -0.0090 1.4893 -0.1222 1.1395 
0 0.0247 -0.0160 1.7475* -1.0501 1.9782# 
1 0.0498 0.0527 2.8392$ 0.8632 1.3973 
2 0.0596 0.0362 3.5119$ 0.6242 2.0419# 
3 0.0938 0.0237 3.6311$ 0.4201 2.2705# 
4 0.1064 0.0034 3.4516$ 0.1864 2.3088# 
5 0.1240 0.0063 3.2040$ 0.1858 2.1342# 
6 0.1254 -0.0035 3.1803$ 0.0538 2.2108# 
7 0.1359 -0.0083 3.2730$ -0.0082 2.3202# 
8 0.1239 -0.0227 2.8859$ -0.2012 2.1829# 
9 0.1257 -0.0243 2.9265$ -0.2397 2.2389# 
10 0.1150 -0.0238 2.9086$ -0.2468 2.2312# 
11 0.1107 -0.0159 2.7999$ -0.1946 2.1175# 
12 0.0987 -0.0203 2.5550$ -0.1757 1.9309* 
13 0.0941 -0.0039 2.3927# -0.1316 1.7849* 
14 0.0906 -0.0052 2.3708# -0.1163 1.7587* 
15 0.0920 -0.0023 2.3322# -0.0782 1.7044* 
16 0.0894 -0.0139 2.1783# -0.1282 1.6309 
17 0.0934 -0.0371 2.5415$ 0.9860 1.0999 
      
 
* significant at 10%; # significant at 5%; $ significant at 1% (two tailed test) 
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Table 7.4 (b):  Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns (CAARs) and 
Associated Patell (1976) Statistics Based on Dimson (1979) Betas for 
Chinese Target Firms over the Period from 1 January, 1990 until 31 
December, 2008  for Cash (N = 44) as against Alternative (M = 16) Modes of 
Consideration  
 
Time 
Relative to  
Announce 
Date (0) 
CAAR 
Cash 
CAAR 
Alternatives 
Patell  
“t” Score  
Cash  
Patell  
“t” Score  
Alternatives 
 
Z Score  
Cash vs  
Alternatives 
      
-6 0.0079 -0.0070 1.3772 -2.0019# 2.3894# 
-5 0.0073 -0.0060 0.7933 -0.9052 1.2010 
-4 0.0135 0.0011 0.4418 0.4025 0.0278 
-3 0.0158 0.0153 1.1741 0.7995 0.2649 
-2 0.0199 -0.0072 1.1347 -0.0481 0.8364 
-1 0.0105 -0.0109 1.4195 -0.2061 1.1495 
0 0.0229 -0.0178 1.8068* -1.2892 2.1892# 
1 0.0483 0.0508 2.8148$ 0.8565 1.3847 
2 0.0568 0.0338 3.4703$ 0.6027 2.0277# 
3 0.0922 0.0240 3.6236$ 0.4163 2.2679# 
4 0.1048 0.0020 3.4492$ 0.1692 2.3193# 
5 0.1223 0.0043 3.2084$ 0.1588 2.1564# 
6 0.1256 -0.0050 3.2024$ 0.0253 2.2466# 
7 0.1361 -0.0124 3.2917$ -0.0525 2.3647# 
8 0.1259 -0.0243 2.9026$ -0.2283 2.2139# 
9 0.1279 -0.0252 2.9760$ -0.2575 2.2864# 
10 0.1170 -0.0234 2.9793$ -0.2602 2.2907# 
11 0.1128 -0.0149 2.8802$ -0.2098 2.1849# 
12 0.1010 -0.0200 2.6824$ -0.1895 2.0308# 
13 0.0990 -0.0040 2.5109$ -0.1461 1.8788* 
14 0.0926 -0.0059 2.4837$ -0.1310 1.8489* 
15 0.0914 -0.0030 2.4121# -0.0931 1.7715* 
16 0.0894 -0.0141 2.2467# -0.1413 1.6885* 
17 0.0942 -0.0380 2.6834$ 0.9794 1.2049 
 
      
      
* significant at 10%; # significant at 5%; $ significant at 1% (two tailed test) 
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In particular, the CAAR across the N = 44 firms where the mode of 
consideration is solely in cash reaches a statistically significant peak of 
13.59% on the seventh trading day after the takeover announcement date and 
then falls away so that it levels off at around 9% after the twelfth trading day 
following the takeover announcement date.  A pictorial representation of the 
CAARs is to be found in Figure 7.2(a) for OLS betas and Figure 7.2(b) for 
Dimson (1979) betas.  In contrast, both the third column Table 7.4(a) and 
Figure 7.2(a) show that for the shareholders of Chinese target firms where the 
consideration is in other than purely in cash, the CAARs are predominately 
negative over the entire event window.  Hence, whilst the CAAR reaches a 
peak of about 5% on the first trading day after the takeover announcement 
date when the consideration is not purely in cash, it decays away in 
subsequent periods so much so that by the end of our event window (t = 17) 
the CAAR is  -3.71%.   
 
Furthermore, the fourth column of Table 7.4(a) summarises the Patell (1976) 
“t” statistics associated with the CAARs of Chinese target firms where cash is 
used as the sole mode of consideration.  The data summarised in this column 
of the table show that statistically significant and positive CAARs accrue to the 
shareholders of Chinese target firms where the consideration is solely in cash 
on the announcement date itself [Patell (1976) “t” statistic, 1.7475] and on all 
subsequent periods of our event window.  In contrast, the fifth column of Table 
7.4(a) and Figure 7.2(a) show that when the consideration is not purely in 
cash, there is a statistically significant and negative CAAR on the sixth trading 
day prior to the takeover announcement date [Patell (1976) “t” statistic, -
2.1170)].  This again may suggest that the market expects target firms to 
perform poorly when the takeover consideration is not purely in cash.  
Furthermore, the fifth column of Table 7.4(a) also shows that from the fifth 
trading day before the takeover announcement date until the end of the event 
window, the CAARs of target firms where the consideration is not purely in 
cash are generally negative, although insignificantly different from zero.  One 
can conclude from these two observations that there are no economic benefits 
of any significance for the shareholders of Chinese target firms where the 
mode of consideration is not purely in cash.   
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Figure 7.2 (a): Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns (CAAR) Betas Based 
on OLS Betas for Chinese Target Firms over the Period from 1 January, 
1990 until 31 December, 2008  for Cash (N = 44) as against Alternative (M = 
16) Modes of Consideration 
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Figure 7.2 (b): Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns (CAAR) Based on 
Dimson (1979) Betas for Chinese Target Firms over the Period from 1 
January, 1990 until 31 December, 2008 for Cash (N = 44) as against 
Alternative (M = 16) Modes of Consideration 
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Thus, our analysis of the Patell (1976) “t” statistics to date indicates that the 
CAARs for the shareholders of Chinese target firms will on average be larger 
when the consideration for the takeover is solely in cash as against when the 
consideration is not purely in cash.  However, we now conduct a formal test of 
this hypothesis.  Our testing procedures are analogous to those summarised 
in section 7.4.1 for the Patell (1976) “t” statistics associated with the target 
firms’ abnormal returns and are based on the test statistic, z
co
t
__
, which is 
defined as follows: 
 
z
co
t
__
 = 
1
2
{
z
c
it
__
N
sˆ(z
c
it)
 - 
z
o
it
__
M
sˆ(z
o
it)
} 
Here z
c
it
__
 is the average Patell (1976) “t” score associated with the CAARs 
across the i = 1,2,3, ___, N = 44 target firms where the mode of consideration 
is solely in cash, z
o
it
__
 is the average Patell (1976) “t” score associated with the 
CAARs across the i = 1,2,3, ___, M = 16 target firms where the mode of 
consideration is other than purely in cash and t = -6, -5, -4,____, 15, 16, 17 is 
the particular date in the event window.   Moreover, sˆ2(z
c
it) is the variance 
computed from the N = 44 Patell statistics for the tth day of the event window 
where the takeover consideration is solely in cash.  Likewise, sˆ2(z
o
it) is the 
variance computed from the M = 16 Patell statistics for the tth day of the event 
window where the takeover consideration is not purely in cash.  Further 
details of the derivation of the test statistic z
co
t
__
 are to be found in section 7.4.1 
of this chapter of the dissertation.  Suffice it to say that for large N and M the 
probability density of the test statistic z
co
t
__
 approaches that of the standard 
normal distribution (Fisz, 1963, p. 197).  The sixth column of Table 7.4(a) 
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shows that the z
co
t
__
 statistic is positive and significantly different from zero on 
the sixth trading day (t = -6) prior to the takeover announcement date 
(z
co
-6
__
 = 2.5353).  As previously noted, this indicates that even before the 
takeover is announced the market expects Chinese target firms where cash is 
the sole mode of consideration to provide larger economic benefits than 
Chinese target firms where the consideration is other than purely in cash.  
This column also shows that there are significantly positive z
co
t
__
 statistics on 
the takeover announcement date itself (z
co
0
__
 = 1.9782) and also, from the 
second trading day after the takeover announcement date until the fifteenth 
trading day following the takeover announcement date.  This in turn suggests 
that for most of the period covering the takeover announcement date until the 
end of event window the shareholders of Chinese target firms where cash is 
the sole mode of consideration obtain larger CAARs from takeovers than the 
shareholders of Chinese target firms where the consideration is other than 
purely in cash.   
 
7.5.2 Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns and Corrado (1989) “z” 
Statistics 
 
In this section, we use the Corrado (1989) “z” statistics associated with the 
cumulative average abnormal returns (CAARs) for our sample of Chinese 
target firms to assess whether the economic benefits which accrue to the 
shareholders of Chinese target firms when the consideration is solely in cash 
are greater than the economic benefits which accrue to the shareholders of 
Chinese target firms where the consideration is other than purely in cash.  A 
summary of the CAARs over the event window using O.L.S betas and their 
associated Corrado (1989) “z” statistics is provided in Table 7.5(a).  Table 
7.5(b) contains the CAARs and their associated Corrado (1989) “z” statistics 
using Dimson (1979) betas.  Here, it is important to note that the CAARs 
summarised in the second and third columns of Table 7.5(a) are identical to 
the CAARs summarised in the second and third columns of Table 7.4(a).   
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Table 7.5 (a):  Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns (CAARs) and 
Associated Corrado (1989) Statistics Based on OLS Betas for Chinese 
Target Firms over the Period from 1 January, 1990 until 31 December, 2008  
for Cash (N = 44) as against Alternative (M =16) Modes of Consideration  
 
Time 
Relative to  
Announce 
Date (0) 
  
CAAR 
Cash 
CAAR 
Alternatives 
Corrado  
Z Score  
Cash  
Corrado  
Z Score  
Alternatives 
 
Z Score  
Cash vs  
Alternatives 
      
-6 0.0088 -0.0073 1.4909 -0.5754 1.4611 
-5 0.0078 -0.0057 0.6448 -0.5287 0.8298 
-4 0.0136 0.0016 0.2539 0.0875 0.1176 
-3 0.0163 0.0164 0.9143 0.6167 0.2104 
-2 0.0201 -0.0049 0.5090 0.0262 0.3414 
-1 0.0125 -0.0090 0.4765 -0.1913 0.4722 
0 0.0247 -0.0160 1.1367 -0.5380 1.1842 
1 0.0498 0.0527 1.9629# -0.9820 2.0823# 
2 0.0596 0.0362 2.2556# -1.3909 2.5785$ 
3 0.0938 0.0237 2.3596# -1.7695* 2.9197$ 
4 0.1064 0.0034 2.2942# -2.2014# 3.1789$ 
5 0.1240 0.0063 2.2049# -1.8561* 2.8715$ 
6 0.1254 -0.0035 1.9546* -1.8387* 2.6823$ 
7 0.1359 -0.0083 1.6965* -1.9385* 2.5703$ 
8 0.1239 -0.0227 1.0695 -1.9946# 2.1667# 
9 0.1257 -0.0243 1.2319 -1.9227* 2.2306# 
10 0.1150 -0.0238 1.0530 -1.7867* 2.0080# 
11 0.1107 -0.0159 0.7381 -1.6194 1.6671* 
12 0.0987 -0.0203 0.4211 -1.3826 1.2754 
13 0.0941 -0.0039 0.1783 -1.1072 0.9090 
14 0.0906 -0.0052 -0.1017 -1.2038 0.7793 
15 0.0920 -0.0023 -0.2327 -1.0086 0.5487 
16 0.0894 -0.0139 -0.4025 -1.2947 0.6309 
17 0.0934 -0.0371 -0.7604 -1.6193 0.6074 
      
 
* significant at 10%; # significant at 5%; $ significant at 1% (two tailed test) 
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Table 7.5 (b):  Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns (CAARs) and 
Associated Corrado (1989) Statistics Based on Dimson (1979) Betas for 
Chinese Target Firms over the Period from 1 January, 1990 until 31 
December, 2008  for Cash (N = 44) as against Alternative (M = 16) Modes of 
Consideration  
 
Time 
Relative to  
Announce 
Date (0) 
  
CAAR 
Cash 
CAAR 
Alternatives 
Corrado  
Z Score  
Cash  
Corrado  
Z Score  
Alternatives 
 
Z Score  
Cash vs  
Alternatives 
      
-6 0.0088 -0.0073 1.2912 -0.5115 1.2747 
-5 0.0078 -0.0057 0.4983 -0.5547 0.7446 
-4 0.0136 0.0016 0.1629 0.1277 0.0249 
-3 0.0163 0.0164 0.8265 0.6445 0.1287 
-2 0.0201 -0.0049 0.4151 0.0062 0.2892 
-1 0.0125 -0.0090 0.3278 -0.1876 0.3645 
0 0.0247 -0.0160 0.9948 -0.4957 1.0540 
1 0.0498 0.0527 1.9615# -0.9696 2.0726# 
2 0.0596 0.0362 2.2672# -1.3276 2.5420$ 
3 0.0938 0.0237 2.4104# -1.6343 2.8601$ 
4 0.1064 0.0034 2.3353# -2.0949# 3.1326$ 
5 0.1240 0.0063 2.1977# -1.7783* 2.8114$ 
6 0.1254 -0.0035 2.0533# -1.7737* 2.7061$ 
7 0.1359 -0.0083 1.7537* -1.8874* 2.5746$ 
8 0.1239 -0.0227 1.1287 -1.9153* 2.1525# 
9 0.1257 -0.0243 1.2939 -1.8338* 2.2116# 
10 0.1150 -0.0238 1.1522 -1.6684* 1.9945# 
11 0.1107 -0.0159 0.8883 -1.5334 1.7124* 
12 0.0987 -0.0203 0.5882 -1.2983 1.3340 
13 0.0941 -0.0039 0.4008 -1.0266 1.0094 
14 0.0906 -0.0052 0.0839 -1.1271 0.8563 
15 0.0920 -0.0023 -0.0591 -0.9346 0.6191 
16 0.0894 -0.0139 -0.1742 -1.2131 0.7346 
17 0.0934 -0.0371 -0.5337 -1.5448 0.7150 
      
 
* significant at 10%; # significant at 5%; $ significant at 1% (two tailed test) 
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Similarly, the CAARs summarised in the second and third columns of Table 
7.5(b) are identical to the CAARs summarised in the second and third 
columns of Table 7.4(b).  A pictorial representation of the CAARs based on 
OLS betas is to be found in Figure 7.2(a) and for Dimson (1979) betas in 
Figure 7.2(b), of the prior section 7.5.1 of this chapter.  More importantly, 
given the fact that the empirical results based on OLS betas in Table 7.5(a) 
and the empirical results based on Dimson (1979) betas in Table 7.5(b) are 
quite similar, our focus will again be on the results obtained using OLS betas 
as summarised in Table 7.5(a). 
 
The fourth column of Table 7.5(a) summarises the Corrado (1989) “z” scores 
associated with the CAARs of Chinese target firms where the mode of 
consideration is solely in cash.  This column shows that when the 
consideration is solely in cash the CAARs which accrue to the shareholders of 
Chinese target firms up to the takeover announcement date are generally 
positive, though not significantly different from zero.  In contrast, in the period 
immediately after the takeover announcement date and up until the seventh 
trading day following the takeover announcement date, the CAARs are both 
positive and significantly different from zero in a statistical sense.  However, 
beyond the seventh trading day following the takeover announcement date, 
the positive CAARs gradually decay away and become insignificantly different 
from zero - though they are still much higher than those prior to the takeover 
announcement date.  Thus, our analysis based on the Corrado (1989) “z” 
statistics suggests that the shareholders of Chinese target firms where the 
consideration is solely in cash can only obtain economic benefits from M&A 
activities in the several trading days immediately after the takeover 
announcement date. 
 
The fifth column of Table 7.5(a) summarises the Corrado (1989) “z” scores 
associated with the CAARs of Chinese target firms where the mode of 
consideration is other than purely in cash.  This column shows that the 
majority of the CAARs are negative over the period from the sixth trading day 
prior to the takeover announcement date until the second trading day after the 
takeover announcement date, though they are not significant in a statistical 
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sense.  However, beyond the second trading day after the takeover 
announcement date up until the tenth trading day subsequent to the takeover 
announcement date, the CAARs are predominantly negative and significantly 
different from zero.   After the tenth trading day in the event window, however, 
all CAARs are negative although not significantly different from zero.  Hence, 
our consideration of the Corrado (1989) “z” statistics associated with the 
CAARs of Chinese target firms as summarised in this section show that the 
shareholders of Chinese target firms where the consideration is other than 
purely in cash suffer significant economic losses in the several trading days 
immediately after the takeover announcement date.  In summary, our analysis 
in this section indicates that the Corrado (1989) “z” statistics associated with 
the CAARs accruing to shareholders of Chinese target firms where the 
consideration is solely in cash tend to be larger than the Corrado (1989) “z” 
statistics associated with the CAARs accruing to the shareholders of Chinese 
target firms where the consideration is other than purely in cash.   We now 
conduct a formal test of this hypothesis.   
 
From section 7.4.2 of this chapter, we know that the Corrado (1989) “z” 
statistic z
c
ct for the firms in our sample where the consideration is solely in 
cash will be asymptotically distributed as a standard normal variate (Fisz, 
1963, p. 197).  It follows from this that 
t=-6

 z
c
ct will be the sum of the Corrado 
(1989) “z” scores associated with the abnormal returns of firms where the 
takeover consideration is purely in cash from the beginning of the event 
window (t = -6) until the th = -6, -5,-4,-3, ____, 17 day of the event window.  
This in turn will mean that 
t=-6

 z
c
ct is asymptotically distributed as a normal 
variate with a mean of zero and a variance of ( + 7).  Similar considerations 
dictate that the Corrado (1989) “z” statistic z
o
ct for the firms in our sample 
where the consideration is other than purely in cash will be asymptotically 
distributed as a standard normal variate (Fisz, 1963, p. 197).  It also follows 
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from this that 
t=-6

 z
o
ct is asymptotically distributed as a normal variate with a 
mean of zero and a variance of ( + 7).  Using these results one can test the 
hypothesis that the mean of the sum of the Corrado (1989) “z” statistics 
associated with the cumulative abnormal returns of Chinese target firms 
where the takeover consideration is purely in cash is identical to the mean of 
the sum of the Corrado (1989) “z” statistics associated with the cumulative 
abnormal returns of Chinese target firms where the takeover consideration is 
other than purely in cash.  Our testing procedure is based on the following 
statistic: 
 
z
co
  = 

t=-6

 z
c
ct - 
t=-6

 z
o
ct
2( + 7)
 
 
which will be asymptotically distributed as a standard normal variate (Fisz, 
1963, p. 197).  We would again emphasise that a test based on the z
co
  
statistic is equivalent to testing the hypothesis that the CAAR on the th day of 
the event window for Chinese target firms where the consideration is solely in 
cash is the same as the CAAR on the th day of the event window for target 
firms where the consideration is other than purely in cash. 
 
The sixth column of Table 7.5(a) summarises the z
co
  scores for each trading 
day during the event window.  This particular column shows that there are no 
significant z
co
  scores before the first trading day subsequent to the takeover 
announcement date.  However, from the first trading day after the takeover 
announcement date up until the eleventh trading day following the takeover 
announcement date, all z
co
  scores are significantly different from zero.  This 
indicates that over this period Chinese target firms where the consideration is 
purely in cash earn significantly larger CAARs than Chinese target firms 
where the consideration is other than purely in cash.  However, after the 
eleventh trading day following the announcement date, the z
co
  statistics 
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gradually decay away and become insignificantly different from zero.  This 
suggests that by the end of the event window, there are virtually no 
differences between the CAARs which accrue to the shareholders of Chinese 
target firms where the consideration is solely in cash and the CAARs for the 
shareholders of Chinese target firms where the consideration is other than 
purely in cash. 
 
7.5.3 Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns and Modified Corrado 
“z” Statistics 
 
In this section, we use the modified Corrado “z” statistics associated with the 
cumulative average abnormal returns (CAARs) of Chinese target firms to 
examine whether the economic benefits accruing to the shareholders of target 
firms when the consideration is solely in cash are larger than the economic 
benefits which accrue to the shareholders of target firms where the 
consideration is other than purely in cash.  A summary of the CAARs over the 
event window using OLS betas and their associated modified Corrado “z” 
statistics is provided in Table 7.6(a).  Table 7.6(b) summarises the CAARs 
and their associated modified Corrado “z” statistics using Dimson (1979) 
betas.  Note again that the CAARs summarised in the second and third 
columns of Table 7.6(a) are the same as the CAARs summarised in the 
second and third columns of Table 7.4(a) and Table 7.5(a).  Likewise, the 
CAARs summarised in the second and third columns of Table 7.6(b) are the 
same as the CAARs summarised in the second and third columns of Table 
7.4(b) and Table 7.5(b).  A pictorial representation of the CAARs based on 
OLS betas is to be found in Figure 7.2(a) and for Dimson (1979) betas in 
Figure 7.2(b) of section 7.5.1 of this chapter.  More importantly, since there 
are no significant differences between the empirical results based on OLS 
betas and the empirical results based on Dimson (1979) betas, the focus our 
analysis will again be on the results obtained using the OLS betas as 
summarised in Table 7.6(a). 
 
The fourth column of Table 7.6(a) summarises the modified Corrado “z” 
scores associated with the CAARs of Chinese target firms where the 
consideration is solely in cash.  This column shows that the CAARs which  
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Table 7.6 (a):  Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns (CAARs) and 
Associated Modified Corrado Statistics Based on OLS Betas for Chinese 
Target Firms over the Period from 1 January, 1990 until 31 December, 2008  
for Cash (N = 44) as against Alternative (M = 16) Modes of Consideration  
 
Time 
Relative to  
Announce 
Date (0) 
  
CAAR 
Cash 
CAAR 
Alternatives 
Modified 
Corrado  
Z Score  
Cash  
Modified 
Corrado  
Z Score  
Alternatives 
 
Z Score  
Cash vs  
Alternatives 
      
-6 0.0088 -0.0073 1.6593* -1.0026 1.8823* 
-5 0.0078 -0.0057 0.6008 -0.5770 0.8328 
-4 0.0136 0.0016 0.1784 0.0420 0.0965 
-3 0.0163 0.0164 0.8429 0.6333 0.1482 
-2 0.0201 -0.0049 0.3813 -0.0179 0.2823 
-1 0.0125 -0.0090 0.3603 -0.2854 0.4566 
0 0.0247 -0.0160 1.3430 -0.9153 1.5968 
1 0.0498 0.0527 1.8443* -1.0695 2.0603# 
2 0.0596 0.0362 2.1618# -1.5540 2.6275$ 
3 0.0938 0.0237 2.2914# -1.9934* 3.0298$ 
4 0.1064 0.0034 2.2539# -2.5073$ 3.3667$ 
5 0.1240 0.0063 2.1769# -2.0963# 3.0216$ 
6 0.1254 -0.0035 1.9222* -2.0811# 2.8307$ 
7 0.1359 -0.0083 1.6637* -2.2006# 2.7325$ 
8 0.1239 -0.0227 1.0040 -2.2716# 2.3162# 
9 0.1257 -0.0243 1.1768 -2.1834# 2.3761# 
10 0.1150 -0.0238 0.9801 -2.0249# 2.1248# 
11 0.1107 -0.0159 0.6487 -1.8330* 1.7549* 
12 0.0987 -0.0203 0.3150 -1.5569 1.3236 
13 0.0941 -0.0039 0.0599 -1.2319 0.9135 
14 0.0906 -0.0052 -0.2370 -1.3553 0.7908 
15 0.0920 -0.0023 -0.3758 -1.1278 0.5318 
16 0.0894 -0.0139 -0.5521 -1.4730 0.6512 
17 0.0934 -0.0371 -0.3839 -0.0778 -0.2165 
      
 
* significant at 10%; # significant at 5%; $ significant at 1% (two tailed test) 
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Table 7.6 (b):  Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns (CAARs) and 
Associated Modified Corrado Statistics Based on Dimson (1979) Betas for 
Chinese Target Firms over the Period from 1 January, 1990 until 31 
December, 2008 for Cash (N =44) as against Alternative (M = 16) Modes of 
Consideration  
 
Time 
Relative to  
Announce 
Date (0) 
  
CAAR 
Cash 
CAAR 
Alternatives 
Modified 
Corrado  
Z Score  
Cash  
Modified 
Corrado  
Z Score  
Alternatives 
 
Z Score  
Cash vs  
Alternatives 
      
-6 0.0088 -0.0073 1.4366 -0.9408 1.6811* 
-5 0.0078 -0.0057 0.4589 -0.6551 0.7877 
-4 0.0136 0.0016 0.1064 0.0622 0.0313 
-3 0.0163 0.0164 0.7666 0.6430 0.0874 
-2 0.0201 -0.0049 0.3002 -0.0633 0.2570 
-1 0.0125 -0.0090 0.2227 -0.2964 0.3671 
0 0.0247 -0.0160 1.2903 -0.9461 1.5813 
1 0.0498 0.0527 1.8423* -1.0738 2.0621# 
2 0.0596 0.0362 2.1688# -1.4943 2.5902$ 
3 0.0938 0.0237 2.3396# -1.8466* 2.9601$ 
4 0.1064 0.0034 2.2913# -2.3922# 3.3117$ 
5 0.1240 0.0063 2.1620# -2.0162# 2.9544$ 
6 0.1254 -0.0035 2.0221# -2.0151# 2.8547$ 
7 0.1359 -0.0083 1.7209* -2.1505# 2.7375$ 
8 0.1239 -0.0227 1.0700 -2.1869# 2.3030# 
9 0.1257 -0.0243 1.2448 -2.0871# 2.3560# 
10 0.1150 -0.0238 1.0894 -1.8934* 2.1091# 
11 0.1107 -0.0159 0.8156 -1.7403* 1.8073* 
12 0.0987 -0.0203 0.5027 -1.4666 1.3925 
13 0.0941 -0.0039 0.3097 -1.1464 1.0296 
14 0.0906 -0.0052 -0.0245 -1.2735 0.8832 
15 0.0920 -0.0023 -0.1749 -1.0496 0.6185 
16 0.0894 -0.0139 -0.2906 -1.3843 0.7733 
17 0.0934 -0.0371 -0.1564 0.0306 -0.1322 
      
 
* significant at 10%; # significant at 5%; $ significant at 1% (two tailed test) 
 
 
accrue to the shareholders of Chinese target firms when the mode of 
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consideration is solely in cash are marginally positive and significantly 
different from zero on the sixth trading day preceding the takeover 
announcement date (modified Corrado “z” statistic, 1.6593).  This may 
suggest that the market has a positive perception of target firms when the 
mode of consideration is solely in cash even before the public announcement 
of the takeover.  Moreover, in the period from the fifth trading day prior to the 
takeover announcement date up until the takeover announcement date itself, 
the CAARs are all positive though not significantly different from zero.  
However, from the first trading day after the takeover announcement date until 
the seventh trading day subsequent to the takeover announcement date, the 
CAARs are both positive and significantly different from zero.  Beyond the 
seventh trading day following the takeover announcement date, however, the 
positive CAARs gradually fall away and become insignificantly different from 
zero.  In summary, our analysis based on the modified Corrado “z” statistics 
suggest that the shareholders of Chinese target firms where the mode of 
consideration is solely in cash are only able to obtain economic benefits for 
their shareholders over the several trading days immediately following the 
takeover announcement date. 
 
The fifth column of Table 7.6(a) summarises the modified Corrado “z” scores 
associated with the CAARs of Chinese target firms when the mode of 
consideration is other than purely in cash.  This particular column shows that 
prior to the second trading day after the takeover announcement date the 
CAARs which accrue to the shareholders of Chinese target firms where the 
consideration is other than purely in cash are generally negative though not 
significantly different from zero.  However, beyond the second trading day 
after the takeover announcement date up until the eleventh trading day after 
the takeover announcement date, the CAARs for target firms when the mode 
of consideration is other than purely in cash are predominantly negative and 
significantly different from zero in a statistical sense.  In the trading days 
subsequent to this point, however, the negative CAARs turn from being 
significantly different from zero to insignificantly different from zero.  Thus, our 
consideration of the modified Corrdao “z” statistics associated with the CAARs 
of Chinese target firms as summarised in the fifth column of Table 7.6(a) show 
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that the shareholders of target firms where the consideration is other than 
purely in cash suffer significant economic losses in the several trading days 
immediately after the takeover announcement date.  In summary, the modified 
Corrado “z” statistics associated with the CAARs which accrue to the 
shareholders of Chinese target firms where the consideration is solely in cash 
tend to be larger than the modified Corrado “z” statistics associated with the 
CAARs for the shareholders of Chinese target firms where the consideration 
is other than purely in cash.   We now conduct a formal test of this hypothesis.   
 
Our testing procedures are analogous to those summarised in section 7.4.3 of 
this chapter for the modified Corrado “z” statistics associated with the Average 
Abnormal Returns (AARs) which accrue to the shareholders of Chinese target 
firms and are based on the test statistic z
co
t
__
 which is defined as follows: 
 
z
co
t
__
 = 
1
2
{z
c
it
__
N - z
o
it
__
M} 
 
Here z
c
it
__
 is the average modified Corrado “z” statistic for the cumulative 
abnormal returns across the i = 1,2,3, ___, N = 44 target firms where the 
mode of consideration is solely in cash, z
o
it
__
 is the average modified Corrado 
“z” statistic for the cumulative abnormal returns across the 
i = 1,2,3, ___, M = 16 target firms where the consideration is other than purely 
in cash and t = -6, -5, -4,____, 15, 16, 17 is the particular date in the event 
window.   Further details of the derivation of the test statistic z
co
t
__
 are to be 
found in section 7.4.3 of this chapter.  Suffice it to say that the probability 
density of the test statistic z
co
t
__
 asymptotically converges to that of the standard 
normal distribution (Fisz, 1963, p. 197).  We emphasise again that a test 
based on the z
co
t
__
 statistic is equivalent to testing the hypothesis that the CAAR 
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on the tth day of the event window for Chinese target firms where the 
consideration is solely in cash is the same as the CAAR on the tth day of the 
event window for Chinese target firms where the consideration is other than 
purely in cash. 
The sixth column of Table 7.6(a) summarises the z
co
t
__
 scores for each trading 
day during the event window.  This column shows that the test statistic, 
z
co
-6
__
 = 1.8823, on the sixth trading day prior to the takeover announcement 
date is both positive and marginally significant.  This indicates that even 
before the public announcement of the takeovers, investors have an 
expectation that Chinese target firms where cash is the sole mode of 
consideration are likely to generate significantly higher economic benefits in 
comparison to Chinese target firms where the consideration is other than 
purely in cash.   After this date in the event window, however, there are no 
significant z
co
t
__
 statistics before the first trading day following the takeover 
announcement date.  Then in the period beginning on the first trading day 
after the takeover announcement date up until the eleventh trading day after 
the takeover announcement date, all z
co
t
__
 statistics are both positive and 
significantly different from zero.  This suggests that over this period Chinese 
target firms where the consideration is solely in cash earn significantly larger 
CAARs than Chinese target firms where the consideration is other than purely 
in cash.  Beyond this point until the conclusion of the event window, however, 
the z
co
t
__
 scores gradually decay away and are insignificantly different from 
zero.  Thus, by the end of the event window there are virtually no differences 
between the CAARs which accrue to the shareholders of Chinese target firms 
where the consideration is solely in cash and the CAARs which accrue to the 
shareholders of Chinese target firms where the consideration is other than 
purely in cash. 
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7.5.4 A Summary and Comparison of Results of Cumulative Average 
Abnormal Returns Based on the Patell, Corrado and Modified Corrado 
Test Statistics 
 
The empirical analysis summarised in Section 7.5.1, Section 7.5.2 and 
Section 7.5.3, shows that irrespective of whether our methodology is based on 
the Patell (1976) “t” statistics, the Corrado (1989) “z” statistics or the modified 
Corrado “z” statistics, the shareholders of Chinese target firms where the 
consideration is solely in cash tend to earn positive CAARs which are 
statistically significant from zero over the several trading days subsequent to 
the takeover announcement date.  However, the exact period of the significant 
CAARs is dependent on which of the three methodologies is employed.  If, for 
example, one uses the Patell (1976) “t” statistics then the CAARs are positive 
and significant over the entire event window commencing from the takeover 
announcement date; that is, (0,+17) trading days.  In contrast, when the 
Corrado (1989) “z” statistic and the modified Corrado “z” statistic are used, the 
CAARs are again positive and significant but over the much narrower event 
window commencing on the first trading day after the takeover announcement 
date and concluding seven trading days after the takeover announcement 
date; that is, (+1,+7) trading days.  Whilst the CAARs are large and positive 
beyond this period, they are no longer significantly different from zero under 
the Corrado (1989) and modified Corrado tests.  
 
In comparison, the Patell (1976) “t” scores associated with the CAARs of the 
Chinese target firms in our sample where the consideration is other than 
purely in cash are insignificantly different from zero and often negative over 
the entire event window.   When the Corrado (1989) “z” statistics and the 
modified Corrado “z” statistics are used, however, the CAARs for these same 
Chinese target firms are negative and significantly different from zero in the 
period commencing on the third trading day after the takeover announcement 
date and concluding on the tenth (Corrado) and eleventh (modified Corrdao) 
trading day after the announcement date.  Beyond the eleventh trading day of 
the event window, the CAARs whilst still negative are no longer significantly 
different from zero.  Here we would emphasise that the Patell (1976) test is 
based on the unlikely assumption that equity returns are normally distributed 
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(Harris and Küçüközmen, 2001; Ashton and Tippett, 2006).  In contrast, both 
the Corrado (1989) test and the modified Corrado test are nonparametric tests 
and make no assumptions about the underlying distribution for equity returns.  
Hence, one should exercise caution with the interpretation of the results 
obtained using the Patell (1976) “t” test, especially when they differ from the 
results obtained using the Corrado (1989) and modified Corrado test statistics. 
 
7.6 Implications of our Empirical Results for Practice 
 
It will be recalled from section 7.3 of this chapter that our sample is comprised 
of 44 Chinese target firms for which the takeover consideration is solely in 
cash.  In contrast, our sample is comprised of only 16 Chinese target firms 
where the consideration is other than purely in cash.  This confirms the 
assertion made in the introductory section 7.1 of this chapter that cash 
predominates as the mode of consideration for the large majority of Chinese 
M&A activities.  Moreover and as alluded to in section 2.6 of chapter two of 
this dissertation, Ding and Yang (2008) argue that using cash as the sole 
mode of consideration can have the effect of signalling to the market that the 
acquiring firm has sufficient cash resources to improve the operating 
performance of the target firm after the takeover is consummated.  This 
provides a partial explanation as to why the empirical results summarised in 
this chapter indicate that the abnormal returns for Chinese target firms where 
the mode of consideration is solely in cash are significantly larger than the 
abnormal returns of target firms where the consideration is other than purely 
in cash. 
 
7.7 Summary and Conclusions 
 
This chapter provides a detailed analysis of the economic benefits which 
accrue to the shareholders of Chinese target firms as a result of using cash as 
against alternative modes of consideration (the shares of the acquiring firm, 
convertible bonds issued by the acquiring firm, warrants issued by the 
acquiring firm, the transfer of some of the acquiring firm’s assets to the 
shareholders of the target firm, the repayment of some of the target firm’s debt 
by the acquiring firm, or some combination thereof) in the takeover process.  
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We begin the chapter by explaining how the sample of Chinese target firms 
employed in our empirical analysis was selected.  The economic benefits 
which accrue to Chinese target firms where cash is used as the sole mode of 
consideration are compared to the economic benefits which accrue to 
Chinese target firms when the consideration is other than purely in cash in 
terms of the average abnormal returns (AARs) and the cumulative average 
abnormal returns (CAARs) on the equity stock of the given firms.  In particular, 
the Patell (1976) “t” test, the original Corrado (1989) “z” test and the modified 
Corrado (1989) “z” test are employed to evaluate and compare the AARs and 
CAARs for Chinese target firms where the consideration is solely in cash and 
Chinese target firms where the consideration is other than purely in cash.  We 
find that that the Patell “t” (1976) test is the most powerful of the three tests 
employed but also, that the modified Corrado “z” test has more power than the 
original test proposed by Corrado (1989).  Here we would emphasise, 
however, that the Patell “t” (1976) test is based on the unlikely assumption 
that equity returns are normally distributed (Harris and Küçüközmen, 2001; 
Ashton and Tippett, 2006).  In contrast, the modified Corrado “z” test is a 
nonparametric test which makes no assumptions about the underlying 
distribution of equity returns.  Whilst there are some variations in the results 
obtained depending on which tests are used, it is important to emphasise that 
all three test statistics show that when the mode of consideration is solely in 
cash the AARs and CAARs which accrue to the shareholders of Chinese 
target firms around the takeover announcement date are positive and 
significantly different from zero.  Our analysis based on the Patell (1976) test 
statistic suggests that the CAARs are statistically significant over the entire 
event window beyond the takeover announcement date.  In contrast, the 
Corrado (1989) and modified Corrado test statistics suggest that the CAARs 
are significantly different from zero over the much narrower window beginning 
on the day subsequent to the takeover announcement date and concluding 
seven days after the takeover announcement date.   
 
One can contrast these results with those obtained for target firms where the 
takeover consideration is other than purely in cash.  Here the Patell “(1976) 
test statistics are insignificantly different from zero and often negative over the 
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entire event window.  However, when the Corrado (1989) test statistic and the 
modified Corrado test statistic are used the CAARs for Chinese target firms 
where the consideration is other than purely in cash are negative and 
significantly different from zero over the period commencing on the third 
trading day after the takeover announcement date and concluding on the 
tenth (Corrado) and eleventh (modified Corrado) trading day after the 
takeover announcement date.  Hence, irrespective of which test statistic is 
used our empirical analysis is compatible with the hypothesis that there are no 
economic benefits (and indeed, probably economic losses) for the 
shareholders of Chinese target firms where the consideration for the takeover 
is other than purely in cash.  
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CHAPTER EIGHT  
 
THE ANALYSIS OF ABNORMAL RETURNS EARNED BY 
CHINESE ACQUIRING FIRMS: CASH VERSUS OTHER 
MODES OF CONSIDERATION  
 
8.1 Introduction 
  
The previous chapter details our empirical results relating to the economic 
benefits which accrue to the shareholders of Chinese target firms where cash 
is used as the sole mode of consideration in comparison to the economic 
benefits that accrue to the shareholders of Chinese target firms where 
alternative modes of consideration are employed.  Here we would remind the 
reader that the alternative modes of consideration commonly used by Chinese 
acquiring firms include exchanging their own shares for shares in the target 
firm, issuing convertible bonds in the acquiring firm in exchange for shares in 
the target firm, the issue of warrants by the acquiring firm, the transfer of 
some of the acquiring firm’s assets to the shareholders of the target firm, the 
repayment of some of the target firm’s debt by the acquiring firm, or some 
combination thereof).  The empirical analysis summarised in chapter seven of 
this dissertation finds that there are significant economic benefits for the 
shareholders of Chinese target firms when cash is used as the sole mode of 
consideration.  In contrast, there are few, if any economic benefits arising for 
the shareholders of Chinese target firms when alternative modes of 
consideration are used to finance M&A activities.  In this chapter, we turn our 
attention to the impact that different modes of consideration can have on the 
economic benefits that accrue to the shareholders of Chinese acquiring firms.  
We ask in particular, whether the economic benefits that accrue to the 
shareholders of Chinese acquiring firms are consistent with the economic 
benefits that accrue to the shareholders of Chinese target firms when cash 
and alternative modes of consideration are used to finance takeovers.  We 
analyse the impact of employing different modes of consideration on Chinese 
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acquiring firms both in terms of the average abnormal returns (AARs) and the 
cumulative average abnormal returns (CAARs) using a 24 -day event window 
surrounding the takeover announcement date.  We then identify potential 
reasons for the differing economic benefits that appear to arise from using 
cash as against alternative modes of consideration for the shareholders of 
Chinese acquiring firms. 
 
We begin our analysis of these issues by reminding the reader that before the 
shareholding structure reform (Guquan Fenzhi Gaige) which took place in 
China in 2005, it was very unusual for anything else but cash to be used as 
the mode of consideration for Chinese takeovers since the large majority of 
Chinese firms were (and continue to be) controlled by the Chinese 
government and only a small number of firms controlled by the Chinese 
government were listed on the Chinese mainland stock exchanges.  It is 
difficult for a firm whose shares are not listed on the stock exchange to 
finance a takeover by exchanging its own shares for those in the target firm 
since the target firm’s shareholders will not be able to determine the price that 
is being offered for their shares.  Because of this, Chinese takeovers have 
traditionally been conducted using cash as the sole mode of consideration.  
However, as noted in section 3.2.3 of chapter three of this dissertation under 
the shareholding structure reforms implemented in 2005, representatives of 
the group of shareholders in a firm with tradable shares (that is, public 
shareholders) can agree terms and conditions for the conversion of non-
tradable shares into tradable shares with representatives of the group of 
shareholders in the firm who hold the non-tradable shares.  The number of 
Chinese firms which are controlled by the Chinese government whose shares 
are listed on the stock exchange has gradually been increasing as a result of 
the shareholding structure reform, although it still remains the case that the 
large majority of Chinese takeovers are financed using cash as the sole mode 
of consideration.  However, it nonetheless remains the case that the 
shareholding structure reform implemented in 2005 has facilitated the use of 
shares in the acquiring firm as the mode of consideration in many takeovers 
and there has been a significant increase in the proportion of takeovers 
financed by the issue of new shares in acquiring firms since that date.  
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The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows: section 8.2 provides a 
brief summary of the prior literature regarding the impact that the mode of 
consideration can have on Chinese acquiring firms in both the Chinese and 
western economies.  Section 8.3 summarises how the data used in our 
empirical analysis is selected.  Section 8.4 provides an analysis of the AARs 
that arise over the event window where cash is used as the sole mode of 
consideration as against the AARs which arise where alternative modes of 
consideration are employed.  The analysis of the AARs is applied in terms of 
the Patell (1976) “t” statistic, the original Corrado (1989) “z” statistic and the 
modified Corrado “z” statistic as developed in Chapter 4 of this dissertation.   
Here, the principal focus of our analysis, however, is with the differences 
which arise in these statistics for Chinese acquiring firms where the takeover 
consideration is solely in cash as against Chinese acquiring firms where 
alternative modes of consideration are employed in the takeover.  Next, 
section 8.5 focuses on the analysis of the CAARs for Chinese acquiring firms 
where the takeover consideration is solely in cash as against the CAARs for 
Chinese acquiring firms where alternative modes of consideration are used in 
takeovers.  Again, our analysis is based on a comparison of the Patell (1976) 
“t” statistics, the Corrado (1989) “z” statistics and the modified Corrado “z” 
statistics which arise for the CAARs of Chinese acquiring firms where the 
takeover consideration is solely in cash as against Chinese acquiring firms 
where alternative modes of consideration are employed.  Section 8.6 outlines 
the implications that our empirical results have for the way that Chinese 
acquiring firms ought to finance their takeovers in order to maximise the 
economic benefits that accrue to their shareholders.  Finally, section 8.7 
provides a brief summary of this chapter and makes a few concluding remarks 
about the economic impact that the various modes of consideration have on 
M&A activities in China. 
 
8.2 A Brief Summary of Prior Literature 
 
It will be recalled from Chapter two of this dissertation there is a large volume 
of work in both western countries as well as in China that deals with the issue 
of whether the economic benefits obtained by Chinese acquiring firms hinge 
on the mode of consideration employed in their M&A activities.   In particular, 
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Chinese work in this area mainly addresses the important question as to 
whether the economic benefits that accrue to the shareholders of acquiring 
firms are larger when the takeover consideration is solely in cash as against 
when the consideration is other than purely in cash.  Unfortunately, the limited 
volume of Chinese empirical work conducted in this area has resulted in 
inconsistent and often contradictory results and is relatively unsophisticated 
when compared to the equivalent work conducted in western economies.  We 
begin this section by briefly summarising the prior western literature in this 
area and this will be followed by a similarly brief review of the relevant 
Chinese literature. 
 
Asquith, Bruner and Mullins (1990) is one of the early western papers that 
deals with the economic benefits that arise for shareholders of acquiring firms 
that use different modes of consideration in their M&A activities.  Asquith, 
Bruner and Mullins (1990) employ a sample of 343 mergers listed on either 
the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) or the American Stock Exchange 
(AMEX) over the period from 1975 till 1983.  Their results indicate that both 
the abnormal percentage returns and the abnormal dollar returns to acquiring 
firms are smaller for stock financed takeovers in comparison to takeovers 
where the mode of consideration is solely in cash.  The Asquith, Bruner and 
Mullins (1990) study is an exemplar for much of the western literature in this 
area which consistently finds that the economic benefits which accrue to the 
shareholders of acquiring firms are larger for takeovers where the 
consideration is in cash in comparison to takeovers where alternative modes 
of consideration are employed.  The empirical work of Martin (1996) provides 
further evidence on this issue.  Martin (1996) employs a sample of 846 
acquisitions listed on either the NYSE or AMEX over the period from 1978 
until 1988.   He finds that the higher the acquiring firm’s growth opportunities, 
the more likely it is that the acquirer will use its own stock to finance a 
takeover.  Moreover, Martin (1996) also finds that the likelihood of an 
acquiring firm financing a takeover with its own stock increases when the pre-
acquisition returns on the acquiring firm’s stock (and the stock market as a 
whole) have been positive and relatively large and that it decreases with the 
acquiring firm’s higher cash availability (e.g. large cash balances on its 
Acquiring Firms: Mode of Consideration  
 277 
balance sheet or the availability of lines of credit that can be readily converted 
into cash), the higher the institutional shareholdings and/or block holdings in 
the acquiring firm and whether the acquiring firm makes a tender offer for the 
target firm. 
 
Using a sample of 311 U.S acquisitions over the period from 1985 to 1996 
Yook (2003) argues that there is no convincing evidence that the abnormal 
returns associated with takeovers are correlated with the mode of 
consideration employed in the takeover.  That is, Yook (2003) found that the 
abnormal returns associated with the takeovers in his sample where the mode 
of consideration was solely in cash were insignificantly different from the 
abnormal returns of the takeovers where the consideration was in the stock of 
the acquiring firm.  However, Yook (2003) also finds that there is some 
evidence that the stock of the acquiring firm might have been used to finance 
the most unsuccessful takeovers.  In contrast, Berkovitch and Narayanan 
(1990) establish analytically that if the market for mergers and acquisitions is 
characterised by asymmetric information then the shareholders of both the 
acquiring firm and the target firm will obtain higher returns when the takeover 
is financed with cash rather than with the stock of the acquiring firm. 
 
Using a sample of 96 acquisitions that occurred in China in 2006, Ge and Ping 
(2009) conclude that non-cash takeovers, which are principally comprised of 
share swap transactions, have positive wealth enhancing effects for the 
shareholders of Chinese acquiring firms over the short term.  In contrast, Ge 
and Ping (2009) find that cash based takeovers do not have significant wealth 
enhancing effects for the shareholders of Chinese acquiring firms.  Zhang, 
Wang and Meng (2007) also note that using cash as the sole mode of 
consideration for Chinese M&A activities can lead to Chinese acquiring firms 
securing pre-emptive rights in the form of a quick takeover.  They note that 
this is the reason why in hostile tender offers especially, cash is typically 
employed as the mode of consideration.  However, Zhang, Wang and Meng 
(2007) also note that in China most acquiring firms lack the free cash flows 
which would enable them to internally finance their M&A activities through 
cash offers.  Hence, whilst share offers occasionally occur in China it is 
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normally the case that acquiring firms raise debt from banks and/or other 
financial institutions so that they can finance their M&A activities purely 
through the medium of cash offers.   
 
8.3 Data Selection 
 
It is important to recall from section 6.3 of chapter six of this dissertation that 
we define a takeover in terms of Article 84(1) of the Measures for the 
Administration of Takeovers of Listed Companies which was promulgated by 
the China Securities Regulation Committee (CSRC) in 2006.  Article 84(1) 
provides that a takeover occurs when an acquiring firm successfully 
purchases more than 50% of the equity shares issued by the listed target firm.  
Based on this definition of a takeover, our initial sample is comprised of 2,448 
Chinese acquiring firms from the Securities Data Company Mergers and 
Acquisitions [SDC (M&A)] Database and covers the period from 1 January, 
1990 until 31 December, 2008.  However, we have previously noted (as in 
section 6.5.2 of this dissertation) that a sample of 250 firms will lead to reliable 
inferences about the magnitude and timing of the abnormal returns that 
accrue to the shareholders of Chinese acquiring firms over this period.  Given 
this, our sampling procedure selected every fifth firm for inclusion in our 
empirical analysis.  This means that we had a potential sample of around 
2448
5
  500 Chinese acquiring firms as the basis of our empirical analysis.  
However, when we exclude firms that did not have share price data available 
on the Datastream system our final sample is comprised of 279 randomly 
selected acquiring firms with A shares on issue, 12 acquiring firms with B 
shares on issue and 27 acquiring firms with H shares on issue.   
 
We confine our research to these 279 Chinese acquiring firms with A shares 
on issue only because of the very limited size of the acquiring firms with B 
shares and H shares on issue.  We begin our analysis by dividing the 279 
Chinese acquiring firms comprising our sample into two groups.1  The first 
                                            
1 Of these, 264 acquiring firms are listed on the two (Shanghai and Shenzhen) Chinese mainland 
stock exchanges whilst the remaining 15 acquiring firms have their shares listed on foreign stock 
exchanges.  Seven of these latter firms are listed on the Nasdaq, three are listed on the NYSE 
(New York Stock Exchange), three are listed on the U.S. OTC Bulletin Board and two are listed on 
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category is comprised of 168 Chinese acquiring firms where cash is the sole 
mode of consideration.  The second category involves those Chinese 
acquiring firms where the mode of consideration for the takeover is other than 
purely in cash.  These alternative modes of consideration include the shares 
of the acquiring firm, convertible bonds issued by the acquiring firm, warrants 
issued by the acquiring firm, the transfer of some of the acquiring firm’s assets 
to the shareholders of the target firm, the repayment of some of the target 
firm’s debt by the acquiring firm, or some combination of all of these.  There 
are 111 acquiring firms in this second category, including 66 acquiring firms 
where the mode of consideration for the takeover is not explicitly stated on the 
SDC (M&A) database.  Again, we conduct our empirical analysis with and 
without the inclusion of these 66 Chinese acquiring firms for which the mode 
of consideration is not explicitly stated.   However, we now find that there are 
significant differences in the results based on the entire sample of 111 
Chinese acquiring firms and the sample of 45 acquiring firms which excludes 
the 66 acquiring firms which do not explicitly specify the exact mode of 
consideration.  Given this, the empirical analysis summarised in subsequent 
sections excludes these 66 Chinese target firms which do not explicitly specify 
the exact mode of consideration; that is, our empirical analysis is based on 
168 Chinese acquiring firms covering the period from 1 January, 1990 until 31 
December, 2008 where cash is the sole mode of consideration and 45 
acquiring firms where the consideration is other than purely in cash.     
 
8.4 Average Abnormal Returns for Cash as against Alternative Modes of 
Consideration for Chinese Acquiring Firms 
 
We commence our analysis by using the OLS and Dimson (1979) betas 
respectively (as in section 4.2 of chapter 4 this dissertation) to calculate the 
average abnormal returns (AARs) for both the 168 Chinese acquiring firms 
where the mode of consideration is solely in cash and the 45 Chinese 
acquiring firms where the mode of consideration is other than purely in cash 
over the event window (-6, +17) trading days.  We then employ the Patell 
                                                                                                                                   
the Hong Kong Stock Exchange.  We conduct our empirical analysis with and without the inclusion 
of these 15 Chinese firms that are listed on foreign stock exchanges.  However, there are no 
significant differences in the results we obtain from including these 15 Chinese foreign listed firms 
and the results we obtain from excluding them from our empirical analysis.   
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(1976) “t” test, the Corrado (1989) test and the Modified Corrado test 
respectively to determine the statistical significance of the abnormal returns 
for our sample of 168 Chinese acquiring firms where cash is the sole mode of 
consideration and the 45 Chinese acquiring firms where the mode of 
consideration is other than purely in cash.   
      
8.4.1 Average Abnormal Returns and Patell (1976) “t” Statistics for 
Chinese Acquiring Firms 
 
A summary of the AARs over the event window using OLS betas and their 
associated Patell (1976) “t” scores for cash as against alternative modes of 
consideration of the Chinese acquiring firms in our sample is provided in 
Table 8.1(a).  Table 8.1(b) contains the AARs and their associated Patell 
(1976) “t” scores using Dimson (1979) betas.  Further details on how the 
Patell (1976) “t” scores were calculated are to be found in section 4.3 of 
chapter 4 this dissertation.  Since there are no significant differences between 
the information summarised in these two tables, we confine our attention to 
the data for OLS betas as summarised in Table 8.1(a).  Hence, the second 
column of Table 8.1(a) shows that based on OLS estimates of beta the 
average abnormal return (AAR) across the 168 Chinese acquiring firms where 
the mode of consideration is solely in cash is positive (though not significantly 
so) in the six trading days prior to the takeover announcement date, on the 
takeover announcement date itself (time zero) and the first day after the 
takeover announcement day (time 1).  These positive AARs reach a peak of 
0.4% on the third trading day prior to the takeover announcement date.  After 
the takeover announcement date there are as many positive as there are 
negative AARs, although the negative AARs tend to be larger in absolute 
magnitude than the positive AARs.  In particular, the AAR reaches a low of -
0.54% over the entire event window on the tenth trading day after the 
takeover announcement date.   
 
The third column of Table 8.1(a) shows that the AARs across the 45 Chinese 
acquiring firms where the mode of consideration is other than purely in cash 
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Table 8.1 (a):  Average Abnormal Returns and Associated Patell “t” 
(1976) Statistics Based on OLS Betas for Chinese Acquiring Firms over 
the Period from 1 January, 1990 until 31 December, 2008  for Cash (N = 
168) as against Alternative (M = 45) Modes of Consideration 
 
Time 
Relative to  
Announce 
Date (0) 
Average 
Abnormal 
Return  
Cash 
Average  
Abnormal 
Return  
Alternatives 
Patell  
“t” Score  
Cash  
Patell  
“t” Score  
Alternatives 
 
Z Score  
Cash vs  
Alternatives 
      
-6 0.0006 0.0013 0.4048 0.3819 0.0162 
-5 0.0027 -0.0012 0.0128 -0.0250 0.0267 
-4 0.0039 0.0013 1.0978 1.4969 -0.2822 
-3 0.0040 0.0026 1.4985 -0.3971 1.3403 
-2 0.0000 0.0035 0.2420 0.9605 -0.5081 
-1 0.0006 -0.0001 0.2670 0.0806 0.1319 
0 0.0003 0.0099 1.0151 1.8712* -0.6053 
1 0.0027 0.0033 0.5985 0.1587 0.3110 
2 -0.0034 0.0066 -0.7189 0.5231 -0.8782 
3 0.0001 0.0038 -1.4123 -0.0233 -0.9822 
4 -0.0023 0.0008 -1.3254 -0.2479 -0.7619 
5 -0.0021 -0.0034 -0.3687 -0.7666 0.2814 
6 -0.0003 0.0075 0.0904 0.6848 -0.4203 
7 0.0002 -0.0003 -0.2185 -0.2024 -0.0113 
8 0.0023 -0.0054 1.4712 -1.0630 1.7920* 
9 -0.0031 -0.0106 -2.1239# -2.2499# 0.0891 
10 -0.0054 -0.0037 -2.1709# -0.8125 -0.9605 
11 0.0010 0.0082 0.4887 2.4612$ -1.3948 
12 -0.0006 0.0026 0.1814 0.7921 -0.4319 
13 0.0005 -0.0070 0.4292 -1.1398 1.1094 
14 -0.0004 -0.0010 -0.2143 0.2936 -0.3591 
15 0.0025 0.0054 1.6065 0.9603 0.4570 
16 0.0007 -0.0016 0.3737 -0.2108 0.4133 
17 0.0001 -0.0059 -0.0580 -0.7844 0.5137 
      
 
* significant at 10%; # significant at 5%; $ significant at 1% (two tailed test) 
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Table 8.1 (b):  Average Abnormal Returns and Associated Patell (1976) 
“t” Statistics Based on Dimson (1979) Betas for Chinese Acquiring 
Firms over the Period from 1 January, 1990 until 31 December, 2008  for 
Cash (N = 168) as against Alternative (M = 45) Modes of Consideration  
 
Time 
Relative to  
Announce 
Date (0) 
Average 
Abnormal 
Return  
Cash 
Average  
Abnormal 
Return  
Alternatives 
Patell  
“t”Score  
Cash  
Patell  
“t” Score  
Alternatives 
 
Z Score  
Cash vs  
Alternatives 
      
-6 0.0014 0.0006 0.5483 0.2373 0.2199 
-5 0.0027 -0.0026 -0.1176 -0.4113 0.2077 
-4 0.0036 0.0020 1.0050 1.5222 -0.3657 
-3 0.0037 0.0037 1.4079 -0.2260 1.1553 
-2 -0.0011 0.0046 -0.1272 1.1402 -0.8962 
-1 0.0012 0.0020 0.4011 0.8054 -0.2859 
0 0.0006 0.0092 0.9678 1.9598* -0.7015 
1 0.0023 0.0026 0.4688 0.0744 0.2789 
2 -0.0039 0.0036 -0.9175 0.2471 -0.8235 
3 -0.0006 0.0024 -1.6044 -0.2038 -0.9904 
4 -0.0029 -0.0018 -1.5348 -0.5380 -0.7048 
5 -0.0023 -0.0017 -0.4725 -0.6377 0.1168 
6 0.0003 0.0087 0.3683 0.8940 -0.3717 
7 -0.0001 0.0006 -0.2588 0.0426 -0.2131 
8 0.0019 -0.0057 1.2823 -1.1392 1.7122* 
9 -0.0035 -0.0113 -2.2860# -2.4350# 0.1053 
10 -0.0049 -0.0034 -1.9346* -0.8299 -0.7811 
11 0.0014 0.0063 0.6044 2.1107# -1.0651 
12 -0.0003 0.0021 0.2570 0.5595 -0.2139 
13 0.0006 -0.0082 0.5330 -1.4823 1.4250 
14 -0.0003 0.0002 -0.1272 0.5296 -0.4645 
15 0.0024 0.0071 1.4660 1.3241 0.1004 
16 0.0006 -0.0008 0.4099 -0.1598 0.4028 
17 0.0002 -0.0039 -0.0381 -0.4532 0.2935 
      
 
* significant at 10%; # significant at 5%; $ significant at 1% (two tailed test) 
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tend to be small and generally positive from the sixth trading day before the 
takeover announcement date until the day prior to the takeover 
announcement date itself.  On the takeover announcement date, however, the 
AAR peaks at a high of 1% over the entire event window.  The AARs then fall 
away reaching a minimum of -1.06% for the entire event window on the ninth 
trading day following the takeover announcement date.  However, even during 
this period of the event window there are a few sizable positive AARs – as on 
the sixth trading day and the eleventh trading day after the takeover 
announcement date where the AARs are 075% and 0.82%, respectively.  The 
overall trends of the AARs over the event window for cash as against 
alternative modes of consideration are to be found in Figure 8.1(a) for OLS 
betas and Figure 8.1(b) for Dimson (1979) betas.  Note how both graphs as 
well as the summary information in Table 8.1(a) and Table 8.1(b) show that 
over the event window the AARs accruing to the shareholders of Chinese 
acquiring firms where alternative modes of consideration are employed (that 
is, other than purely in cash) far exceed the AARs for shareholders of 
acquiring firms where cash is the sole mode of consideration.  We now 
provide a brief summary of the possible reasons why the AARs of Chinese 
acquiring firms that use alternative modes of consideration are larger than the 
AARs of Chinese acquiring firms where cash is the sole mode of 
consideration.   A more detailed consideration of this issue, however, is 
deferred until section 8.6 of this chapter. 
 
We have previously noted (as in section 2.6 of chapter two of this dissertation) 
that when a listed acquiring firm’s shares are over-valued in the market then it 
will have an incentive to offer its own shares in exchange for the shares of the 
target firm.  This reduces the cost of the takeover to the acquiring firm and 
thereby results in larger economic benefits for its shareholders.  Here it is 
important to note that the Chinese Economy Reform and Opening Up Policy 
initiated by Chairman Deng Xiaoping in the early 1980’s combined with 
China’s entry into the World Trade Organisation in 2001 has resulted in an 
unparalleled period of growth for shares of firms listed on the two mainland  
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Figure 8.1 (a):  Average Abnormal Returns Based on OLS Betas for Chinese 
Acquiring Firms over the Period from 1 January, 1990 until 31 December, 2008  
for Cash (N = 168) as against Alternative (M = 45) Modes of Consideration 
 
 
 
Chinese stock exchanges, some of which are undoubtedly overvalued.  These 
Chinese firms will thus have incentives to employ their own stock as 
consideration in their M&A activities.  This provides one possible explanation 
as to why the economic benefits that accrue to the Chinese acquiring firms in 
our sample that use alternative modes of consideration (e.g. stock of the 
acquiring firm, assets of the acquiring firm, convertible bonds, warrants, etc. or 
a mixture thereof – all of which are likely to be overvalued) are larger than the 
economic benefits which accrue to the Chinese acquiring firms where cash is 
used as the sole mode of consideration.  Moreover, consideration in the form 
of a share exchange may enable the target firm’s shareholders to defer the 
incidence of capital gains taxes in contrast to an offer in cash where capital 
gains tax would have to be paid immediately.  A more detailed consideration 
of this issue is to be found in section 8.6 of this chapter. 
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Figure 8.1 (b):  Average Abnormal Returns Based on Dimson (1979) Betas for 
Chinese Acquiring Firms over the Period from 1 January, 1990 until 31 
December, 2008 for Cash (N = 168) as against Alternative (M = 45) Modes of 
Consideration 
 
 
. 
 
The fourth column of Table 8.1(a) summarises the Patell (1976) “t” statistics 
associated with the AARs of Chinese acquiring firms where cash is the sole 
mode of consideration.  We have previously noted that the AARs over the 
period leading up to the takeover announcement date are all positive.  
However, none of the Patell (1976) “t” statistics associated with the AARs for 
this period, as summarised in the fourth column of Table 8.1(a), turn out to be 
statistically significant at generally accepted levels.  However, the AARs 
beyond the takeover announcement date generally fall away so much so that 
on the ninth and tenth trading days after the takeover announcement date the 
AARs are -0.31% and -0.54% respectively and return significant Patell (1976) 
“t” statistics (at the 5% level) of -2.1239 and -2.1709, respectively.   
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The fifth column of Table 8.1(a) summarises the Patell (1976) “t” statistics 
associated with the AARs of Chinese acquiring firms where the mode of 
consideration is other than purely in cash.  This shows that when alternative 
modes of consideration are used by Chinese acquiring firms the Patell (1976) 
“t” statistics are generally small and insignificantly positive in the run up to the 
takeover announcement date.  On the takeover announcement date itself the 
AAR peaks at 1% with a marginally significant Patell “t” statistic of 1.8712.  
Beyond this date the AARs tend to fall way so much so that by the ninth 
trading day following the takeover announcement date the AAR reaches a low 
over the event window of -1.06% with a significant (at the 5% level) Patell “t” 
statistic of 2.2499.  Interestingly, the ARR on the eleventh trading day after the 
takeover announcement date is positive and highly significant (Patell “t” 
statistic, 2.4612) but this represents a hiatus in what is generally a downward 
spiral in the AARs after the takeover announcement date. 
 
Our analysis up to this point suggests that the AARs accruing to the 
shareholders of Chinese acquiring firms where alternative modes of 
consideration are used tend to be larger than the AARs for shareholders of 
Chinese acquiring firms where cash is the sole mode of consideration.  We 
now use the Patell (1976) “t” statistics associated with the AARs over the 
event window for the Chinese acquiring firms comprising our sample to 
formally test this hypothesis.  The test statistic is identical to that employed in 
section 7.4.1 of chapter seven of this dissertation.  In particular, we define 
z
c
it
__
 = 
1
N
 
i=1
N
 z
c
it to be the average Patell (1976) “t” statistic for the abnormal 
returns across the N = 168 Chinese acquiring firms during the tth day of the 
event window when the takeover consideration is solely in cash.  Moreover, 
sˆ2(z
c
it) = 
1
N
 
i=1
N
 (z
c
it - z
c
it
__
)2 will be the variance of the Patell (1976) “t” statistics for 
the tth day of the event window when the takeover consideration is solely in 
cash.  We also define z
o
it to be the Patell (1976) “t” statistic corresponding to 
the abnormal return for the ith acquiring firm on the tth day of the event window 
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where the takeover consideration is other than purely in cash.  It then follows 
that z
o
it
__
 = 
1
M
 
i=1
M
 z
o
it will be the average Patell (1976) “t” statistic across the 
M = 45 firms during the tth day of the event window where the takeover 
consideration is other than purely in cash.  Moreover, sˆ2(z
o
it) = 
1
M
 
i=1
M
 (z
o
it - z
o
it
__
)2 
will be the variance of the Patell (1976) “t” statistics for the tth day of the event 
window where the takeover consideration is other than purely in cash.  One 
can then test the hypothesis that the mean Patell (1976) “t” statistic, z
c
it
__
, for 
takeovers where the consideration is solely in cash is identical to the mean 
Patell (1976) “t” statistic, z
o
it
__
, for takeovers where the consideration is other 
than purely in cash by using the statistic: 
 
z
co
t
__
 = 
1
2
{
z
c
it
__
N
sˆ(z
c
it)
 - 
z
o
it
__
M
sˆ(z
o
it)
} 
 
The z
co
t
__
 statistic given above is asymptotically distributed as a standard 
normal variate (Fisz, 1963, p. 197).  Moreover, testing the hypothesis that z
co
t
__
 
is insignificantly different from zero is equivalent to testing the hypothesis that 
the mean abnormal return on the tth day of the event window for acquiring 
firms where the consideration is solely in cash is the same as the mean 
abnormal return on the tth day of the event window for acquiring firms where 
the consideration is other than purely in cash. 
The sixth column of Table 8.1(a) summarises the z
co
t
__
 statistic for each trading 
day, t = -6, -5, -4,____, 15, 16, 17, of the event window.  The z
co
t
__
 statistics 
summarised in this column are generally insignificant apart from the eighth 
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trading day after the takeover announcement date where z
co
8
__
 = 1.7920 which 
is marginally significant at the 10% level.  This indicates that there are virtually 
no differences between the AARs that accrue to the shareholders of Chinese 
acquiring firms where the consideration is solely in cash and the AARs that 
accrue to the shareholders of Chinese acquiring firms where the consideration 
is other than purely in cash. 
 
 8.4.2 Average Abnormal Returns and Corrado (1989) “Z” Statistics for 
Chinese Acquiring Firms 
 
A summary of the average abnormal returns (AARs) over the event window 
using OLS betas and their associated Corrado (1989) “z” statistics for Chinese 
acquiring firms where cash is used as the sole mode of consideration as 
against the AARs and Corrado (1989) “z” statistics for acquiring firms where 
alternative modes of consideration are used, is contained in Table 8.2(a).  
Table 8.2(b) summarises the AARs and their associated Corrado (1989) “z” 
statistics using Dimson (1979) betas.  Further details of how the Corrado “z” 
statistics were calculated are to be found in section 4.2 of chapter four of this 
dissertation and in abridged form, in section 7.4.2 of chapter seven of this 
dissertation.  Since there are no significant differences between the 
information summarised in Table 8.2(a) and Table 8.2(b), we confine our 
attention to the data for OLS. betas as summarised in Table 8.2(a).  It is also 
important to emphasise that the AARs summarised in the second and third 
columns of Table 8.2(a) for cash as against alternative modes of 
consideration are the same as the AARs summarised in the second and third 
columns of Table 8.1(a).  Similarly, the AARs summarised in the second and 
third columns of Table 8.2(b) are the same as the AARs summarised in the 
second and third columns of Table 8.1(b).  A pictorial summary of the AARs 
based on OLS betas is to be found in Figure 8.1(a) and for Dimson (1979) 
betas, in Figure 8.1(b) in the previous section of this chapter. 
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Table 8.2 (a):  Average Abnormal Returns and Associated Corrado (1989) 
Statistics Based on OLS Betas for Chinese Acquiring Firms over the 
Period from 1 January, 1990 until 31 December, 2008  for Cash (N = 168)  
as against Alternative (M = 45) Modes of Consideration 
 
Time 
Relative to  
Announce 
Date (0) 
Average 
Abnormal 
Return  
Cash 
Average  
Abnormal 
Return  
Alternatives 
Corrado 
Z Score  
Cash  
Corrado 
Z Score  
Alternatives 
 
Z Score  
Cash vs  
Alternatives 
      
-6 0.0006 0.0013 -0.0903 0.1042 -0.1375 
-5 0.0027 -0.0012 -0.6625 0.1064 -0.5436 
-4 0.0039 0.0013 0.4166 0.8799 -0.3276 
-3 0.0040 0.0026 1.7035* -0.3986 1.4864 
-2 0.0000 0.0035 -0.2023 0.8864 -0.7698 
-1 0.0006 -0.0001 1.0258 -0.1042 0.7990 
0 0.0003 0.0099 2.8548$ 1.8793* 0.6898 
1 0.0027 0.0033 0.5004 0.6242 -0.0876 
2 -0.0034 0.0066 -1.3804 2.0639# -2.4355# 
3 0.0001 0.0038 -1.5544 0.9659 -1.7821* 
4 -0.0023 0.0008 -1.3249 0.2998 -1.1488 
5 -0.0021 -0.0034 -0.9203 -0.2353 -0.4844 
6 -0.0003 0.0075 0.7397 1.6879* -0.6704 
7 0.0002 -0.0003 -0.0946 -0.4910 0.2803 
8 0.0023 -0.0054 0.8985 -1.2366 1.5098 
9 -0.0031 -0.0106 -1.6621* -1.4257 -0.1672 
10 -0.0054 -0.0037 -2.3768# -0.3234 -1.4520 
11 0.0010 0.0082 0.5243 2.4485# -1.3606 
12 -0.0006 0.0026 -0.9866 0.2718 -0.8899 
13 0.0005 -0.0070 -0.1262 -1.4364 0.9265 
14 -0.0004 -0.0010 -0.8909 -0.6951 -0.1384 
15 0.0025 0.0054 0.5744 0.6908 -0.0824 
16 0.0007 -0.0016 0.1534 -0.5855 0.5225 
17 0.0001 -0.0059 -0.3165 -1.1251 0.5717 
      
 
* significant at 10%; # significant at 5%; $ significant at 1% (two tailed test) 
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Table 8.2 (b):  Average Abnormal Returns and Associated Corrado 
(1989) Statistics Based on Dimson (1979) Betas for Chinese Acquiring 
Firms over the Period from 1 January, 1990 until 31 December, 2008  for 
Cash (N = 168) as against Alternative (M = 45) Modes of Consideration  
 
Time 
Relative to  
Announce 
Date (0) 
Average 
Abnormal 
Return  
Cash 
Average  
Abnormal 
Return  
Alternatives 
Corrado 
Z Score  
Cash  
Corrado  
Z Score  
Alternatives 
 
Z Score  
Cash vs  
Alternatives 
      
-6 0.0014 0.0006 0.2211 -0.2196 0.3117 
-5 0.0027 -0.0026 -0.6164 -0.3213 -0.2087 
-4 0.0036 0.0020 0.3023 1.0201 -0.5075 
-3 0.0037 0.0037 1.6965* -0.2780 1.3962 
-2 -0.0011 0.0046 -0.5790 0.7605 -0.9472 
-1 0.0012 0.0020 1.3546 0.6804 0.4767 
0 0.0006 0.0092 2.7599$ 1.8468* 0.6456 
1 0.0023 0.0026 0.3771 0.5052 -0.0906 
2 -0.0039 0.0036 -1.8599* 1.6648 -2.4924$ 
3 -0.0006 0.0024 -1.7980* 0.6804 -1.7525* 
4 -0.0029 -0.0018 -1.6014 -0.2780 -0.9358 
5 -0.0023 -0.0017 -0.8696 0.0422 -0.6447 
6 0.0003 0.0087 0.9262 1.8855* -0.6783 
7 -0.0001 0.0006 -0.3194 -0.2867 -0.0232 
8 0.0019 -0.0057 0.8087 -1.2321 1.4431 
9 -0.0035 -0.0113 -1.8279* -1.6043 -0.1581 
10 -0.0049 -0.0034 -2.0576# 0.0400 -1.4832 
11 0.0014 0.0063 0.4124 2.1214# -1.2084 
12 -0.0003 0.0021 -0.8429 -0.1006 -0.5249 
13 0.0006 -0.0082 -0.0021 -1.6302 1.1512 
14 -0.0003 0.0002 -0.6976 -0.5268 -0.1208 
15 0.0024 0.0071 0.2970 1.0417 -0.5266 
16 0.0006 -0.0008 0.3910 -0.2997 0.4884 
17 0.0002 -0.0039 -0.2077 -0.9907 0.5537 
      
 
* significant at 10%; # significant at 5%; $ significant at 1% (two tailed test) 
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The fourth column of Table 8.2(a) summarises the Corrado “z” statistics 
associated with the AARs of Chinese acquiring firms where the mode of 
consideration is solely in cash.  This column shows that when cash is used as 
the sole mode of consideration, the AARs that accrue to the shareholders of 
Chinese acquiring firms in the run up to the takeover announcement date are 
all positive though not always significantly different from zero.  However, on 
the third trading day prior to the takeover announcement date the AAR has a 
marginally significant Corrado “z” statistic of 1.7035 and on the takeover 
announcement date itself, the Corrado “z” statistic, 2.8548, associated with 
the AAR is highly significant (at the 1% level).  In contrast, after the takeover 
announcement date the AARs which accrue to the shareholders of Chinese 
acquiring firms gradually decay away and become insignificantly different from 
zero.  Indeed, on the ninth trading day after the takeover announcement date 
the AAR is -0.31% with a Corrado “z” statistic of -1.6621 which is marginally 
significant. On the tenth trading day following the takeover announcement 
date the AAR reaches a low over the event window of slightly more than 
minus one half of one percent with a significant (at the 5% level) Corrado “z” 
statistic of -2.3768.  We conclude from this that shareholders of Chinese 
acquiring firms obtain economic benefits for only a very short period 
surrounding the takeover announcement date, after which the AARs decay 
quickly away.  In other words, there are few, if any, economic benefits (and 
probably economic losses) for the shareholders of Chinese acquiring firms 
beyond the takeover announcement date. 
 
The fifth column of Table 8.2(a) summarises the Corrado “z” statistics 
associated with the average abnormal returns (AARs) for the shareholders of 
Chinese acquiring firms where the consideration is other than purely in cash; 
that is, for alternative modes of consideration.  The results summarised in this 
fifth column of the table show that when alternative modes of consideration 
are used the Corrado (1989) “z” statistics corresponding to the AARs which 
accrue to the shareholders of Chinese acquiring firms are insignificant up until 
the takeover announcement date itself.  On the takeover announcement date, 
however, there is a positive and significant AAR for the shareholder of 
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Chinese acquiring firms (Corrado “z” statistic, 1.8793) Moreover, on the 
second trading day subsequent to the takeover announcement date there is 
also a positive and significant AAR (Corrado “z” statistic, 2.0639).  However, 
even though the AARs beyond the second trading day following the takeover 
announcement date tend to be predominantly negative and insignificantly 
different from zero, there are still significant and positive AARs on the sixth 
trading day after the announcement date (Corrado “z” statistic, 1.6879) and 
the eleventh trading day following the takeover announcement date (Corrado 
“z” statistic, 2.4485).  From this, we conclude that the shareholders of Chinese 
acquiring firms where alternative modes of consideration are employed obtain 
significant and positive AARs in a narrow window beyond the takeover 
announcement date.  However, as the event window proceeds, the positive 
AARs have a tendency to fall away and eventually become negative, although 
even here there are still occasions over the event window where positive and 
significant AARs are earned. 
 
Having summarised the empirical evidence relating to the AARs earned by 
Chinese acquiring firms we now address the issue of whether there are any 
significant differences in the AARs according to whether cash is employed as 
the sole mode of consideration or an alternative mode of consideration is 
used.  One can test this hypothesis by using the mean Corrado (1989) “z” 
statistic, z
c
ct, associated with the AARs that arise on the t
th day of the event 
window for Chinese acquiring firms where the mode of consideration is solely 
in cash and the mean Corrado (1989) “z” statistic, z
o
ct, associated with the 
AARs that arise on the tth day of the event window for acquiring firms where 
the consideration is other than purely in cash.  Our testing procedure is based 
on the following statistic: 
        
                                                      z
co
ct  = 
z
c
ct - z
o
ct
2
 
 
where z
co
ct  is asymptotically distributed as a standard normal variate (Fisz, 
1963, p. 197).  In particular, testing the hypothesis that z
co
ct  is insignificantly 
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different from zero is equivalent to testing the hypothesis that the mean AAR 
on the tth day of the event window for Chinese acquiring firms where the 
consideration is solely in cash is the same as the mean AAR on the tth day of 
the event window for acquiring firms where the consideration is other than 
purely in cash.  Further details about the derivation of the above test statistic 
are to be found in section 7.4.2 of chapter seven of this dissertation.   
 
The sixth column of Table 8.2(a) summarises the z
co
ct  statistics for each 
trading day, t = -6, -5, -4,____, 15, 16, 17 over the event window.  This 
column shows that there are no significant z
co
ct  statistics over the event 
window before the second trading day following the takeover announcement 
date. However, on both the second and third trading days subsequent to the 
takeover announcement date the z
co
ct  statistics are negative and significantly 
different from zero (z
co
c2 = -2.4355 and z
co
c3 = -1.7821, respectively.).  Moreover, 
there are no significant z
co
ct  statistics beyond this point in the event window.  
The z
co
ct  statistics summarised here imply that the shareholders of Chinese 
acquiring firms where alternative modes of consideration are employed obtain 
significantly larger mean AARs than the shareholders of Chinese acquiring 
firms where the consideration is solely in cash only over a very narrow window 
immediately after the takeover announcement date.  Over the remainder of 
the event window, however, the z
co
ct  statistics summarised in the sixth column 
of Table 8.2(a) are compatible with the hypothesis that there are no 
differences in the mean AARs which accrue to the shareholders of Chinese 
acquiring firms where cash is used as the sole mode of consideration and the 
mean AARs that accrue to the shareholders of Chinese acquiring firms where 
alternative modes of consideration are employed. 
 
8.4.3 Average Abnormal Returns and Modified Corrado “Z” Statistics 
for Chinese Acquiring Firms 
 
A summary of the average abnormal returns (AARs) over the event window 
using OLS betas and their associated modified Corrado “z” statistics for cash 
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as against alternative modes of consideration for the Chinese acquiring firms 
in our sample is provided in Table 8.3(a).  Table 8.3(b) is comprised of the 
AARs and their associated modified Corrado “z” statistics using Dimson 
(1979) betas.  Further details of how the modified Corrado “z” statistics for the 
AARs were calculated are to be found in section 4.2 of chapter four of this 
dissertation.  Since there are no significant differences between the 
information summarised in Table 8.3(a) and Table 8.3(b), we shall henceforth 
focus on the data for OLS betas as summarised in Table 8.3(a).   
 
It is also important to highlight that the AARs summarised in the second and 
third columns of Table 8.3(a) for cash as against the alternative modes of 
consideration are the same as the AARs summarised in the second and third 
columns of Table 8.1(a) and Table 8.2(a).  Likewise, the AARs summarised in 
the second and third columns of Table 8.3(b) are the same as the AARs 
summarised in the second and third columns of Table 8.1(b) and Table 8.2(b).  
A pictorial summary of the AARs based on OLS betas is to be found in Figure 
8.1(a) and for Dimson (1979) betas, in Figure 8.1(b) in section 8.4.1 of this 
chapter.  The fourth column of Table 8.3(a) summarises the modified Corrado 
“z” statistics associated with the AARs of Chinese acquiring firms where the 
mode of consideration is solely in cash.  This column shows that in the run up 
to the takeover announcement date the AARs are all positive though not 
significantly so, apart from the third trading day prior to the takeover 
announcement date where the modified Corrado “z” statistic is marginally 
significant 1.8705.  Moreover, on the takeover announcement date itself whilst 
the modified Corrado “z” statistic is highly significant at 2.7653, the AAR is a 
miserly 0.03%.    Beyond the takeover announcement date, the AARs decay 
away over the entire event window so much so that there are significantly 
negative AARs on the ninth (-0.3%) and tenth (-0.5%) trading days following 
the takeover announcement date with modified Corrado “z” statistics of -
1.7684 and -2.5320, respectively. 
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Table 8.3 (a):  Average Abnormal Returns and Associated Modified Corrado 
Statistics Based on OLS Betas for Chinese Acquiring Firms over the Period 
from 1 January, 1990 until 31 December, 2008  for Cash (N = 168) as against 
Alternative (M = 45) Modes of Consideration 
 
Time 
Relative to  
Announce 
Date (0) 
Average 
Abnormal 
Return  
Cash 
Average  
Abnormal 
Return  
Alternatives 
Modified 
Corrado 
Z Score  
Cash  
Modified 
Corrado 
Z Score  
Alternatives 
 
Z Score  
Cash vs  
Alternatives 
      
-6 0.0006 0.0013 -0.5522 0.2854 -0.5923 
-5 0.0027 -0.0012 -0.7218 -0.2324 -0.3461 
-4 0.0039 0.0013 0.4602 1.1074 -0.4577 
-3 0.0040 0.0026 1.8705* -0.4709 1.6557* 
-2 0.0000 0.0035 -0.2190 0.9164 -0.8028 
-1 0.0006 -0.0001 1.1271 0.1492 0.6915 
0 0.0003 0.0099 2.7653$ 1.8487* 0.6481 
1 0.0027 0.0033 0.5498 0.5301 0.0140 
2 -0.0034 0.0066 -1.6359 1.8108* -2.4372# 
3 0.0001 0.0038 -1.7025* 0.9566 -1.8803* 
4 -0.0023 0.0008 -1.5892 -0.0885 -1.0611 
5 -0.0021 -0.0034 -0.8040 -0.0017 -0.5673 
6 -0.0003 0.0075 0.8417 2.2258# -0.9787 
7 0.0002 -0.0003 -0.2221 -0.3245 0.0724 
8 0.0023 -0.0054 0.9435 -1.2468 1.5488 
9 -0.0031 -0.0106 -1.7684* -1.4815 -0.2029 
10 -0.0054 -0.0037 -2.5320$ -0.6108 -1.3585 
11 0.0010 0.0082 0.4657 2.3835# -1.3561 
12 -0.0006 0.0026 -1.0861 0.2321 -0.9321 
13 0.0005 -0.0070 -0.0286 -1.6311 1.1331 
14 -0.0004 -0.0010 -0.9729 -0.7230 -0.1767 
15 0.0025 0.0054 0.5674 1.1771 -0.4311 
16 0.0007 -0.0016 0.1938 -0.7470 0.6653 
17 0.0001 -0.0059 -0.3294 -0.9533 0.4412 
      
 
* significant at 10%; # significant at 5%; $ significant at 1% (two tailed test) 
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Table 8.3 (b):  Average Abnormal Returns and Associated Modified Corrado 
Statistics Based on Dimson (1979) Betas for Chinese Acquiring Firms over the 
Period from 1 January, 1990 until 31 December, 2008  for Cash (N = 168) as 
against Alternative (M = 45) Modes of Consideration  
 
Time 
Relative to  
Announce 
Date (0) 
Average 
Abnormal 
Return  
Cash 
Average  
Abnormal 
Return  
Alternatives 
Modified 
Corrado 
Z Score  
Cash  
Modified 
Corrado  
Z Score  
Alternatives 
 
Z Score  
Cash vs  
Alternatives 
      
-6 0.0014 0.0006 -0.1429 0.1338 -0.1957 
-5 0.0027 -0.0026 -0.6851 -0.3385 -0.2451 
-4 0.0036 0.0020 0.3442 1.0890 -0.5266 
-3 0.0037 0.0037 1.8970* -0.2933 1.5488 
-2 -0.0011 0.0046 -0.6402 0.8150 -1.0290 
-1 0.0012 0.0020 1.5161 0.7287 0.5568 
0 0.0006 0.0092 2.5423$ 1.6654* 0.6201 
1 0.0023 0.0026 0.4234 0.5414 -0.0835 
2 -0.0039 0.0036 -2.0725# 1.7764* -2.7216$ 
3 -0.0006 0.0024 -2.0066# 0.7274 -1.9332* 
4 -0.0029 -0.0018 -1.7874* -0.2936 -1.0563 
5 -0.0023 -0.0017 -0.9734 0.0494 -0.7232 
6 0.0003 0.0087 1.0421 2.0111# -0.6852 
7 -0.0001 0.0006 -0.3533 -0.3016 -0.0366 
8 0.0019 -0.0057 0.9063 -1.3092 1.5666 
9 -0.0035 -0.0113 -2.0488# -1.7051* -0.2430 
10 -0.0049 -0.0034 -2.2921# 0.0464 -1.6536 
11 0.0014 0.0063 0.4609 2.2630# -1.2743 
12 -0.0003 0.0021 -0.9419 -0.1037 -0.5927 
13 0.0006 -0.0082 0.0010 -1.7328* 1.2260 
14 -0.0003 0.0002 -0.7832 -0.5594 -0.1583 
15 0.0024 0.0071 0.3324 1.1130 -0.5520 
16 0.0006 -0.0008 0.4409 -0.3154 0.5348 
17 0.0002 -0.0039 -0.2144 -0.8028 0.4161 
      
 
* significant at 10%; # significant at 5%; $ significant at 1% (two tailed test) 
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The fifth column of Table 8.3(a) summarises the modified Corrado “z” 
statistics corresponding to the AARs for shareholders of Chinese acquiring 
firms where the consideration is other than purely in cash; that is, for 
alternative modes of consideration.  The results summarised in this column of 
Table 8.3(a) show that when alternative modes of consideration are 
employed, the modified Corrado “z” statistics associated with the AARs are 
insignificantly different from zero in the run up to the takeover announcement 
date. However, on the takeover announcement date itself the AAR reaches a 
peak over the event window of 0.99% with a marginally significant modified 
Corrado “z” statistic of 1.8487.  There is also a significantly positive AAR of 
0.66% (modified Corrado “z” statistic, 1.8108) on the second trading day after 
the takeover announcement date, a significantly positive AAR of 0.75% 
(modified Corrado “z” statistic, 2.2258) on the sixth trading day following the 
takeover announcement date and a significantly positive AAR of 0.82% 
(modified Corrado “z” statistic, 2.3835) on the eleventh trading day 
subsequent to the takeover announcement date.  Given this, it appears that 
there are significant economic benefits beyond the takeover announcement 
date for the shareholders of Chinese acquiring firms where alternative modes 
of consideration are used to finance their M&A activities. 
 
Our analysis up to this point suggests that the AARs accruing to the 
shareholders of Chinese acquiring firms where alternative modes of 
consideration are used tend to be larger than the AARs for the shareholders 
of Chinese acquiring firms where cash is the sole mode of consideration.  We 
now use the modified Corrado “z” statistics associated with the AARs over the 
event window for the Chinese acquiring firms comprising our sample to 
formally test this hypothesis.  The test is identical to that employed in section 
7.4.3 of chapter seven of this dissertation and is based on the following 
statistic:   
 
z
co
t
__
 = 
1
2
{z
c
it
__
N - z
o
it
__
M} 
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where z
c
it
__
 = 
1
N
 
i=1
N
 z
c
it is the average modified Corrado “z” statistic for the AARs 
on the tth day of the event window across the N = 169 firms where the 
takeover consideration is solely in cash and z
o
it
__
 = 
1
M
 
i=1
M
 z
o
it is the average 
modified Corrado statistic on the tth day of the event window across the 
M = 45 firms where the takeover consideration is other than purely in cash.  
Moreover, the test satistic, z
co
t
__
, is asymptotically distributed as a standard 
normal variate (Fisz, 1963, p. 197) and is equivalent to testing the hypothesis 
that the AARs on the tth day of the event window for Chinese acquiring firms 
where the consideration is solely in cash is the same as the AARs on the tth 
day of the event window for Chinese acquiring firms where the consideration 
is other than purely in cash.  Further details pertaining to the test statistic are 
to be found in section 7.4.3 of this dissertation. 
Now, the sixth column of Table 8.3(a) summarises the z
co
t
__
 test statistic for 
each trading day of the event window.  This column shows that the test 
statistic is positive and marginally significant (z
co
-3
__
 = 1.6557) on the third 
trading day before the takeover announcement date.  In contrast, the test 
statistic is negative and significantly different from zero on both the second 
trading day after the announcement date (z
co
2
__
 = -2.4372) and the third trading 
day subsequent to the takeover announcement date (z
co
3
__
 = -1.8803).  Hence, 
the test statistic returns mixed results about the economic benefits which 
accrue to the shareholders of Chinese acquiring firms that use cash as the 
sole mode of consideration when compared to acquiring firms that use 
alternative modes of consideration in their M&A activities.   However, here we 
would make the point that the negative test statistics for the second and third 
trading days after the takeover announcement date are more compelling than 
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the marginally significant and positive test statistic that occurs on the third 
trading day before the takeover announcement date.  Hence, on balance it 
appears that there are marginally larger economic benefits for shareholders of 
Chinese acquiring firms that use alternative modes of consideration in 
comparison to acquiring firms where cash is used as the sole mode of 
consideration.  But we would emphasise again that the differences in 
economic benefits arising between the two modes of consideration are 
marginal at best.   
 
8.4.4 A Summary and Comparison of Patell, Corrado and Modified 
Corrado Results on Average Abnormal Returns Accruing to 
Shareholders of Chinese Acquiring Firms 
 
The analysis conducted in section 8.4.1, section 8.4.2 and section 8.4.3, 
shows that the Patell (1976) “t” statistics, the Corrado (1989) “z” statistics and 
the modified Corrado “z” statistics associated with the average abnormal 
returns (AARs) tell much the same story about the economic benefits that 
accrue to the shareholders of Chinese acquiring firms when cash is used as 
the sole mode of consideration in their M&A activities.  The Corrado (1989) “z” 
statistics and the modified Corrado “z” statistics show that there are no 
significant economic benefits for shareholders of Chinese acquiring firms over 
the entire event window apart from those which arise on the takeover 
announcement date itself.  The Patell (1976) “t” statistics also show that there 
are no significant economic benefits for shareholders over the event window, 
even on the takeover announcement date itself.  Indeed, apart from the 
economic benefits that arise on the takeover announcement date itself, all 
three tests show that there are occasional and significant economic losses 
over the event window for the shareholders of Chinese acquiring firms when 
cash is used as the sole mode of consideration (as with the ninth and tenth 
trading days after the takeover announcement date as summarised in Tables 
8.1(a), 8.2(a) and 8.3(a)).  In contrast, there are occasional and significant 
economic benefits on and after the takeover announcement date for the 
shareholders of Chinese acquiring firms where alternative modes of 
consideration are used (as with the takeover announcement date, and the 
sixth and eleventh trading days after the takeover announcement date as 
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summarised in Tables 8.1(a), 8.2(a) and 8.3(a)).  However, in the case of the 
Patell “t” test, these significant economic benefits are interspersed with 
significant economic losses (as with the ninth trading day after the takeover 
announcement date as summarised in Tables 8.1(a)).  Furthermore, our 
analysis based on the z
co
t
__
 statistics associated with the Patell (1976) “t” 
statistics and the modified Corrado “z” statistics (section 8.4.1 and section 
8.4.3) and the z
co
ct  statistics associated with the Corrado (1989) “z” statistics 
(section 8.4.2) show that  the AARs which accrue to the shareholders of 
Chinese acquiring firms where alternative modes of consideration are used 
tend to be larger than the AARs for shareholders of Chinese acquiring firms 
where cash is used as the sole mode of consideration on only a few trading 
days immediately following the takeover announcement date.   In other words, 
for the large majority of the event window, there are no significant differences 
between the AARs of Chinese acquiring firms where cash is used as the sole 
mode of consideration and the AARs of Chinese acquiring firms where 
alternative modes of consideration are used.   We would also emphasise that 
our analysis shows the modified Corrado “z” statistic is more powerful than 
both the original Corrado (1989) “z” statistic and the Patell (1976) “t” statistic 
in detecting significant AARs when cash is used as the sole mode of 
consideration.  The modified Corrado “z” statistic is also more powerful than 
the other two tests in detecting significant AARs when alternative modes of 
consideration are used.  Finally, the z
co
t
__
 associated with the modified Corrado 
“z” statistic is more powerful than the z
co
t
__
 statistic associated with the Patell 
(1976) “t” statistic and the z
co
ct  statistic associated with the Corrado (1989) “z” 
statistics in detecting significant differences between the ARRs that accrue to 
acquiring firms which use cash as the sole mode of consideration and the 
AARs which accrue to acquiring firms that use alternative modes of 
consideration.   
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 8.5 Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns for Cash as against 
Alternative Modes of Consideration for Chinese Acquiring Firms 
 
In this section we begin our analysis by accumulating the average abnormal 
returns based on the OLS and Dimson (1979) betas respectively over the 
event window (-6, +17) trading days for both the 168 Chinese acquiring firms 
where the mode of consideration is solely in cash and the 45 Chinese 
acquiring firms where alternative modes of consideration are used.  We then 
employ the Patell (1976) “t” test, the Corrado “z” (1989) test and the Modified 
Corrado “z” test to determine the statistical significance of the cumulative 
average abnormal returns (CAARs) for our sample of 168 Chinese acquiring 
firms where cash is the sole mode of consideration and the 45 Chinese 
acquiring firms where alternative modes of consideration are used.  
 
8.5.1 Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns and Patell (1976) “t” 
Statistics for Chinese Acquiring Firms 
 
A summary of the CAARs over the event window based on OLS betas for 
cash as against alternative modes of consideration for our sample of Chinese 
acquiring firms is provided in Table 8.4(a).  Table 8.4(b) contains the CAARs 
and their associated Patell (1976) “t” scores using Dimson (1979) betas.  
Since there are no significant differences between the information 
summarised in these two tables the focus of our analysis shall henceforth be 
on the data for the OLS betas as summarised in Table 8.4(a).  The second 
column of Table 8.4(a) shows that the CAARs over the event window for 
shareholders of Chinese acquiring firms where cash is the sole mode of 
consideration gradually increase in the run up to the takeover announcement 
date.  In particular, the CAAR peaks on the announcement date itself at 
1.47%.  Beyond this point, however, the CAARs decay away quite sharply so 
much so that by the tenth trading day after the takeover announcement date 
the CAAR reaches a minimum over the entire event window of 0.07%.  
 
The third column of Table 8.4(a) shows that the CAARs which accrue to 
shareholders of Chinese acquiring firms where alternative modes of 
consideration are employed grow rapidly from the beginning of the event 
window and reach a peak of 3.60% six trading days after the takeover  
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Table 8.4 (a):  Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns and Associated Patell 
(1976) Statistics Based on OLS Betas for Chinese Acquiring Firms over the 
Period from 1 January, 1990 until 31 December, 2008  for Cash (N = 168) as 
against Alternative (M = 45) Modes of Consideration 
 
Time 
Relative to  
Announce 
Date (0) 
CAAR  
Cash 
CAAR 
Alternatives 
Patell 
“t” Score  
Cash  
Patell 
“t” Score  
Alternatives 
 
Z Score  
Cash vs  
Alternatives 
      
-6 0.0006 0.0013 0.5396 -0.1980 0.5216 
-5 0.0033 0.0001 0.2348 -0.1631 0.2814 
-4 0.0072 0.0014 0.8202 1.0619 -0.1710 
-3 0.0112 0.0040 1.3980 0.5153 0.6242 
-2 0.0112 0.0075 1.3192 0.9109 0.2887 
-1 0.0118 0.0075 1.3007 1.1206 0.1273 
0 0.0120 0.0174 0.6205 1.5410 -0.6509 
1 0.0147 0.0207 1.8834* 1.8364* 0.0332 
2 0.0113 0.0273 1.3719 1.2847 0.0617 
3 0.0114 0.0311 0.9428 0.7815 0.1140 
4 0.0091 0.0318 0.5466 0.4509 0.0676 
5 0.0070 0.0285 0.4343 0.3331 0.0716 
6 0.0067 0.0360 0.4350 0.4511 -0.0114 
7 0.0069 0.0357 0.3464 0.3331 0.0095 
8 0.0092 0.0303 0.6905 0.1054 0.4138 
9 0.0061 0.0198 0.1968 -0.0897 0.2026 
10 0.0007 0.0160 -0.2616 -0.1948 -0.0472 
11 0.0017 0.0242 -0.1516 -0.0177 -0.0947 
12 0.0011 0.0269 -0.1122 -0.0100 -0.0723 
13 0.0016 0.0199 -0.0200 -0.0838 0.0452 
14 0.0012 0.0189 -0.0731 0.0000 -0.0517 
15 0.0037 0.0243 0.2656 0.0782 0.1325 
16 0.0043 0.0227 0.3343 0.0113 0.2284 
17 0.0044 0.0168 0.6130 2.3552# -1.2319 
      
 
* significant at 10%; # significant at 5%; $ significant at 1% (two tailed test) 
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Table 8.4 (b):  Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns and Associated Patell 
(1976) Statistics Based on Dimson (1979) Betas for Chinese Acquiring 
Firms over the Period from 1 January, 1990 until 31 December, 2008  for 
Cash (N = 168) as against Alternative (M = 45) Modes of Consideration 
 
Time 
Relative to  
Announce 
Date (0) 
CAAR  
Cash 
CAAR 
Alternatives 
Patell 
“t” Score  
Cash  
Patell 
“t” Score  
Alternatives 
 
Z Score  
Cash vs  
Alternatives 
      
-6 0.0014 0.0006 0.5334 0.2373 0.2094 
-5 0.0041 -0.0020 0.2352 -0.4353 0.4741 
-4 0.0077 -0.0001 0.7609 0.6736 0.0618 
-3 0.0114 0.0036 1.2874 0.5224 0.5409 
-2 0.0104 0.0083 1.0653 0.9597 0.0746 
-1 0.0115 0.0103 1.1699 1.2229 -0.0375 
0 0.0121 0.0195 0.5123 1.4092 -0.6342 
1 0.0144 0.0221 1.6915* 1.6190 0.0513 
2 0.0106 0.0257 1.1285 1.2358 -0.0759 
3 0.0100 0.0280 0.6467 0.8554 -0.1476 
4 0.0071 0.0262 0.2015 0.4996 -0.2108 
5 0.0047 0.0245 0.0724 0.3112 -0.1689 
6 0.0050 0.0332 0.1628 0.4488 -0.2023 
7 0.0049 0.0338 0.0826 0.4185 -0.2376 
8 0.0068 0.0281 0.3863 0.2022 0.1302 
9 0.0033 0.0168 -0.1389 -0.1291 -0.0069 
10 -0.0016 0.0134 -0.5616 -0.2165 -0.2440 
11 -0.0002 0.0197 -0.4212 -0.0460 -0.2653 
12 -0.0005 0.0218 -0.3565 0.0056 -0.2561 
13 0.0000 0.0137 -0.2330 -0.1319 -0.0715 
14 -0.0003 0.0139 -0.2668 -0.0874 -0.1269 
15 0.0021 0.0210 0.0414 0.0314 0.0071 
16 0.0027 0.0201 0.1226 0.0174 0.0744 
17 0.0029 0.0162 0.4324 2.5369$ -1.4882 
      
 
* significant at 10%; # significant at 5%; $ significant at 1% (two tailed test) 
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Figure 8.2 (a):  Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns Based on O.L.S Betas 
for Chinese Acquiring Firms over the Period from 1 January, 1990 until 31 
December, 2008  for Cash (N = 168) as against Alternative (M = 45) Modes of 
Consideration 
 
 
 
announcement date.  The CAARs tend to decline after this date and then 
stabilise towards the end of the event window at a figure which is in excess of 
1.65%.  The overall trend in the CAARs for Chinese acquiring firms where 
cash is the sole mode of consideration as against the CAARs for acquiring 
firms where alternative modes of consideration are used is to be found in 
Figure 8.2(a) for OLS betas and Figure 8.2(b) for Dimson (1979) betas.  Note 
how both these graphs as well as the summary information in Table 8.4(a) 
and Table 8.4(b) show that over the event window the overall CAARs that 
accrue to the shareholders of Chinese acquiring firms where alternative 
modes of consideration are employed (that is, other than purely in cash) far 
exceed the CAARs for shareholders of acquiring firms where cash is the sole 
mode of consideration. 
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Figure 8.2 (b):  Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns Based on Dimson 
(1979) Betas for Chinese Acquiring Firms over the Period from 1 
January, 1990 until 31 December, 2008  for Cash (N = 168) as against 
Alternative (M = 45) Modes of Consideration 
 
 
 
 
 
The fourth column of Table 8.4(a) summarises the Patell (1976) “t” statistics 
associated with the CAARs of Chinese acquiring firms where the mode of 
consideration is solely in cash.  This column shows that apart from a 
marginally significant Patell (1976) “t” statistic of 1.8834 on the first trading 
day after the takeover announcement date, all the remaining Patell (1976) “t” 
statistics over the event window are not significantly different from zero in a 
statistical sense.  We thus conclude from the Patell (1976) “t” statistics 
summarised in Table 8.4(a) that there are very few, if any, economic benefits 
arising for the shareholders of Chinese acquiring firms over the event window 
when the mode of consideration is solely in cash. 
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The fifth column of Table 8.4(a) summarises the Patell (1976) “t” statistics 
corresponding to the CAARs for shareholders of Chinese acquiring firms 
where the mode of consideration is other than purely in cash; that is, for 
alternative modes of consideration.  The results summarised in this column of 
the table show that when alternative modes of consideration are used, almost 
all the Patell (1976) “t” statistics over the event window are insignificant apart 
from the first and seventeenth trading days following the takeover 
announcement date where the Patell (1976) “t” statistics are marginally 
significant at 1.8364 and highly significant at 2.3552, respectively. Hence, the 
absence of consistently significant Patell (1976) “t” statistics for the CAARs 
over the entire event window as summarised in the fifth column of Table 
8.4(a) shows that there are probably only marginal economic benefits 
available for the shareholders of Chinese acquiring firms when alternative 
modes of consideration are used to finance their M&A activities. 
 
We now use the Patell (1976) “t” statistics associated with the CAARs over 
the event window for the Chinese acquiring firms comprising our sample to 
formally test the hypothesis that the mean Patell (1976) “t” statistic, for 
takeovers where the consideration is solely in cash is identical to the mean 
Patell (1976) “t” statistic for takeovers where the consideration is other than 
purely in cash.  Our testing procedures are analogous to those summarised in 
section 7.5.1 of chapter seven for the Patell (1976) “t” statistics associated 
with the target firms’ CAARs and are based on the test statistic z
co
t
__
 which is 
defined as follows: 
z
co
t
__
 = 
1
2
{
z
c
it
__
N
sˆ(z
c
it)
 - 
z
o
it
__
M
sˆ(z
o
it)
} 
Here z
c
it
__
 is the average Patell (1976) “t” score associated with the CAARs 
across the i = 1,2,3, ___, N = 168 Chinese acquiring firms where the mode of 
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consideration is solely in cash, z
o
it
__
 is the average Patell (1976) “t” score 
associated with the CAARs across the i = 1,2,3, ___, M = 45 acquiring firms 
where the mode of consideration is other than purely in cash and 
t = -6, -5, -4,____, 15, 16, 17 is the particular date in the event window.   
Moreover, sˆ2(z
c
it) is the variance computed from the N = 168 Patell statistics 
for the tth day of the event window where the takeover consideration is solely 
in cash.  Likewise, sˆ2(z
o
it) is the variance computed from the M = 45 Patell 
statistics for the tth day of the event window where the takeover consideration 
is other than purely in cash.  Furthermore, the test statistic, z
co
t
__
, is 
asymptotically distributed as a standard normal variate (Fisz, 1963, p. 197).  
Finally, testing the hypothesis that z
co
t
__
 is insignificantly different from zero is 
equivalent to testing the hypothesis that the mean CAAR on the tth day of the 
event window for Chinese acquiring firms where the consideration is solely in 
cash is the same as the mean CAAR on the tth day of the event window for 
Chinese acquiring firms where the consideration is other than purely in cash. 
The sixth column of Table 8.4(a) summarises the z
co
t
__
 statistic for each trading 
day, t = -6, -5, -4,____, 15, 16, 17, of the event window.  The z
co
t
__
 statistics 
summarised in this column are all insignificantly different from zero in a 
statistical sense over the whole event window.  Thus, the z
co
t
__
 statistics 
summarised here are compatible with the hypothesis that there are no 
differences between the CAARs accruing to the shareholders of Chinese 
acquiring firms when the mode of consideration is solely in cash and the 
CAARs that accrue to the shareholders of Chinese acquiring firms where the 
consideration is other than purely in cash.  We have previously noted, 
however, that the Patell (1976) “t” statistics on which the z
co
t
__
 statistics 
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summarised in column six of Table 8.4(a) are based assume that the returns 
on the A shares of the Chinese acquiring firms comprising our sample are 
normally distributed (as in section 4.4 of this dissertation).  However, previous 
empirical work shows that it is unlikely this assumption will be satisfied by our 
data (Harris and Küçüközmen , 2001; Ashton and Tippett, 2006).  Given this, 
one should place more reliance on the results obtained from the Corrado 
(1989) and modified Corrado testing procedures which we now summarise. 
 
8.5.2 Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns and Corrado(1989) “z ” 
Statistics for Chinese Acquiring Firms 
 
A summary of the cumulative average abnormal returns (CAARs) over the 
event window using OLS betas and their associated Corrado (1989) “z” 
statistics for Chinese acquiring firms where cash is used as the sole mode of 
consideration as against the CAARs and their Corrado (1989) “z” statistics for 
acquiring firms where alternative modes of consideration are employed is 
contained in Table 8.5(a).  Table 8.5(b) summarises the CAARs and their 
associated Corrado (1989) “z” statistics using Dimson (1979) betas.  Again, 
further details of how the Corrado “z” statistics were calculated are to be found 
in section 4.2 of chapter four of this dissertation and in abridged form, in 
section 7.4.2 of this dissertation.  Since there are no significant differences 
between the information summarised in Table 8.5(a) and Table 8.5(b) the 
focus of our analysis will be on the data for OLS. betas as summarised in 
Table 8.5(a).  It is also important to emphasise that the CAARs summarised in 
the second and third columns of Table 8.5(a) for cash as against alternative 
modes of consideration are the same as the CAARs summarised in the 
second and third columns of Table 8.4(a).  Similarly, the CAARs summarised 
in the second and third columns of Table 8.5(b) are the same as the CAARs 
summarised in the second and third columns of Table 8.4(b).  A pictorial 
summary of the trend in the CAARs based on OLS betas is to be found in 
Figure 8.2(a) and for Dimson (1979) betas in Figure 8.2(b) in the previous 
section of this chapter. 
 
The fourth column of Table 8.5(a) summarises the Corrado (1989) “z” 
statistics associated with the CAARs of Chinese acquiring firms where the  
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Table 8.5 (a):  Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns and Associated 
Corrado (1989) Statistics Based on OLS Betas for Chinese Acquiring Firms 
over the Period from 1 January, 1990 until 31 December, 2008  for Cash (N = 
168) as against Alternative (M = 45) Modes of Consideration 
 
Time 
Relative to  
Announce 
Date (0) 
CAAR  
Cash 
CAAR 
Alternatives 
Corrado 
Z Score  
Cash  
Corrado 
Z Score  
Alternatives 
 
Z Score  
Cash vs  
Alternatives 
      
-6 0.0006 0.0013 -0.0903 0.1042 -0.1375 
-5 0.0033 0.0001 -0.5323 0.1489 -0.4817 
-4 0.0072 0.0014 -0.1941 0.6296 -0.5824 
-3 0.0112 0.0040 0.6837 0.3460 0.2388 
-2 0.0112 0.0075 0.5210 0.7058 -0.1307 
-1 0.0118 0.0075 0.8944 0.6018 0.2069 
0 0.0120 0.0174 1.9071* 1.2674 0.4523 
1 0.0147 0.0207 1.9608# 1.4063 0.3921 
2 0.0113 0.0273 1.3885 2.0138# -0.4421 
3 0.0114 0.0311 0.8257 2.2159# -0.9830 
4 0.0091 0.0318 0.3878 2.2032# -1.2836 
5 0.0070 0.0285 0.1057 2.0414# -1.3688 
6 0.0067 0.0360 0.3067 2.4295# -1.5011 
7 0.0069 0.0357 0.2702 2.2099# -1.3716 
8 0.0092 0.0303 0.4930 1.8157* -0.9352 
9 0.0061 0.0198 0.0619 1.4016 -0.9473 
10 0.0007 0.0160 -0.5165 1.2813 -1.2712 
11 0.0017 0.0242 -0.3783 1.8223* -1.5561 
12 0.0011 0.0269 -0.5946 1.8361* -1.7187* 
13 0.0016 0.0199 -0.6077 1.4684 -1.4680 
14 0.0012 0.0189 -0.7875 1.2813 -1.4629 
15 0.0037 0.0243 -0.6469 1.3991 -1.4468 
16 0.0043 0.0227 -0.6007 1.2463 -1.3060 
17 0.0044 0.0168 -0.6527 0.9904 -1.1618 
      
 
* significant at 10%; # significant at 5%; $ significant at 1% (two tailed test) 
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Table 8.5(b):  Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns and Associated 
Corrado (1989) Statistics Based on Dimson (1979) Betas for Chinese 
Acquiring Firms over the Period from 1 January, 1990 until 31 December, 
2008  for Cash (N = 168) as against Alternative (M = 45) Modes of 
Consideration 
 
Time 
Relative to  
Announce 
Date (0) 
CAAR  
Cash 
CAAR 
Alternatives 
Corrado 
Z Score  
Cash  
Corrado 
Z Score  
Alternatives 
 
Z Score  
Cash vs  
Alternatives 
      
-6 0.0014 0.0006 0.9974 -0.2196 0.8605 
-5 0.0041 -0.0020 0.5555 -0.3825 0.6633 
-4 0.0077 -0.0001 0.6321 0.2767 0.2513 
-3 0.0114 0.0036 1.2696 0.1006 0.8266 
-2 0.0104 0.0083 0.9566 0.4301 0.3723 
-1 0.0115 0.0103 1.3737 0.6704 0.4973 
0 0.0121 0.0195 2.2151# 1.3187 0.6339 
1 0.0144 0.0221 2.2207# 1.4121 0.5717 
2 0.0106 0.0257 1.5566 1.8863* -0.2332 
3 0.0100 0.0280 0.9713 2.0047# -0.7307 
4 0.0071 0.0262 0.4890 1.8276* -0.9465 
5 0.0047 0.0245 0.2388 1.7619* -1.0770 
6 0.0050 0.0332 0.4699 2.2158# -1.2345 
7 0.0049 0.0338 0.3751 2.0586# -1.1904 
8 0.0068 0.0281 0.5600 1.6706* -0.7853 
9 0.0033 0.0168 0.1134 1.2165 -0.7800 
10 -0.0016 0.0134 -0.3617 1.1899 -1.0971 
11 -0.0002 0.0197 -0.2603 1.6564* -1.3553 
12 -0.0005 0.0218 -0.4380 1.5891 -1.4334 
13 0.0000 0.0137 -0.4283 1.1843 -1.1403 
14 -0.0003 0.0139 -0.5644 1.0408 -1.1351 
15 0.0021 0.0210 -0.4919 1.2390 -1.2239 
16 0.0027 0.0201 -0.4037 1.1493 -1.0982 
17 0.0029 0.0162 -0.4366 0.9229 -0.9613 
      
 
* significant at 10%; # significant at 5%; $ significant at 1% (two tailed test) 
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mode of consideration is solely in cash.  This column shows that when cash is 
used as the sole mode of consideration, the CAARs that accrue to the 
shareholders of Chinese acquiring firms are significantly different from zero 
only on the takeover announcement date itself and on the first trading day 
following the takeover announcement date with Corrado (1989) “z” statistics of 
1.9071 and 1.9608, respectively.  The first of these z statistics is significant at 
the 10% level whilst the second z statistic is significant at the 5% level.  Apart 
from these two trading days there are no significant CAARs over the event 
window, although the CAARs are consistently positive over the entire event 
window.  From this we conclude that if there are any economic benefits for the 
shareholders of Chinese acquiring firms where cash is the sole mode of 
consideration then they occur in a very narrow window on and after the 
takeover announcement date.  Outside of this narrow window there do not 
appear to be any significant economic benefits for the shareholders of 
Chinese acquiring firms where cash is used as the sole mode of 
consideration.    
 
The fifth column of Table 8.5(a) summarises the Corrado “z” statistics 
associated with the CAARs for the shareholders of Chinese acquiring firms 
where the consideration is other than purely in cash; that is, for alternative 
modes of consideration.  The results summarised in this column show that 
when alternative modes of consideration are employed, the Corrado (1989) 
“z” statistics corresponding to the CAARs which accrue to the shareholders of 
Chinese acquiring firms are not significant until the second trading day after 
the takeover announcement date.  On the second and subsequent trading 
days after the takeover announcement date the Corrado (1989) “z” statistic 
associated with the CAARs rises to 2.0138, which is significant at the 5% 
level, and remains significant at this level until the seventh trading day after 
the takeover announcement date.  The Corrado (1989) “z” statistic associated 
with the CAARs is marginally significant on the eighth trading day after the 
takeover announcement date at 1.8157 but then decays away and becomes 
insignificant until the eleventh and twelve trading days after the takeover 
announcement date when it is again marginally significant at 1.8223 and 
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1.8361, respectively.  It then falls away again and becomes insignificant for 
the remainder of the event window.  Hence, the Corrado (1989) “z” statistics 
show that there is very strong evidence over the large majority of the event 
window of significant economic benefits for the shareholders of Chinese 
acquiring firms when alternative modes of consideration are used.  This 
contrasts with the marginal nature of the economic benefits (if any) that 
accrue to the shareholders of Chinese acquiring firms where cash is used as 
the sole mode of consideration. 
 
In summary, our analysis in this section is compatible with the hypothesis that 
the Corrado (1989) “z” statistics associated with the CAARs accruing to 
shareholders of Chinese acquiring firms where alternative modes of 
consideration are employed tend to be larger than the Corrado (1989) “z” 
statistics associated with the CAARs accruing to the shareholders of Chinese 
acquiring firms where cash is used as the sole mode of consideration.   Given 
this, we now conduct a formal test of this hypothesis.  Our testing procedures 
are analogous to those summarised in section 7.5.2 of chapter seven of this 
dissertation for the Corrado (1989) “z” statistics associated with the target 
firms’ CAARs and are based on the test statistic, z
co
 , which is defined as 
follows: 
z
co
  = 

t=-6

 z
c
ct - 
t=-6

 z
o
ct
2( + 7)
 
Here 
t=-6

 z
c
ct is the sum of the Corrado (1989) “z” scores associated with the 
abnormal returns of firms where the takeover consideration is purely in cash 
from the beginning of the event window (t = -6) until the 
th = -6, -5,-4,-3, ____, 17 day of the event window.  Likewise, 
t=-6

 z
o
ct is the 
sum of the Corrado (1989) “z” scores up until the th day of the event window 
for Chinese acquiring firms that use alternative modes of consideration.  
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Moreover, z
co
  is asymptotically distributed as a standard normal variate (Fisz, 
1963, p. 197).    
 
The sixth column of Table 8.5(a) summarises the z
co
  statistics for each 
trading day over the event window.  This particular column shows that whilst 
most of the z
co
  statistics are negative over the event window (and therefore 
have the correct sign) it is only on the twelfth trading day after the takeover 
announcement date where the z
co
  statistic becomes significant and then only 
marginally so at z
co
12 = -1.7187.  This result is somewhat perplexing because 
we have previously argued that the CAARs associated with Chinese acquiring 
firms where cash is the sole mode of consideration, tend to be smaller than 
the CAARs for acquiring firms that use alternative modes of consideration.  
Given this one would expect the z
co
  statistic to be significantly negative on 
more than just the one occasion recorded in the sixth column of Table 8.5(a).   
Fortunately, the results we report in the next section for the modified Corrado 
“z” statistics associated with the CAARs indicate that the perplexing results 
reported in the sixth column of Table 8.5(a) are largely due to the lack of 
power of Corrado (1989) test itself.  
 
8.5.3 Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns and Modified Corrado 
“z” Statistics for Chinese Acquiring Firms 
 
In this section, we employ the modified Corrado “z” statistics corresponding to 
the cumulative average abnormal returns (CAARs) of Chinese acquiring firms 
to examine whether the economic benefits accruing to the shareholders of 
Chinese acquiring firms when cash is used as the sole mode of consideration 
are larger than the economic benefits that accrue to the shareholders of 
Chinese acquiring firms where alternative modes of consideration are used.   
A summary of the CAARs over the event window using OLS betas and their 
associated modified Corrado “z” statistics is provided in Table 8.6(a).  Table 
8.6(b) summarises the CAARs and their associated modified Corrado “z” 
statistics using Dimson (1979) betas.  Since there are no significant 
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differences between the empirical results based on the OLS betas as 
summarised in Table 8.6(a) and the empirical results based on the Dimson 
(1979) betas as summarised in Table 8.6(b), the focus our analysis will again 
be on the results obtained using the OLS betas as summarised in Table 
8.6(a).  We would also remind the reader that the CAARs summarised in the 
second and third columns of Table 8.6(a) are the same as the CAARs 
summarised in the second and third columns of Table 8.4(a) and Table 8.5(a), 
respectively.  Likewise, the CAARs summarised in the second and third 
columns of Table 8.6(b) are the same as the CAARs summarised in the 
second and third columns of Table 8.4(b) and Table 8.5(b).  A pictorial 
representation of the CAARs based on the OLS betas is to be found in Figure 
8.2(a) and for Dimson (1979) betas, in Figure 8.2(b) of section 8.5.1 in this 
chapter.   
 
The fourth column of Table 8.6(a) summarises the modified Corrado “z” 
statistics associated with the CAARs of Chinese acquiring firms where the 
mode of consideration is solely in cash.  This column shows that apart from 
the first trading day following the takeover announcement date the CAARs 
which accrue to the shareholders of Chinese acquiring firms where the mode 
of consideration is solely in cash are not significantly different from zero over 
the entire event window.  The CAAR reaches a peak of 1.47% on the first 
trading day after the takeover announcement date and is marginally significant 
at the 5% level with a modified Corrado “z” statistic of 1.8846.  Thus, we 
conclude that apart from a very narrow window after the takeover 
announcement date there are no significant economic benefits accruing to the 
shareholders of Chinese acquiring firms where cash is employed as the sole 
mode of consideration. 
 
The fifth column of Table 8.6(a) summarises the modified Corrado “z” 
statistics associated with the CAARs of Chinese acquiring firms where 
alternative modes of consideration are employed.  This particular column 
shows that when alternative modes of consideration are used the modified 
Corrado “z” statistics are not significantly different from zero until the second  
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Table 8.6(a):  Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns and Associated 
Modified Corrado Statistics Based on OLS Betas for Chinese Acquiring 
Firms over the Period from 1 January, 1990 until 31 December, 2008 for 
Cash (N = 168) as against Alternative (M = 45) Modes of Consideration 
 
Time 
Relative to  
Announce 
Date (0) 
CAAR  
Cash 
CAAR 
Alternatives 
Modified 
Corrado 
Z Score  
Cash  
Modified 
Corrado 
Z Score  
Alternatives 
 
Z Score  
Cash vs  
Alternatives 
      
-6 0.0006 0.0013 -0.5522 0.2854 -0.5923 
-5 0.0033 0.0001 -0.9471 -0.2063 -0.5238 
-4 0.0072 0.0014 -0.4356 0.5462 -0.6942 
-3 0.0112 0.0040 0.6086 0.3285 0.1980 
-2 0.0112 0.0075 0.3951 0.7199 -0.2297 
-1 0.0118 0.0075 0.8478 0.7185 0.0914 
0 0.0120 0.0174 0.7857 1.0641 -0.1968 
1 0.0147 0.0207 1.8846* 1.4325 0.3196 
2 0.0113 0.0273 1.1937 1.9908# -0.5637 
3 0.0114 0.0311 0.5535 2.1924# -1.1589 
4 0.0091 0.0318 0.0130 2.0637# -1.4501 
5 0.0070 0.0285 -0.2400 1.9799# -1.5697 
6 0.0067 0.0360 0.0096 2.5569$ -1.8012* 
7 0.0069 0.0357 -0.0597 2.3715# -1.7191* 
8 0.0092 0.0303 0.1995 1.9504* -1.2381 
9 0.0061 0.0198 -0.2730 1.5024 -1.2554 
10 0.0007 0.0160 -0.9159 1.3057 -1.5709 
11 0.0017 0.0242 -0.7751 1.8593* -1.8628* 
12 0.0011 0.0269 -1.0251 1.8702* -2.0473# 
13 0.0016 0.0199 -1.0099 1.4370 -1.7302* 
14 0.0012 0.0189 -1.2160 1.2330 -1.7317* 
15 0.0037 0.0243 -1.0603 1.4760 -1.7934* 
16 0.0043 0.0227 -0.9933 1.2821 -1.6089 
17 0.0044 0.0168 -0.5796 2.4528# -2.1443# 
      
 
* significant at 10%; # significant at 5%; $ significant at 1% (two tailed test) 
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Table 8.6(b):  Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns and Associated 
Modified Corrado Statistics Based on Dimson (1979) Betas for Chinese 
Acquiring Firms over the Period from 1 January, 1990 until 31 December, 
2008 for Cash (N =168) as against Alternative (M = 45) Modes of 
Consideration 
 
Time 
Relative to  
Announce 
Date (0) 
CAAR  
Cash 
CAAR 
Alternatives 
Corrado 
Z Score  
Cash  
Corrado 
Z Score  
Alternatives 
 
Z Score  
Cash vs  
Alternatives 
      
-6 0.0014 0.0006 -0.1071 0.1338 -0.1704 
-5 0.0041 -0.0020 -0.6223 -0.3429 -0.1976 
-4 0.0077 -0.0001 -0.2898 0.4265 -0.5065 
-3 0.0114 0.0036 0.7526 0.3123 0.3113 
-2 0.0104 0.0083 0.3242 0.6477 -0.2288 
-1 0.0115 0.0103 0.9620 0.9125 0.0350 
0 0.0121 0.0195 0.7012 1.1602 -0.3246 
1 0.0144 0.0221 1.8931* 1.5435 0.2472 
2 0.0106 0.0257 1.0454 2.0820# -0.7330 
3 0.0100 0.0280 0.3154 2.2015# -1.3336 
4 0.0071 0.0262 -0.2863 2.0055# -1.6206 
5 0.0047 0.0245 -0.5677 1.9411* -1.7740* 
6 0.0050 0.0332 -0.2446 2.4538# -1.9080* 
7 0.0049 0.0338 -0.3562 2.2789# -1.8633* 
8 0.0068 0.0281 -0.1060 1.8447* -1.3794 
9 0.0033 0.0168 -0.6456 1.3401 -1.4041 
10 -0.0016 0.0134 -1.2251 1.3169 -1.7974* 
11 -0.0002 0.0197 -1.0749 1.8399* -2.0611# 
12 -0.0005 0.0218 -1.2771 1.7693* -2.1541# 
13 0.0000 0.0137 -1.2466 1.3133 -1.8101* 
14 -0.0003 0.0139 -1.4083 1.1502 -1.8091* 
15 0.0021 0.0210 -1.3092 1.3805 -1.9019* 
16 0.0027 0.0201 -1.1775 1.2838 -1.7404* 
17 0.0029 0.0162 -0.7491 2.5931$ -2.3633# 
 
* significant at 10%; # significant at 5%; $ significant at 1% (two tailed test) 
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trading day following the takeover announcement date.  On the second 
trading day after the takeover announcement date the modified Corrado “z” 
statistic for the CAAR is 1.9908 and is significant at the 5% level.  The 
modified Corrado “z” statistics then remain highly significant until the eighth 
trading day after the takeover announcement date and reach a peak value of 
2.5569 on the sixth trading day after the takeover announcement date, which 
is significant at the 1% level.  The modified Corrado “z” statistics then decay 
away and become insignificant until the eleventh and twelfth trading days after 
the takeover announcement date when they reach values of 1.8593 and 
1.8702, respectively which are marginally significant at the 10% level.  The 
modified Corrado “z” statistic then falls away again and becomes insignificant 
until the seventeenth trading day subsequent to the takeover announcement 
date where it reaches a highly significant value of 2.4528, at the 1
1
2% level of 
significance.  From modified Corrado statistics summarised above we draw 
the conclusion that for the vast majority of the event window beyond the 
takeover announcement date, there are significant economic benefits for the 
shareholders of Chinese acquiring firms when alternative modes of 
consideration are employed.  Again (as in section 8.5.2 of this chapter), this 
contrasts with the highly marginal nature of the economic benefits as shown in 
the fourth column of Table 8.5(a), that accrue to the shareholders of Chinese 
acquiring firms when cash is used as the sole mode of consideration. 
 
Our analysis up to this point suggests that the modified Corrado “z” statistics 
associated with the CAARs which accrue to the shareholders of Chinese 
acquiring firms where alternative modes of consideration are employed tend 
to be larger than the modified Corrado “z” statistics associated with the 
CAARs for shareholders of acquiring firms where the mode of consideration is 
solely in cash.   We now conduct a formal test of this hypothesis.  Our testing 
procedures are analogous to those summarised in section 7.4.3 of chapter 
seven of this dissertation for the modified Corrado “z” statistics associated 
with the Average Abnormal Returns (AARs) which accrue to the shareholders 
of Chinese target firms and are based on the test statistic  which is defined as 
follows: 
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z
co
t
__
 = 
1
2
{z
c
it
__
N - z
o
it
__
M} 
Here z
c
it
__
 is the average modified Corrado “z” statistic for the CAARs across 
the i = 1,2,3, ___, N = 168 Chinese acquiring firms where the mode of 
consideration is solely in cash, z
o
it
__
 is the average modified Corrado “z” statistic 
for the CAARs across the i = 1,2,3, ___, M = 45 acquiring firms where 
alternative modes of consideration are employed and 
t = -6, -5, -4,____, 15, 16, 17 is the particular date in the event window.   
Further details of the derivation of the test statistic z
co
t
__
 are to be found in 
section 7.4.3 of chapter seven.  Suffice it to say that the probability density of 
the test statistic z
co
t
__
 asymptotically converges to that of the standard normal 
distribution (Fisz, 1963, p. 197).  We emphasise again that a test based on the 
z
co
t
__
 statistic is equivalent to testing the hypothesis that the CAAR on the tth day 
of the event window for acquiring firms where the mode of consideration is 
solely in cash is the same as the CAAR on the tth day of the event window for 
acquiring firms where the consideration is other than purely in cash. 
The sixth column of Table 8.6(a) summarises the z
co
t
__
 statistics for each 
trading day during the event window.  This column shows that although the 
z
co
t
__
 statistics are predominately negative from the beginning of the event 
window up until the fifth trading day following the takeover announcement 
date, none of them are significantly different from zero in a statistical sense.  
Beyond this point, however, there is a preponderance of significantly negative 
z
co
t
__
 statistics.  Thus, on the sixth and seventh trading days after the takeover 
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announcement date the z
co
t
__
 statistics are both negative and marginally 
significant at z
co
6
__
 = -1.8012 and z
co
7
__
 = -1.7191, respectively.  The z
co
t
__
 statistics 
then fall away and become insignificant until the eleventh trading day after the 
takeover announcement date where z
co
11
__
 = -1.8628, which is marginally 
significant (at the 10% level).  Then except for the sixteenth trading day after 
the takeover announcement date the z
co
t
__
 statistics remain negative and 
(occasionally highly) significant over the remainder of the event window.  
Thus, the results of the modified Corrado z
co
t
__
 statistics as summarised above 
are compatible with the hypothesis that the CAARs accruing to the 
shareholders of Chinese acquiring firms where alternative modes of 
consideration are employed far exceed the CAARs for the shareholders of 
acquiring firms where cash is the sole mode of consideration.   
 
The results based on the modified Corrado test statistics as summarised in 
this section are in marked contrast to those based on the original Corrado 
(1989) test statistics as summarised in section 8.5.2 above where there was 
little evidence of significantly different CAARs between Chinese acquiring 
firms where cash is used as the sole mode of consideration and the Chinese 
acquiring firms where alternative modes of consideration are employed.  In 
section 8.5.2 of this chapter we speculated that the “perplexing” results 
obtained using the z
co
  statistics based on the Corrado (1989) “z” scores were 
probably due to a lack of power in the Corrado (1989) test statistic itself rather 
than any lack of difference between the CAARs for Chinese acquiring firms 
where cash is used as the sole mode of consideration and the CAARs of 
Chinese acquiring firms where alternative modes of consideration are 
employed.  The results based on the modified Corrado test statistic reported 
in this section largely confirm our suspicions about the lack of power in the 
original Corrado (1989) test since they show that the economic benefits that 
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accrue to the shareholders of Chinese acquiring firms where alternative 
modes of consideration are employed are significantly larger (in a statistical 
sense) than the economic benefits that accrue to the shareholders of Chinese 
acquiring firms acquiring firms where cash is used as the sole mode of 
consideration.   
 
8.5.4 A Summary and Comparison of Patell, Corrado and Modified 
Corrado Results on Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns 
Accruing to Shareholders of Chinese Acquiring Firms 
 
The analysis conducted in section 8.5.1, section 8.5.2 and section 8.5.3, 
shows that the Patell (1976) “t” statistics, the Corrado (1989) “z” statistics and 
the modified Corrado “z” statistics associated with the cumulative average 
abnormal returns (CAARs) all lead to the same conclusion about the 
economic benefits which accrue to the shareholders of Chinese acquiring 
firms when the mode of consideration is solely in cash.  The Patell (1976) “t” 
statistics, the Corrado (1989) “z” statistics and the modified Corrado “z” 
statistics all show that when cash is used as the sole mode of consideration, 
there are no significant economic benefits for shareholders of Chinese 
acquiring firms apart from a very narrow window surrounding the takeover 
announcement date.  
 
In contrast to the marginal economic benefits for the shareholders of Chinese 
acquiring firms when cash is used as the sole mode of consideration, the 
Corrado (1989) “z” statistics and the modified Corrado “z” statistics both show 
that when alternative modes of consideration are employed, there are 
significant economic benefits that accrue to the shareholders of Chinese 
acquiring firms over the vast majority of the event window following the 
takeover announcement date.  Even here, however, the results obtained using 
the Corrado (1989) “z” statistics and the modified Corrado “z” statistics need 
to be contrasted with those obtained using the Patell (1976) “t” statistics 
where there are only very occasional and marginally significant economic 
benefits for shareholders of Chinese acquiring firms when alternative modes 
of consideration are used (as with the first trading day following the takeover 
announcement date and the seventeenth trading day after the announcement 
date as summarised in the fifth column of Table 8.4(a)).  Furthermore, from 
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the second column and third column of Table 8.4(a), Table 8.5(a) and Table 
8.6(a), as well as Figure 8.2(a), the CAARs which accrue to the shareholders 
of Chinese acquiring firms where alternative modes of consideration are used 
are considerably larger than the CAARs for shareholders of acquiring firms 
where cash is used as the sole mode of consideration.  However, this is not 
always backed up by the statistical procedures we use to test for differences 
between the CAARs which accrue to the shareholders of Chinese acquiring 
firms where cash is the sole mode of consideration and the CAARs of 
acquiring firms that use alternative modes of consideration.  In particular, all 
the results based on the z
co
t
__
 statistics associated with the Patell (1976) “t” 
statistics (as with column six of Table 8.4(a))  and all but one of the z
co
ct  
statistics associated with the Corrado (1989) “z” statistics (as with column six 
of Table 8.5(a)) show that there are no significant differences between the 
CAARs which accrue to the shareholders of Chinese acquiring firms where 
the mode of consideration is solely in cash and the CAARs which accrue to 
the shareholders of acquiring firms where alternative modes of consideration 
are employed.  These results are in contrast with the z
co
t
__
 statistics associated 
with modified Corrado “z” statistics which show strong evidence that over the 
majority of the event window following the takeover announcement date the 
CAARs which accrue to the shareholders of Chinese acquiring firms where 
alternative modes of consideration are employed far exceed the CAARs which 
accrue to the shareholders of Chinese acquiring firms where the mode of 
consideration is solely in cash.  This is consistent with the conclusion we draw 
from the CAARs summarised in the second column (consideration purely in 
cash) and third column (alternative modes of consideration) of Table 8.4(a), 
Table 8.5(a) and Table 8.6(a).  As analysed in section 8.5.2 and section 8.5.3, 
we need to emphasise again that the divergence of the results obtained using 
the z
co
ct  scores based on the Corrado (1989) “z” statistics and the z
co
t
__
 scores 
based on the Patell (1976) “t” statistic with the results obtained using the z
co
t
__
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scores based on the modified Corrado “z” statistics is probably due to a lack 
of power in the Patell (1976) and Corrado (1989) test statistics themselves 
rather than any lack of difference between the CAARs for acquiring firms 
where cash is used as the sole mode of consideration and the CAARs of 
acquiring firms where alternative modes of consideration are employed.  In 
addition, it is doubtful whether the normal distribution assumptions that 
underpin the Patell (1976) “t” test are satisfied by our CAAR data (Harris and 
Küçüközmen , 2001; Ashton and Tippett, 2006). 
 
8.6 Potential Reasons Contributing to the Different Results for Chinese 
Acquiring Firms as against Target Firms as well as their practical 
implications  
 
Our analysis in previous sections of this chapter shows that when cash is 
used as the sole mode of consideration in Chinese M&A activities the 
shareholders of Chinese acquiring firms obtain no significant economic 
benefits either in terms of the average abnormal returns (AARs) or the 
cumulative average abnormal returns (CAARs) that arise in a 24-day event 
window around the takeover announcement date.  However, when alternative 
modes of consideration are employed the shareholders of Chinese acquiring 
firms achieve significant economic benefits from takeovers in terms of both 
the AARs and the CAARs which arise over the event window.  This contrasts 
with the economic benefits which accrue to the shareholders of Chinese target 
firms that arise from cash as against alternative modes of consideration as 
analysed in chapter seven of this dissertation.  In particular, our analysis in 
chapter seven shows that when the mode of consideration is solely in cash 
there are significant economic benefits for the shareholders of Chinese target 
firms.  Against this, when alternative modes of consideration are used there 
are no economic benefits of any significance for the shareholders of Chinese 
target firms.  Section 7.6 chronicles some potential reasons for why the 
economic benefits that accrue to the shareholders of Chinese target firms are 
larger when cash is used as the sole mode of consideration as compared to 
the economic benefits that arise when alternative modes of consideration are 
employed.   We now seek to explain why it is that the economic benefits that 
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arise for Chinese acquiring firms are larger when alternative modes of 
consideration are used to finance their takeover activities.  
 
Huang and Walking (1987) note that when cash is employed as the sole mode 
of consideration, target firms will tend to demand higher takeover premiums 
due to the capital gains tax which will have to be paid by the shareholders of 
the target firm immediately after the takeover is consummated.  However, if 
alternative modes of consideration are employed (shares, in particular) the 
capital gains tax can be deferred until such times as the shares issued by the 
acquiring firm to finance the takeover are sold.  As a consequence of this, 
extra costs will be incurred by acquiring firms due to the higher takeover 
premiums demanded by target firm shareholders to cover the capital gains 
taxes that they will have to bear.  Thus, in order to avoid the extra costs that 
arise from using cash as the sole mode of consideration, Chinese acquiring 
firms are likely to use alternative modes of consideration for their proposed 
M&A activities.  The lower costs associated with using alternative modes of 
consideration will mean that there will be greater economic benefits for the 
shareholders of the acquiring firm.  This is the first reason given in the 
literature as to why the economic benefits for shareholders of Chinese 
acquiring firms are larger when alternative modes of consideration are used to 
finance their M&A activities.   
 
A second reason is given by Hansen (1987) who shows that acquiring firms 
will prefer to use alternative modes of consideration because of the 
information asymmetries that arise in the takeover process.  In particular, 
target firms will tend to have a much better understanding of the value their 
own physical assets, their productive activities and their prospective 
contractual arrangements.  Moreover, acquiring firms will have private 
information about the intrinsic value of their own shares.  Hansen (1987) 
argues that these information asymmetries may lead acquiring firms to offer 
stock rather than cash for the proposed takeover, especially when the 
acquiring firm knows that its shares are over-valued on the stock market.  The 
difference between the stock market value of the acquiring firm’s shares and 
their intrinsic value will lower the implicit cost of the takeover and thereby 
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increase the economic benefits that accrue to the shareholders of the 
acquiring firm.  Financing the takeover through the issue of new shares in the 
acquiring firm rather than cash also transfers some of the risks associated 
with the takeover from the shareholders of the acquiring firm to the 
shareholders of the target firm.  This provides a second reason given in the 
literature as to why the economic benefits for shareholders of Chinese 
acquiring firms are larger when alternative modes of consideration are used to 
finance their M&A activities.   
 
Our results have some very important implications for practice.  In particular 
our empirical results show that using alternative modes of consideration 
brings significant economic benefits to the shareholders of Chinese acquiring 
firms.  In contrast, when cash is used as the sole mode of consideration there 
are few if any economic benefits for the shareholders of Chinese acquiring 
firms.  Hence, if Chinese acquiring firms are to maximise the economic 
benefits that accrue to their shareholders they should normally finance their 
M&A activities using alternative modes of consideration (that is, acquiring 
firms exchange their own shares for shares in the target firm, acquiring firms 
exchange some of their own assets for shares in the target firm, the acquiring 
firm repays target firm’s debt in exchange for shares in the target firm, the 
acquiring firm issues convertible bonds and/or warrants in exchange for 
shares in the target firm, etc. or some mixtures thereof).  Our empirical 
analysis shows that financing M&A activities through these alternative modes 
of consideration will bring significantly greater benefits for the shareholders of 
Chinese acquiring firms than if the M&A activities are financed purely through 
the medium of cash.  Given this, it is somewhat perplexing that the vast 
majority of Chinese M&A activities continue to be financed solely in cash, 
even since the implementation of the shareholding structure reforms of 2005 
(Guquan Fenzhi Gaige) which both facilitated and encouraged the use of 
alternative modes of consideration in Chinese M&A activities.  
 
8.7 Summary and Conclusions 
  
This chapter provides a detailed analysis of the economic benefits which 
accrue to the shareholders of Chinese acquiring firms as a result of using 
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cash as against alternative modes of consideration (shares of the acquiring 
firm, debt repayment, etc. and mixtures thereof, etc.) in their M&A activities.  
Specifically, we use the Patell (1976) “t” statistics, the Corrado (1989) “z” 
statistics and the modified Corrado “z” statistics respectively to assess the 
significance of the average abnormal returns (AARs) and the cumulative 
average abnormal returns (CAARs) that accrue to the shareholders of 
Chinese acquiring firms when the consideration is solely in cash as against 
when alternative modes of consideration are employed.  Our analysis shows 
that the AARs and CAARs that accrue to the shareholders of Chinese 
acquiring firms when alternative modes of consideration are used are positive 
and significantly different from zero in a statistical sense.  In contrast, the 
economic benefits for shareholders of Chinese acquiring firms when cash is 
used as the sole mode of consideration tend to be insignificantly different from 
zero and occasionally, negative.   Moreover, we conduct a formal test of the 
hypothesis that the AARs and the CAARs for Chinese acquiring firms where 
alternative modes of consideration are used are larger than the AARs and the 
CAARs for Chinese acquiring firms where cash is used as the sole mode of 
consideration using the z
co
t
__
 statistics associated with the Patell (1976) “t” 
statistics, the z
co
ct  statistics associated with the Corrado (1989) “z” statistics  
and also, the z
co
t
__
 statistics associated with the modified Corrado “z” statistics.  
These tests show that the economic benefits which accrue to the 
shareholders of Chinese acquiring firms when alternative modes of 
consideration are employed far exceed the economic benefits for the 
shareholders of Chinese acquiring firms where cash is used as the sole mode 
of consideration.   
 
We then outline some potential reasons as to why the economic benefits that 
accrue to the shareholders of Chinese acquiring firms appear to be larger 
when alternative modes of consideration are used in preference to cash.  The 
first reason stems from the fact that in China a capital gains tax of 20% must 
be paid immediately by the target firm’s shareholders when cash is used to 
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finance the takeover.  In contrast, when alternative modes of consideration 
are used to finance the takeover, it is normally possible to defer the payment 
of capital gains tax until a date often in the distant future.  Second, the 
information asymmetries that arise in the takeover process may lead acquiring 
firms to offer stock rather than cash for the proposed takeover, especially 
when the acquiring firm knows that its shares are over-valued on the stock 
market.  The difference between the stock market value of the acquiring firm’s 
shares and their intrinsic value will lower the implicit cost of the takeover and 
thereby increase the economic benefits that accrue to the shareholders of the 
acquiring firm.  These considerations, when taken in conjunction with our 
empirical analysis, show that Chinese acquiring firms ought to employ 
alternative modes of consideration if they are to maximise the economic 
benefits that accrue to their shareholders from their M&A activities.  Given 
this, it is somewhat perplexing that the vast majority of Chinese M&A activities 
continue to be financed solely in cash.  
 
Finally, with regards to the different methodologies employed in the empirical 
work summarised in this chapter we again conclude that the modified Corrado 
“z” test is more powerful than both the original Corrado (1989) “z” test and the 
Patell (1976) “t” test.  In particular, our empirical analysis shows that the 
modified Corrado “z” test detects significant AARs and CAARs when 
alternative modes of consideration are used to finance takeovers more 
frequently than either the Corrado (1989) “z” test or the Patell (1976) “t” test.  
Similarly, the modified Corrado “z” test is the most efficient test for detecting 
significant AARs and CAARs when cash is used as the sole mode of 
consideration.  Moreover, the z
co
t
__
 associated with the modified Corrado “z” 
statistic is more powerful than the z
co
t
__
 statistic associated with the Patell 
(1976) “t” statistic and the z
co
ct  statistic associated with the Corrado (1989) “z” 
statistics  in detecting significant differences between the ARRs and the 
CAARs that accrue to  Chinese acquiring firms which use cash as the sole 
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mode of consideration and the AARs and the CAARs which accrue to Chinese 
acquiring firms that use alternative modes of consideration.   
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CHAPTER NINE1 
 
THE FAMA AND FRENCH ASSET PRICING MODEL 
AND THE DETERMINATION OF ABNORMAL RETURNS 
 
9.1 Introduction 
 
The empirical analysis in this dissertation is based exclusively on the one 
factor market model which in turn, is based on the Capital Asset Pricing Model 
(CAPM).  However, in recent years a number of authors have suggested that 
because of the alleged deficiencies in the CAPM it is advisable to use the 
Fama and French Asset Pricing Model (1992, 1993, 1995, 1996) (in 
preference to the CAPM) to calculate the abnormal returns which accrue from 
M&A activities (André Kooli and L'Her, 2004).  It is our view, however, that 
the Fama and French (1992, 1993, 1995, 1996) Asset Pricing Model has 
numerous deficiencies of its own and that to base the calculation of abnormal 
returns upon this model has the potential to lead to a seriously flawed analysis 
of the abnormal returns which accrue to the shareholders of Chinese 
acquiring and target firms.  Hence, in this chapter we outline our reasons for 
not employing the Fama and French (1992, 1993, 1995, 1996) Asset Pricing 
Model to isolate the abnormal returns associated with Chinese M&A activities.  
Our analysis of this issue begins in the next section with a simple example 
that shows how it will only be possible to construct a Fama and French (1992, 
1993, 1995, 1996) Asset Pricing Model if one uses an index portfolio that does 
not lie on the Markowitz efficient investment frontier.  In other words, if one 
chooses an index portfolio that does lie on the Markowitz efficient investment 
frontier, then it will always be the case that the average returns on the assets 
comprising a portfolio will be perfectly correlated with the betas computed with 
reference to the given (efficient) index portfolio.  Factors such as the ratio of 
                                                          
1
  Some of the material in this chapter is based on an article entitled “Constructing Asset 
Pricing Models with Specific Factor Loadings” jointly written by Ian Davidson, Qian Guo, 
Xiaojing Song and Mark Tippett that is forthcoming in the journal Abacus. 
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the book value of equity to the market value of equity and the “size” of assets 
can then add nothing towards the explanation of the average returns on the 
affected assets.  However, the simple example employed in this section 
shows that it will always be possible to construct an inefficient index portfolio 
that leads to a Fama and French (1992, 1993, 1995, 1996) Asset Pricing 
Model that is compatible with an abnormal returns vector of the user’s 
choosing.  In other words, if a researcher posits an hypothesis which requires 
that the abnormal returns vector is to take a particular form, then the 
researcher will always be able to base the calculation of betas on an 
inefficient index portfolio which leads to an abnormal returns vector that is 
compatible with the hypothesis which the researcher wishes to “prove”.  This 
means that it will always be possible for one to specify a desired abnormal 
returns vector and then determine the Fama and French (1992, 1993, 1995, 
1996) Asset Pricing Model which is compatible with it.  In the next section we 
begin our analysis by determining the Markowitz efficient frontier and the 
particular form of the CAPM for a five asset economy.  We then use this 
simple five asset example to demonstrate how it is possible to construct a 
Fama and French (1992, 1993, 1995, 1996) Asset Pricing Model using an 
inefficient index portfolio that is compatible with an abnormal returns vector of 
the user’s choosing.  We then move on to discuss the implications of our 
analysis for the empirical work we conduct on Chinese M&A activities.  A brief 
summary of the conclusion we reach is that one could construct a Fama and 
French (1992, 1993, 1995, 1996) Asset Pricing Model that is compatible with 
any conclusion whatsoever that the researcher wishes to reach.  This alone is 
a property that disqualifies the Fama and French (1992, 1993, 1995, 1996) 
Asset Pricing Model as a suitable vehicle for isolating the abnormal returns 
that arise in Chinese M&A activities we examine – besides the numerous 
other deficiencies from which the model suffers.  The final section of this 
Chapter contains our summary conclusions.  
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9.2 A Simple Numerical Example 
 
One can demonstrate the fundamental points that we wish to make about the 
Fama and French (1992, 1993, 1995, 1996) Asset Pricing Model by 
considering the n = 5 asset portfolio with the following vector of average 
returns:   
 
                                                            
~
 = 







0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
0.30
                                          (9.1) 
 
Thus, the average return on the first asset is 1 = 0.10 or 10%.  Likewise, the 
average return on the second asset is 2 = 0.15 or 15% and so on.  The 
matrix of variances and covariances is given by: 
 
                                            = 







0.8 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
0.1 0.8 0.1 0.1 0.1
0.1 0.1 0.8 0.1 0.1
0.1 0.1 0.1 0.8 0.1
0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.8
                      (9.2) 
 
This shows that the variance of the return on the first asset is 
2
1 = 0.8 whilst 
the covariance of the return between the first and second asset is 
12 = 0.1 = 21.  The remaining entries in  are to be similarly interpreted.  
Now, it is not hard to show that the set of mean-variance or Markowitz efficient 
portfolios implied by the average returns vector, 
~
, and variance-covariance 
matrix, , given above is as follows: 
 
                                                p = 28
2
p - 
56
5
p + 
34
25
                             (9.3)    
 
where  p is the average return on the portfolio, p is the standard deviation of 
the return on the portfolio and p  
56
5
228
 = 0.2 defines the global minimum 
variance portfolio.  Now suppose for pedagogical convenience, that the risk 
Fama and French Asset Pricing Model 
 
 331 
free rate of interest is zero. 2  It may then be shown that the capital market line 
takes the form:  
 
                                                                 p = 
17
84
.p                               (9.4) 
 
Moreover, it is not hard to show that the capital market line is tangential to the 
mean-variance efficient frontier at the “orthogonal” portfolio with a 
proportionate investments vector of: 3 
 
                                                       M
~
 = 
1
35







1
4
7
10
13
                                     (9.5)                           
 
This means the orthogonal portfolio is comprised of an M1 = 
1
35
 proportionate 
investment in the first asset, an M2 = 
4
35
 proportionate investment in the 
second asset and so on.   One can graph these relationships as follows: 
 
                                                          
2
  We would emphasise that assuming a risk free rate of return of zero makes no difference to 
the generality of the results we are about to report. 
 
3
 Note that the orthogonal portfolio is always a mean-variance efficient portfolio but is not in 
general equivalent to the market portfolio. 
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Moreover if one lets M
~
T be the transpose of the vector M
~
 then the orthogonal 
portfolio has an average return and variance of M = M~
T.
~
 = 
17
70
 and 

2
M = M~
TM
~
 = 
51
175
, respectively.  One can then compute the vector of betas 
based on the orthogonal portfolio; namely:   
 
                                      
~
 = 
M
~
M
~
TM
~
 = 
1
50







6
9
12
15
18
51
175
 = 
1
34







14
21
28
35
42
                      (9.6)                     
 
Hence, the beta for the first asset is 1 = 
14
34
  0.4118, the beta for the second 
asset is 2 = 
21
34
  0.6176, and so on.  Moreover, there is a perfect linear 
relationship between the vector of average returns, 
~
, and the vector of betas, 

~
, on which the example is based, or: 
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                                     
~
 = 







0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
0.30
 = 
17
70

1
34







14
21
28
35
42
 = M~
                    (9.7) 
 
Hence, if one desires to “prove” that beta is a “sufficient statistic” for the 
determination of risky asset average returns then one can leave the analysis 
here and go no further.  A simple least squares regression will show that there 
is a perfect linear relationship between the average returns and betas based 
on the orthogonal portfolio.  In other words, beta will be a sufficient statistic for 
asset returns provided betas are based on an index portfolio that falls on the 
Markowitz efficient frontier (that is, an orthogonal portfolio).  Other factors, 
such as firm size and the book to market ratio for equity, will add nothing to a 
regression based on these two variables.  If, however, one wants to follow 
Fama and French (1992, 1993, 1995, 1996) in building a pricing formula in 
which firm size, the book to market ratio or some other combination of 
variables can be viewed as instrumental in determining asset prices then we 
now demonstrate how one can do this by basing the calculation of betas on 
an alternative and generally inefficient index portfolio; that is, an index 
portfolio that does not fall on the Markowitz efficient frontier.   
9.3 The Fama and French Asset Pricing Model 
 
We illustrate the procedures which can be used to build a Fama and French 
(1992, 1993, 1995, 1996) Asset Pricing Model by using results summarised in 
the previous section to determine the set of generally inefficient index 
portfolios, 
~
, which have the same average return, M = 
17
70
, as the orthogonal 
portfolio, M
~
, defined above, namely:  
 
    
~
 = M
~
 + 
j=1
3
 jk~j
 = 
1
35







1
4
7
10
13
 + 1







1
-2
1
0
0
 + 2







2
-3
0
1
0
 + 3







3
-4
0
0
1
       (9.8)  
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where 1, 2 and 3 are parameters which vary over the real line.
4  One can 
then use this expression to determine the betas, b
~
, implied by these inefficient 
index portfolios, namely: 
 
       b
~
 =  

~

~
T
~
 =  
1
50







6
9
12
15
18
 + 1







0.7
-1.4
0.7
0
0
 + 2







1.4
-2.1
0
0.7
0
 + 3







2.1
-2.8
0
0
0.7
51
175
 + 
21
5

2
1 + 
49
5

2
2 + 
91
5

2
3 + 
56
5
12 + 
77
5
13 + 
126
5
23
    
                                                                                                                         (9.9)          
 
Note that if one sets the three parameters 1, 2 and 3 all to zero then the 
betas will be those obtained earlier for the orthogonal portfolio M
~
, and there 
will be a perfect linear relationship between the betas and the average 
returns. 5  When, however, any of 1, 2 and 3  assume values other than zero 
                                                          
4
 One can use the Gram-Schmidt orthogonalisation procedure to determine an orthogonal 
basis for the proportionate investments vectors on which the inefficient index portfolios given 
here are based (Lipschutz, 1974, pp. 283-284).  Inefficient index portfolios may then be 
determined from the following alternative expression:  
 

~
 = M
~
 + 
j=1
3
 
j
k
~j
 = 
1
35






1
4
7
10
13
 + 
1






0.05
-0.1
0.05
0
0
 + 
2






0.1
-0.05
-0.2
0.15
0
 + 
3






0.05
0
-0.05
-0.1
0.1
 
 
where 
1
, 
2
 and 
3
 are again parameters that vary over the real line.  The proportionate 
investments portfolios in this expression are orthogonal by which we mean k
~
T
i .k~j
 = 0 for 
integral i and j and provided i  j.  Stating inefficient index portfolios in terms of orthogonal 
proportionate investments portfolios has distinct computational advantages over the 
expression for the inefficient index portfolios summarised in the text. 
 
5
 One can use the orthogonal proportionate investments portfolios summarised earlier to state 
the betas implied by the inefficient index portfolios in the simpler form:  
 
b
~
 = 
1
50






6
9
12
15
18
 + 
1






4.9
-9.8
4.9
0
0
 + 
2






9.8
-4.9
-19.6
14.7
0
 + 
3






4.9
0
-4.9
-9.8
9.8
51
175
 + 
1029
5

2
1 + 1029
2
2 + 343
2
3
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there is no longer a perfect relationship between the asset betas and their 
average returns.  Moreover, prior analysis shows that the relationship 
between the error vector, e
~
, and betas based on the orthogonal portfolio, 
~
, 
and betas based on inefficient index portfolio, b
~
, will be as follows: 
 
                                                             
1
M
.e
~
 = 
~
 - b
~
                                     (9.10)              
 
where M =  is the common average return on the orthogonal and inefficient 
index portfolios.  One can substitute equations (9.6) and (9.9) into this 
expression and thereby show that for the five asset example considered here 
the components of the error vector, e
~
, will be: 
 
70
17








e1
e2
e3
e4
e5
 = 
1
34







14
21
28
35
42
 – 
1
50







6
9
12
15
18
 + 1







0.7
-1.4
0.7
0
0
 + 2







1.4
-2.1
0
0.7
0
 + 3







2.1
-2.8
0
0
0.7
51
175
 + 
21
5

2
1 + 
49
5

2
2 + 
91
5

2
3 + 
56
5
12 + 
77
5
13 + 
126
5
23
 
                                                                                                                         (9.11) 
 
It is important to note that the error expression given here is based on five 
equations but that there are eight unknowns – namely; the components of the 
error vector, e1, e2, e3, e4, e5, and the three parameters 1, 2 and 3, which 
characterise the inefficient index portfolio.  Hence, three of these eight 
variables can be specified so as to satisfy exogenously specified criteria.  
More generally, if the analysis is based on n assets then (n - 2) elements of 
the error vector, e
~
, can be exogenously specified before the inefficient index 
portfolio on which the asset pricing formula is to be based is determined.  If, 
                                                                                                                                                                      
where, as previously, 
1
, 
2
 and 
3
 are parameters which vary over the real line.  Note that the 
cross product terms (
1

2
, 
1

3
, 
2

3
) associated with the parameters in the denominator of the 
expression summarised in the text all disappear when an orthogonal basis is used for the 
proportionate investments portfolios.  This simplifies both the calculations made here as well 
as those which follow. 
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for example, the researcher determines that firm size and the book to market 
ratio are to be important factors in the asset pricing process, then he can 
specify numerical values for any (n - 2) elements of the error vector so that 
they accommodate this hypothesis perfectly.  There will then be a perfect 
linear relationship between the average returns for the (n - 2) firms for which 
the elements of the error vector have been specified and the factors (beta, 
firm size, book to market ratio, etc.) the researcher stipulates are to be 
important in the asset pricing process.  Moreover, since large samples typify 
the empirical research of the area (Fama and French, 1992, 1993, 1995, 
1996), the two firms for which there will be an inexact relationship can have 
only a minor impact on the analysis and can safely be discarded from any 
subsequent work based on the sample.  
 
One can further illustrate the principles developed here by supposing an 
empirical researcher wants to determine an Fama and French (1992, 1993, 
1995, 1996) asset pricing formula in which a firm’s liquidity is viewed as a 
significant determinant of the return that accrues to its equity holders.  We 
measure liquidity by the (natural) logarithm of the firm’s current ratio (current 
assets divided by current liabilities) and the researcher has specified that the 
coefficient associated with the liquidity variable in an Fama and French (1992, 
1993, 1995, 1996) Asset Pricing Model is to be as close to five as possible.  
Prior analysis shows that the researcher will be able to determine an 
inefficient index portfolio with betas that when taken in conjunction with the 
asset liquidity measures will have a perfect linear relationship with the 
average return earned by (n - 2) = 3 of the n = 5 assets on which the analysis 
is based.6  One can illustrate the principles involved by supposing the 
empirical researcher determines the logarithm of the current ratio for the third, 
fourth and fifth firms and summarises them in the following vector: 
 
                                                          
6
 This result has the important implication that the Fama and French (1993) three factor model 
can in general only have a perfect linear relationship with the average returns of (n - 2) of the 
n assets on which the estimation procedures are based.  In other words the Fama and French 
(1993) three factor model can only have a perfect linear relationship for all n assets when the 
two endogenous components of the error vector, e
~
, happen “by chance” to be equal to the 
exogenous values for these variables. 
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                                       c
~
 = 








c1
c2
c3
c4
c5
 =  
1
26300






c1
c2
-53
125
-37
                    (9.12) 
 
Thus, the logarithm of the current ratio for the third, fourth and fifth firms are 
c3 =  
-53
26300
, c4 = 
125
26300
 and c5 = 
-37
26300
, respectively.  Now here it will be 
recalled that the researcher wants a coefficient of five (5) to be associated 
with the logarithm of the current ratio in an empirically determined Fama and 
French (1992, 1993, 1995, 1996) asset pricing formula which relates betas 
and the logarithm of the current ratio to asset average returns.  Given this, the 
researcher will need to determine the inefficient index portfolio which leads to 
the following error vector:  
 
                                              e
~
 = 5c
~
 =  
1
5260






e1
e2
-53
125
-37
                        (9.13) 
 
One can substitute this latter vector into equation (9.11) and thereby 
determine the five unknowns using a numerical procedure such as the 
Newton-Raphson technique (Carnahan, Luther and Wilkes, 1969, p. 319).  
This procedure shows that 1 = 
1
35
, 2 = - 
1
35
, 3 = 
1
35
, e1 = 
-154
5260
 and e2 = 
279
5260
 
will lead to betas which return an error vector with the desired components.  
Substituting the computed values for 1, 2 and 3 into equation (9.8) shows 
that the inefficient index portfolio which will lead to betas that are compatible 
with the error vector (9.13) will be: 
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              
~
 = 
1
35







1
4
7
10
13
 + 
1
35







1
-2
1
0
0
 – 
1
35







2
-3
0
1
0
 + 
1
35







3
-4
0
0
1
 = 
1
35







3
1
8
9
14
                                                 
                                                                                                        
(9.14)                                                                  
 
This in turn means the inefficient index portfolio is comprised of an 1 = 
3
35
 
proportionate investment in the first asset, an 2 = 
1
35
 proportionate 
investment in the second asset and so on.  This will also mean that the betas 
for this inefficient index portfolio will be: 
 
                                                 b
~
 = 

~

~
T
~
 = 
1
526







280
210
455
490
665
                             (9.15) 
 
Hence, the beta based on the inefficient index portfolio for the first asset is 
b1 = 
280
526
  0.5323, the beta for the second asset is b2 = 
210
526
  0.3992 and so 
on.  As expected, the linear relationship between the average returns and 
betas predicted by the CAPM breaks down when betas are based on the 
inefficient index portfolio detailed here.  Indeed, the vector of errors that arise 
from basing the calculation of betas on the inefficient index portfolio turns out 
to be: 
 
                 e
~
 = 
~
 –  Mb~
 = 







0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
0.30
 – 
17
70

1
526







280
210
455
490
665
 = 
1
5260







-154
279
-53
125
-37
   0
~
    
                                                                                                              (9.16) 
 
Thus, the error in the CAPM associated with the first asset is e1 = 
-154
5260
 whilst 
the error associated with the second asset is e2 = 
279
5260
.  More important, 
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however, is that the errors associated with the third (e3 = 
-53
5260
), fourth 
(e4 = 
-125
5260
) and fifth (e5 = 
-37
5260
) assets are exactly five times the logarithm of 
the given firm’s current ratio as summarised in the vector (9.13).  Here it will 
be recalled that this is no coincidence as the index portfolio on which the 
calculation of betas is based was deliberately designed to return a perfect 
linear relationship between the average return, beta and logarithm of the 
current ratio for all but the first two firms on which the example is based.  
Thus, one can use the third, fourth and fifth elements of the vector of betas 
(9.15) and the logarithm of the current ratios (9.12) to confirm that there is a 
perfect linear relationship between the average return, beta and the liquidity 
measures for the affected firms, namely:   
 
   





3
4
5
 = 




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
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
-53
125
-37
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




b3
b4
b5
 + 5





c3
c4
c5
 
                                   
                                                                                                             (9.17) 
 
There is of course nothing unique about the Fama and French (1992, 1993, 
1995, 1996) asset pricing formula determined here.  If, for whatever reason, 
the empirical researcher needs liquidity to play an even more important rôle in 
the returns generating process then he could increase the coefficient 
associated with the liquidity variable in the error vector (9.13) and then 
determine the inefficient index portfolio which returns betas which are 
compatible with the existence of a perfect linear relationship between the 
average returns, betas and the revised and more prominent liquidity 
measures.  Alternatively, if the researcher wants to show that other variables, 
such as firm size and/or the book to market ratio for equity are important in the 
asset pricing process then he can fix the coefficients associated with the 
vectors summarising these two variables at the desired levels and thereby 
determine the error vector which needs to be substituted into equation (9.11).  
The researcher can then solve equation (9.11) and in so doing determine the 
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inefficient index portfolio that leads to a set of betas which when taken in 
conjunction with the vectors summarising firm size and the book to market 
ratio, will have a perfect linear relationship with the average returns vector.  
9.4 Summary and Conclusions 
 
There are several lessons to be taken from our analysis of the Fama and 
French (1992, 1993, 1995, 1996) Asset Pricing Model given in this chapter.  
The first is that one has to be very careful about the index portfolio on which 
the calculation of betas is based.  In particular, if the index portfolio does not 
fall on the Markowitz efficient frontier, then it is easy to come to the potentially 
false conclusion that the CAPM provides an inadequate description of the 
way risky asset prices are determined.  Here it is important to note that even 
when the CAPM is descriptively true it will nonetheless always be possible to 
determine an inefficient index portfolio that leads to a Fama and French 
(1992, 1993, 1995, 1996) Asset Pricing Model which also appears to provide 
an adequate description of the way that risky asset prices are determined.  In 
other words, even when there is a perfect linear relationship between asset 
betas and their expected returns, it will still be the case that one can base the 
calculation of betas on an inefficient index portfolio which when taken in 
conjunction with other determining factors (such as the book to market ratio 
and firm size) leads to a Fama and French (1992, 1993, 1995, 1996) Asset 
Pricing Model which also appears to provide a very good description of the 
way that risky asset prices are determined.   
 
One can give a simple example of this by noting that it will always be possible 
to determine the Markowitz efficient frontier corresponding to an asset 
average returns vector, 
~
, and the variance-covariance matrix, , associated 
with it.  One can then use an arbitrary (that is, orthogonal) portfolio that lies on 
the Markowitz locus as the basis for determining the asset betas.  These 
asset betas will be perfectly correlated (that is, have a perfect linear 
relationship) with the asset average returns.  In other words, the book to 
market ratio and size variables which are so instrumental in the Fama and 
French (1992, 1993, 1995, 1996) Asset Pricing Model, will have no rôle to 
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play in determining the asset average returns if one adopts this particular 
procedure for determining betas.  Thus, if one can always find an index 
portfolio for which the betas will have a perfect linear relationship with the 
asset average returns, what can be (or is) proved by showing that the book to 
market ratio and size plug the gap in the returns process if one mistakenly 
chooses an inefficient index portfolio on which to base the calculation of asset 
betas?  It is this which explains my unwillingness to apply the Fama and 
French (1992, 1993, 1995, 1996) Asset Pricing Model in my empirical work 
dealing with Chinese M&A activities. 
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CHAPTER TEN 
 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
 
We began this dissertation by noting in chapter one how the Chinese 
economy has experienced a prolonged period of rapid expansion with a 
growth rate in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) which far exceeds that of most 
western economies (Prasad, 2004).  We also noted how the vibrancy of the 
Chinese economy has attracted significant investment from both domestic 
firms and virtually every advanced industrialised country in the world (Fei, 
2004).  In particular, the Chinese government has actively encouraged 
Chinese firms to initiate foreign acquisition and merger (M&A) activities – 
especially in relation to western corporations - in order to strengthen Chinese 
capital markets and also, to act as a conduit for technological and managerial 
expertise transfer.  This in turn has fuelled the development of M&A activities 
in China, especially in relation to foreign acquisitions (Fei, 2004).  
Unfortunately, relatively little research has been conducted into the impact that 
M&A activities can have on the Chinese economy.  Moreover, such empirical 
work as has been conducted on Chinese M&A activities is naïve and relatively 
unsophisticated.  Given this, our principal objective in this dissertation has 
been to conduct a deep and thorough empirical analysis of Chinese M&A 
activities and of their impact on the Chinese economy.   
 
Chapter one provides a brief introduction to the dissertation and in particular, 
summarises the principal results obtained from the empirical work that was 
conducted for this dissertation on Chinese M&A activities.  Chapter two then 
goes on to briefly summarise the literature relating to M&A activities both for 
the western and Chinese economies.  Our analysis in this chapter shows that 
there are very few studies that have undertaken an empirical analysis of the 
important issues that arise in Chinese M&A activities.  Thus, in order to bridge 
this gap in the Chinese literature, I undertook a series of empirical and other 
analyses on a range of important issues dealing with issues that arise in 
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Chinese M &A activities.  Particular issues considered in this dissertation 
include: the wealth effects of the varying motivations for takeovers on the 
shareholders of Chinese acquiring and target firms; the impact that different 
modes of consideration have on shareholder wealth for both Chinese 
acquiring and target firms; the effect that hostile as against friendly takeovers 
can have on shareholder wealth for both Chinese acquiring and target firms, 
etc.  Furthermore, I also note that the empirical work conducted on Chinese 
M&A activities often employs an accounting (book) based methodology rather 
than the market model methodology which is invariably used in western 
empirical work.  In addition, I find that the empirical research conducted on 
Chinese M&A activities is often plagued by methodological and other errors.  
For example, empirical work on Chinese M&A activities is generally based on 
discrete returns (the price “today” less the price “yesterday” divided by the 
price “yesterday”) rather than the continuously compounded (or logarithmic) 
return.  Our empirical work on Chinese M&A activities is based exclusively on 
the continuously compounded return.1  Most importantly, I employed an 
hitherto unused non-parametric testing procedure in my empirical work to 
assess the significance of the abnormal returns which accrue to the 
shareholders of acquiring and target firms involved in Chinese M&A activities.  
 
Chapter three of the dissertation deals primarily with the laws and regulations 
governing M&A activities in China.  We begin our analysis in this chapter by 
briefly summarising the development of China’s securities markets; this 
includes an introduction to China’s main stock exchanges together with their 
listing requirements and distinctive characteristics.  Probably the most 
important distinguishing characteristic of the two mainland Chinese stock 
markets is that traded shares are comprised of A shares and B shares.  The 
reason behind the division between A shares and B shares is that the Chinese 
government has implemented a policy of limiting the amount of the RMB 
(Yuan) which can leave the country in order to preserve the nation’s foreign 
currency reserves.  This in turn means that a distinction has had to be drawn 
                                                        
1
 For a detailed exposition of the dangers that can arise from basing empirical analysis on 
discretely calculated (rather than continuously compounded) returns see chapter one of the 
text by Davidson and Tippett (2012). 
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between foreign investors and Chinese national investors; in particular, until 
recently and with rare exceptions only Chinese citizens have been allowed to 
hold A shares whilst foreign investors have generally been limited to holding B 
shares.  Another important characteristic of the two mainland Chinese stock 
markets is that the majority of A shares in most listed Chinese firms are 
controlled by the Chinese government or its instrumentalities.  A shares 
controlled by the government are called state-owned shares and until recently, 
could not be traded on any of the Chinese mainland stock exchanges.  
However, in April, 2005, the Chinese government began implementing a 
reform programme called “GuQuan Fenzhi Gaige” (Shareholding Structure 
Reform) under which non-tradable A shares will be gradually converted into 
tradable shares.  But the conversion process will be slow and cumbersome 
and it will take many years for it to be fully implemented.  Furthermore, this 
distinction between A and B shares points to some of the unique 
characteristics that determine the laws regulating M&A activities in China and 
of how they are different from the “equivalent” laws in most western countries. 
 
The most important laws and regulations governing mergers and acquisitions 
in China are the Takeover Measures, 2006, the Anti-Monopoly Law, 2008, the 
Declaration Thresholds which supplement the Anti-Monopoly Law, 2008, and 
finally, the Provisions on Mergers and Acquisitions of a Domestic Enterprise 
by Foreign Investors, 2009 (otherwise known as the Foreign M & A Provisions, 
2009).  The Takeover Measures, 2006 cover such areas as the mandated bid 
rules, tender offer rules, the disclosure of substantial shareholdings and the 
defence mechanisms which may be mounted against takeovers and mergers, 
etc.  The Anti-Monopoly Law, 2008 details the mandatory pre-merger and 
acquisition notification process, the investigation procedures that are to be 
used by the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) and other government 
instrumentalities and the procedures MOFCOM must use for promulgating its 
decisions, etc.  The Foreign M & A Provisions, 2009 specify inter alia the 
regulations which govern share swap transactions by foreign investors 
merging with or acquiring Chinese domestic firms and the regulations which 
apply to Special Purpose Companies (SPC).  We conclude this chapter with 
the observation that the Anti-Monopoly Law, 2008, the Foreign M & A 
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Provisions, 2009 and the Takeover Measures, 2006 have made China’s M&A 
legal framework more complete, mature and importantly, more in compatible 
with best international practices and norms.   
 
Our principal objective in chapter four has been to assess the significance of 
the abnormal returns earned by target firms involved in Chinese M&A 
activities.  In particular, we employ nonparametric testing procedures in order 
to enhance the robustness of our empirical analysis.  A significant difficulty 
here, however, is that the standard nonparametric testing procedures in the 
area – of which Corrado (1989) is probably the best exemplar – have only 
limited power in comparison to the traditionally employed parametric “t” tests.  
We address this issue by modifying the Corrado (1989) test so as to increase 
its power relative to the benchmark Patell (1976) “t” test.  In particular, we 
employ a consistent estimator for the variance of the ranks of abnormal 
security returns and then use this consistent estimator to obtain an exact 
closed form expression for the Corrado (1989) test statistic.  This simplifies 
the computational procedures behind the Corrado (1989) test considerably – 
to the point where they can be implemented using only a hand held calculator.  
Moreover, we also extend the original Corrado (1989) analysis by determining 
the distributional properties of the sum of the ranks of the individual abnormal 
returns over a given event window.  We apply both the original Corrado (1989) 
test and our modification of it to data on Chinese target firms involved in M&A 
activities occurring over the period from 1 January, 1990 until 31 December, 
2008.  Our empirical analysis shows that there are significant abnormal 
returns around the takeover announcement date for the Chinese target firms – 
although a significant proportion of these abnormal returns decay away within 
a few weeks following the takeover announcement.  Moreover, our 
modification of the original Corrado (1989) test shows significantly more 
power in detecting these abnormal returns than the original Corrado (1989) 
test itself.  Indeed, the modified Corrado test employed in our empirical 
analysis has almost the same power as the Patell (1976) “t” test but has the 
distinct advantage of not being based on the assumption of normally 
distributed returns (Harris and Küçüközmen , 2001; Ashton and Tippett, 2006). 
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In chapter five we turn to a detailed analysis of the wealth effects that M&A 
activities have for the holders of B and H shares in Chinese target firms.  We 
begin the chapter by explaining how the data was selected on which our 
empirical analysis of B and H shares of Chinese target firms is based.  We 
then discuss the methodology used to calculate the abnormal returns which 
arise on the of B and H shares of Chinese target firms comprising our sample 
as well as the statistical methodology used to assess the significance of these 
abnormal returns.  We then turn the focus of our attention to the wealth effects 
that M&A activities have for the holders of B shares and H shares in Chinese 
target firms, respectively.  Our general conclusion is that whilst there are 
positive abnormal returns around the takeover announcement date for the 
holders of B shares in Chinese target firms, they tend to be of marginal 
significance at best.  In contrast, the abnormal returns around the takeover 
announcement date for the holders of H shares tend to be larger than those 
for B shares.  Furthermore, the abnormal returns for H shares around the 
takeover announcement date tend to be statistically significant at any 
reasonable level, irrespective of whether one employs the Patell (1976) “t” 
test, the Corrado (1989) rank test or the modified Corrado test.  However, our 
sample of H shares is small and possibly, not representative of the wider 
Chinese securities market.   
 
The sixth chapter of this dissertation provides a detailed analysis of the wealth 
effects of M&A activities for the shareholders of Chinese acquiring firms.  We 
begin the chapter by explaining how the data on which our empirical analysis 
of Chinese acquiring firms was selected.  We then outline and discuss the 
methodology used to calculate the abnormal returns which arise on the 
Chinese acquiring firms comprising our sample as well as the statistical 
methodology used to assess the significance of these abnormal returns.  We 
assess the significance of the abnormal returns obtained for our sample of 
Chinese acquiring firms by using the Patell (1976) “t” test, the Corrado (1989) 
rank test and my modification of the Corrado (1989) rank test.  The empirical 
analysis of Chinese acquiring firms summarised in the current chapter 
confirms previous results (as in chapter 4 for target firms) that the modified 
Corrado test provides a much more robust statistic for isolating the 
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significance of abnormal returns than both the Patell (1976) “t” test and the 
original Corrado (1989) test.  We then move on to provide a detailed analysis 
of the empirical results obtained on the wealth effects that Chinese M&A 
activities have for the holders of A shares, B shares and H shares in Chinese 
acquiring firms, respectively.  Our empirical results in this section of chapter 
six show that the shareholders of Chinese acquiring firms obtain virtually no 
economic benefits from their M&A activities.  In this respect our results for 
Chinese acquiring firms are very similar to those obtained by researchers for 
western acquiring firms, although there are some important differences.  In 
particular, there appear to be statistically significant abnormal returns for the 
shareholders of Chinese acquiring firms around the first public announcement 
of the takeover but these generally decay away over the next ten to fifteen 
trading days thereby leaving the shareholders of acquiring firms with no 
significant benefits from the M&A activities.  We provide some possible 
explanations for this phenomenon by linking our empirical results with the 
Chinese political, economic and capital systems which are fundamentally 
different from those of the western economies.   
 
We then move on to chapter seven which provides a detailed analysis of the 
economic benefits which accrue to the shareholders of Chinese target firms as 
a result of using cash as against alternative modes of consideration (issue of 
shares in the acquiring firm, transfer of assets from the acquiring to the target 
firm, the repayment of the target firm’s debt, etc. and mixtures thereof) in the 
takeover process.  The chapter begins by explaining how the sample of target 
firms employed in our empirical analysis was selected.  The economic benefits 
which accrue to Chinese target firms when cash is used as the sole mode of 
consideration are then compared with the economic benefits which accrue to 
target firms when the consideration is other than purely in cash.  The relevant 
economic benefits are measured in terms of the average abnormal returns 
(AARs) and the cumulative average abnormal returns (CAARs) on the equity 
stock of the given firms.  In particular, the Patell (1976) “t” test, the original 
Corrado (1989) rank test and the modified Corrado (1989) test are employed 
to evaluate and compare the AARs and CAARs for Chinese target firms where 
the consideration is solely in cash as against Chinese target firms where the 
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consideration is other than purely in cash.  We find that that the Patell “t” 
(1976) test is the most powerful of the three tests employed but also, that the 
modified Corrado test has significantly more power than the original rank test 
proposed by Corrado (1989).  All three tests show that when the mode of 
consideration is solely in cash the AARs and CAARs which accrue to the 
shareholders of Chinese target firms around the takeover announcement date 
are positive and significantly different from zero.  One can also compare these 
results with those obtained for target firms where the takeover consideration is 
other than purely in cash.  These show that irrespective of which test statistic 
is used our empirical analysis is compatible with the hypothesis that there are 
no economic benefits (and indeed, probably economic losses) for the 
shareholders of Chinese target firms when the consideration for the takeover 
is other than purely in cash.  
 
Chapter eight of this dissertation provides a detailed analysis of the economic 
benefits which accrue to the shareholders of Chinese acquiring firms as a 
result of using cash as against alternative modes of consideration (issue of 
shares in the acquiring firm, transfer of assets from the acquiring to the target 
firm, the repayment of the target firm’s debt, etc. and mixtures thereof) in their 
M&A activities.  Economic benefits are again measured in terms of the AARs 
and the CAARs that accrue to the shareholders of Chinese acquiring firms 
when the consideration is solely in cash as against when alternative modes of 
consideration are employed.  Our analysis shows that the AARs and CAARs 
that accrue to the shareholders of Chinese acquiring firms when alternative 
modes of consideration are used are positive and significantly different from 
zero in a statistical sense.  In contrast, the economic benefits for shareholders 
of Chinese acquiring firms when cash is used as the sole mode of 
consideration tend to be insignificantly different from zero and occasionally, 
negative.  We then outline some potential reasons as to why the economic 
benefits that accrue to the shareholders of Chinese acquiring firms appear to 
be larger when alternative modes of consideration are used in preference to 
cash.  The first reason stems from the fact that in China a capital gains tax of 
20% must be paid immediately by the target firm’s shareholders when cash is 
used to finance the takeover.  In contrast, when alternative modes of 
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consideration are used, it is normally possible to defer the payment of capital 
gains tax until a date that is far into the distant future.  Second, the information 
asymmetries that arise in the takeover process may lead acquiring firms to 
offer stock rather than cash for the proposed takeover, especially when the 
acquiring firm knows that its shares are over-valued on the stock market.  The 
difference between the stock market value of the acquiring firm’s shares and 
their intrinsic value will lower the implicit cost of the takeover and thereby 
increase the economic benefits that accrue to the shareholders of the 
acquiring firm.  These considerations when taken in conjunction with our 
empirical analysis show that Chinese acquiring firms ought to employ 
alternative modes of consideration if they are to maximise the economic 
benefits that accrue to their shareholders from their M&A activities.   
 
In chapter nine we note how in recent years several authors have suggested 
that the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) has serious deficiencies and that 
these deficiencies flow through to the market model on which much of our 
empirical analysis is based (Ashton and Tippett, 1998; Roll, 1977; Roll, 1978).  
We note how in response to this Fama and French (1992, 1993, 1995, 1996) 
have formulated an asset pricing model which allegedly addresses the 
deficiencies of the market model and therefore, which should be used in 
preference to the market model for isolating the abnormal returns which 
accrue in event studies of the kind employed in this dissertation.  Our analysis 
in this chapter shows, however, that the Fama and French Asset Pricing 
Model (1992, 1993, 1995, 1996) will have to be based on an index portfolio 
which does not fall on the Markowitz locus and that because of this, it is easy 
to come to the potentially false conclusion that the CAPM provides an 
inadequate description of the way risky asset prices are determined in 
practice.  In other words, even when the CAPM is descriptively true it will 
nonetheless always be possible to determine an inefficient index portfolio that 
leads to a Fama and French Asset Pricing Model (1992, 1993, 1995, 1996) 
which also appears to provide an adequate description of the way that risky 
asset prices are determined.  However, the abnormal returns obtained from 
the empirically determined Fama and French Asset Pricing Model (1992, 
1993, 1995, 1996) will be different (and invariably substantially so) from those 
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obtained under the (descriptively true) CAPM.  Since all scientific theories 
have to be potentially falsifiable this will mean that the Fama and French 
Asset Pricing Model (1992, 1993, 1995, 1996) can never form the basis of a 
scientific theory of the asset pricing process (Popper, 1963, p. 36).  Given this, 
we have elected to base our analysis on the CAPM and its empirical 
counterpart – namely, the market model – since this procedure suffers from 
fewer theoretical deficiencies when compared to using the Fama and French 
Asset Pricing Model to isolate the abnormal returns associated with Chinese 
firms involved in M&A activities. 2 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                        
2
 Many of the analytical results summarised in chapter nine are based on an article entitled 
“Constructing Asset Pricing Models with Specific Factor Loadings” that is jointly written by Ian 
Davidson, Qian Guo, Xiaojing Song and Mark Tippett and which is forthcoming in the journal 
Abacus.  
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